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Abstract 
 
 
ENERGY LANDSCAPES: COAL CANALS, OIL PIPELINES, AND ELECTRICITY 
TRANSMISSION WIRES IN THE MID-ATLANTIC, 1820-1930 
Christopher Jones 
Ruth Schwartz Cowan 
Coal canals, oil pipelines, and electricity transmission wires transformed the built 
environment of the American mid-Atlantic region between 1820 and 1930.  By 
transporting coal, oil, and electrons cheaply, reliably, and in great quantities, these 
technologies reshaped the energy choices available to mid-Atlantic residents.  In 
particular, canals, pipelines, and wires created new energy landscapes: systems of 
transport infrastructure that enabled the ever-increasing consumption of fossil fuels.   
 Energy Landscapes integrates history of technology, environmental history, and 
business history to provide new perspectives on how Americans began to use fossil fuels 
and the social implications of these practices.  First, I argue that the development of 
transport infrastructure played critical, and underappreciated, roles in shaping social 
energy choices.  Rather than simply responding passively to the needs of producers and 
consumers, canals, pipelines, and wires structured how, when, where, and in what 
quantities energy was used.  Second, I analyze the ways fossil fuel consumption 
transformed the society, economy, and environment of the mid-Atlantic.  I link the 
consumption of coal, oil, and electricity to the development of an urban and 
industrialized region, the transition from an organic to a mineral economy, and the 
creation of a society dependent on fossil fuel energy. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Coal canals, oil pipelines, and electricity transmission wires transformed the built 
environment of the American mid-Atlantic between 1820 and 1930.  By connecting rural 
sites of energy abundance with urban consumption centers, canals, pipelines, and wires 
created new energy landscapes: infrastructure networks that enabled fossil fuel energy to 
be transported cheaply, reliably, and abundantly.  The ever-increasing consumption of 
coal, oil, and electricity made possible by these technologies, in turn, led to the 
development of an urban and industrialized region, the transition from an organic to a 
mineral economy, and the creation of a society dependent on fossil fuel energy. 
Consider the difference between life in the mid-Atlantic in 1820 and in 1930.  In 
1820, most people in the mid-Atlantic lived in rural areas and worked on farms.  
Philadelphia and New York City, the region’s leading cities, were commercial trade 
centers with tens of thousands of residents.  Manufacturing was a small part of the overall 
economy, mostly clustered in areas where falling streams powered mills and machinery.  
Muscles—human and animal—supplied most of the society’s energy needs while 
firewood provided heat for homes, cooking, and industry.   
By 1930, most people in the mid-Atlantic lived in cities and many worked in 
factories.  Philadelphia and New York had grown into sprawling metropolitan centers 
with millions of residents.
1
  While agriculture and commerce remained important, 
industry was the most dynamic and rapidly growing sector of the economy.  The 
                                                
1
 In 1820, Philadelphia had 63,802 residents and New York City had a population of 125,706.  In 1930, 
Philadelphia had 1,950,961 residents and New York City had 6,930,446 people.  John Andriot, Population 
Abstract of the United States (McLean, Va.: Andriot Associates, 1980). 
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geography of industry had shifted as well; most factories were now located in large 
cities.  Mid-Atlantic residents used fossil fuels to heat their homes, power factories, 
transport goods, and travel between places.   
The cheap and abundant transport of coal, oil, and electricity by canals, pipelines, 
and wires structured these developments.  Moreover, the new energy practices that 
emerged between 1820 and 1930 shaped broad changes in the mid-Atlantic and the rest 
of the nation.  Urbanization created new living patterns and exacerbated class 
segregation.  Industrialization altered the experience of work for factory employees, 
transforming training patterns and skill sets, relations between workers and employees, 
and the organization of labor.  The rise of urban factories led to concentrated flows of 
people from Europe into New York and Philadelphia.  The proliferation of large 
corporations involved in the production and transport of fossil fuels influenced the 
nation’s political responses to the rise of monopoly capital.  Fossil fuels initiated new 
leisure practices including driving automobiles for pleasure and using electric 
technologies like phonographs and movie projectors.  In short, many aspects of how 
people lived, worked, and played were affected by the development of a fossil fuel-
intensive society in the mid-Atlantic.     
Energy Landscapes analyzes the energy history of the American mid-Atlantic 
from 1820 to 1930.  I link the development of transport technologies to the new energy 
practices they made possible and show how these changes impacted economic 
opportunities, residential living patterns, factory locations, and leisure activities.  
Ultimately, fossil fuels helped transform the mid-Atlantic region from a commercial and 
 3
agricultural node in a mercantile network into an urban and industrialized society at the 
heart of the United States’ emergence as a global military and economic superpower.   
In this work, I seek to contribute to debates about how Americans came to use 
new energy sources and the social implications of fossil fuel consumption.  Three aspects 
of my approach are particularly important.  First, I highlight the role of energy transport 
infrastructure.  Existing literature focuses on the production of energy and largely treats 
canals, pipelines, and wires as afterthoughts responding passively to the needs of 
producers and consumers.
2
  This view is too limited.  Energy Landscapes demonstrates 
that canals, pipelines, and wires structured how, when, where, and in what quantities 
mineral energy sources were used.  Decisions about where these technologies would be 
built, who would own them, and how they would be operated shaped the actions of 
energy producers and consumers, encouraged the widespread adoption of new energy 
sources, and redirected the development patterns of the entire region.  
Second, I use the concept of the shift from the organic to the mineral economy to 
analyze the social effects of new energy consumption practices.  This theoretical 
framework provides a particularly effective way to understand the broader implications 
of fossil fuel consumption and the energy history of the mid-Atlantic.  For example, it 
                                                
2
 No single work focuses on the transportation of coal, oil, and electricity in the mid-Atlantic.  In general, 
these industries have been studied separately and from the perspective of production.  Some of the better 
industry analyses touch on transport matters but do not make it their primary focus: Donald L. Miller and 
Richard E. Sharpless, The Kingdom of Coal: Work, Enterprise, and Ethnic Communities in the Mine Fields 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985); Harold Francis Williamson and Arnold Daum, The 
American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 
1959); Richard F. Hirsh, Technology and Transformation in the American Electric Utility Industry 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).  There is a much smaller literature that 
addresses the transport of individual energy sources: Chester Lloyd Jones, The Economic History of the 
Anthracite-Tidewater Canals (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1908); Arthur Menzies 
Johnson, "The Development of American Petroleum Pipelines: A Study in Private Enterprise and Public 
Policy, 1862-1906" (Thesis, Vanderbilt University.  Published for the American Historical Association by 
Cornell University Press, 1956); Thomas Parke Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western 
Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983). 
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illuminates the ways processes like urbanization and industrialization depend on energy 
transitions.  My research also enriches our understanding of this framework.  This is the 
first study to focus on the interrelationships between energy transport infrastructure and 
the development of the mineral economy.  Moreover, while this framework has been 
developed mainly through studies of Britain and to a certain extent Germany, I know of 
only one other study of organic and mineral economies in the American context.
3
    
Third, I focus on the mid-Atlantic, America’s first region to use fossil fuels 
intensively.  Mid-Atlantic residents pioneered the large-scale construction of transport 
infrastructure and the region’s boosters played crucial roles in establishing new energy 
consumption practices.  Over time, the patterns of the mid-Atlantic extended beyond its 
boundaries.  Many other regions saw the economic benefits of fossil fuel consumption 
and sought to emulate the example of the mid-Atlantic.  I also study the mid-Atlantic 
because there are methodological benefits to regional analysis.  The most important is 
that regions can provide a middle-level for analysis that strikes a balance between a unit 
that may be too unwieldy to examine in depth (such as the nation-state) and one that may 
be too local to produce insights that are broadly applicable (such as a particular 
community).  Regions offer the possibility of studying widespread energy practices while 
retaining a sense of local particularities.
4
   
 
 
                                                
3
 Thomas G. Andrews, Killing for Coal: America's Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2008). 
4
 Good examples of regional analyses include: William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the 
Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991); John C. Hudson, Making the Corn Belt: A Geographical 
History of Middle-Western Agriculture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Richard White, The 
Organic Machine (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995). 
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Thematics 
Transport Infrastructure & Energy Landscapes 
 Coal canals, oil pipelines, and electricity transmission wires are energy transport 
infrastructure systems that created new energy landscapes in the mid-Atlantic region 
between 1820 and 1930.  Let me unpack this statement by explaining what I mean by 
infrastructure and energy landscapes. 
 
Infrastructure 
 Infrastructure is a particular type of technology.  While historians of technology 
have devoted significant attention to large technical systems, there has been relatively 
little explicit analysis of the distinctive features of infrastructure.
5
  Although 
infrastructure may belong to the same family as other technologies, they are not members 
of the same genus.  In particular, infrastructure systems are highly capital-intensive, 
structure human activities according to their designs, last a long time, yet have a 
remarkable ability to remain socially invisible. 
 First, infrastructure projects are typically very expensive.  Canals built during the 
antebellum era were among the most capital-intensive undertakings of the time.  Oil 
pipelines and electricity transmission wires were somewhat cheaper comparatively, but 
still cost the equivalent of millions of dollars if the expenditures are adjusted to present-
day values.  The high cost of infrastructure has several implications.  Building 
                                                
5
 Examples of the large technical system literature include: Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in 
Western Society, 1880-1930; Arne Kaijser and Erik van der Vleuten, eds., Networking Europe: 
Transnational Infrastructures and the Shaping of Europe, 1850-2000 (Sagamore Beach, MA: Science 
History Publications, 2006).  One work studying infrastructure more explicitly is Paul N. Edwards, 
"Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and Social Organization in the History of Sociotechnical 
Systems," in Modernity and Technology, ed. Thomas J. Misa, Philip Brey, and Andrew Feenberg 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003). 
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infrastructure requires lots of investors and/or a large organization to pay for, construct, 
and manage the system.  In practice, this usually means that the state plays a prominent 
role by building the infrastructure itself or granting privileges like corporate charters and 
rights to land.  It is unlikely that small, decentralized efforts can produce infrastructure.  
In addition, the high capital costs of infrastructure create disincentives for the building of 
competing systems.  Once a society has invested significant resources into one type of 
infrastructure, it is much harder to justify the expense of a parallel or replacement system.  
In other words, a choice to do things one way usually initiates a path-dependent trajectory 
that is difficult to break.
6
   
Second, infrastructure systems encourage certain types of activity.  At the most 
basic level, infrastructure makes certain things easier to do.  Bruno Latour offers a few 
straightforward examples of how technologies shape people’s actions.
7
  He notes that 
people have a tendency to leave doors open when they exit a room and to drive without 
wearing a seatbelt.  One option for changing these unwanted behaviors is education: 
teaching people about opening and closing doors and wearing seatbelts.  However, this 
involves a lot of effort and there is no guarantee that it will work.  On the other hand, 
designing technologies that make it difficult to engage in these behaviors can be an easier 
and more effective strategy.  Self-closing doors and automatic seatbelts can alter 
unwanted behavior much more simply, because it means a person must exert more effort 
                                                
6
 Such transitions do happen—witness the transfer of coal from canals to railroads and crude oil from 
railroads to pipelines—but they are comparatively rare and require the significant allocation of resources. 
7
 Bruno Latour, "Where Are the Missing Masses?  The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts," in Shaping 
Technology / Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker and John Law 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992). 
 7 
not to shut the door or put on a seat belt.  People tend to take the path of least resistance, 
and technologies can make certain things easy and other things hard.
8
   
Infrastructure operates in this way, only at a much bigger scale.  This has 
important implications for our understanding of canals, pipelines, and wires.  Each of 
these technologies alters social energy practices by changing the path of least resistance.  
For example, without canals, it was difficult and expensive to ship anthracite coal from 
northeast Pennsylvania to Philadelphia.  It was easier and cheaper for residents of the 
Quaker City to use imported coal from Britain or firewood.  Once several canals were 
built, the cost of anthracite dropped dramatically and it could be delivered in large 
quantities.  This change in supply and price altered the social logic of coal consumption.  
By making coal cheap and abundant, canals made anthracite consumption the path of 
least resistance for Philadelphia’s residents.  Canals, pipelines, and wires, therefore, can 
have the consequence of encouraging the consumption of fossil fuels.   
Third, infrastructure is distinctive because of its durability.  Canals, pipelines, and 
wires are built to last a long time.  Therefore, these technologies are not only significant 
at the date of their completion; they will matter for the next several decades.  If a 
company builds an oil pipeline in year one, it is committing itself to transporting oil in 
year ten, twenty, thirty, and forty.  Since canals, pipelines, and wires also have the effect 
of encouraging the consumption of energy as seen above, the durability of infrastructure 
means that they reinforce these patterns for several decades.  
                                                
8
 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thayer have recently applied the logic of shaping outcomes through creating a 
path of least resistance to public policy more generally: Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: 
Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
 8 
Finally, infrastructure is remarkably invisible.  Infrastructure projects are 
typically massive, involve huge expenditures of capital, materials, and expertise, and 
transform the built environment.  Our daily lives are dependent upon the smooth 
operations of these systems, whether it is the transport networks that enable the flows of 
people and goods, sewage systems that remove and process our waste, or electrical grids 
that power everything from laptops to household appliances to security systems.  Life as 
we know it could not exist without infrastructure.  But despite the importance of 
infrastructure to society, it is not given the explicit level of attention by politicians, 
citizens, and scholars that it would seem to warrant.  Only in times of crisis—electricity 
blackouts or threats by Russia to cut off natural gas supplies to Europe—does public 
perception of infrastructure get heightened.  Once constructed, infrastructure tends to be 
quickly naturalized.  The fact that infrastructure derives comparatively little social notice 
is peculiar and worth studying further.   
 Collectively, these features of infrastructure indicate that canals, pipelines, and 
wires are capital-intensive technologies that encourage the consumption of fossil fuel 
energy over long periods of time in a relatively invisible manner.   
 
Energy Landscapes 
 I argue throughout this work that canals, pipelines, and wires created new energy 
landscapes: systems of energy transport infrastructure in action in a regional and social 
context.  Energy landscapes have several characteristics.  First, they have a physical 
dimension.  At base, an energy landscape includes an infrastructure system or systems 
(such as canals, pipelines, and wires) and the energy source or sources (such as wood, 
 9 
coal, or oil) to be transported.  Second, energy landscapes are rooted in particular places.  
They have a specific geography that includes some areas but not others.  Third, energy 
landscapes are dynamic systems based on the flow of energy resources.  Without flow, 
there is no energy landscape.  Finally, energy landscapes include the social context in 
which these systems operate.  A society’s economic, cultural, political, and 
environmental beliefs shape the ways energy landscapes function and their social effects.
9
  
I use the concept of energy landscapes to analyze transport infrastructure in a 
dynamic, regional, and social context.  I find it useful to think in terms of energy 
landscapes because it focuses our attention on issues that might get lost in the study of a 
single canal, pipeline, or wire, such as the synergistic properties of these networks, the 
geography of energy, and technologies in use.  In other words, thinking about energy 
landscapes helps us ask and answer new questions.    
 First, the concept of energy landscapes encourages us to analyze the collaborative 
effects of transport infrastructure systems.  When canals, pipelines, and wires have been 
studied, it has often been with an eye towards understanding the rivalries between 
competing shippers.  These conflicts are important, because they shape how these 
technologies are built and whom they benefit.
10
  However, an exclusive focus on inter-
corporate rivalries misses the synergistic effects of canals, pipes, and wires.  The owners 
                                                
9
 Although this dissertation discusses energy landscapes in the context of mineral economies, they are not 
limited to societies consuming fossil fuels.  The organic economy has energy landscapes as well—they just 
happen to have different technologies, energy sources, flow patterns, and regional scales, thereby 
establishing different relationships between humans and the environment. 
10
 Most of the literature on transport infrastructure, particularly from the perspective of business and 
economic history, emphasizes the rivalries between competing shippers.  In Chapters 1, 3, and 5, I draw on 
this literature because it is an important starting point for understanding these systems.  Detailed references 
to such works are available in these chapters.  A few examples include: Jones, The Economic History of the 
Anthracite-Tidewater Canals; Rolland Harper Maybee, Railroad Competition and the Oil Trade, 1855-
1873 (Mt. Pleasant, Mich.: The Extension Press, 1940); Johnson, "The Development of American 
Petroleum Pipelines: A Study in Private Enterprise and Public Policy, 1862-1906". 
 10 
of the companies that built these technologies all sought to increase energy demand by 
developing new applications for coal, oil, and electricity.  Consumers felt more confident 
switching to new energy sources when the presence of multiple shippers made the supply 
more regular.  The rivalries between the companies usually lowered the cost of energy to 
consumers, encouraging them to use more fossil fuels.  In other words, despite being 
financial competitors, rival shippers worked together—sometimes intentionally, 
sometimes not—to increase energy demand.  The synergistic effects of transport 
networks deserve at least as much attention as their competitive dynamics.     
 Second, thinking about energy landscapes draws our attention to the geography of 
energy transport and consumption.  Canals, pipelines, and wires made new forms of 
energy available to people, but only in specific places.  In the United States, residents of 
the mid-Atlantic reaped a disproportionate share of the benefits of fossil fuel energy in 
comparison with regions such as the South and West.  However, there were intra-regional 
differences as well.  Large eastern seaboard cities such as Philadelphia and New York 
gained the most from new energy supplies while the rural regions through which canals, 
pipelines, and wires shipped these goods benefited much less.  Studying energy 
landscapes suggests that we pay attention to the geographic distributions of energy’s 
costs and benefits.    
 Third, analyzing energy landscapes encourages us to study technological systems 
in action.  Examining energy flows, although rarely as exciting as studying striking 
miners, wildcatting drillers, or plundering oil magnates, focuses our attention on 
 11
technologies in use.
11
  Historians of technology have spent considerable effort over the 
last twenty years studying the invention and innovation stages of technological 
development but far less examining the social effects of technologies over their entire 
lifecycle.
12
  There has been an implicit assumption that the early stages are the most 
important and that the social consequences of technological systems emerge from the 
decisions of inventors and early adopters.  This is not necessarily the case.  Looking at 
the operations of canals, pipelines, and wires over time allows us to compare their effects 
over several decades and analyze new patterns.    
 
Organic Versus Mineral Economy 
 Canals, pipelines, and wires revolutionized the social energy practices of the mid-
Atlantic between 1820 and 1930.  They created energy landscapes capable of delivering 
ever-increasing amounts of fossil fuels, thereby facilitating the growth of an urban and 
industrial society.  In particular, energy transport infrastructure played a crucial role in 
initiating the shift from an organic to a mineral economy in the mid-Atlantic.      
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The framework of organic and mineral economies is a remarkably useful way 
of understanding how and why fossil fuel consumption has changed our world.
13
  Yet 
despite the compelling nature of these concepts, they have failed to gain wider traction 
beyond a small group of energy and environmental historians.
14
  This is unfortunate.  
Given the high political, economic, and environmental stakes associated with our current 
energy practices, we need good frameworks for analyzing and addressing these issues. 
 In the remainder of this section, I detail the concept of organic and mineral 
economies, drawing heavily on the demographer E. A. Wrigley and the environmental 
historian Rolf-Peter Sieferle.  I use this framework for three reasons.  First, the 
transformation from an organic to a mineral economy is a very effective way of 
understanding the energy transitions that occurred in the mid-Atlantic between 1820 and 
1930.  Second, I seek to enrich our understanding of this framework by applying it to the 
American context and highlighting the importance of energy transport infrastructure for 
the creation of mineral economies.  Third, I hope my use of these concepts encourages 
scholars, politicians, policy advocates, and citizens to consider the use of this framework 
in conceptualizing our energy challenges and developing solutions.    
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Let me begin by sketching out the main characteristics of an organic economy 
through the ideas of one of its most famous analysts.  Thomas Malthus was an English 
economist who lived and wrote in the decades surrounding the turn of the nineteenth 
century.  He is most famous for his “principle of population,” which states that if 
population increases geometrically while food production increases at an arithmetic rate, 
as was happening in Europe at the time, it will lead to decreased standards of living, 
famine, and/or war.  Malthus came to this pessimistic conclusion because he understood 
the deep connections between humans and the land.  Simply put, land was the source of 
all goods and wealth.  If you had a situation where you increased the number of humans 
without increasing the amount of land they inhabited, then per capita wealth would 
inevitably decline: “I say, that the power of population is indefinitely greater than the 
power in the earth to produce subsistence for man.”
15
  If population expanded enough, it 
would overtake the carrying capacity of the land. 
Why did land matter so much?  Malthus noted that human survival depended on 
at least four things: food, clothing, lodging, and fire.  In an organic economy, all of these 
goods come from the land, either through growing crops (arable land), raising animals 
(pasture land), or firewood (forest land).  Food comes from arable land (crops), pasture 
land (meat), and forest land (hunting and gathering).  So does clothing (arable land for 
growing plants, pasture land for wool and leather, or forest land for hides).  Lodging 
requires forest land either in the form of lumber for a house or firewood to operate kilns 
that produce bricks (even houses built of stone usually used significant amounts of wood 
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for support).  Fire for heating homes or cooking food requires land to grow 
combustible plant material.  In addition, most manufacturing enterprises require raw 
materials from the land.  Iron tools require iron ore and timber for charcoal.  Tanners and 
leather-goods manufactures require pasture land for cattle.  Brewing, distilling, salt-
making, and pottery all require forest land for heating resources.   
In a sparsely populated society, these constraints matter very little.  However, in a 
densely populated world, like Europe at the end of the eighteenth century, these 
constraints were very real.  Once the available land had been settled, increasing the 
output of one good meant having less of another.
16
  For example, increasing the supply of 
meat and wool required more pasture land, and therefore less arable or forest land for 
other purposes.  From Malthus’ perspective, it was only a matter of time before the 
dietary needs of an increasing population would require the reallocation of land towards 
food production, leaving less available for other purposes such as manufacturing.  In 
other words, the pie of goods would at best grow incrementally while the number of 
people requesting slices would grow much more quickly.  The result would be fewer and 
less satisfying slices of pie.  Because of its dependence on the carrying capacity of the 
land, the organic economy operated as a zero-sum game.     
Malthus was not the only one who saw the world this way.  Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo shared his pessimistic views on the limits to growth.
17
  In assessing the 
three factors of production—land, labor, and capital—they saw that the supply of land 
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could not be expanded.  It was therefore subject to the law of diminishing returns: 
coaxing more output from the land would require increasing the labor and/or capital 
inputs.  Each improvement to the land meant that the next improvement would require a 
greater amount of labor or capital to achieve.  Applied to the economy as a whole, this 
implied that while economic gain might be made in the short term—witness Smith’s 
parable of the pin-makers—the law of diminishing returns promised an eventual return to 
a stationary state.
18
  Every improvement made the next one harder.
19
  In modern terms, 
we would describe the constraints of the land as a negative feedback loop.
20
   
The structural relationships between land and society in an organic economy had 
important implications for energy practices.  First, all energy was derived from the flow 
of solar energy through the ecosystem.  Plants used photosynthesis to transform solar 
energy into food or combustible material, and the thermal energy of the sun created wind 
and rain patterns that could move boats and turn mill wheels on streams.  Second, 
humans got most of their energy from the land, as plant material to eat, to feed animals, 
or to burn.
21
  As a result, the carrying capacity of the land presented finite limits to 
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energy supply.  Once all the available land was being used at or near its capacity, there 
was no way to increase energy significantly.  Third, energy use was local.  There were 
significant barriers to transporting energy over long distances.
22
  The cost of firewood 
doubled every 2-4 kilometers it was shipped over land, while the energy from a water 
wheel could only be used within a very short distance from the river bank.
23
   
These features of energy supply in an organic economy influenced how and where 
people lived and worked.  First, because energy was local, energy-intensive enterprises 
needed to be established near abundant forests, falling streams, or rural areas with few 
competing demands for energy supply.  Cities, by contrast, were energy-poor due to the 
limited ability to import energy, multiple demands for energy supplies, and small 
amounts of land.  Agricultural communities tended to form at sites where there was 
enough water power available for mills.  Commercial societies congregated where river 
currents and ocean breezes made transport easier.  Finally, because of the local nature of 
energy availability, most communities had to be largely self-sufficient in terms of energy.  
It made little sense to talk of national trends when the cost of transporting firewood 
doubled every few miles and the power of streams was limited to particular places.  
Communities lived on their own islands of energy supply.
24
 
In an organic economy, societies faced finite limits to growth based on the 
carrying capacity of the land and the ability of humans to tap into the flow of solar 
energy.  Whether expressed through the concept of diminishing returns, the stationary 
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state, or negative feedback loops, the organic economy was not a world in which 
constant growth could or was expected to occur.  Growth was not impossible, but it was 
the exception rather than the norm, and the law of diminishing returns promised a return 
to the stationary state.  For example, the Netherlands achieved phenomenal commercial 
success in the seventeenth century by controlling much of Europe’s international trade 
and drawing on the land resources of other parts of the world.  However, once the Dutch 
could no longer increase their land holdings, their trade empire entered a period of 
decline.
25
  Limits were an inevitable part of the organic economy, lending credibility to 
the Malthusian worldview.   
As it turned out, the classical economists were wrong.  Not long after Malthus’s 
publication of his ideas, England, followed by other nations, entered a long period of 
sustained economic growth that exceeded anything seen before.  The process of 
industrialization broke through previous limits to growth and generated long-term 
increases in output, wages, and standards-of-living.  The negative feedback loops of the 
stationary state were replaced by positive feedbacks.  With fossil fuel energy, each 
improvement made the next one easier.   
The classical economists were wrong because they were describing an organic 
economy.  The application of mineral energy sources—first coal, and later oil and 
electricity—would shatter the linkages between the land and economic growth that 
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Malthus, Smith, and Ricardo had identified.  In other words, they failed to appreciate 
the revolutionary possibilities of fossil fuel energy.
26
 
When a society begins to use fossil fuels intensively, it alters the three 
relationships between energy and society that characterize the organic economy.  First, 
fossil fuels eliminate limits to growth by separating the links between energy and the 
carrying capacity of the land.  Second, people in mineral economies tap stocks of energy 
built over millions of years rather than the immediate flow of solar energy.
27
  Third, fossil 
fuels create the possibility for the intensive long-distance transport of energy thereby 
separating sites of energy production and consumption.  These shifts replace the zero-
sum trade offs of an organic economy with the possibility of continual growth.   
In an organic economy, land is needed for the four necessities of life: clothing, 
housing, food, and fire.  In a mineral economy, fossil fuels directly replace land through 
substitution (as when coal replaces firewood in homes and heat-intensive industries or 
when coke replaces charcoal in iron production) or by dramatically increasing the value 
of existing land (such as raising farm yields with fossil fuel-based fertilizers).  By freeing 
the land for other purposes, fossil fuels allow the exponential increase of the production 
of goods: the pie can get bigger and bigger.  For example, if in 1820 British iron 
production had used charcoal, that industry alone would have required a forest the size of 
the entire land area of the British Isles.
28
  But by substituting coal for charcoal, Britain 
could lead the world in iron production and feed a population of several million people—
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an impossible situation in an organic economy.  With fossil fuels, the pie could get 
larger and larger.    
Because fossil fuels are the stored energy of millions of years of sunlight, they 
dramatically increase the energy available to society in a given moment.  Mid-Atlantic 
residents increased the production of anthracite coal from a few hundred tons in 1820 to 
more than ten million tons in 1860 and nearly sixty million tons by 1900.
29
  Oil 
production increased from several thousand barrels in 1860 to forty-eight million barrels 
in 1900 and nearly a billion barrels by 1930.
30
  This amount of fossil fuel energy far 
exceeded the potential of land-based organic sources.  For example, Pennsylvania’s 
production of coal in 1900 provided the energy equivalent of a forest four times the size 
of the state.
31
   
Moreover, the energy density of fossil fuels makes the development of transport 
infrastructure economically viable.  Organic energy sources tend to be decentralized and 
lack the density necessary to justify extensive alterations of the built environment for 
their transport.
32
  This is why farmers in areas without transport infrastructure deliver 
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their corn to markets in the form of whiskey and pigs—commodities that have a much 
higher weight-value ratio than corn.  Firewood is spread out over large forests in a 
relatively thin layer that would be less than four inches thick if distributed evenly.  By 
contrast, coal seams are often found in deposits several feet thick with as many as 30 to 
120 layers on top of one another.  This means that the energy yield from a single place is 
at least 300 times (and often several thousand times) greater than coal with firewood.
33
  
As a result, there is much greater incentive for capital investment in transport 
infrastructure with fossil fuels because the costs can be recouped through the high 
volume of traffic.  This is one of the central reasons canals, pipelines, and wires were so 
important to the creation of the mineral economy.    
Once a society develops a mineral economy, it creates new possibilities for the 
geographic distribution of people, industries, and goods.  Rather than having to be located 
along the paths of falling streams, energy-intensive industries can be established 
anywhere mineral fuels can be easily transported.  Most of the time, this has meant the 
move of industry from rural to urban areas.  More people can live in cities because there 
is abundant energy for homes and factories.  Mineral fuels also allow changes in transport 
networks by encouraging the construction of railroads and steamboats that can travel 
across land and upriver.   
There are limits in a mineral economy, but they are on a completely different 
order of magnitude from an organic economy.  In the long term, fossil fuels are an 
exhaustible resource.  Coal taken out of a mine or oil pumped from the ground cannot be 
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replaced, except through millions of years of geological action.  Eventually, we will 
need to return to a system whereby our energy supply is derived from flows, not stocks.  
However, in the short term, and for our hydrocarbon age that is measuring in centuries, 
supplies of energy are practically infinite.  The historical pattern is that their use can be 
expanded to suit human needs without zero-sum trade offs.     
Mineral economies enable and amplify industrialization, but they are not 
synonymous with it.  Due to the limits of growth characteristic of the organic economy, 
no amount of capital investment, technological acumen, or specialization of production 
could lead to the rapid, sustained growth first seen in Britain towards the end of the 
eighteenth century and later in the United States and many parts of western Europe.  For 
example, by the eighteenth century many regions in China had developed sophisticated 
manufacturing practices that produced high quality goods.  Without fossil fuel energy, 
however, these industries never experienced the sustained and self-reinforcing growth of 
mineral-powered industrialization in Europe and the United States.
34
  Conversely, the 
presence of mineral energy sources is not a guarantee of industrialization: several regions 
in the United States and around the world have been endowed with fossil fuels and yet 
have not developed an industrial society.
35
    
Thinking in terms of organic and mineral economies is useful because it draws 
our attention to the deep interconnections between energy and society.  Contemporary 
political debates about energy err by devoting too much attention to short-term and 
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nationalistic issues like energy independence and eliminating oil payments to hostile 
governments.  We would be better served by discussing the fundamental links between 
energy, environment, and the provision of human necessities.  Running out of fossil fuels 
will not simply alter how we get energy; it will transform how we allocate land, what 
types of goods our society is able to produce, and how many people our planet can 
support.  We would be wise to remember the cautionary tale of Malthus—the constraints 
of the organic economy may be in our future.    
 
Regional Analysis 
 Energy Landscapes analyzes the development of the mineral economy in the 
American mid-Atlantic.  As such, it is a regional analysis.
36
  I have used this approach for 
several reasons.  First, it reflects the fact that there were important regional variations in 
energy practices throughout America between 1820 and 1930.
37
  The South used very 
little fossil fuel energy, relying mainly on large tracts of forest for heating, cooking, and 
manufacturing.  New England was endowed with fast-moving streams and led the nation 
in the use of water power.  Settlers in the Northwest Territory took advantage of the large 
forests to derive most of their fuel from trees felled to clear the land.  The settling of the 
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Great Plains was at first limited by the shortage of energy resources.  A regional 
approach allows us to see wide differences between the energy practices of different 
areas.
38
 
 Second, and most importantly, the energy practices of the mid-Atlantic, more than 
any other American region, have shaped our contemporary world.  It was in the mid-
Atlantic that Americans first began to use fossil fuels intensively and pioneered the 
transition into a mineral economy.  Other regions, in America and across the globe, took 
notice.  The economic success that resulted from the mid-Atlantic’s consumption of fossil 
fuels encouraged other regions to emulate its development patterns.  The roots of 
American fossil fuel dependency, therefore, can be found in the energy history of the 
mid-Atlantic.   
 The energy landscapes I examine were largely, but not exclusively, contained in 
the mid-Atlantic region.  Conventionally, the mid-Atlantic is considered the states of 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York, while Delaware and Maryland are sometimes 
included.  The principal cities of the region are New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, 
although other cities including Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Harrisburg, Albany, Trenton, and 
Wilmington also figure in this story.  However, canals, pipelines, and wires did not 
always respect political boundaries or conventional definitions of the mid-Atlantic.  For 
example, the anthracite canal network operated primarily in the eastern half of the mid-
Atlantic while the oil pipeline network extended west to Cleveland and Chicago.  The 
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Holtwood Dam in Pennsylvania sent most of its electricity to Baltimore while the 
Conowingo Dam in Maryland supplied Philadelphia.   
 When there is a tension between the conventional boundaries of the mid-Atlantic 
region and the paths of canals, pipelines, or wires, I follow the latter.  My central 
arguments are about energy, not the specific boundaries of regions.  Moreover, I do not 
treat all parts of the mid-Atlantic equally.  I focus most of my attention on those sites 
where energy was produced, transported, and consumed—those parts of the mid-Atlantic 
that were part of the energy landscapes I analyze.  Therefore, rather than trying to give an 
exhaustive account of the region, this dissertation is a study of energy landscapes that are 
predominantly contained in the mid-Atlantic.   
 
Disciplinary Approaches 
My approach throughout Energy Landscapes integrates history of technology, 
environmental history, and business/economic history.  Intellectually, my primary models 
are William Cronon’s examination of commodity flows shaping regional development 
and environmental change, E. A. Wrigley’s study of the relationships between energy and 
industrialization, and Thomas Hughes’ analysis of large technical systems.
39
 
 In addition to drawing on works in history of technology, business/economic 
history, and environmental history, I hope my work will contribute to the intellectual 
development of these fields.  For historians of technology, I focus on the properties of 
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infrastructure and the study of technologies in use.
40
  One of the benefits of this 
approach is that it offers a way past long-standing debates over technological 
determinism.  For a variety of disciplinary and intellectual reasons, historians of 
technology have spent much of the last two decades debunking stories of technological 
determinism.
41
  While these attacks have largely been correct, they have had the 
unintended consequence of encouraging narrow scholarship focused disproportionately 
on the invention and innovation of technologies.  This is unfortunate because it has meant 
that many important stories have not been told.  In Energy Landscapes, I seek to balance 
these approaches.  Canals, pipelines, and wires were not determinative technologies; they 
could have been built differently or not at all, different parties could have managed them, 
and societies could have made different energy choices.  However, once these 
technologies were built and operated in the particular social and economic context of the 
mid-Atlantic, they shaped the energy practices of the region in powerful ways.  Looking 
at the ways technologies in use shape social choices strikes me as an effective way 
around debates over social construction versus technological determinism.   
For business and economic historians, I seek to connect the financial operations of 
canals, pipelines, and wires to their broader social effects.  Despite widespread agreement 
that businesses have been critical to American history, many historians ignore the 
academic subfields of business and economic history.  While there are many reasons for 
this oversight, part of the explanation is that works in these fields sometimes fail to 
connect with questions that are central to other historians.  In Energy Landscapes, I seek 
                                                
40
 See my discussion of these issues earlier in the introduction under the heading “Transport Infrastructure 
& Energy Landscapes.” 
41
 Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological 
Determinism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994). 
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to provide an example of work that integrates the business and economic aspects of 
transport infrastructure with broader issues of historical interest, such as environmental 
change, urbanization, industrialization, and the nation’s political economy.
42
 
Finally, I hope to contribute to scholarship in environmental history that deepens 
our understandings of the structural relationships between humans and the environment.  
At first glance, this is not the theme that one might expect for an environmental history of 
energy.  This work is not about the connections between fossil fuels and global warming.  
Nor is it centrally concerned with the environmental damage caused by producing, 
transporting, and consuming energy sources, although these issues are discussed in the 
text.  Instead, I use the concepts of energy landscapes and organic and mineral economies 
to demonstrate how patterns of human life that are often taken for granted depend on 
contingent relationships between human societies and the natural world.  Cheap and 
abundant fossil fuel energy, large urban populations, and industrial economies are not 
natural or inevitable features of the world that we live in.  They exist only because (a) 
human societies have created a built environment that permits ever-increasing flows of 
energy from place to place and (b) the natural world has supplied an abundance of fossil 
fuels.  It would be foolish for humans to expect these same conditions to hold forever.      
A Story at Three Levels 
 A major topic of debate in contemporary history is whether we should study the 
past through micro-studies that give a close focus on a small part of the world and a 
                                                
42
 Many of these themes were discussed at a recent conference on the future of business history at the 
Hagley Museum & Library.  I presented a paper at the conference that discusses the ways my work seeks to 
bridge the divide between business historians and American historians more generally.  Christopher Jones, 
“More Than Which Capitalist Wins” (paper presented at “Business History as Critique: Questions, 
Concepts, Boundaries, and Audience” conference, Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, DE, May 15, 
2009). 
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restricted chronology or through macro-studies that take a much broader and less 
detailed view of change over time.  This is a complex debate involving questions of 
historical methodology, shifts in the economics of book publishing, and tensions between 
academic and public history.  The strengths of big-picture analyses are that they can 
make sense of broad sweeps of history, provide new frameworks for interpretation, and 
engage broader audiences.  The drawback of this approach is that the scholarship is often 
based on secondary literature which leads to questions about whether the work is saying 
something new or simply summarizing what is already out there.  By contrast, micro-
histories are the most common form of historical research.  Some strengths of this 
approach are that authors are able to access new primary sources, provide a detailed and 
specific account of change, and demonstrate the historical contingencies of a particular 
development.  The main drawbacks of this approach are that micro-histories often fail to 
inform scholarship outside their narrow purview and lack widespread appeal.   
 My dissertation seeks to navigate between Scylla and Charybdis by integrating 
micro- and macro-level histories with a middle-level analysis.  Several scholars have 
noted that middle-level analysis can strengthen “little picture” histories by exploring how 
particular case studies relate to the whole.  In addition, middle-level analysis can provide 
an additional degree of detail and grounding to conclusions drawn at the macro level.  
Thomas Misa has made this argument in the context of history of technology, while Paul 
Edwards has noted that infrastructure is a particularly suitable topic for middle-level 
analysis.
43
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 Thomas J. Misa, "Retrieving Sociotechnical Change from Technological Determinism," in Does 
Technology Drive History?: The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, ed. Leo Marx and Merritt Roe 
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 These ideas are embodied in the structure of my dissertation, which is a story 
told at three levels of analysis: micro-, middle-, and macro-.  The micro-level analysis of 
my dissertation is represented by case studies of the Lehigh Canal, the Tide-Water 
pipeline, and the transmission wires extending from the Holtwood Dam (chapters 1, 3, 
and 5).  The middle-level sections study the patterns of flow and consumption of coal, oil, 
and electricity along the networks of transport infrastructure (chapters 2, 4, and 6).  The 
slow and non-linear shift from an organic to a mineral economy that occurred in the mid-
Atlantic is the macro-level analysis (introduction, chapters 2, 4, 6, conclusion).  By using 
each level of analysis to inform the others, my study offers a broad perspective, grounded 
in the historical details, on the importance of energy transport infrastructure in the mid-
Atlantic between 1820 and 1930  
 
Dissertation Contents 
Energy Landscapes consists of three sections analyzing the transport and 
consumption of coal (1820-1860), oil (1860-1900), and electricity (1900-1930).  Each 
section has two chapters.  The first shows how the construction of canals (chapter 1), 
pipelines (chapter 3), and transmission wires (chapter 5) transformed the built 
environment of the mid-Atlantic, thereby creating new energy landscapes in which coal, 
oil, and electricity could be consumed in ever-increasing amounts.  The second chapter in 
each section traces the flow of coal (chapter 2), oil (chapter 4), and electricity (chapter 6) 
along these networks and analyzes the social impacts of new fossil fuel consumption 
patterns.  
                                                                                                                                            
Smith (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994); Edwards, "Infrastructure and Modernity: Force, Time, and 
Social Organization in the History of Sociotechnical Systems." 
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In the first chapter of each section, I examine the construction of a pioneering 
energy transport technology and how it stimulated the creation of a broader network of 
canals, pipelines, or wires in the region.  The Lehigh Canal, Tide-Water pipeline, and 
transmission wires extending from the Holtwood hydroelectric dam on the Susquehanna 
River were path-breaking technologies that transformed the energy options available to 
mid-Atlantic residents.
44
  In the first half of each of these chapters, I study the social 
choices, power struggles, and historical contingencies that shaped their development, 
exploring who paid for them, how and where they were built, and how they influenced 
the broader coal, oil, and electrical industries.  In the second half of these chapters, I 
analyze the rise of a network of several canals, pipelines, or wires that emerged in 
response to these pioneering case studies.  I show how these region-wide infrastructure 
networks created new energy landscapes that altered the built environment of the mid-
Atlantic, thereby triggering the growth of fossil fuel consumption.  The sources for these 
chapters are corporate records, trade journals, newspaper articles, government reports, 
and secondary literature.
45, 46, 47, 48
 
                                                
44
 Although hydroelectricity is not a fossil-fuel based source of energy, most electricity in the mid-Atlantic 
during this period came from burning coal.  I chose this case study because it most effectively illustrates the 
energy transport and consumption transitions that took place during this period.   
45
 In this work, I have drawn on any sources that have helped me answer the questions that I have posed.  
As it has turned out, archival sources have proved less beneficial to this work than is typical in a historical 
dissertation.  This is partly because of the limits of the materials (there are almost no archival records I 
could find for the Tide-Water pipeline and despite the fact that there are many records for the Holtwood 
Dam, most of them concern financial operations, not the construction of transmission wires) and partially 
because of the questions I am interested in.  During my research, I have found that trade journals, 
government reports, and secondary literature have been the most useful sources for my project.     
46
 The corporate records of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company are available in several locations, 
with the most complete set at the Pennsylvania State Archives in Harrisburg, PA.  Relevant trade journals 
for understanding the coal trade include The Miners’ Journal (Pottsville, PA), Hazard’s Register 
(Philadelphia, PA), and Niles Weekly Register (Baltimore, MD).  Government documents reviewing the 
coal trade include the decennial Census of Manufactures as well as "Report of the Committee of the Senate 
of Pennsylvania Upon the Subject of the Coal Trade,"  (Harrisburg: Henry Welsh, 1834); United States. 
Dept. of the Treasury. and Louis McLane, Documents Relative to the Manufacturers in the United States, 2 
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In the second chapter of each section, I analyze the social impacts of the new 
landscapes by studying the energy consumption patterns along the canal, pipeline, or wire 
network.  First, I explore how these technologies shaped the geographic distribution of 
coal, oil, and electricity by detailing where these resources were consumed.  I compare 
consumption at the site of production, along the path of the canal, pipeline, or wire, and at 
its terminus.  Second, I study how coal, oil, and electricity resources were consumed and 
how these energy practices contributed to the development of a mineral economy.  Third, 
I conclude by analyzing the intra-regional differences in energy consumption that led to 
an uneven distribution of costs and benefits, the steps that led society to become 
dependent on fossil fuel energy, and the ways that coal, oil, and electricity shaped broad 
                                                                                                                                            
vols. (Washington: Printed by D. Green, 1833); Secretary of the Treasury, Report on Steam Engines 
(Washington, DC: Thomas Allen, Printer, 1838).  Secondary literature on the Lehigh Canal includes 
Anthony Brzyski, "The Lehigh Canal and Its Economic Impact on the Region through Which It Passed, 
1818-1873" (Ph.D. Dissertation, New York University, 1957); Joan Gilbert, Gateway to the Coalfields: The 
Upper Grand Section of the Lehigh Canal (Easton, PA: Canal History and Technology Press, 2005); 
Michael Knies, Coal on the Lehigh, 1790-1827: Beginnings and Growth of the Anthracite Industry in 
Carbon County, Pennsylvania (Easton, PA: Canal History and Technology Press, 2001). 
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 There is no central repository of records for the history of the Tide-Water pipeline, although I have found 
relevant materials at the Drake Well Museum in Titusville, PA, the Hagley Museum and Library in 
Wilmington, DE, the Rockefeller Archives in Tarrytown, NY, and the Yale Manuscripts and Archives 
Library in New Haven, CT.  Relevant trade journals include The Titusville Morning Herald (Titusville, 
PA), The Oil City Derrick (Oil City, PA), and Oil, Paint, and Drug Reporter (New York, NY).  
Government documents reviewing the oil trade include New York Assembly, Proceedings of the Special 
Committee on Railroads, Appointed to Investigate Alleged Abuses in the Management of Railroads 
Chartered in the State of New York., 8 vols. (Albany: 1880); House of Representatives, "Report on 
Investigation of Trusts,"  (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1888); Industrial Commission, 
"Preliminary Report on Trusts and Industrial Combinations,"  (Washington, DC: 1900).  Secondary 
literature includes Allan Nevins, Study in Power (New York: Scribner, 1953); Williamson and Daum, The 
American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899; Johnson, "The Development of 
American Petroleum Pipelines: A Study in Private Enterprise and Public Policy, 1862-1906".  
48
 The corporate records for the Holtwood hydroelectric dam are located at the Hagley Museum and Library 
in Wilmington, DE as part of the Pennsylvania Power & Light Company collection.  Relevant trade 
journals include Electrical World (New York, NY) and Transactions of the American Institute of Electrical 
Engineers (New York, NY).  There is no secondary literature treating the Holtwood dam or its transmission 
wires in significant depth.  Useful secondary sources on transmission wires in the mid-Atlantic include 
David E. Nye, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940 (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 1990); Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930; Bayla 
Singer, "Power to the People: The Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, 1925-1970" 
(Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1983). 
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regional transformations in how people lived, worked, and played.  The sources for 
these chapters are statistical compendiums of energy flows listed in trade journals, 
corporate records, government reports, consumer surveys, and historical analyses of 
energy industries.
49
 
 
In 1820, fossil fuel energy played only a minor role in the society and economy of 
the mid-Atlantic.  Residents of the region lived in an organic economy, only using small 
amounts of coal in seaboard cities and small towns located on or near coalfields.  A few 
people had noted the presence of anthracite coal in northeast Pennsylvania, within a 
hundred miles of Philadelphia and New York City.  Some had even formed companies 
hoping to profit from its sale in urban markets, but had been thwarted by the lack of 
transport infrastructure and minimal demand for coal.  A casual observer would have had 
little reason to anticipate a dramatic change in this state of affairs.  And yet, by the dawn 
of the Civil War, organic energy sources were already being superseded by fossil fuels.   
How, when, where, and why did this happen?  It is with these questions that our story 
begins.    
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 These chapters draw on many of the same sources identified in the previous paragraph.  For example, 
both trade journals and government reports included information on the construction of canals, pipelines, 
and wires as well as the transportation and consumption of energy.  For coal, The Miners’ Journal includes 
weekly reports and yearly summaries of coal shipments, and The Titusville Morning Herald offers 
comparable analysis for oil.  Statistics on electricity consumption are available from United States Bureau 
of the Census., Census of Electrical Industries: Central Light and Power Stations, 1902-1927 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1905-1930).  Secondary literature studying energy consumption includes 
Frederick Moore Binder, Coal Age Empire: Pennsylvania Coal and Its Utilization to 1860 (Harrisburg: 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1974); David E. Nye, 
Consuming Power: A Social History of American Energies (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Schurr 
and Netschert, Energy in the American Economy, 1850-1975: An Economic Study of Its History and 
Prospects.    
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Chapter 1: The Lehigh Canal and the Energy Landscape of  
Anthracite Coal, 1820-1860 
 
 
 When a group of men piloting crude wooden rafts piled with black stones arrived 
at the Philadelphia port in 1820, a casual observer would have had little reason to take 
notice.  There was nothing remarkable about rafting goods down the Delaware River to 
the region’s main trading center.  After all, farmers, traders, and lumbermen had been 
delivering wood, agricultural products, and other goods from the areas north of 
Philadelphia for decades along this route.  The boatmen and arks appeared to be simple 
extensions of well-established trade patterns.   
 Upon closer inspection, however, two things were different about these boatmen.  
The first is where they came from.  Their journey began on the recently improved Lehigh 
River.  Several hundred workers had spent the better part of the previous two years in the 
river, creating dams, stone walls, and hydro-static gates that would allow the regular 
shipment of goods down the river.  Through their efforts, the natural flows of the Lehigh 
River were funneled, trapped, and regulated to suit the needs of human commerce.  It was 
the most significant transformation of a waterway in the mid-Atlantic at the time.    
The second distinctive thing about these men was their cargo: anthracite coal from 
the Lehigh Valley.  At the time, our hypothetical observer would have been unlikely to 
ascribe much importance to these deliveries.  Although Philadelphia craftsmen were 
accustomed to using bituminous coal imported from Britain, Nova Scotia, and Virginia, 
there was no active trade in the state’s “stone coal” as anthracite was more commonly 
known.  The city’s coal market was small and well-stocked.  There was no pent-up 
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demand for anthracite.  It was easier for the men to break up the arks and sell them as 
lumber than to create a new market for anthracite coal.   
With the advantage of historical hindsight, however, the true importance of these 
boatmen and their cargo becomes clear.  Over the next forty years, anthracite coal would 
trigger revolutionary changes in the economy, environment, and society of the mid-
Atlantic.  Stone coal would be used to forge iron, build railroads, power steam engines, 
propel boats, and keep people warm.  Anthracite would create great wealth for some, 
support dense concentrations of people, and enable the mid-Atlantic to develop an 
industrial economy.  As residents of the mid-Atlantic became accustomed to using coal, 
their appetites for fossil fuel energy grew at a remarkable rate.  While it was difficult to 
sell a few hundred tons of coal in 1820, by the dawn of the Civil War consumers required 
annual deliveries of several million tons to maintain their way of life.      
 How did this happen?  The improvement of the Lehigh River was part of a 
broader transformation of the region’s built environment that created new flows of goods 
and people. The flow of one product outweighed all others, both literally and figuratively: 
anthracite coal.  By connecting the rich coalfields of the upper Lehigh Valley with 
Philadelphia, the Lehigh Canal gave the Quaker City a new energy hinterland.  In 
conjunction with comparable developments along the Schuylkill, Delaware, and Hudson 
rivers over the next decade, coal canals gave rise to a new energy landscape in the mid-
Atlantic.  The most salient feature of this energy landscape was that coal could be 
delivered from rural areas to urban consumers cheaply, reliably, and in ever-increasing 
quantities.  
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The nexus of canals, boosters, and consumers provided the foundations for the 
development of a mineral economy in the mid-Atlantic between 1820 and 1860.  Canals 
delivered anthracite coal in ever-increasing quantities and at steadily decreasing prices.  
Boosters encouraged consumer demand by creating new applications for anthracite, 
teaching users techniques how to burn it in homes and factories, and advertising its 
benefits.  Thousands of consumers made individual decisions about where to live, how to 
heat their homes, and what type of power sources to use.  Ultimately, these forces 
operated in a synergistic feedback cycle whereby canals increased supply, boosters found 
new applications for coal, and consumer demand encouraged the expansion of the energy 
landscape to further increase supply.  The limits and negative feedback loops of the 
organic economy were soon replaced by the mineral economy’s pattern of continual 
growth.   
 These changes began on the Lehigh River.  In this chapter, I focus on the 
development of the Lehigh Canal to show the choices, struggles, and contingencies that 
shaped the construction of energy transport infrastructure in the mid-Atlantic.  I begin by 
studying organic and mineral energy sources in the mid-Atlantic before the development 
of transport infrastructure.  Next, I analyze the early development of the Lehigh Canal, 
focusing on how it transformed the built environment of the Lehigh River.  Over the next 
decades, the increasing demand for coal required significant extensions to the canal 
system in order to supply the region’s growing fossil fuel appetite.  In the fourth section, I 
explore the broader network of canals that operated throughout the mid-Atlantic and 
highlight their points of similarity and difference with the Lehigh Canal.  Finally, I 
review the patterns of increasing coal consumption, the creation of the anthracite iron 
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industry, and the transition to railroads as the primary transporters of coal at the dawn 
of the Civil War.  The next chapter will study the patterns of anthracite flows and 
consumption to demonstrate how these practices created the first stages of a mineral 
economy in the mid-Atlantic.   
 
Energy in the Mid-Atlantic, pre-1820 
 In 1820, the mid-Atlantic operated as an organic economy.  Much like the rest of 
the United States, human muscles and firewood provided the large majority of the energy 
that people needed for farming, crafting goods, heating homes, and cooking food.  Only 
small amounts of coal were used, mostly by craftsmen in cities like Philadelphia and New 
York or the northeastern parts of Pennsylvania where anthracite coal was plentiful.  
Industrial sites were largely concentrated along the falls of rivers or in rural areas where 
there were no competing demands for firewood.  Most of the population was engaged in 
agriculture and relied almost wholly on organic energy sources in their daily lives.   
 Muscles, water, and wood were not limiting factors for mid-Atlantic residents at 
the time.  As European observers had noted since arriving in the New World, the 
abundance of forests and land offered what seemed to be limitless possibilities.  If 
anything, people believed there were too many trees as the dense forests made it difficult 
to clear the land or travel across it.  There were several rivers with falls that could be used 
to power mills and the large amounts of unsettled land could feed plenty of draft animals.  
Given the low population density and small energy demands of the region’s farmers, 
merchants, and craftsmen, energy shortages were not a chronic condition for most of the 
mid-Atlantic. 
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 However, the existence of large amounts of organic energy did not dissuade 
certain residents of the mid-Atlantic from seeking to develop the region’s coal resources.  
Three factors inspired boosters.  First, various groups like blacksmiths, nail smiths, 
distillers, and the water works in Philadelphia were already using bituminous coal 
imported from Britain, Nova Scotia, and Virginia.
1
  While the trade was small—for 
example, in 1784, Philadelphia imported around 500 tons of coal, just over 1,000 tons by 
the early 1790s, and about 3,000 tons per year by the 1810s—boosters saw the potential 
to replace foreign imports with domestic supplies.
2
  Second, the presence of coal in 
northeastern Pennsylvania had been known for several years.  As early as the 1770s, 
farmers and craftsmen in Wilkes-Barre and the Wyoming Valley used anthracite coal 
regularly.  By the 1790s, large deposits had been identified in the Lehigh Valley and 
small amounts of anthracite from the Schuylkill region were being marketed in 
Philadelphia in the 1810s.
3
  There was coal near Philadelphia, but transporting it was 
cumbersome and expensive.     
 Third, and most important, boosters sought to replicate the industrial and 
economic success of Britain by building a trade in coal.  For example, Thomas Cooper, a 
professor of chemistry at several American colleges, argued that coal was the source of 
                                                
1
 Coal is commonly divided into three classes based on each deposit’s percentage of carbon.  Coal that is 
more than 90 percent carbon is labeled anthracite.  Coal that is roughly 70-90 percent carbon is classed as 
bituminous.  Coal with less carbon than bituminous is lignite.  There are differences between these classes 
of coal that shaped their use, as will be discussed throughout the next two chapters.  The most important 
differences are that anthracite is much harder to light because there are fewer volatile gases, but once lit, it 
burns with a cleaner flame.  
2
 Philadelphia’s population during these years was 28,522 in 1790, 41,220 in 1800, and 53,722 in 1810 
according to the Census.  Coal import numbers from Howard Benjamin Powell, Philadelphia's First Fuel 
Crisis: Jacob Cist and the Developing Market for Pennsylvania Anthracite (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1978), 9, 24-25. 
3
 Knies, Coal on the Lehigh, 1790-1827: Beginnings and Growth of the Anthracite Industry in Carbon 
County, Pennsylvania, chapter 1; Powell, Philadelphia's First Fuel Crisis: Jacob Cist and the Developing 
Market for Pennsylvania Anthracite, 16. 
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British wealth: “In this country every suggestion that brings forward the importance of 
coal to the public view is of moment: we know little of its value in Pennsylvania as yet.  
All, all the superior wealth, power and energy of Great Britain, is founded on her coal 
mining.”
4
  Josiah White, pioneer of the Lehigh Canal, further made the case for the links 
between coal, canals, and financial success in an article in The Democratic Press: “It is a 
general belief that the extraordinary personal industry of the English people is the cause 
of the wealth of that empire.  I ask, what would the value of all their labor be, in all their 
commercial articles, without their canals?  The steam engines spread all over England are 
said to perform many times over the labor of the entire population of that country.  The 
coal for those engines comes on their canals… Canals are the foundation of their wealth.  
Canals give industry its essence – the collecting of raw materials and the sending of the 
products of the factory to market.”
5
 
 As contemporary observers knew, transport was the key bottleneck.  The 
mountainous terrain and lack of improved roads meant that the Lehigh, Schuylkill, and 
Wyoming valleys were poorly connected with the urban centers where concentrations of 
consumers lived.  Moving coal by wagons was expensive and there were finite limits to 
the amount that could be transported in this manner.  The Schuylkill and Lehigh rivers 
offered a more promising outlet, but their falls and variable water levels made it difficult 
for boats to travel downstream.  Simply put, the coalfields of eastern Pennsylvania were 
not part of the trade hinterlands of cities like New York and Philadelphia.   
                                                
4
 Thomas Cooper, “Statement on Coal” from early nineteenth century, as cited in Powell, Philadelphia's 
First Fuel Crisis: Jacob Cist and the Developing Market for Pennsylvania Anthracite, 1.   
5
 Josiah White, “English Industry” The Democratic Press, March 20, 1821, as cited in Norris Hansell, 
Josiah White: Quaker Entrepreneur (Easton, PA: Canal History and Technology Press, 1992), 56. 
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 In seeking to develop Pennsylvania’s coal resources, boosters directed their 
attention to solving the transport problem.  Their efforts drew on a long history of popular 
support for improved transport networks in the mid-Atlantic.  Philadelphia merchants 
were already petitioning the provincial Assembly in 1762 to investigate the west branch 
of the Susquehanna River to see if a connection could be established with the Ohio River.  
The American Philosophical Society recommended a canal linking the Schuylkill and 
Susquehanna rivers as early as 1771.  In 1789, prominent Philadelphians including 
Robert Morris and David Rittenhouse formed the Society for Promoting Roads and 
Inland Navigation to encourage the improvement of transport infrastructure.
6
  
Philadelphia printer, lawyer, and politician William Duane urged Pennsylvanians to 
demand their elected representatives support internal improvements in a series of letters 
to the Aurora newspaper in 1810.
7
  These efforts bore fruit as Pennsylvania had invested 
more capital in internal improvements than any government other than France by 1810.
8
   
New Yorkers were also active proponents of internal improvements.  The Empire 
State had invested more in its turnpikes by 1808 than any other state.
9
  In 1815 the State 
Assembly authorized construction of the Erie Canal and petitioned Congress for financial 
support and land rights.
10
  By contrast, transport boosters in other states were less 
                                                
6
 On early efforts to improve navigation, see: W. Bernard Carlson, "The Pennsylvania Society for the 
Promotion of Internal Improvements," Proceedings of the Canal History and Technology Symposium 7 
(1988). 
7
 William J. Duane, Letters, Addressed to the People of Pennsylvania Respecting the Internal Improvement 
of the Commonwealth; by Means of Roads and Canals (Philadelphia: Printed by Jane Aitken, 1811). 
8
 This calculation included investments in banks.  Thomas Childs Cochran, "Early Industrialization in the 
Delaware and Susquehanna River Areas: A Regional Analysis," Social Science History 1, no. 3 (1977): 
291. 
9
 United States. Dept. of the Treasury, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Subject of Public 
Roads and Canals (Philadelphia: William Duane, 1808), 56. 
10
 Memorial of the Commissioners of the State of New York, in Behalf of Said State; Praying the Aid of the 
General Government in Opening a Communication between the Navigable Waters of Hudson River and the 
Lakes,  (Washington: Printed by William A. Davis, 1816). 
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successful.  Although Virginia exported some coal from its bituminous coalfields about 
twenty miles upriver from Richmond to Philadelphia and other cities, the variable flows 
of the James River limited the volume of the trade.  Several Virginians petitioned the 
state to improve the James River in order to make it practical to deliver more coal.  
However, their efforts were rejected by the state government, which was controlled by 
eastern farming interests.
11
  The role of the federal government in stimulating transport 
infrastructure was relatively minor during this period.  Although it constructed some 
postal roads and commissioned some reports, state governments and private capital 
played more active roles.
12
 
What animated these early boosters?  While many of them were merchants and 
businessmen who stood to profit from increased commercial activity, it would be 
incorrect to see them as solely driven by the pursuit of profit.  Political values were 
equally important.  Many transport boosters hoped to create a strong and integrated 
nation out of a collection of young states, a particularly pressing task during the early 
years of the Republic.  They believed that improved transport infrastructure would allow 
trade and communication between people, thereby binding them together.  In seeking aid 
for the Erie Canal, New York commissioners noted: “[Canals] constitute improvements 
peculiarly fit for a republic.  They contribute equally to the safety and opulence of the 
people, and the reputation and resources of the government.  They are equally desirable 
in reference to the employments of peace, and the operations of war.  In whatever light 
                                                
11
 The James River was shallow and had variable flows.  It could support small coal arks during certain 
parts of the year, but could not support large boats year-round.  However, the James River did offer 
superior transport facilities circa 1800 compared to the Lehigh and Schuylkill rivers.  The different political 
success of transport boosters in Virginia and Pennsylvania is well documented in Adams, Old Dominion, 
Industrial Commonwealth: Coal, Politics, and Economy in Antebellum America. 
12
 See, for instance: United States. Dept. of the Treasury, Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the 
Subject of Public Roads and Canals. 
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they are viewed, they seem to combine the substantial glories of the most splendid and 
permanent utility.”
13
  Robert Fulton, the steamboat pioneer, put the matter more directly: 
“what stronger bonds of union can be invented than those which enable each individual to 
transport the produce of his industry 1,200 miles for 60 cents the hundred weight?  Here 
then is a certain method of securing the union of the states, and of rendering it as lasting 
as the continent we inhabit.”
14
  Internal improvements were not just a commercial activity 
for early boosters, they were nation-building. 
 Although coal boosters failed to achieve great success before the 1820s, their 
efforts went beyond mere rhetoric.  They mobilized financial and political resources, 
formed companies, introduced consumers to Pennsylvania’s anthracite coal, and laid the 
groundwork for the success of later endeavors.  The history of their efforts demonstrates 
a sustained interest in developing the coal trade and highlights the central challenge of 
transport in the anthracite trade.   
 The Lehigh Coal and Mine Company was the first organization to bring anthracite 
coal from northeast Pennsylvania to Philadelphia.  In 1791, Philip Ginder, described in 
various accounts as either a farmer or a hunter, allegedly tripped over a black stone while 
walking on Sharp Mountain.  Suspecting that it might be coal, Ginder took a sample to 
Jacob Weiss, an area merchant familiar with anthracite.  Weiss confirmed Ginder’s guess 
and began to contact his wealthy friends in Philadelphia to mine and market the coal.  
Together with his cousin Michael Hillegas (former Treasurer of the United States), his 
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brother-in-law Charles Cist (a publisher), John Nicholson (Comptroller-General of 
Pennsylvania and a land speculator), and others, Weiss created the Lehigh Coal and Mine 
Company.  Ginder bought some land near the area but was not actively involved in the 
new company.
15
 
 The company first purchased large amounts of land around the site of Ginder’s 
discovery.  Although coal would later be found in many other locations in the region, 
Ginder had stumbled upon a particularly fortuitous site.  At Sharp Mountain (soon 
renamed Summit Hill), the Mammoth Vein, a belt of anthracite coal fifty to a hundred 
feet thick, rose to the surface.  To extract the coal, miners only needed to clear the top 
level of dirt and then break off pieces of coal with picks and shovels.  Because the site 
was above water level, drainage was not an issue.  As a result, coal could be extracted 
without expensive shafts, tunnels, or water pumping systems.  Moreover, massive 
quantities of coal were clustered in one site.  Even as late as 1983, the area was still being 
mined by a subsidiary of Bethlehem Steel.  Over its history, an estimated 250 million 
tons were removed from the site.
16
      
 While mining coal at Summit Hill was a relatively straightforward proposition, 
getting it to market was not.  The mine was located nine miles from the Lehigh River, 
forcing the company to build a road between Summit Hill and Lausanne, the closest point 
on the river.  While horse-drawn wagons could use the primitive road, drivers charged as 
much as $4 per ton and the steepness of the grade prevented it from being used in icy 
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weather.
17
  Once the coal reached the river, the company had to deal with the 
limitations of the Lehigh River.  From Lausanne, the river fell more than 300 feet over 
the course of its 46-mile journey to Easton where it connected with the Delaware River.  
In many places it was very shallow and choppy, particularly during the summer months.  
It was possible to ship goods on arks—simple flat wooden boats that would only travel 
downriver and be sold as lumber with the rest of the goods—during times of high river 
flow (usually in the spring and fall).  While this always involved a certain amount of 
danger and risk of lost goods, it was an established practice in the 1790s by lumbermen in 
the region.   
 The road and river enabled the Lehigh Coal and Mine Company to deliver coal to 
Philadelphia, but not on a competitive basis.  After expanding its land holdings to more 
than 10,000 acres in 1798, the company accomplished little else and was basically 
moribund by 1800.  The directors could not overcome the fact that imported coal and 
wood were cheaper and more convenient alternatives for Philadelphians when the 
transport costs were factored in.  In addition, the company lost much of its vitality after 
the 1793 yellow fever epidemic killed as much as 20 percent of Philadelphia’s 
population.  Finally, the principals of the company were merchants who found their 
general business prospects failing during this time as New York replaced Philadelphia as 
the nation’s premier port.  As a result, they lacked the resources to develop the 
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company’s prospects further.  Several of the Lehigh Coal Mine Company’s founders 
went bankrupt and died poor, including Cist, Hillegas, Morris, and Nicholson.
18
 
 Over the next decade there were several efforts by entrepreneurs to continue to 
develop a coal trade.  In 1806, attorney William Turnbull shipped several arks of coal 
down the Lehigh in an attempt to supply the coal needs of the Philadelphia waterworks.  
The waterworks could not get the coal to burn successfully, however, and the remaining 
coal was used as gravel in the street.
19
  In 1807, the Lehigh Coal and Mine Company 
leased its properties to two men named Rowland and Butland who intended to dig coal 
and iron ore.  Their efforts did not succeed on a wide scale.   
 As the dramatic example of William Turnbull’s coal being discarded as waste 
indicates, transport was not the only problem facing anthracite boosters.  The physical 
qualities of anthracite also mattered.  Anthracite coal contains an extremely high 
percentage of carbon (over 90 percent) that gives it a hard and shiny appearance, similar 
to obsidian.  In fact, one of anthracite’s first uses around the world was as a decorative 
stone in jewelry, a practice known in China and among Native Americans in northeast 
Pennsylvania.  This high carbon content means that anthracite is difficult to burn.  You 
cannot simply toss anthracite into a wood-burning fire and have it ignite, as is possible 
with bituminous coal.
20
  On the other hand, anthracite has two important advantages over 
bituminous.  One is that once it starts burning, it can create a hotter and steadier flame 
that is beneficial for home heating and forging iron.  The second advantage is that it 
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contains fewer impurities, such as sulfur, and therefore burns cleaner than bituminous.  
As a result, it is much less polluting, has fewer ashes, and can forge iron more efficiently.   
 In 1800, this chemistry was not well understood.  What people in Philadelphia 
knew was that anthracite was hard to burn, so they preferred working with wood, 
charcoal, or bituminous coal imported from England, Nova Scotia, or Virginia.  The story 
of how Josiah White came to see the benefits of anthracite is instructive in this context.  
When he was operating an iron nail and wire factory in Philadelphia, he ordered some 
anthracite during the War of 1812.  He and his workmen had attempted to ignite the coal 
unsuccessfully for several hours when they gave up in frustration.  They shut the furnace 
door and left the factory.  A worker who forgot his coat returned to the factory thirty 
minutes later and was shocked to find the furnace door glowing with heat.  They had 
accidentally discovered the secret to burning anthracite—the air flow had to go through 
the coal rather than over it.  With the anthracite lit, the men rushed back to the factory 
and were able to make four runs of iron wire from its heat.  Josiah White became a 
committed advocate of anthracite from this point forward and estimated that it enabled 
him to produce iron wire for $17 per ton, versus a cost of $52 with bituminous coal.
 21
  
The higher heat levels of anthracite meant less coal was needed (five bushels of Lehigh 
coal versus twenty bushels of Virginia coal) and the smelting process required half the 
labor.
22
   
                                                
21
 Powell, Philadelphia's First Fuel Crisis: Jacob Cist and the Developing Market for Pennsylvania 
Anthracite, 50-51. 
22
 These savings are described in a testimonial produced for Jacob Cist by White and Hazard in November 
of 1814, as cited in: Hansell, Josiah White: Quaker Entrepreneur, 33. 
 45 
Jacob Cist was the earliest booster who systematically sought to overcome the 
popular prejudice against anthracite coal.
23
  If anyone’s background could have prepared 
him better to be an anthracite advocate, it is difficult to imagine.  Jacob’s father was 
Charles Cist, one of the founders of the Lehigh Coal & Mine Company, and as a young 
man, Jacob had attended many of the company’s business meetings.  His uncle was Jacob 
Weiss, the man Philip Ginder had initially contacted to determine whether he had 
discovered coal.  In addition, he had inherited his father’s shares in the company and 
knew many of the other shareholders.  Cist advanced his position in 1807 by marrying the 
daughter of Wilkes-Barre’s richest merchant Matthias Hollenback, thereby becoming a 
partner in an extensive trading network that extended from New York City to 
Philadelphia.  Moreover, his time in Wilkes-Barre exposed him to numerous blacksmiths, 
iron manufacturers, and farmers who had solved the challenges of using anthracite as an 
industrial and home heating fuel.
24
   
 While Jacob Cist had been interested in anthracite from his early years, he made 
his most significant efforts to expand the trade during the War of 1812.  As part of the 
hostilities, the British Navy had successfully blockaded most of the American seaports, 
including Philadelphia.  As a result, Philadelphia craftsmen were experiencing soaring 
fuel costs.  Virginia coal, which had been selling for thirty cents a bushel in 1812 had 
risen to over a dollar in 1813.
25
  The sense of crisis was sufficient to encourage a group of 
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Philadelphia manufacturers, including the prolific inventor Oliver Evans, to form The 
Mutual Assistance Coal Company of Philadelphia for the Promotion of Manufactures.  
This organization sought to ensure steady deliveries of coal to the city’s craftsmen.  Cist 
used this fuel crisis to expand his coal operations and seek to develop a permanent market 
in the Quaker City.  He formed partnerships with Isaac Chapman, Charles Miner, and 
John Robinson to collaborate in the venture.   
 With his personal connections, Cist easily obtained a lease from the dormant 
Lehigh Coal Mine Company to mine coal and use its timber lands.
26
  From a transport 
perspective, Jacob Cist and his partners did little to innovate on existing practices.  In 
1813, Cist sent coal to market in Philadelphia from the Wyoming Valley using wagons.  
The coal sold for a dollar per bushel, although its transport cost of $20 per ton meant that 
little profit was made (there are approximately 28 bushels in a ton).  In the following 
years, the partners used the old road of the Lehigh Coal Mine Company to transport coal 
from the Summit Hill mine to the banks of the Lehigh River, where the coal was shipped 
to market via arks.  Cist hoped to achieve costs of $7.50 per ton shipped along the river, 
but his actual expenses ended up being $10.50, 90 percent of which were transport-
related ($1 for mining, $3 for hauling, $5.50 for arking, $1 for provisions).
27
  For 
comparative purposes, an 1816 report from the U.S. Senate noted that the cost of 
shipping a ton of goods 3,000 miles from Europe was only $9.00, or $.50 less than the 
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110-mile journey from the Summit Hill mine to Philadelphia.
28
  Because of the scarcity 
of coal in Philadelphia due to the War of 1812, Cist, Chapman, and Robinson were able 
to sell the Lehigh coal for nearly a dollar a bushel, making a profit of $1,650 from selling 
100 tons for $2,700.
29
     
 Chapman coordinated the hiring of laborers to dig coal and teams to transport it to 
the river.  He also worked to establish a settlement at Mauch Chunk (just north of 
Lausanne), believing that a community of trained craftsmen would help to develop the 
coal trade.  Jacob Cist focused on marketing.  He worked extensively to encourage 
Philadelphians to use anthracite coal in homes and factories and employed a multi-prong 
strategy.  For example, he hired Peter Yarrington, a Wyoming Valley blacksmith, to visit 
Philadelphia iron works and instruct the smiths on techniques for using anthracite.  He 
published circulars in Philadelphia newspapers describing the benefits of anthracite and 
encouraging its use.  He also engaged in scientific studies expanding the base of 
knowledge about stone coal, for example, by mapping the coal seams and providing 
estimates of the available reserves.
30
   
 Cist’s marketing efforts were critical to the later adoption of anthracite coal, but 
his work did not translate into personal financial success.  When the War of 1812 ended, 
the price advantage of anthracite disappeared.  Most Philadelphia craftsmen returned to 
burning Virginia bituminous once it returned to the pre-war level of $.30 per bushel 
(approximately $8.40 per ton, less than the transportation costs of Lehigh coal).  Cist and 
Chapman soon abandoned their efforts and Cist focused on his mercantile business in the 
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Wyoming Valley.  He would continue to be interested in anthracite ventures until his 
premature death at age 43 in 1825.    
 By 1815, there had been several efforts to introduce anthracite coal, but they had 
not been financially successful.  This early period reveals several lessons.  First, there 
were numerous anthracite boosters.  These men not only sought personal profit, they also 
hoped to improve the position of the young nation.  Second, the efforts to develop a coal 
trade occurred in a world of energy abundance, not scarcity.  While the war of 1812 
created a temporary energy shortage that was advantageous to anthracite boosters, most 
of the time people had sufficient supplies of firewood, water, coal, and muscles to meet 
their needs.  Anthracite was seen as an opportunity to replace other sources, not as a 
social necessity.  Third, the cost of transport was a significant hindrance that early 
boosters failed to overcome.  Coal could be shipped more cheaply to Philadelphia from 
Britain, Nova Scotia, and Virginia than the Lehigh Valley.  As Cist’s account books 
show, 90 percent of the cost of anthracite in Philadelphia was for transportation, and only 
10 percent was for mining.  Finally, the particular properties of anthracite coal created an 
additional challenge for boosters.  Consumers needed to redesign furnaces and learn new 
techniques to burn anthracite.  Marketing efforts by anthracite merchants during this 
period, therefore, played an important role in laying the groundwork for the future 
success of the trade.   
 
The Lehigh River and the First Transport Revolution, 1817-1825 
 In 1820, Josiah White and Erskine Hazard succeeded where so many others had 
failed.  That year, they were able to improve the river enough to deliver 365 tons of 
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anthracite to Philadelphia.  While the movement of a few hundred tons of coal was 
hardly revolutionary, it marked the beginning of a new energy landscape in the mid-
Atlantic.  By investing in infrastructure to lower the cost of moving coal from the Lehigh 
Valley to Philadelphia, Josiah White, Erskine Hazard, and the laborers of the Lehigh Coal 
& Navigation Company eliminated the most significant obstacle to the consumption of 
anthracite coal on the eastern seaboard.  Coal was now part of the energy hinterland of 
Philadelphia.   
 Josiah White was born in Mount Holly, New Jersey in 1781 to a devoutly Quaker 
family of moderate means.  He received a rudimentary education, but was always far 
more interested in practice than theory, and his practical abilities were impressive.  He 
was apprenticed to a Philadelphia hardware store owner at the age of 15 and within a 
couple years he was running the store himself.  He soon opened his own store and by the 
age of 28 had amassed a small fortune of $40,000.  He planned to retire as a gentleman 
farmer, but Catherine Ridgeway, his young wife, died.  Grief-stricken, White spent the 
next two years traveling.  When he returned to Philadelphia in 1809, he married Elizabeth 
White (no relation).   
 In 1810, White decided to re-enter the business world, a decision that would have 
far-reaching effects on the development of the anthracite trade.  In that year, he purchased 
the Schuylkill Falls from Robert Kennedy for $14,000.
31
  The deal included property on 
either side of the Schuylkill River and a charter to dam the river and charge tolls for 
passage.  White described a sense of financial opportunity and civic responsibility as 
important motivators: “If I succeeded, it would lead to a similar improvement in the 
                                                
31
 This property was located about a mile north of the current Fairmount Dam.   
 50 
interior of Pennsylvania which would be of great public good.  While the water power 
& the Falls would make it a profitable investment to me & fully as well as to invest my 
capital elsewhere.”
32
   
White’s property along the Schuylkill was a site of technological innovation and 
financial strain.  The challenge was daunting.  In 1810, no American river the size of the 
Schuylkill had been successfully dammed.  White tried a number of designs before 
discovering that an angled dam would bear the water pressure without folding.
33
  
Building the dam, however, cost White almost all of his fortune.  Even though the 
technical achievement was widely regarded by his contemporaries, it did not generate a 
profit.  One of his plans was to sell water power from the dam to industrial enterprises, 
but he found no customers.  He also sought to earn money by charging a $.50 toll—the 
maximum allowable by law—on boats using his lock.  These charges generated a 
firestorm of criticism among boating men who had been accustomed to free use of the 
Schuylkill.    
 At the same time he was building the dam, White also established two factories 
on the property, one to manufacture iron nails and the other to produce iron wire.  His 
innovative ideas soon drew the interest of Erskine Hazard who became his partner in 
1811.  The men met at the house of Ebenezer Hazard, Erskine’s father.  Ebenezer Hazard 
was the first postmaster of the United States and hosted many gatherings of Quakers.  
Seven years younger than Josiah, Erskine shared his mechanical aptitude and business 
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interests, and also had the benefit of formal education.
34
  Erskine attended Princeton 
and had published original scientific research on electricity in 1809.  Erskine’s brother 
Samuel was the editor of the widely circulated journal Hazard’s Register.    
 White and Hazard created several innovations at the Whitestown Manufacturing 
Company, as the factories were known.  White took out a patent in 1810 for a new 
method of rolling nails and after Hazard visited France to witness new methods of 
producing wire, they filed a patent on new techniques in 1812.  They developed a new 
model for an iron canal boat that worked, although it was not financially successful.  
After a pedestrian bridge over the Schuylkill was destroyed by a flood, White and Hazard 
erected the first wire suspension bridge in America in 1816.
35
  Most importantly, their 
work at the factories exposed White and Hazard to the benefits of using anthracite coal in 
manufacturing processes.   
Despite White and Hazard’s clear inventive genius, the Whitestown 
Manufacturing Company was only moderately successful, in part due to the general 
economic decline of the period.  Then disaster struck in April of 1815.  A fire broke out 
and the factories burned to the ground, forcing White to go $20,000 into debt and to sell 
nearly half of the property.   
 White and Hazard also turned their attention in these early years to the 
development of the Schuylkill River.  Philadelphians had been interested in improving 
the Schuylkill since the time of William Penn.  They knew that improved river transport 
would enhance the Quaker City’s position as the nation’s trading center and give its 
manufacturers access to upstream markets.  Benjamin Franklin was part of a group that 
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led an effort in the 18
th
 century to remove large rocks from the middle of the river, but 
financial limitations meant they only improved a small section.  In the winter of 1812-
1813, White and Hazard presented petitions to the Pennsylvania legislature requesting a 
charter to improve the river and charge tolls for navigation.  However, the unpopularity 
of the toll charges White was charging at the Schuylkill Falls created a strong backlash 
among boatmen towards his proposal.  They noted that he had charged the maximum toll 
allowable by law at the Schuylkill Falls and feared he would do the same along the entire 
length of the river.  In addition, even though White and Hazard envisioned shipping coal 
along the Schuylkill, Frederick Fraily, a state Senator, denied there was coal along the 
river, just a black rock that would not burn.
36
 
The Pennsylvania legislature authorized the creation of the Schuylkill Navigation 
Company in 1815.  White became one of the largest shareholders of the corporation, and 
hoped to be appointed a manager, based on his advocacy for improving the Schuylkill 
and his proven record in river improvements.  However, at the first meeting of the board 
of directors, his opponents prevailed and White was denied an active role in the 
development of the Schuylkill, being relegated to an oversight role as a commissioner.  
Over the next two years, White and Hazard offered several proposals to the directors of 
the Schuylkill Navigation Company regarding the delivery of coal, but these were 
rejected.  In a rage, White is reported to have exclaimed: “This ends our using the 
Schuylkill!  I’ll go to another region!  The … Lehigh … I’ll make the Lehigh a rival to 
the Schuylkill.”
37
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While the above quotation is most likely apocryphal, it is a good approximation 
of what happened.  White and Hazard turned their attention to the Lehigh River and its 
coal resources.  In December of 1817, White surveyed the river along with his 
stonemason William Briggs and George Hauto, a flamboyant man who often visited 
White and Hazard to discuss engineering matters.  Short on cash and with little backing, 
White had to rent a horse and borrow the surveying equipment that had been used in 1791 
by the ill-fated Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company.  After surveying the river for a 
week, White returned convinced that he could make the necessary improvements to 
ensure a regular coal trade.  He, Hazard, and Hauto decided to form a partnership.   
Few people shared White’s confidence, a fact that worked for and against the 
partners.  On the positive side, it made obtaining a corporate charter much easier.  
Corporate charters had to be approved by a vote of the state legislature at the time, 
making them rare and valuable.  Hauto wrote the proposed legislation, asking for 
extensive rights to the river, and then argued the case before the legislature in German, 
the main language of the assembly at the time.  The charter was granted without much 
debate, largely because everyone expected them to fail.  According to White’s 
recollection, there had been at least seven charters granted to improve the Lehigh over the 
last half-century.
38
  As one legislator is reported to have expressed it, the men were 
“given permission to ruin themselves.”
39
  The broad corporate privileges given to the 
partners, in particular the right to ship and mine coal, would later be hotly contested, but 
it caused little debate at the time.  In addition, the partners were easily able to obtain a 
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lease from the dormant Lehigh Coal Mine Company to use its properties as no other 
parties were seeking to develop the Lehigh region.
40
   
On the other hand, the lack of faith in White’s endeavor made it much more 
difficult to raise capital.  In his memoirs, he describes the reception of prominent 
Philadelphians to his proposal, which ranged from polite refusals to men who signaled 
the end of the discussion by picking up the newspaper.
41
  To make their project more 
attractive, the partners pursued several strategies, including hiring independent engineers 
to survey the lands and evaluate the proposal, splitting the company into a coal mining 
company and a transportation company, and agreeing that investors would receive 
dividends before the partners.
42
  White and Hazard had also expected Hauto to help them 
raise money from his wealthy friends in New York and Baltimore.  This did not happen.  
White and Hazard soon discovered that Hauto was widely considered to be a confidence 
man and swindler and eventually forced him out of the partnership.
43
   
The difficulty in attracting investors was not because of a broader social 
resistance to transport infrastructure.  For example, the Schuylkill Navigation Company 
had raised $500,000 very quickly two years earlier.
44
  Instead, investors worried about the 
difficulty of improving the Lehigh and whether there was a sufficient market for 
anthracite.   Moreover, the Lehigh Valley was less densely settled than the Schuylkill 
region, which meant there were fewer potential investors.  As John Majewski has shown, 
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Pennsylvania farmers were large investors in transport infrastructure because they 
hoped to improve the value of their land and their access to market, not because they 
expected the company to return dividends.
45
   
 White and Hazard finally got capital investors when John Stoddardt agreed to 
invest $10,000.  Stoddardt was a successful land speculator, and his backing encouraged 
several others to join him.  Soon afterwards, White and Hazard had raised $100,000 and 
formed the Lehigh Coal Company and the Lehigh Navigation Company in the fall of 
1818.
46
  In 1821, the two companies were merged to form the Lehigh Coal & Navigation 
Company.   
 With capital, a corporate charter, and the rights to coal properties in the Lehigh 
Valley, White and Hazard turned their attention to improving the river and road from 
Summit Hill.  At this point, White’s practical mind turned to great advantage.  The 
partners started simple.  Because there was little incentive to ship goods upriver (as the 
upper Lehigh Valley was sparsely settled and had few consumers) they devoted their 
attention to improving downriver navigation for coal arks.  Their primary strategy was to 
funnel the flow of the river towards the middle, thereby creating a deeper channel for 
arks, and to remove obstacles like large rocks from the middle.   
 White and thirteen workers traveled to Lausanne in August of 1818 and began 
work.  They removed large rocks from the middle of the river and built stone walls that 
created a deeper channel at wide points.  By the end of 1818, there were over three 
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hundred men working on the river.
47
  White estimated that this was the largest group of 
men working on a public improvement project in Pennsylvania at the time.
48
 
 Clearing stones and forming channels made navigating the river easier, but could 
not address the challenge of irregular water flow.  Local residents had told White that the 
water never dropped below a certain point on a rock in the river.  The next year a severe 
drought lowered the water level a foot below this line.
49
  In response, White decided to 
use the system of pond freshets to ensure adequate water depth.  Sometimes used by 
lumbermen, pond freshets involved creating a temporary dam that would build up a large 
pool of water.  When the dam was released, lumber could be floated downstream on the 
long wave of high water that had been gathered.  In 1819, White directed his workers to 
create a series of dams along the Lehigh that would allow shipments of coal regardless of 
the river’s water level.   
While the artificial dams developed by lumbermen were often temporary, White 
needed a more permanent system.  Therefore, he developed an innovative lock 
mechanism that made it simple to trap and release the water.  Using hydrostatic pressure, 
the gates could be opened and closed by pressing a single lever, allowing a boatman to 
release the boats and water and reset the gates after the last ark had passed.  If a curious 
passerby asked what the men were building, they responded that the gates were “bear 
traps,” an early form of trade secrecy.  The name stuck, and White filed for a patent on 
his design in December of 1819.
50
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 The partners also knew it was essential to improve the road from Summit Hill 
to Lausanne.  White re-graded the road so that it descended its entire length without a 
single rise.  He claimed that this was the longest such road in America at the time.
51
  In 
addition, he redesigned the wheels of the wagons used to carry the coal.  He installed 
wheels of varying width and coated them with iron.  Thus equipped, the wagon wheels 
flattened and improved the road with use instead of creating ruts.  These changes to the 
road allowed White to lower the cost of transporting coal from the mines to the river from 
the $4.00 per ton paid by Cist and Chapman to 62.5 cents by the early 1820s.
52
  In 
addition, White and Hazard turned the fledgling community of Mauch Chunk (just north 
of Lausanne) into a company town.  The active managers of the company operated from 
Mauch Chunk beginning in the early 1820s while the financial management was centered 
in Philadelphia.   
It is easy to celebrate White and Hazard’s vision and technical management, but 
without hundreds of hard-working men who have been lost in the historical record, the 
river could not have been improved.  The labor conditions were basic, regardless of 
whether the work was performed in the river, in the mine, or on the road.  The main tools 
were shovels, picks, dynamite, wheelbarrows, and most important, human muscle.  To 
create the bear trap locks, the men spent several hours a day up to their waists in water, 
with a hole cut in the toe of their boots so that the water would drain out.  The river banks 
were largely unsettled, so White constructed a series of flat boats that served as a floating 
camp for the workers.  As they completed any section of the river, they floated the boats 
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down river a little ways, anchored them, and began working again.  Workers 
considered it a significant improvement in working conditions when primitive mattresses 
were purchased a few years later.
53
  
Work relations seem to have been relatively smooth, as there were no reported 
interruptions, although there were clearly underlying tensions.  White adopted the dress 
of the workers (red flannel shirt, buckskin coated pants, boots with holes in the toe) and 
worked in the river with the men.  However, the managers took several precautions that 
indicate separations between themselves and the workers.  First, they made clear that all 
wage checks had to be signed by at least two of the managers, so that a group of workers 
could not accost one of the managers in the forest and force him to sign a check.  Second, 
the managers instilled “cob” laws borrowed from sailing culture.  Workers who took 
more food than they could eat, ran “in any way uncivil” to their meals, or misbehaved in 
other ways, were to be cobed, or spanked with a paddle.
54
  White claimed the workers 
requested these laws to be put in place, although this statement seems unlikely to be 
true.
55
   
We do not know a lot about the laborers themselves.  Commentators at the time 
were quick to make distinctions between the thrifty, hard-working Yankee or German 
laborers and the dirty, drinking Irish hands, a common trope of the mid-nineteenth 
century.  For instance, Anne Royall, a traveler who recorded her journeys, wrote: “But 
the Teagues, poor fellows, they are strung along the canal, scarcely alive, stupid from 
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drink…  I have been informed that they generally live about 18 months after coming to 
this country, and work and drink most of the time.  They care little about eating, provided 
they get whiskey.”
56
  Without doubt these sentiments say as much about 19
th
 century 
attitudes as the workers themselves.  We know that they must have worked very hard 
under difficult circumstances, facing dangers from accidents, the elements, and disease.  
 By the fall of 1820, the river was sufficiently improved that the company could 
send its first 365 tons of coal to market.  Eight of eleven bear trap locks had been 
completed along with several wing-dams and miles of stone walls.  While there were 
several setbacks during construction—ice floods during the winters destroyed some of 
the work and a series of slate ledges proved so difficult to improve that they forced White 
to invest an additional $40,000 in the company—the fast pace of work and low cost was 
remarkable.  While it would take over ten years and more than two million dollars to 
create a functioning canal along the Schuylkill River, the Lehigh Coal & Navigation 
Company had created a system that made it possible to deliver coal at competitive prices 
in two years and for less than $200,000.
57
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Map 1.1: Lehigh Canal 
 
 Transforming the built environment of the Lehigh River made it possible for 
White and Hazard to deliver anthracite coal to Philadelphia where they could profitably 
sell it for $8.40 a ton, about the same price as Virginia coal.  However, shipping coal to 
market and selling it were two different things.  As the company itself noted, the first 365 
tons were only disposed of “with difficulty.”
58
  The company had to overcome some of 
the prejudices against anthracite coal that stymied earlier boosters.  In addition to 
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working with craftsmen, White & Hazard also hoped to develop a domestic trade using 
anthracite for home heating.   
 The domestic market was attractive both because of its large potential and the 
increasing price of firewood in cities such as Philadelphia, New York, and Boston.  As 
early as 1744, Benjamin Franklin observed that firewood was getting more expensive and 
had to be fetched from further away, leading him to develop a stove that would heat 
houses more efficiently.
59
  Although shipping lumber down the Schuylkill and Delaware 
rivers from longer distances over the next several decades ensured that no acute shortage 
had occurred by 1820, firewood prices had steadily increased.  Given that a poor family 
required at least 2.5 cords of wood per winter while a wealthy family often used more 
than 20, it was no surprise that coal boosters saw the potential of the domestic market.
60
  
Several contemporary writers noted the increasing price of firewood and worried that 
dwindling supplies would present a limit to urban growth.
61
    
 However, the difficulty of burning anthracite was a significant hindrance to its 
adoption.  Consumers had to invest in a specially designed stove or grate and alter their 
heating and cooking practices.  Because burning anthracite in a stove meant abandoning 
the pleasant flame of an open hearth, many objected on aesthetic grounds.  White and 
Hazard undertook several efforts to overcome these challenges.  First, White had his wife 
Elizabeth maintain a burning anthracite fire in their home at all times so that people could 
                                                
59
 Sean P. Adams, "Warming the Poor and Growing Consumers: Fuel Philanthropy in the Early Republic's 
Urban North," Journal of American History 95, no. 1 (2008). 
60
 A cord of wood was a stacked pile of wood four feet wide, eight feet long, and four feet high.  For 
estimates of fuel consumption see: "Fuel Savings Society," Hazard's Register, August 20, 1831; 
"Anthracite Coal, Versus Wood," Hazard's Register, November 15, 1834; Adams, "Warming the Poor and 
Growing Consumers: Fuel Philanthropy in the Early Republic's Urban North." 
61
 "Exposition," Miners' Journal, April 2, 1831. 
 62 
see it in operation.
62
  Second, both White and Hazard wrote articles to newspapers 
extolling the value of anthracite in the home.  In an article appearing in The Democratic 
Press, White noted that Lehigh coal was better than wood for family use, as it “burns 
with a more durable fire, is beautiful in an open parlour gate, and does not foul the 
chimney.”
63
  Third, the company advertised anthracite with pamphlets that gave 
testimonials by homeowners and craftsmen about the benefits of Lehigh coal.
64
 
 Their efforts had some, but not complete success.  The company increased its 
shipments to 1,073 tons in 1821, 2,240 tons in 1822, and 5,823 tons in 1823.  However, at 
the beginning of the 1824 season, there were still over 1,000 tons unsold in Philadelphia 
warehouses.  The company’s board of directors recommended that the company ship 
2,000-3,000 tons that year.  White and Hazard objected strenuously.  They argued that 
customers needed to be assured that a full supply would always be available in order to 
have confidence to switch over.  Supply, they believed, needed to drive demand.  White 
and Hazard carried the day, and the company delivered 9,451 tons of anthracite in 1824, 
lowering the price to $7.00 per ton.
65
  
According to White, the winter of 1824-1825 was the turning point in the history 
of anthracite coal consumption.  He credited the decision to flood the market with 
anthracite for the success because it reassured consumers.
66
  While this was an important 
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factor, White and Hazard were not the only ones driving anthracite demand.  If 
consumers were worried about a steady supply of anthracite, they would have felt far 
more secure because the opening of the Schuylkill Canal in 1825 meant that two canal 
systems were delivering coal.  New designs of stove grates by iron manufacturers also 
made it cheaper and easier for homeowners to burn anthracite.  Finally, there were timber 
shortages in 1825 that caused high prices for firewood.
67
 
 By 1825, the prospects for the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company and the 
anthracite trade were extremely promising.  This was a large relief to White & Hazard as 
raising money to complete the bear-lock navigation system in the early 1820s had been 
difficult, requiring them to offer favorable terms to investors and apply their own capital.  
Once the consumption of anthracite in homes had gained considerable momentum, it 
made a significant difference to the company’s finances.  The first dividends were sent to 
investors in 1822 and by 1824, White and Hazard received dividends as well.
68
  The 
energy landscape of the mid-Atlantic had been altered in a way that made ever-increasing 
supplies of fossil fuels a possibility.   
 
System Expansion, 1825-1840 
 Energy landscapes are not static.  The creation of descending-only navigation on 
the Lehigh River opened the market for anthracite coal.  In the years following 1825, 
however, increased consumer demand threatened to exceed the capacity of the bear trap 
lock navigation system.  After shipping over 9,000 tons in 1824, the company delivered 
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28,393 tons in 1825 and 31,280 in 1826.
69
  The anthracite market showed no signs of 
slowing.  For example, Floyd Bailey, a New York coal merchant, signed an agreement 
with the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company to deliver 10,000 tons of anthracite in 1825 
and increase the shipments by 7,000 tons every year.
70
  The system of bear trap locks 
could ship several thousand tons of coal per year, but not hundreds of thousands of tons.  
Supply and demand could only operate synergistically if enhancements to the energy 
landscape of anthracite flows could deliver ever-increasing quantities of fossil fuel 
energy.   
 Wood was the primary limitation of White and Hazard’s bear trap navigation 
system.  Coal was delivered to markets on wooden arks that could only be used once.  
Each ark was built by workers at Mauch Chunk and loaded with about sixty tons of coal 
and floated to Philadelphia.  In Philadelphia, the boatmen broke up the arks and sold the 
wood as lumber.
71
  This required substantial amounts of wood.  Each ark was 16-18 feet 
wide and 20-25 feet long.  In 1827, the company reported that the arks used to ship coal 
that year would have stretched more than fifteen miles if placed end to end, requiring 
more than seven million feet of lumber.
72
  While the company had access to large forest 
tracts in the upper Lehigh Valley, the use of wood in arks was already contributing to 
deforestation in the area.  White feared that if they did not develop ascending navigation, 
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which would allow them to reuse canal boats, they would soon run out of wood.
73
  
Moreover, a large canal could support canal boats capable of carrying far more coal than 
the 60-ton arks.    
 In 1826, White and Hazard turned their attention to revamping their entire 
infrastructure system.  First, they replaced the road from the Summit Hill mine with a 
gravity railroad.  This was a major technological accomplishment and one of the longest 
railroads in the world at the time.  White claims to have planned this project as early as 
1818, but could not justify the capital expenditure until shipments increased.
74
  In 1826, 
White presented his plan to the Board of Directors, even creating a 100-foot scale model.  
The company hired William Strickland to review the proposal.  Strickland was one of the 
few Americans experienced with railroad improvements, since he had been sent to 
Europe to study roads, canals, and railroads the previous year by the Pennsylvania 
Society for Internal Improvements.  He approved the plan and the company started work 
the following winter. 
Workmen installed over twelve miles of track—nine miles from the river to the 
mine, and then nearly four miles of branching lines inside the mine.  White chose a 
relatively cheap method of construction, laying wooden rails across wooden ties and 
covering the wooden rails with iron, abandoning the British practice of fixing rails to 
granite blocks.  Each railroad car could carry a ton and a half of coal, and descended the 
entire length by gravity.  Horses and mules rode down in empty cars and then hauled the 
empty cars back up the tracks.  To increase efficiency, the animals were fed on the 
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descending journey leading some to quip that these were the first railroad dining cars.
75
  
Each team could complete two and a half trips in a day.  The gravity railroad was 
completed in under four months at a cost of $38,726.  It immediately paid dividends by 
lowering the cost of transportation of coal from mine to river to 22 cents per ton.
76
   
The gravity railroad was a major technological accomplishment and soon became 
a tourist attraction.  Passengers could ride the line in specialized cars, and many flocked 
to Mauch Chunk for the privilege.  The cars went as fast as 30 miles per hour, a dizzying 
speed at the time that few people had ever experienced before.
77
  Unfortunately, at this 
speed the horses and mules became sick, so the cars were usually run more slowly for 
coal deliveries.
78
   
 The company next turned its attention to creating a canal that would facilitate 
ascending and descending navigation.  Although canals may seem simply like large 
ditches, they were complex technological systems and among the largest undertakings of 
the early nineteenth century.  Canals involved significant engineering knowledge and 
skills, including “locks, feeder canals to provide water in the highest part of the canal, 
dams to protect the canal from spring floods, and aqueducts and tunnels to overcome 
valleys and mountains.”
79
  The loose soil along the Delaware and Lehigh rivers created 
an additional challenge for canal builders.  In order to maintain the water depth in the 
channel, workers needed to line the canal with planks and hydraulic cement.  Engineers 
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on the recently completed Erie Canal had worked out solutions to some of these 
problems, but the practice of building canals in America was still in its infancy in 1825.    
Canvass White, an engineer on the Erie Canal and no relation to Josiah, was hired 
by the company in 1827 to direct the efforts.  Under his guidance, the workers 
constructed a navigation that was a combination of canal (36 miles) and slack-water (10 
miles), with a tow-path along the entire length.
80
  The canal was sixty feet wide on the 
surface, forty-five feet wide on the bottom, and five feet deep.  There were fifty-six locks 
between Mauch Chunk and Easton, varying in height from six to nine feet.  The total fall 
over this stretch was 355 feet.  To ensure that the canal could support large shipments of 
coal, Josiah White insisted that the locks be big enough to allow two boats of 120-ton 
capacity to pass at one time.  The locks were 22 feet wide and 100 feet long, much larger 
than typical canal locks.
81
  The work took two years to complete and Canvass White 
calculated that the total cost was $781,303.
82
     
 The gravity railroad and canal system significantly expanded the quantities of 
coal the company could ship to markets.  However, the company did not immediately feel 
the benefits of their improvements to the Lehigh River because there was not a 
comparable upgrade to the Delaware River.  Most of the year, the Delaware River could 
float small arks, but its water level was not always sufficient to handle 120-ton canal 
boats.  White and Hazard had long recognized this situation.  As early as 1823 they 
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petitioned the state government to allow them to improve the Delaware River.  Their 
proposal was rejected for several reasons.  White’s ambitious plan called for a canal big 
enough to handle 150-ton steam-powered ocean-going vessels led many to doubt the 
credibility of the proposal.  Other users of the river were worried that White would 
charge high tolls as he had on the Schuylkill River.  Finally, this was the hey-day of canal 
building, and many thought the state should build the canal itself so as to reap the 
profits.
83
 
In 1827, Pennsylvania lawmakers decided to construct a canal along the Delaware 
River as part of the Pennsylvania canal system.  However, the state engineers decided to 
pursue a different strategy than White and Hazard hoped.  Instead of creating a large 
canal able to handle heavy coal boats, they decided to follow the European model of 
small canals.  William Strickland’s influential 1826 report on European improvements 
reported that small canals were more economical.
84
  While this may have been true in the 
European context, small canals would limit the exponential growth of the anthracite coal 
trade.  The 120-ton capacity boats of the Lehigh company would have to be unloaded 
onto smaller boats at Easton to travel down the Delaware at times of low water, thereby 
increasing the cost of Lehigh coal and limiting the region’s ability to deliver anthracite to 
markets.  As one historian aptly stated, it was as if the Lehigh River were a coal highway 
leading to a dirt path.
85
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The design of the canal was not the only limitation of the Delaware Division 
Canal.  Construction problems plagued the project from the beginning.  The state hoped 
to save money on construction by authorizing only small contracts to several companies.  
Without expert oversight, much of the work was shoddy and had to be redone.  Finally, 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey fought over the water rights of the Delaware and could not 
come to an amicable agreement.  Pennsylvania had to supply all the water for the canal, 
which often proved insufficient, especially given the leaky soil along the river banks.  By 
1830, the canal was declared completed, but in reality it was hardly functional.  
Embarrassed by its poor performance, the state turned to Josiah White and asked him to 
direct repairs to the canal.  Over the next couple years, he oversaw the work (without 
salary) and the Delaware Division canal re-opened in October of 1832.  The total bill was 
at least $1,238,028, nearly double its initial budget of $686,596.
86
  
 With the completion of the Lehigh and Delaware Division canals, the built 
environment of the mid-Atlantic took on a new shape.  Combined with the Schuylkill 
Navigation Company, Delaware & Hudson canal, and other improvements in the region 
that will be discussed in the next section, the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company had 
altered the energy landscape to handle hundreds of thousands and even millions of tons of 
coal per year cheaply and reliably.  For example, White estimated that the annual 
capacity of the Lehigh Canal was over two and a half million tons of coal.
87
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 The new energy landscape was quickly put to work.  By 1825, consumers were 
becoming more acquainted with the benefits of anthracite coal and increased their use 
correspondingly.  Consumer demand was encouraged by several factors, such as 
publication of reports by scientists demonstrating the superior heating qualities of 
anthracite.
88
  In 1830, it was estimated that Philadelphians spent $308,400 on coal for 
heating and New Yorkers over $320,000, and most of this was anthracite.
89
  New York 
City was sufficiently dependent on anthracite for its heating needs that a shortage in 
supply over the winter of 1831-1832 caused widespread alarm and led to donations of 
money for the poor.
90
  While less than 10,000 tons of anthracite were sold in all markets 
in 1824, sales increased to 107,815 tons in 1829, 394,986 in 1834, and 782,458 in 1839.
91
  
This growth was facilitated by the synergistic relationship between supply and price.  The 
more anthracite people used, the cheaper it became.  The price of anthracite was reduced 
from $8.40 per wholesale ton in Philadelphia in 1820 to $7.00 in 1825, $6.50 in 1830 and 
$5.50 by 1840.
92
  Lowering prices facilitated the development of a positive feedback loop 
between demand and supply characteristic of a mineral economy.   
 The years between 1825 and 1840 also saw the development of anthracite in new 
markets such as steam engines and steam vessels.  The creation of these markets will be 
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discussed in greater depth in the next chapter, but two points are notable in the 
meantime.  First, each of these markets required boosters to help create them.  Scientists, 
engineers, capitalists, and politicians worked to solve the technical difficulties involved 
in applying anthracite to new tasks and turn technological possibilities into financially 
practical industries.  The Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company was one of the industry’s 
most important boosters, in particular helping to develop the anthracite iron trade 
beginning in the late 1830s.  Second, once new practices were established, consumption 
patterns increased dramatically.  As people learned to use coal in new ways, they always 
seemed to want more.   
 The increased activity of the coal trade drew significant attention to the Lehigh 
Coal & Navigation Company’s activities.  In general, this public attention was negative.  
While few people had cared about the generous privileges given to White and Hazard in 
1818, by the early 1830s, these were under attack.  In particular, people argued that the 
right to both mine and ship coal gave the company a virtual monopoly in the 
development of the Lehigh Valley since its competitors would be dependent on the canal 
for transport.  In contrast to the few operators in the Lehigh Valley, the Schuylkill region 
was a center of individual enterprise, with hundreds of small businesses.  People believed 
the fact that the Schuylkill Navigation Company was not permitted to mine coal led it to 
encourage competition, not create a monopoly.
93
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These protests led to investigations of the company’s operations by the 
Pennsylvania government in 1832 and 1834.  Through hearings, opinion pieces in 
newspapers, and circulated pamphlets, people expressed the view that the Lehigh Coal & 
Navigation Company was a monopoly power.  People suggested a variety of remedies for 
this evil, including rescinding the coal mining privileges of the company, increasing the 
tolls on the Delaware Canal to punish the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company, 
chartering a railroad company with parallel rights of way to introduce competition, and 
exercising the right of the state to purchase the canal and make it a public highway.  
Ultimately, the investigations did not lead to any official action taken against the 
company, and it was able to continue its activities, albeit with much less public support.
94
  
The most significant effect on the company was an inability to amend its corporate 
charter to increase its capitalization, forcing it to carry large amounts of debt.
95
  In 1840, 
there was another series of allegations made in Philadelphia newspapers attacking the 
operations of the company, causing Josiah White to write defenses of the company under 
the pseudonym “Honestas.”
96
 
 The attacks against the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company are important 
because they reveal that people were recognizing the importance of coal to the region’s 
future by the 1830s.  These protests did not question whether the anthracite trade was a 
                                                
94
 See, for instance: Counter Report of the Minority of the Committee to Whom Was Referred the 
Memorials of a Number of the Citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Praying That the Same Rates 
of Toll May Be Charged on the Delaware Division of the Pennsylvania Canal as Are Changed by the 
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company for the Use of the Lehigh Canal and Praying That Additional 
Privileges May Be Granted to the Beaver Meadow Rail-Road Company,  (Harrisburg: Henry Welsh, 1832); 
Josiah White, To the Committee on Corporations of the Senate (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, printers, 
1832); "Report of the Committee of the Senate of Pennsylvania Upon the Subject of the Coal Trade." 
95
 History of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, Published by Order of the Board of Managers, 22. 
96
 X, Exposure of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, by X (Philadelphia: S.n., 1840); Honestas, "A 
Defence of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company from the Assaults Made Upon Its Interests by X.,"  
(Philadelphia: Jesper Harding, 1840). 
 73 
good thing.  Instead, the key question was how the industry would be operated and 
who would derive the benefits.  Anthracite coal, to many people, was too important to be 
left to monopoly powers.   
 By the late 1830s, the continued expansion of anthracite consumption justified 
further extensions of the Lehigh’s transport infrastructure.  The company decided to 
create a canal along the upper section of the Lehigh River between Mauch Chunk and 
Stoddartsville.  Because of the major drop in height over the upper section (600 feet over 
26 miles), the company would need to build seventy-five locks over the stretch if they 
stuck with conventional locks that averaged nine feet.  Even though Josiah White had 
retired from active management of the company in 1831, he was still involved in 
decision-making.  He proposed locks as high as thirty feet tall, which he believed would 
save a full day’s time in transit.  The company began interviewing engineers for the job, 
but none of them thought White’s plan was feasible.  Eventually, the company hired 
Edwin Douglas.  As White described the hiring process, Douglas’ willingness to use his 
design was the key factor: “On apply[g] to Engineers to carry out this plan, they one & all 
objected; some one plea, & some another, untill I came to E. A. Douglass, our present 
Superintendent & Engineer, & he on my nameing the plan to him agreed to it, at once, & 
at once I employ[d] him.”
97
     
This section of the canal, known as the Upper Grand Section, was built between 
1835 and 1838.  Workmen constructed 20 dams, including one as high as 58 feet, as well 
as 29 locks, some as high as 30 feet.  White’s design enabled the locks, even as high as 
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30 feet, to be filled or emptied in less than five minutes.  Edwin Douglas stayed on 
with the company and became its chief engineer until his death in 1860.
98
    
 The Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company’s developments during this period 
demonstrate the interconnections between transport infrastructure and the emergence of 
new energy consumption practices.  The early stages of river improvement allowed the 
company to ship enough coal to begin creating markets.  As those markets developed, 
demand began to drive supply, thereby requiring an expansion of the energy landscape to 
ensure that markets never lacked for coal.  This synergistic pattern of shipping coal, 
working to create demand, and then expanding infrastructure, was an important part of 
the development of a mineral economy.   
 
The Anthracite Canal Network 
 The Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company played a pioneering role in developing 
the anthracite coal trade.  Its early infrastructure developments and marketing efforts laid 
the critical groundwork for the future development of the trade.  However, it was not the 
only player reshaping the energy landscape of the mid-Atlantic.  Several other canals, and 
later railroads, were built during the antebellum era to bring anthracite to markets.  This 
section reviews the broader anthracite transport network, focusing on the competitive and 
collaborative dynamics of the system.   
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Map 1.2: The Anthracite Canal Network, 1840s 
 
 
 Two other major canals delivered coal from northeastern Pennsylvania to the 
eastern seaboard, each connected to one of the main anthracite fields.  One was the 
Schuylkill Navigation Company, which improved the Schuylkill River between 
Philadelphia and the coal regions above Pottsville.  In the beginning, coal did not play an 
important role in the development of the Schuylkill River.  As late as 1818, the 
company’s directors thought 10,000 tons of business per year to be an optimistic 
estimate.
99
  Instead, the goal was to improve navigation for a general trade whereby 
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agricultural goods would flow downriver to Philadelphia and manufactured goods 
would be sent upstream.  Much of the financial support for the company came from 
farmers who lived along its banks and subscribed to a large percentage of its initial 
capitalization of $500,000 in 1815.
100
    
 By the time the canal was actually finished in 1825, after ten years of construction 
and $2.2 million in expenditures, coal was the main article of trade.
101
  Despite starting 
coal shipments five years after the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company in 1825, more 
coal was being shipped along the Schuylkill than the Lehigh by 1828 (47,284 versus 
30,111 tons).  The rate of expansion was dramatic, as the canal shipped 339,508 tons in 
1835 and 452,291 in 1840.  In conjunction with the Reading Railroad, which began 
shipping coal in 1841, the Schuylkill region would ship more anthracite to market than 
any other region up through the Civil War, transporting over three million tons in 
1860.
102
     
 The Delaware & Hudson canal was the second major canal network.  Pioneered 
by the Wurtz brothers of Philadelphia, the Delaware & Hudson canal connected the 
northern coalfields of the Wyoming Valley with New York City via a 60-mile canal 
between the Delaware and Hudson rivers.  Speculators saw it as a great investment 
opportunity.  When shares in the new company were put on the market on January 8, 
1825 in New York City, the whole subscription for $1.5 million was sold out by 2 in the 
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afternoon.
103
  Work began on the canal in July of 1825 and the first canal boats crossed 
it in February of 1829.
104
  Once the canal boats reached the Hudson River near Kingston, 
they could float the remaining distance to New York City.   
 The Delaware & Hudson Canal was more similar to the improvements on the 
Lehigh than the Schuylkill.  The company’s charter gave it the right to mine and ship 
coal, and the development of the Wyoming Valley, like the Lehigh Valley, was managed 
by a few large corporations.  The company also found itself the target of social critique, 
particularly over the price of its coal.  In its 1823 prospectus, used to get a charter from 
the New York legislature, the company claimed it could deliver coal at $3.25 per ton.  By 
1831, the price was still $8.00 and people believed the coal was not as high quality as 
Schuylkill or Lehigh coal.
105
  Despite some rocky starts and poor financial results over its 
first decades, the company also greatly expanded its coal shipments, from 43,000 tons in 
1830 to 148,400 in 1840 and 432,339 in 1850.
106
 
Two canals were built across New Jersey to transport coal from the Lehigh and 
Schuylkill regions to the New York harbor.  The Morris Canal was chartered in 1824.  
This canal cut across the mountainous northern part of the state, connecting Easton, PA 
with Jersey City, NJ.  Because New Jersey lawmakers believed it would be a profitable 
investment, both by bringing Lehigh coal to New York City and stimulating the 
development of trade in the mineral-rich district through which it would pass, the state 
chose to develop the canal itself.  As with the Delaware & Hudson canal, the shares were 
                                                
103
 Miller and Sharpless, The Kingdom of Coal: Work, Enterprise, and Ethnic Communities in the Mine 
Fields, 36. 
104
 Jones, The Economic History of the Anthracite-Tidewater Canals, 76-78. 
105
 Ibid., 81. 
106
 Ibid., 86. 
 78 
sold immediately in a speculative craze in 1825.  However, construction did not go 
smoothly.  The state company installed inclined planes to ascend the nearly fifteen 
hundred feet of elevation gain between Easton and the western end of the canal, but they 
never worked as well as hoped.  Moreover, the small size of the canal meant only 25-ton 
canal boats could travel along it, restricting the amount of coal traffic traveling between 
the Lehigh Valley and New York.  The canal was opened in 1831 as far as Newark and 
was eventually completed to the New York harbor.  It succeeded in stimulating the 
development of the regions along its path, but it never achieved the financial success that 
encouraged its initial development.
107
 
The Delaware & Raritan canal, by contrast, was far more successful, financially 
and as a coal carrier.  Begun in 1830 and completed in 1834, the canal allowed coal boats 
to travel from Trenton, NJ, along the Delaware River, to New Brunswick, where the 
Raritan River led to the New York harbor.  Canvass White, who also worked on the 
Lehigh Canal, led construction efforts and designed the canal to handle large boats.  This 
made it easy for coal shipped from the Lehigh or Schuylkill rivers to be sent directly to 
New York without unloading at Philadelphia, drawing much of the traffic away from the 
Morris Canal.  In addition, the flatter terrain of the middle of New Jersey made canal 
development much easier.  By 1860, more than a million tons of coal were being shipped 
along this route.
108
    
Finally, improvements along the Susquehanna River as part of the State of 
Pennsylvania canal network connected the anthracite regions with Harrisburg and 
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Baltimore.  The North Branch was completed between Northumberland and the 
Nanticoke Dam, 55 miles upriver in 1830.  The Wyoming Division ran for seventeen 
miles above this point, allowing the coal trade to descend along the Susquehanna 
beginning in 1834.  Many hoped the state would build an extension of the North Branch 
connecting the Wyoming Valley to the Erie Canal system thereby introducing anthracite 
to more of New York State.  Despite several attempts to build such a canal, construction 
challenges delayed its completion until 1853.  Overall, the total amounts of coal traveling 
along the Susquehanna River were minor in comparison with shipments along the 
Lehigh, Schuylkill, and Hudson rivers, although as much as five hundred thousand tons 
were carried in 1855.
109
 
 The millions of dollars spent on infrastructure to move coal attest to the critical 
nature transportation played in the development of a fossil-fuel intensive society.  
Anthracite was the major item of trade on all these canals, meaning that their economic 
success was tied to the fate of the coal trade.  Just as important, the coal trade owed its 
success to the activities of the transporting companies.  From an economic perspective, 
the investments in the transportation of coal far outweighed the costs of mining it.  For 
example, by 1834, over $9,750,000 was invested in transport infrastructure (canals and 
railroads) in the anthracite regions while only $1,270,280 was invested in collieries (and 
much of this capital was spent on boats and wagons).
110
  Mining coal was physically 
demanding labor, but there were few barriers to extracting it from the ground, particularly 
in the early years before extensive underground mines were established.  Getting coal to 
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market was much harder and more expensive.
111
  As Thomas Dublin and Walter Licht 
note: “[t]he movers and shakers of the trade would be the transporters and merchandisers 
of coal, not the operators of mines.”
112
    
 While the routes of the canals did not change once they were established, they 
were not static technologies.  In addition to regular maintenance, the canals were steadily 
expanded in order to handle the increased demand for coal.  For example, the Schuylkill 
canal was widened and deepened in 1840 and 1846, allowing 180-ton boats to pass.  The 
Delaware & Hudson canal was enhanced in 1842, 1845, 1850, and 1853 to allow boats to 
increase their loads from 30 tons to 140 tons of coal.
113
  These expansions were crucial to 
making sure that transport of fossil fuels would not limit consumer demand.  Widening 
canals was a key factor in establishing a built environment conducive to the positive 
feedback loops of the mineral economy.   
The canal companies were competitors of one another, seeking to establish the 
primacy of their coal in the market and control the market.
114
  However, in many ways, 
their competitive nature was less important than the synergies between them.  Each of the 
companies worked to build demand for coal, thereby creating a larger base of consumers.  
By providing multiple sources of supply, they generated a more reliable market, making 
customers feel more secure in switching to anthracite.  Even their competitive actions had 
the general effect of increasing the market.  By lowering the cost of coal in rate wars or 
increasing production to gain market share, the companies gave consumers further 
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incentives to use anthracite because it was constantly becoming cheaper and more 
plentiful.  Ultimately, the synergistic growth of the canal companies, not their 
competitive nature, was more important to the development of an energy landscape of 
fossil fuel abundance.   
 
Increased Consumption, Iron, and Railroads, 1840-1860 
 By 1840, consumer demand for anthracite coal had been firmly established.  Over 
the next two decades leading up to the Civil War, three trends were particularly important 
in shaping the activities of the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company and other coal 
transporters: continued expansion of demand for anthracite, the development of an 
anthracite iron industry, and the emergence of railroad competition.   
 Anthracite use continued to expand between 1840 and 1860 by a factor of 10 (see 
Table 1.1).  The largest market remained home heating, although substantial amounts of 
anthracite were used in steam vessels, steam engines, and iron manufacture (as discussed 
in this section and the next chapter).  Moreover, these totals do not include the amounts 
of anthracite consumed in the process of coal mining.  The huge steam engines used to 
pump water and coal to the surface from underground mines consumed additional 
quantities of hundreds of thousands of tons.  These steady increases of demand 
encouraged the continual expansion of the energy landscape to supply the market.   
 82 
Table 1.1: Anthracite Coal Shipments, By Region, in Tons, 1820-1860
115
 
Year Schuylkill Lehigh Wyoming Total % Increase 
1820  365  365  
1825 6,500 28,393  34,893 9459% 
1830 186,059 41,750 43,000 270,809 676% 
1835 339,508 131,250 90,090 560,848 107% 
1840 452,291 225,318 148,470 826,079 47% 
1845 1,083,796 429,453 451,836 1,965,085  138% 
1850 1,712,007 690,456 827,823 3,230,286 64% 
1855 3,318,555 1,284,113 1,771,511 6,374,179 97% 
1860 3,270,516 1,821,674 2,941,817 8,034,007 26% 
 
The second major development during this period was the creation of an 
anthracite iron industry.  In the 1830s, American iron production was lagging behind 
foreign competitors, in both output and quality.  Britain produced far more iron than 
America and iron from Sweden was known for having the highest quality.  Many 
Americans were concerned by this state of affairs and thought the nation’s economic 
future would be strengthened by a robust iron industry.  Discovering how to use 
anthracite for smelting was one way many people thought this process could be 
improved.  However, the emergence of an anthracite iron industry was not inevitable.  It 
was actively shaped by the region’s boosters.  For example, the Franklin Institute of 
Philadelphia offered a prize for anyone that developed a method for smelting iron with 
anthracite in 1835.  A few months later, Nicholas Biddle (president of the Second Bank 
of the United States) and a few friends added a $5,000 cash award to sweeten the pot.
116
  
In 1836, the Pennsylvania legislature granted corporate privileges to any company 
making iron with anthracite coal.
117
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The Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company was also interested in developing an 
iron market and pursued several activities to make this happen.  First, it offered 
inducements to entrepreneurs as early as 1834, such as free water power, lower rates on 
coal, and cheap transport of finished goods to anyone who could produce iron with 
anthracite.  By 1838, one small factory was located in Mauch Chunk, but its production 
was limited to a ton and a half a day.
118
  Second, the company sent representatives to 
Wales where several ironmasters had experience working with anthracite coal.  Solomon 
Roberts, the nephew of Josiah White, traveled in 1837 to Wales and met David Thomas, 
the superintendent at George Crane’s iron factory to learn the process.  The next year 
Erskine Hazard followed Roberts.  The men formed an agreement with George Crane and 
returned with David Thomas to the Lehigh Valley in 1839 to set up a factory.
119
 
 David Thomas scouted the Lehigh Valley and decided to establish his factory at 
Catasqua (about three miles upriver of Allentown).  The Lehigh Crane Iron Company 
was established on May 20, 1839 and produced its first anthracite iron on July 3, 1840.  
The company became highly successful and contributed to a revolution in American iron 
production.  In 1840, there were 6 forges in America making pig iron using anthracite.  
By 1846, there were 42, all of them located in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  A decade 
later, 121 furnaces were forging iron with anthracite and 93 of them were in 
Pennsylvania.  American pig iron production had increased from 220,000 tons in 1842 to 
750,000 tons in 1847.  Anthracite not only helped the iron industry increase its 
production, but the quality of the iron was also generally higher because the coal did not 
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have sulfur and the price was cheaper—$12 per ton compared to $16 per ton for iron 
made with charcoal.
120
   
There were numerous social consequences of this transformation in iron 
production.  First, it generated a geographical change in the location of forges.  
Previously forges were built in forested areas where there was enough wood to generate 
charcoal.  With the adoption of anthracite, furnaces could be clustered along transpor 
networks such as canals.  Moreover, Northeast Pennsylvania became the undisputed 
center of American iron production, and the Lehigh Valley took center stage: “By 1856, 
19 percent of the iron furnaces in the United States and 21.5 percent of the furnaces of 
Pennsylvania were in the Lehigh Valley.”
121
  Connected to this change in location, iron 
became much cheaper because both production and transport costs declined.  A ton of 
iron could be shipped to Philadelphia or New York for about a dollar a ton, versus five to 
eight dollars from country forges.
122
  Third, the increased iron production bolstered 
American industry.  Cheap and abundant iron made the rapid expansion of railroads, 
steam engines, and machinery feasible during this period.   And, of course, it required 
burning lots of coal, thereby furthering the development of a fossil-fuel intensive society.     
 The third major development in these years was the rise of railroad competition 
for the transport of anthracite.  In many ways, the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company 
was spared the worst effects of railroad competition during the antebellum era.  Whereas 
a bitter thirty-year war emerged between the Schuylkill Navigation Company and 
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Reading Railroad beginning in 1842, serious railroad competition did not emerge in 
the Lehigh Valley until the mid-1850s.  In addition, as evidenced by the construction of 
its gravity railroad in 1827, the White and Hazard’s company saw railroads as 
complementary to canals, not necessarily exclusively as competitors.  From 1830 to 
1833, the company constructed another railroad connecting its mines at Room Run (four 
miles from the Lehigh River) to Mauch Chunk.  And beginning in 1837, the company 
began construction on a canal that would connect White Haven (15 miles north of Mauch 
Chunk) with Wilkes-Barre, thereby forming trade links with the Wyoming Valley.
123
   
The company’s railroad developments took both a step forward and backward in 
the winter of 1841 when a devastating flood wrecked much of the canal.  Blocks of ice 
rushed over dams and destroyed locks the whole length of the Lehigh River.  Even 
though they were likely unaware of it at the time, this was not simply an act of God.  The 
company’s heavy cutting of timber from the upper section of the river decreased the 
ability of the soil to hold water, funneling more into the river.  In addition, the newly 
constructed dams served to keep much more water in the river so that when they burst, 
the floodwaters were more destructive.
124
  Company engineers estimated that repairing 
the damage cost several hundred thousand dollars.  Josiah White came out of retirement 
and re-invested much of his fortune to keep the company in business.  By the next year, 
the section between Mauch Chunk and Easton was repaired although it took until 1843 
for the upper grand section to be fixed.
125 
 The flood had the unintended consequence of 
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weakening public attitudes against the company, and the legislature aided the company 
by allowing it to expand its capitalization to six million dollars thereby putting it on more 
secure financial footing.
126
  
The flood delayed the completion of the company’s railroad projects.  The 
railroad to Wilkes-Barre, despite being nearly finished in 1840, was not opened until 
1846.  In addition, the company had plans to replace the gravity railroad with a switch 
back railroad.  This was finally executed in the mid-1840s.  The company set up two 
inclined planes that allowed the carts to be pulled up at only two locations, and then coast 
on gravity for the rest of the journey.  This successful design saved money and eliminated 
the need for mules and horses to drag the carts between the mine and the river.  Like the 
gravity railroad, it proved to be a major tourist attraction.
127
   
The company also faced the competitive threat of rival railroads.  As early as 
1830, the Pennsylvania legislature had given a charter for a railroad company to open a 
line parallel to the canal.  It was hoped this would break the canal’s monopoly.  The 
Beaver Meadow Railroad was completed in 1836, and began delivering coal from the 
Lehigh Valley to Easton.  The Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company did not take kindly to 
its new competitor, and in the proper spirit of capitalists at the time, the fighting was 
occasionally ugly.  The Lehigh company had a habit of stationing its lumber workers on 
the slopes above the Beaver Meadow employees, with the result that several trees would 
come barreling through the railroad workers.
128
  Both sides were said to have armed their 
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men with muskets.
129
  However, the Beaver Meadow Railroad never emerged as a 
major competitor.  Because it did not have links all the way to the eastern seaboard, it 
delivered most of its coal to points along the canal to be sent to market.
130
 
The Lehigh Valley Railroad emerged as a much stronger foe in the 1850s.  
Philadelphia capitalists organized this company in 1846, but could not get adequate 
funding, partially because the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company actively campaigned 
against the company’s prospects.  Asa Packer, a successful manufacturer of canal boats 
and coal producer, took control of the dormant company in 1851.  Despite a litany of 
challenges involved in raising the necessary money, he persisted and the railroad was 
completed between Mauch Chunk and Easton in 1855.  From Easton, Packer could ship 
coal south to Philadelphia over the Delaware Division canal, or east to New York via the 
New Jersey Central Railroad or the Morris and Delaware & Raritan canals.  The railroad 
soon took much of the coal traffic from the canal, increasing its coal shipments from 
9,063 tons in 1855 to 730,642 in 1860, 1,502,277 in 1865 and 3,608,587 in 1870 (versus 
888,784 in 1865 for the canal and 789,112 in 1870).
131
 
By 1860, railroads began overtaking canals as the primary shippers of anthracite 
coal.  The dominance of the Schuylkill, Lehigh, and Delaware & Hudson canals was soon 
replaced by the Reading, Lehigh Valley, and Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western 
Railroads, respectively.  Railroads had a few advantages that helped them achieve a 
competitive edge.  First, they could be operated year-round, whereas canals were frozen 
for some of the winter and occasionally had limited traffic during the dry months of 
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summer.  Second, railroads had greater physical capacities.  Had the Lehigh Canal 
been built to handle 150-ton capacity boats as White originally hoped, he estimated that 
its capacity would be 2,700,000 tons of coal a year.  By 1862, the Reading Railroad’s 
coal shipments had already exceeded this number, and the Lehigh Valley Railroad was 
shipping more than three million tons by 1870.
132
  Third, railroads had greater geographic 
flexibility.  There were limitations on where canals could be placed based on water 
supply and elevation.  Railroads could travel across landscapes not conducive to canal 
development.    
However, the transition to railroads did not have the same revolutionary effects as 
the development of the canal network.  The canal network created a new energy 
landscape in the mid-Atlantic, making it possible for the first time to deliver fossil fuel 
energy to the eastern seaboard in large quantities.  Railroads altered and extended this 
energy landscape, but did not revolutionize it.  Most importantly, the flows of coal along 
railroads were similar to the flows along canals.  The large majority of the coal shipped 
on railroads from Northeastern Pennsylvania went to Philadelphia and New York just as 
it had with canals.  Railroads had greater capacities and funneled their profits to different 
people, but these were differences in degree, not in kind.  The energy landscape of 
railroads was very similar to the energy landscape of the anthracite canal network.   
 
Conclusion 
 The history of the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company is filled with impressive 
technological achievements.  Josiah White and Erskine Hazard were innovative geniuses 
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who favored the practical over the theoretical.  Even before they turned their attention 
to the Lehigh River, the men proved their acumen by damming the Schuylkill River, 
developing new techniques for manufacturing wire, inventing iron canal boats, and 
building the first wire suspension bridge in America.  On the Lehigh River, they 
pioneered the development of bear trap locks, a gravity railroad, double-wide locks on 
the lower grand section, thirty-foot high locks on the upper grand section, and the switch-
back railroad.   
 In the post Civil War era, the company would continue to operate for several 
decades, although by the 1870s, it would be in a state of steady decline.  When a 
disastrous flood in 1862 destroyed much of the canal, the company turned its attention to 
developing railroads for coal delivery.  While the canal would continue to be operated 
into the twentieth century, the coal traffic steadily declined.  As late as 1906, the 
company experimented with using electric traction to pull canal boats and shipped over 
240,000 tons of coal by water that year.
133
  Various parts of the company continued to 
exist until 1969, when its last assets were sold.
134
   
 Impressive as they are, the company’s long history and technological 
achievements are not its most important legacy.  Viewed in historical hindsight, the 
pioneering work of the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company in creating a new energy 
landscape in the mid-Atlantic mattered far more.  In competition and collaboration with 
other anthracite canals, the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company played a crucial role in 
transforming the energy possibilities for mid-Atlantic residents.  In the next chapter, I 
                                                
133
 Jones, The Economic History of the Anthracite-Tidewater Canals, 51. 
134
 W. Julian Parton, The Death of a Great Company: Reflections on the Decline and Fall of the Lehigh 
Coal and Navigation Company (Easton, Pa.: Center for Canal History and Technology, 1986). 
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explore how consumers chose to adopt these new possibilities and how these choices 
initiated a transition into a mineral economy.     
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Chapter 2: Coal Flows and Consumption:  
Creating a Mineral Economy in the Mid-Atlantic, 1820-1860 
 
 
Residents of the mid-Atlantic region took their first steps into a mineral economy 
between 1820 and 1860.  A quick comparison of domestic and industrial conditions in 
1820 and 1860 shows how significant these changes were.  In 1820, people warmed their 
houses with wood burning fires.  The limited energy endowments of cities presented 
finite limits to the number of industrial operations that could be concentrated in a single 
space.  Travel depended on organic sources of energy like animals, wind, currents, and 
human legs.  Most people worked on farms or in commercial trades.  By 1860, cities like 
Philadelphia and New York had grown much larger and their residents kept themselves 
warm and cooked with anthracite coal.  Factories had begun to concentrate in urban 
locations and use anthracite coal to supplement water and muscle power.  Railroads and 
steam vessels were starting to transport people and goods throughout the region more 
quickly and regularly than was possible with organic energy sources.  While agriculture 
and commerce remained vibrant, urban industrial enterprises had become the most 
dynamic and rapidly growing sector of the economy.    
The effects of anthracite coal and the creation of a mineral economy were most 
pronounced in the mid-Atlantic.  Philadelphia and New York City had the nation’s 
highest levels of urban and industrial growth.  Most of the nation’s anthracite coal was 
burned in the mid-Atlantic’s homes, iron furnaces, steam engines, and factories.  
However, the impacts of these changes were felt beyond the region as well.  The 
consumption of coal in the mid-Atlantic increased economic and political differences 
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between North and South, contributing to the tensions that precipitated the Civil War.  
The proliferation of urban industries in the mid-Atlantic altered flows of immigrant 
laborers from Europe.  The spread of large corporations involved in the mining, transport, 
and consumption of anthracite influenced debates over the meaning and value of 
republican ideals for the nation’s future.  In other words, coal’s political, economic, and 
environmental ramifications often traveled further than the mineral itself.   
The development of the mid-Atlantic’s mineral economy relied on the smooth 
operations of the region’s energy landscape described in the previous chapter.  This canal 
network structured social energy choices bud did not determine the outcomes.  In this 
chapter, I analyze the impacts of this energy landscape by asking the following questions: 
what were the patterns of coal flows along the conduits of the energy landscape?  How 
did new energy consumption patterns contribute to a shift from an organic to a mineral 
economy?  Finally, how did the development of a mineral economy favor certain groups 
over others, lead to a society dependent on fossil fuel energy, and affect the development 
of the region and nation?    
 
Putting the Energy Landscape to Work 
 Once the construction of anthracite canals created a new energy landscape in the 
mid-Atlantic, what were the patterns of coal flows along these networks?  In brief, the 
majority of coal was shipped to Philadelphia and New York, the termini of the canals.  
Urban residents consumed large amounts of this coal and significant quantities were 
shipped to other cities along the eastern seaboard.  At first, comparatively little coal was 
used in the anthracite region.  By mid-century, however, powerful steam engines used to 
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pump coal and water to the surface of mines consumed large quantities of coal.
1
  Little 
coal was delivered to points along the paths of the canals before the development of an 
anthracite iron industry in the 1840s and 1850s.  Large swaths of the mid-Atlantic were 
excluded from the new energy landscape, particularly if they were located more than a 
few miles from the banks of an anthracite canal or navigable river. 
 Canals did not determine coal flows, but they heavily structured these patterns.  
The concentration of coal deliveries to Philadelphia and New York was not accidental.  
Canal boosters designed their systems to reach these cities because these were seen as the 
most promising markets.  Moreover, Philadelphia and New York already had synergistic 
relationships with the Delaware, Schuylkill and Hudson rivers before these routes were 
transformed into anthracite highways.  These cities were located where they were largely 
because the rivers offered the potential for cheap transport of goods from the surrounding 
hinterlands.  Philadelphia and New York had developed as large cities with promising 
markets, therefore, in large part because they were served by rivers.  Since canals were 
most easily built by augmenting existing waterways, it is hardly surprising that 
Philadelphia and New York became the primary outlets for an energy landscape based on 
water transport. 
 The design of canals also shaped the flows of coal to other parts of the region.  
Very little coal was delivered to areas more than a few miles away from the canals 
because the overland transport of coal remained prohibitively expensive for most 
purposes.  Most of the land area in the mid-Atlantic, therefore, was not integrated into the 
new energy landscape.  The construction of the canal network also had less obvious 
                                                
1
 Because this coal did not “flow” (it was used directly at the site of production) I will discuss these 
consumption patterns in detail in the next section of this chapter. 
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impacts on coal flows.  The fact that canals could deliver goods in two directions was 
critical for the development of an anthracite iron industry along their banks.  At sites like 
Reading and Phoenixville along the Schuylkill canal and Bethlehem and Allentown on 
the Lehigh canal, entrepreneurs erected large iron works soon after they solved the 
technical problems of forging iron with anthracite.  Canals could deliver coal from mines 
above the forges and inputs such as lime and ore from both upstream and downstream 
sites.  The canals then provided cheap transport to markets for the finished goods.  
Finally, canals often supplied water power that could be used to operate blast furnaces.
2
  
Therefore, the design of the canal network facilitated the emergence of a new geography 
of iron production along the banks of the river. 
 This section illustrates these patterns by closely analyzing the flows of coal along 
the Lehigh and Schuylkill canals.
 
 Here and in the rest of the chapter, I draw heavily on 
statistics.  I have spent significant time collecting these statistics from a wide variety of 
sources including government reports, trade journals, and industry analyses.
3
  To my 
knowledge, the data in this chapter is the most complete set of information on anthracite 
flows and consumption in the mid-Atlantic gathered to date.  It represents a significant 
contribution to our knowledge of how, when, and where coal was used during this period. 
However, this evidence must be read carefully.  The antebellum era has been 
aptly described as “the statistical dark age” because the available data are neither 
                                                
2
 The water power was derived from funneling water out of the main channel through sluice gates that 
powered water wheels or turbines.   
3
 Different sources often have competing data.  I have done my best to present what I consider to be the 
most useful data by triangulating between various sources and assessing the reliability of historical 
documents. 
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abundant nor reliable.
4
  For example, coal weights were not always standardized.  Tons 
were alternatively measured as 2,000 or 2,240 pounds and the contents of a bushel often 
varied from time to time and place to place.  As a result, this data is most usefully read 
for trends rather than specific facts about a given year.  In other words, we have no way 
to verify whether exactly 429,492 tons of coal were shipped on the Lehigh canal in 1840.  
However, we can feel confident that the shipments in that year were roughly double the 
company’s operations five years before and would nearly double again by 1845.   
 
Coal along the Lehigh  
 The anthracite coal trade began in earnest on the Lehigh Canal in 1820.  Over the 
next forty years, coal from the Lehigh region was sent along three main routes.  First, the 
Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company delivered anthracite to Philadelphia.  Second, coal 
was shipped to the New York harbor via the New Jersey canals starting in the 1830s.  
Finally, the iron forges along the path of the Lehigh Canal consumed large quantities of 
coal beginning in the 1840s.    
Philadelphia was the initial destination for anthracite coal from the Lehigh Valley.  
For the first decade of its operations, the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company sent all of 
its coal to Philadelphia, where about half was consumed.  The balance was shipped to 
other cities on the eastern seaboard including New York, Boston, and Providence (see 
Tables 2.1 and 2.5).  Philadelphia did not remain the major transshipment point for the 
Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company for long, however.  When the Delaware Division 
canal was completed in the early 1830s, the company established coal wharves at Bristol, 
                                                
4
 Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region, 1810-1850 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1978), 2. 
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the southern terminus of the canal about twenty miles north of Philadelphia.  At Bristol 
and points south, the water depth of the Delaware River was sufficient to allow steam 
vessels to pull coal boats all the way to the Atlantic seaboard.  From this point in time, 
the company sent coal to its Philadelphia wharves for local consumption and managed its 
exports from Bristol.  Throughout the antebellum period, Philadelphia remained an 
important and growing market for the Lehigh Valley coal trade, although its relative 
receipt of coal shipments declined over time.   
 When the Morris and Delaware & Raritan canals opened in the early 1830s, the 
Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company began to divert many of its coal shipments towards 
the New York harbor.  The large majority of the coal shipped on the Delaware & Raritan 
canal reached the coal wharves at Elizabeth.  By contrast, significant quantities of coal 
were consumed along the path of the Morris Canal due to its concentration of iron and 
mineral industries.  The flow of Lehigh coal to New York along the New Jersey canals 
steadily increased in quantity and importance.  In 1835, less than 25 percent of the coal 
shipments went to New York.  By 1860, more than 50 percent of coal shipments traveled 
this route (see Table 2.1).  This change both reflected and shaped the decline of 
Philadelphia as the primary port for anthracite and the corresponding rise of the New 
York harbor.
5
  
The rise of New York’s port was partly a result of trade advantages and partly the 
construction of transport infrastructure.  At the beginning of the nineteenth century, New 
York City surpassed Philadelphia as the nation’s main port through a combination of 
                                                
5
 Up through the 1840s, Philadelphia’s port had been the primary coal market but New York had overtaken 
it by the 1850s.  For information on Philadelphia’s coal exports, see Ibid., 58.  On the rise of New York as 
the primary coal market, see Pennsylvania Coal and Its Carriers,  (Philadelphia: Crissy & Markley, 
Printers, 1852), 23. 
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geography, port improvements, public policy, and the synergistic concentration of 
finance and markets in a single location.
6
  New York also benefited greatly from the 
opening of the New Jersey canals, which connected the Lehigh and Schuylkill regions 
with the New York harbor.  Philadelphians were aware of the threat to their port from the 
Morris and Delaware & Raritan canals and tried to maintain control of the trade.  For 
example, the Delaware & Raritan canal began on the Delaware River near Trenton, north 
of Bristol.  For many years, the Pennsylvania legislature refused to create an outlet lock 
on the Delaware Division canal that would allow coal boats to transfer directly to the 
Delaware & Raritan.  Instead, the boats had to travel all the way south to Bristol and then 
be pulled up the other side of the Delaware River to the entrance of the Delaware & 
Raritan.  Only in 1848, nearly fifteen years after the completion of the Delaware & 
Raritan canal, did the state legislature create an outlet lock.
7
  The battle over the outlet 
lock shows the ways in which transport infrastructure was used as a competitive weapon 
in intra-regional struggles.   
 Third, some coal was consumed along the path of the canal.  Before 1840, this 
was a minor part of the trade.  In 1839, businesses and residents along the path of the 
canal consumed as little as 6 percent of total shipments—13,733 out of a total of 221,850 
(Table 2.1).  The development of the anthracite iron industry in 1840 created new 
patterns of consumption.  Led by the Lehigh Crane Iron Company and supported by the 
Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company, the Lehigh Valley quickly became the nation’s 
                                                
6
 The classic work on this topic is Robert Greenhalgh Albion, The Rise of New York Port, 1815-1860 
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1961). 
7
 Despite the connections of White and Hazard to Philadelphia, they made several petitions to the state of 
Pennsylvania to construct an outlet lock at Black’s Eddy which would allow them to send coal directly to 
New York.  The state largely ignored their request, eventually building the outlet lock at New Hope and 
charging coal boats an additional fee to use this outlet lock.  A Review of the Question of the Outlet Lock at 
Black's Eddy,  (Philadelphia [?]: s.n., 1840). 
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leading site of iron production. Entrepreneurs established several additional iron forges 
along the canal in towns such as Allentown and Bethlehem.  As the industry matured, 
these enterprises along the path of the canal began consuming nearly 20 percent of the 
company’s overall shipments.  By 1854, the local consumption had grown in fifteen years 
from 13,733 to 243,825 tons.
8
   
 Railroad competition did not alter the dynamics of coal flows in the Lehigh 
Valley dramatically during the antebellum era.  The Beaver Meadow Railroad began to 
ship coal in the 1830s to Easton, which was then transshipped to eastern seaboard 
markets along the Delaware Division and New Jersey canals.  The Lehigh Valley 
Railroad was completed in 1855 and quickly became a major competitor of the Lehigh 
Canal, acquiring 730,642 tons of the coal trade by 1860.  While this railroad took over 
much of the coal trade of the Lehigh Valley, the geography of its coal deliveries were 
similar to the canal shipments.
9
    
                                                
8
 Tonnage data from Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, Report of the Board of Managers of the 
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, Presented to the Stockholders (Philadelphia: various printers, 1828-
1859). 
9
 See previous chapter for more information on the Beaver Meadow and Lehigh Valley Railroads, 
including shipment data.   
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Table 2.1: Coal Flows from the Lehigh Region, in Tons, 1820-1860
10
 
Year 
LC&NC 
shipments 
Consumed 
along line To Morris 
To Delaware 
Division 
To 
Delaware 
& Raritan 
To Phila-
delphia 
Shipped from 
Philadelphia / 
Bristol 
1820 365       
1825 28,393     11,245 11,378 
1830 43,000 7,615    12,601 20,391 
1835 131,250  40,000    70,194 
1840 225,585 23,955 30,210 171,210    
1845 429,492 (81,726) 12,567 335,199 30,985   
1850 723,099 117,119 98,100 507,323    
1855 1,276,367 229,056 290,730 755,265 156,340   
1860 1,091,032 (174,462) 276,947 639,623 341,816   
 
 
Coal Flows from the Schuylkill Region 
 Although coal from the Lehigh region initiated the anthracite trade, the Schuylkill 
region soon surpassed its rival to become the largest producer and shipper of coal during 
the antebellum era.  The coal flows from this region went through two major phases.  The 
first, between 1825 and 1840, was characterized by large flows of coal along the 
Schuylkill canal directed towards Philadelphia and shipped to the eastern seaboard.  In 
the second phase, from 1840 to 1860, the Reading Railroad overtook the canal as the 
major transport company, the anthracite iron industry began to consume large quantities 
of coal, and some coal began to flow directly to New York.  With the exception of the 
early introduction of railroad competition, the flow of coal from the Schuylkill region 
shared many of the patterns of the Lehigh region.   
 
                                                
10
 Numbers in parentheses are estimates made by subtracting shipments on the Morris and Delaware 
Division canals from the total shipments.  Sources for Table 2.1: Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 
Report of the Board of Managers of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, Presented to the 
Stockholders; Jones, The Economic History of the Anthracite-Tidewater Canals; Taylor, Statistics of Coal, 
404; "Report of the Committee of the Senate of Pennsylvania Upon the Subject of the Coal Trade." 
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Schuylkill Flows, 1825-1840 
 The first phase of coal flows from the Schuylkill region began in earnest with the 
completion of the canal built by the Schuylkill Navigation Company in 1825.  Small 
amounts of coal had been sent to Philadelphia when heavy rains raised the waters of the 
Schuylkill before the canal was complete, but the amounts were negligible and rarely 
recorded.  When the Schuylkill Canal began operations in 1825, Lehigh coal had a five-
year head start in the market.  However, the Schuylkill Navigation Company quickly 
closed the gap.  In 1825, the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company shipped more than four 
times as much coal as the Schuylkill Navigation Company.  Only five years later, the 
Schuylkill region had gained the advantage and sent twice as much coal to market.  This 
discrepancy increased over time as Schuylkill coal shipments began to dwarf those from 
the Lehigh.     
 Law and geography were the main reasons the output of the Schuylkill region 
exceeded other areas during the antebellum era.  The Schuylkill Navigation Company 
was the only transport company whose corporate charter prevented it from mining coal.  
The Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company and Delaware & Hudson Company, by 
contrast, had corporate charters that allowed them to both own coal lands and ship coal to 
market, thereby encouraging these companies to control much of the mining in their 
regions.
11
  By contrast, the Schuylkill Navigation Company encouraged the expansion of 
mining in the region in order to increase its transport revenues, its primary source of 
income.  Geography gave a further advantage to individual enterprises in the Schuylkill 
                                                
11
 While there were independent coal mining companies in the Lehigh and Wyoming valleys, these 
companies were at a price disadvantage because the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company and Delaware & 
Hudson companies could ship their own coal at discounted rates, thereby increasing their profit margins 
and undercutting competitors.   
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region.  The coal deposits were nearer to the surface than in other regions.  This made 
it easier for small operators to enter the industry because they did not have to invest large 
quantities of capital to sink deep mine shafts.
12
  The proliferation of mining enterprises in 
the Schuylkill region, therefore, led to exponential increases in output throughout the 
antebellum era.   
 The Schuylkill Navigation Company shipped most of its coal to Philadelphia 
between 1825 and 1840, where about half to two-thirds was transshipped to other cities 
on the eastern seaboard.  As was the case in the Lehigh region, towns along the path of 
the canal accounted for a small percentage of the coal shipments, about 5-10 percent.  
Because most of these towns had small populations, it is unlikely that they were 
experiencing any shortages of firewood for home heating.  Therefore, most of this coal 
was likely used in industrial enterprises, particularly at sites such as Reading, 
Phoenixville, and Manayunk.   
                                                
12
 A person could enter the mining industry in 1834 with $10,000 ($3,500 for coal land, $3,000 for opening 
the land, wagons, $2,500 for boats, and $1,000 for working capital) according to an industry analysis. 
While this was a considerable amount of money at the time, it was not prohibitive.  Moreover, these costs 
overstated the barriers to entry.  With tools as simple as picks, shovels, and wagons, an individual could 
agree to mine coal and pay the property owner a percentage of the profits.  "Report of the Committee of the 
Senate of Pennsylvania Upon the Subject of the Coal Trade," 45. 
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Table 2.2: Schuylkill Coal Flows, in Tons, 1825-1840
13
   
Year Canal 
shipments 
Consumed 
along line 
Sent to 
Philadelphia 
Direct to New 
York City 
Shipped from 
Philadelphia 
% Increase in 
shipments 
1825 6,500      
1826 16,767    11,596 158 
1827 31,360    20,804 87 
1828 47,284 3,154   23,039 51 
1829 79,973 3,332   36,246 69 
1830 89,984 5,321   42,746 13 
1831 81,854 6,150   41,546 -10 
1832 209,271 10,048   124,690 150 
1833 252,971 13,429   154,006 21 
1834 226,692 19,429   156,154 -10 
1835 339,508 18,571    267,139 50 
1836 432,045 17,863 61,944  344,812 27 
1837 523,152 21,749 71,916  328,304 21 
1838 433,875 28,775 98,707  278,268 -17 
1839 442,608 30,990 100,694 27,000 286,990 2 
1840 452,291 28,924 90,000 64,388 244,680 2 
 
Schuylkill Flows, 1840-1860 
 Three developments altered the coal flows from the Schuylkill region beginning 
around 1840.  First, the Reading Railroad, which began operations in 1842, acquired 
most of the coal trade from the canal.  As in the Lehigh region, the development of the 
anthracite iron industry created a large demand for coal along the paths of the canal and 
railroad.  Finally, much of the remaining coal that was shipped along the Schuylkill canal 
was sent directly to the New York harbor.   
When the Reading Railroad completed its tracks between the Schuylkill coal 
regions and Philadelphia in the early 1840s, it initiated a nearly thirty-year battle between 
the two transport companies, ending in 1870 when the railroad purchased the canal.  The 
dynamics of the competition were fascinating, involving capital, technology, politics, and 
                                                
13
 Table 2.2 sources: Jones, The Economic History of the Anthracite-Tidewater Canals, 133, 149-154; 
Taylor, Statistics of Coal, 395, 405; Miners' Journal, Coal Statistical Register for 1870.  Exports sent 
directly to New York went along the Delaware & Raritan Canal. The shipments and exports in a given year 
may not always add up to an even total.  This is due to the fact that after some winters there was left over 
stock in the market which was not shipped until a year or two later. 
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debates over corporate privileges.
14
  However, because the tracks of the Reading 
Railroad followed a route that was fairly similar to the canal, the transition from boat to 
rail did not alter the geography of coal flows dramatically with the exception of coal sent 
directly to New York (discussed below).  Therefore, this was an important transition from 
the perspective of how coal traveled, but not where it went.   
 The development of an anthracite iron trade along the paths of the canal and 
railroad was of greater consequence.  Entrepreneurs established iron forges along the 
Schuylkill River at towns such as Reading, Phoenixville, and Norristown.  The forges 
were drawn to the cheap transport offered by the canal as well as the availability of water 
power.  As I demonstrate in Table 2.4, sites with iron forges represented around 90 
percent of the consumption of anthracite along the path of the canal and railroad.
15
  Iron 
forges increased the coal consumption along the line dramatically, from under 30,000 
tons in 1840 to more than half a million tons by the middle of the 1850s (Table 2.3).   
 Finally, some Schuylkill merchants began to send their coal directly to New York 
City beginning in the late 1830s.  This was one area where the differences between rails 
and canals shaped the distribution of coal.  Most of the coal sent directly to New York 
traveled by canals, since coal boats could travel down the Schuylkill River, around 
Philadelphia, up the Delaware River, and through the Delaware & Raritan canal without 
                                                
14
 For more information on the battle between the railroad and canal, see Miller and Sharpless, The 
Kingdom of Coal: Work, Enterprise, and Ethnic Communities in the Mine Fields; Jules Irwin Bogen, The 
Anthracite Railroads; a Study in American Railroad Enterprise (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 
1927); Jones, The Economic History of the Anthracite-Tidewater Canals; Clifton K. Yearley, Enterprise 
and Anthracite: Economics and Democracy in Schuylkill County, 1820-1875 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1961).    
15
 While it is possible that some of the coal used at these locations was consumed for home heating or other 
non-iron related purposes, it is doubtful such uses represented more than a small fraction of the 
consumption.  For example, in 1855 Reading likely had about 20,000 residents (15,743 in 1850 and 23,886 
in 1860 according to the Census).  If the whole town used anthracite coal for heating, this would represent 
use of at most 20,000 tons, only a sixth of the total deliveries of 120,000 tons.   
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stopping for transshipment.  The coal cars of the Reading Railroad, by contrast, had 
to stop at the company’s wharves in Port Richmond since its tracks did not extend into 
New Jersey before the Civil War.
16
  More than 600,000 tons per year were sent along this 
route  to New York City by the late 1850s, more than half of the total shipments on the 
Schuylkill canal (Table 2.3).    
 
Table 2.3: Schuylkill Coal Flows, in Tons, 1840-1860
17
 
Year Canal 
shipments 
Railroad 
shipments 
Total 
shipments 
Consumed 
along 
lines 
Sent to 
Philadel-
phia 
Direct to 
New York 
City 
Shipped 
from 
Philadelphia 
1840 452,291  452,291 28,924 90,000 64,388 244,680 
1841 584,692 850 584,542 41,223 89,000 78,296 367,812 
1842 491,608 49,902 541,510 40,584 88,000 126,554 256,080 
1843 447,058 230,254 677,312 34,619  119,972  
1844 398,887 441,491 840,378 60,000  111,521  
1845 263,587 820,237 1,083,824 90,000    
1846 3,440
18
 1,233,142 1,236,582 155,460   892,464 
1847 222,693 1,360,681 1,583,374 226,610 430,150  1,375,000 
1848 436,608 1,216,233 1,652,841 252,837    
1849 489,208 1,115,918 1,605,126 239,290    
1850 288,030 1,428,977 1,717,007 207,863   1,075,344 
1851 579,156 1,650,270 2,229,426 312,347   1,211,405 
1852 800,038 1,650,912 2,450,950 322,211   1,226,488 
1853 888,695 1,582,248 2,470,943 394,078  474,105 1,088,167 
1854 907,354 1,987,854 2,895,208 444,161 468,232 571,081 1,411,734 
1855 1,105,263 2,213,292 3,318,555 481,861 628,398 631,700 1,576,596 
1856 1,169,453 2,088,903 3,258,356 520,504 660,772  1,421,213 
1857 1,275,988 1,709,552 2,985,540 511,977 707,806 689,710 1,076,187 
1858 1,323,804 1,542,645 2,866,449 441,166 758,471 638,832 1,029,003 
1859 1,372,109 1,682,932 3,055,041 554,774 799,461  1,004,540 
1860 1,356,678 1,878,156 3,234,834 608,877 800,903  1,186,477 
 
                                                
16
 As the Reading Railroad expanded its operations after the Civil War, it acquired control of several other 
railroads giving it direct access to the New York market.   
17
 Sources for Table 2.3: Jones, The Economic History of the Anthracite-Tidewater Canals, 41, 149-54; 
Miners' Journal, Coal Statistical Register for 1870; Taylor, Statistics of Coal, 395, 405; Samuel Harries 
Daddow and Benjamin Bannan, Coal, Iron, and Oil, or, the Practical American Miner: A Plain and 
Popular Work on Our Mines and Mineral Resources, and a Text-Book or Guide to Their Economical 
Development (Pottsville, Pa.: Benjamin Bannan, 1866), 711; Thirteenth Annual Report, Made by the Board 
of Trade, to the Coal Mining Association of Schuylkill County,  (Pottsville: Benjamin Bannan, 1845). 
18
 The canal was closed for most of this year while it was widened and deepened to allow larger boats to 
travel along it.   
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Table 2.4: Consumption Along the Path of the Reading Railroad and Schuylkill 
Canal, in Tons, 1855
19
 
Station or Turnout Reading SNC  Station or Turnout Reading  SNC  
Port Carbon 209  Brewer's Landing  280 
Schuylkill Haven 201  Port Kennedy 6,519 4,424 
Orwigsburg 42 28 Norristown (iron site) 26,255 23,491 
Auburn 38  Swede Furnace (iron site) 4,296  
Hamburg 445 5,807 Rambo's Limekiln 3,397  
Mohrsville 489 1,467 Bridgeport  1,464 
Between Mohrsville 
and Reading 2,507  Plymouth  10,212 
Leesport (iron site)  15,883 Conshohocken (iron site) 37,349 1,081 
Felix Dam  2,384 Spring Mill (iron site) 152 28,760 
Reading (iron site) 77,361 42,110 Flat Rock  303 
Birdsboro' (iron site) 706 18,081 Manayunk (iron site) 1,128 11,677 
Mt. Airy  112 Falls (iron site) 49,225  
Douglassville 872  
Nicetown and Germantown 
(iron site) 14,095  
Port Union  510 Philadelphia Branch Road 537  
Pottstown (iron site) 8,986 615 Consumed Along Path 294,385 187,526 
Limerick 630    Amount at iron sites 277,205 158,082 
Springville  206   % Consumed at iron sites 94% 84% 
Boyer's Ford 924 754   Overall iron consumption 90% 
Black Rock Dam  519 Philadelphia 342,311 286,087 
Phoenixville (iron site) 57,652 16,384 Port Richmond 1,576,596  
Port Providence  481 New York City  631,700 
Pauling's Dam  397    
Valley Forge 370 96 Total Coal Shipments 2,213,292 1,105,313 
 
 
Coal Flows from the Wyoming Valley 
 The Wyoming Valley was the third anthracite coal region.  The broad patterns of 
coal flows from this region are as follows.  First, the large majority of the coal traveled to 
New York City along the Delaware & Hudson canal, and later on the Delaware, 
Lackawanna, and Western Railroad.  Second, much smaller amounts of coal went north 
along the Hudson River to Albany and west along the Erie Canal to manufacturing cities 
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like Syracuse and Rochester.  Third, some coal flowed south along the Susquehanna 
River to Harrisburg and Baltimore. 
 
Coal Shipments from Philadelphia   
 Philadelphia and New York City were sites of coal consumption and 
transshipment.  Coal merchants loaded anthracite onto steam vessels from wharves and 
shipped it to consumers up and down the eastern seaboard.  The scale of this trade was 
enormous.  By the 1850s, Philadelphians were exporting more than a million and a half 
tons of anthracite, representing more than 90 percent of the city’s coastal trade as 
measured by tonnage.
20
 
Most of these shipments were directed towards other cities in the mid-Atlantic 
and New England.  Boston was the third largest market for anthracite and began 
importing coal as early as 1824.  Boston averaged imports of 75,000 tons of anthracite 
between 1835 and 1840, 140,000 tons from 1841 to 1846, 250,000 tons between 1847 
and 1849, and over 400,000 tons during the 1850s.
21
  The use of this coal was fairly 
evenly split between home heating and industrial purposes.
22
  Several other cities also 
received shipments, including Providence, Lowell, Hartford, New Haven, Wilmington, 
and Albany.  All of these towns were located on the seaboard or navigable rivers.  The 
cost of transporting coal over land doubled every five miles, so any location distant from 
a navigable waterway was unlikely to receive shipments.   
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Coal shipments from Philadelphia were used in home and industrial 
applications. For example, as early as 1825, workers at the Springfield Armory in 
Massachusetts preferred the use of anthracite for making gun barrels.
23
  In 1831, the 
Miners’ Journal reported that anthracite coal was being used for making bricks in New 
Orleans.
24
  In 1832, Niles Weekly Register documented the varied use of anthracite in 
Rhode Island mills, demonstrating that the coal was employed for dyeing, print-making, 
and heating purposes.
25
  Beginning in the mid-1830s, the Lowell textile mills began 
importing significant quantities of anthracite for heating and manufacturing purposes.
26
  
 Coal did not flow everywhere.  Most importantly, very little anthracite was 
delivered south of Baltimore (Table 2.6).  Some of this discrepancy is explained by 
climate: the warmer winters and larger forest reserves of the south meant that the home 
heating market was less promising.  However, the south also trailed the north in the 
industrial consumption of anthracite.  Much has been written about the different 
industrial development patterns of the north versus south in antebellum America.
27
  To 
the extent that coal was an enabling factor for industrialization (and I argue throughout 
this work that it was very important in this capacity) the evidence of coal flows offers 
another explanation for the divergent economic histories of the north and south.  
 Foreign trade never became an important part of the anthracite trade.  Small 
quantities were shipped to Caribbean islands (part of Philadelphia and New York’s 
participation in the Triangle Trade) but these exports were only a fractional component of 
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the overall shipments.  Despite the hope of some boosters to develop an international 
trade, the cheap price of anthracite coal undercut the potential of this market due to its 
general bulk.  Simply put, anthracite had a weight-value ratio that was not conducive to 
large-scale shipments across the ocean.
28
    
 
Table 2.5: Anthracite Shipments from Bristol, in Tons, 1832
29
  
Location Tons Location Tons 
Boston 1616 New Haven 1614 
Albany 1698 New York 585 
Hartford, Conn 700 Salem, MA 702 
Portsmouth 138 Troy, NY 507 
West Point 526 Baltimore 193 
Wilmington, DE 160 Providence, RI 174 
Newport, RI 245 Wareham, MA 291 
Fall River 166 Alexandria 65 
New Bedford 144 Somersett 360 
Portsmouth, NH 110 Taunton 294 
Schenectady 80 Plymouth 110 
Chester 50 Poughkeepsie 25 
 
 Table 2.6: Anthracite Shipments from Philadelphia’s Port Richmond, in Tons, 1855
30
 
Regional destination Total tonnage 
New England 
  (Massachusetts: 553,074; Rhode Island: 98,090; Connecticut; 60,796;  
  Maine: 33,528; New Hampshire: 15,518) 
770,006 
Mid-Atlantic 
  (New York: 523,312; New Jersey: 52,850; Baltimore: 10,615; Delaware: 7,760) 
594,537 
South & West 
  (Virginia: 22,721; South Carolina: 29,568; Georgia: 4,023; California: 3,547; 
  North Carolina: 4,112; Florida: 3,312; New Orleans: 3,294; Alabama: 2,125;  
  Washington, DC: 16,754) 
89,456 
Foreign Exports 
  (Includes Cuba, Nicaragua, Jamaica, Montevideo, Rio, San Juan, St. Johns,  
  St. Michaels, and Thomaston) 
17,232 
  Total 1,471,231 
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Consuming Coal, Creating the Mineral Economy 
 Once coal was delivered to consumers, how was it used?  What were the effects 
of these new practices?  As I show throughout this section, the consumption of coal by 
mid-Atlantic residents broke the connections between land, energy, and society that had 
characterized the region’s traditional relationships with energy.  The millions of tons of 
coal traveling along the anthracite canals generated new structural possibilities for the 
expansion of cities, industrial operations, and transportation.  Consumers used anthracite 
in homes, iron furnaces, steam engines, and factories.  Collectively, these practices began 
the transition to a mineral economy in the mid-Atlantic by the outbreak of the Civil War.   
 
Home Heating 
 Home heating was the most common and widespread use of anthracite coal.  By 
the turn of the nineteenth century, the heating demands of cities such as Philadelphia, 
New York, and Boston were putting a strain on their timber hinterlands.  The cost of 
firewood had nearly tripled over the latter half of the eighteenth century by some 
calculations, rising at a greater rate than food, clothing, or housing.
31
  By the 1820s, 
commentators were wondering whether cost of firewood would limit the growth of 
eastern seaboard cities.
32
  The mid-Atlantic’s reliance on organic energy sources for 
home heating was subject to the negative feedbacks of a Malthusian world.   
 People worried about the firewood supply for two reasons.  First, many of the 
forests near Philadelphia, New York, and Boston had been cut down over the course of 
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the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  In the nineteenth century, wood was 
arriving from further and further distances up the Schuylkill, Delaware, and Hudson 
rivers.  Second, it took a lot of wood to keep a family warm through a northeast winter.  
A poor family in Philadelphia needed at least two and a half cords of wood each winter.
33
  
Families with larger households and more means consumed much more wood.  A 
wealthy writer in the early 1830s noted that his household burned twenty-four cords of 
wood a winter.
34
  On average, eight cords of wood for the year likely represented a 
reasonable expectation for a family’s needs.
35
  As cities grew larger over the first two 
decades of the nineteenth century, urbanites’ increasing demand for wood strained the 
available resources.   
 Anthracite boosters were quick to argue that coal was a compelling substitute.  
Unlike the decline of forests along the mid-Atlantic’s rivers, the mines of the anthracite 
region showed signs of practically limitless bounty.  Articles promoting the use of 
anthracite argued that it would take about one ton of coal per month during the six cold 
months of the year to keep a family warm.
36
  As the typical Philadelphia household held 
roughly six people, we can assume that one ton of coal per person was needed each 
winter.
37
   
 Anthracite boosters had to overcome several challenges to convince consumers to 
switch fuel sources.  Consumers had to invest in a specially designed stove or grate and 
                                                
33
 A cord of wood was measured as a stack four feet wide, four feet high, and eight feet long.  The estimate 
of two and a half cords was made by the Philadelphia Fuel Savings Society, an organization helping poor 
people offset the high costs of wood during the winter: "Fuel Savings Society." 
34
 "Anthracite Coal, Versus Wood." 
35
 "Coal and Wood," Hazard's Register, October 10, 1829. 
36
 "The Economy of Heat," Hazard's Register, February 23, 1833. 
37
 According to the 1860 Census, the average number of persons per dwelling was 5.98 in 1850 and 5.64 in 
1860.  United States Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 1860 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1862), xxvii.    
 111 
alter their heating and cooking practices.  Because burning anthracite in a stove meant 
abandoning the pleasant flame of an open hearth, many objected on aesthetic grounds.  
Anthracite boosters adopted several strategies to counter these difficulties.  Scientists 
performed experiments demonstrating the superior heating qualities of anthracite.
38
  The 
Fuel Savings Society, a philanthropic organization, contracted with the Steinhaur & 
Kisterbock company to build stoves costing only $5.50, making it cheaper for consumers 
to switch over.
39
  In fact, this period saw extensive experiments with stove design, many 
of which were constructed to burn anthracite.  Priscilla Brewer notes that between 1815 
and 1839, there were 329 patents for stove designs, representing nearly four percent of 
the Patent Office’s awards.
40
  Josiah White had his wife keep an anthracite fire burning in 
their Philadelphia home so that prospective customers could see how it worked.
41
 
 Starting and maintaining an anthracite fire was difficult.  In his guide to servants, 
Robert Roberts devoted fifteen pages to the process, covering everything from buying 
coal, breaking it, starting a fire, and keeping it going.  As the author prefaced his 
instructions: “Very few servants at first understand the method of kindling and continuing 
a fire of Lehigh coal, many will never learn, and many more from erroneous instructions, 
whilst they think they understand it, make but a bungling piece of work of it…  it must be 
granted that a knowledge of how to make a Lehigh coal fire, when it is becoming so 
common in this country, is quite an acquisition.”  The descriptions include such advice as 
breaking the coal into the right size pieces (“about as large as your fist, if your hand is 
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rather a small one”), using the right kindling (“charcoal, unless dry hickory be 
preferred”), keeping the fire going (“judicious use of the poker is essential to the well-
being of an anthracite fire”), as well as an analysis of the relative merits of anthracite (“I 
place cleanliness at the top of its virtues,—cleanliness as to smoke, dust, and smell”).
42
  
Using anthracite was not a simple or intuitive process.   
 Despite the challenges of conversion, many homes began using anthracite for 
heating purposes in the middle of the 1820s.  This was a gradual process, beginning with 
no homes heated with coal in 1820 to widespread adoption by the Civil War.  By 1830, 
the total receipts for coal sales in Philadelphia City and County were $308,400.
43
  This 
indicates that a small but growing percentage of the population was already using coal in 
homes at the time.  Anthracite was selling at $6.50 per ton in Philadelphia during these 
years, meaning that a maximum of 47,446 tons of coal were sold in the marketplace.  
Assuming 20 percent of the coal was bituminous from Liverpool, Virginia, and Nova 
Scotia, this leaves about 38,000 tons of anthracite coal in the market.
44
  Given that the 
population of Philadelphia City and County in this year was 188,797 and assuming usage 
of one ton per person, this gives a maximum adoption of coal for home heating of 20 
percent, supposing that all the coal was used in this capacity.  However, contemporary 
reports suggest that more coal was used in industry than in homes.  An 1831 report in a 
trade journal argues that “[m]ore than one-half of the whole quantity of Anthracite Coal, 
mined and brought to market, has been consumed by steam engines and in 
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manufactories.”
45
  Therefore, assuming that around half of the anthracite coal was 
used in domestic heating, about 10 percent of Philadelphia’s home heating needs came 
from anthracite in 1830.   
 New York City appears to have followed a similar pattern of adoption of 
anthracite.  By 1831, the city was sufficiently dependent on anthracite that market 
shortages led to widespread panic.
46
  Like Philadelphians, New Yorkers used anthracite 
in factories and steam engines as well as for home heating.  Therefore, at the beginning of 
the 1830s, it is likely that an adoption rate of approximately 10 percent held for New 
York as well (assuming that about half of New York’s 50,162 tons of anthracite used in 
1832 and 53,882 tons used in 1833 were for home heating).
47
    
  Over the 1840s and 1850s, there was a synergistic pattern between increased 
shipments of anthracite, lower coal prices, and the widespread distribution of stoves.  By 
1850, it was estimated that ninety percent of houses in the northern states used stoves for 
home heating.
48
  While we do not know for certain what fuel was used in these stoves, 
anthracite was the cheapest and most abundant fuel in cities like Philadelphia and New 
York at the time.  A ton of anthracite cost between $4.50 and $5.00 wholesale in 
Philadelphia in 1850 while a cord of wood in the 1830s already cost between four and 
seven dollars in the Quaker City depending on whether it was purchased in summer or 
winter.
49
  Given that a ton of coal had greater heating capacity for lesser cost, it is 
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reasonable to infer that three-quarters of Philadelphia and New York City’s 
populations were using anthracite by 1850.    
 By 1860, the adoption of anthracite for home heating in Philadelphia was 
practically universal.  If a Boston physician in 1868 could report that 99 out of 100 
homes in that city were heated by anthracite, it is fair to assume that a similar ratio held 
in Philadelphia by 1860, since anthracite was both cheaper and more easily available.
50
  
With a population of 565,529 in 1860, citizens of Philadelphia City and County was 
likely burning between 500,000 and 600,000 tons of anthracite per year to keep warm.  
This was approximately half of the coal delivered to Philadelphia that year (800,903 
arrived from the Schuylkill region and approximately 200,000 additional tons arrived 
from the Lehigh region).    
 I have collated this information in Table 2.7 to estimate the total consumption of 
anthracite for home heating in Philadelphia and New York City.  It is important to realize 
that much more was consumed for home heating purposes in other cities including 
Boston, Providence, New Haven, and Albany.  As discussed above, home heating 
required about one ton of coal per person per winter, so multiplying the population by the 
adoption rate provides an estimate total consumption for home heating purposes.  The 
adoption percentage is based on calculations from 1830, 1850, and 1860, and assumes a 
steady rate of growth in the interim period.   
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Table 2.7: Estimated Coal Consumption in Home Heating, Philadelphia and New 
York City, in Tons, 1830-1860
51
 
Year Philadelphia 
population  
(city and county) 
Adoption 
rate 
(estimate) 
Consumption, 
in tons 
(estimate) 
New York 
City 
population 
Adoption 
rate 
(estimate) 
Consumption, 
in tons 
 (estimate) 
1830 188,797 10% 20,000 202,589 10% 20,000 
1840 258,037 40% 105,000 312,210 35% 110,000 
1850 408,792 75% 305,000 515,547 70% 360,000 
1860 565,529 90% 510,000 813,669 85% 690,000 
 
 What were the effects of using anthracite coal in the home, and how did this 
contribute to the shift from the organic to mineral economy?  First, it changed people’s 
experience of home heating.  The introduction of coal likely made houses warmer and 
more comfortable for most consumers because of its lower cost and higher heat output.
52
  
It also altered the gender dynamics of household labor.  The gathering, sawing, and 
stacking of firewood was usually performed by men.  An efficient coal stove saved the 
man’s work of gathering fuel but not the woman’s work of cooking or cleaning the 
stove.
53
  Substituting coal for wood thereby shifted the relative balance of housework 
from men to women.  Finally, buying coal integrated some families further into the 
market economy by substituting the collection of wood by personal exertion with cash 
purchases of anthracite.   
Over the long term, the substitution of coal for firewood also helped to push the 
mid-Atlantic towards a mineral economy.  This can be seen most clearly through 
considering the amount of firewood that would be necessary to support the population of 
the mid-Atlantic’s burgeoning cities.  For example, in 1860, 565,529 people lived in the 
City and County of Philadelphia.  Given that about 1.25 cords of wood were needed per 
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person per winter for heating purposes, and at least another quarter of a cord was 
needed for cooking, we can estimate a minimal need of 1.5 cords of wood per person.  
Philadelphia in 1860 therefore would have required at least 850,000 cords of wood just to 
support the living needs of its population.  Under nineteenth century forestry practices, 
about 2/3 of an acre was needed to produce a sustainable yield of one cord of wood.
54
  
Therefore, Philadelphia would have required a dedicated wood hinterland of 567,000 
acres (~885 square miles or roughly 1/50
th
 of Pennsylvania) to support the heating and 
cooking needs of its population. 
It was technically possible for Philadelphians in 1860 to have met their heating 
needs with wood, but it would have required difficult trade-offs.  The city could have 
created a large wood reserve, although any land that was near transportation facilities 
would have been more highly sought after as farmland.  More likely, Philadelphians 
would have relied on the vast timber resources of Maine and North Carolina to fill the 
gap.  However, the additional requirements on these forests by residents of eastern 
seaboard cities would have significantly raised the cost of firewood and increased the rate 
of exhaustion.  It would have also driven up the price of lumber, thereby making housing 
more expensive since most American buildings were made out of wood at the time.
55
  
Therefore, the use of anthracite in home heating preserved trees for lumber, keeping 
building supply prices down.  In other words, while Philadelphia could have supported its 
population in 1860 with firewood instead of anthracite, this would have required more 
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land and the zero-sum trade-offs that were characteristic of an organic economy.  In 
addition, these changes would have become more acute as Philadelphia’s population 
grew to 675,000 in 1870, 875,000 in 1880, and over a million by 1890.
56
  As a cheap 
heating fuel, anthracite removed a significant constraint to the growth of nineteenth 
century cities and represented an important step into a mineral economy.   
 
Iron Manufacture 
 The application of anthracite coal to iron manufacture provides one of the clearest 
examples of the development of a mineral economy in the mid-Atlantic.  Once the 
technical problems associated with forging iron with anthracite were solved in 1840, the 
industry expanded at an exponential pace.  Anthracite forges consumed huge quantities of 
coal, reshaped the geography of iron manufacture, and played an important role in 
stimulating the industrialization of America.   
Iron manufacture is a complex chemical and engineering process and figuring out 
how to use anthracite for this purpose was not easy.  The smelting fuel had to serve 
several functions: supplying heat, providing structural support, and removing impurities 
from the ore.  Anthracite boosters led several efforts to overcome these technical 
challenges.   The Franklin Institute, a scientific association in Philadelphia, offered its 
prestigious gold medal prizes to anyone who could forge iron with anthracite; a group of 
wealthy men including Nicholas Biddle offered a $5,000 reward to anyone who could 
keep an anthracite forge in operation for three months; and the State of Pennsylvania 
granted favorable corporate charter privileges to companies forging iron with 
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anthracite.
57
  The Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company sent officers to Wales to learn 
about new techniques.  Despite the interest and attention of several parties, it still took 
years of experimentation until the technical problems were solved.  By 1840, several 
groups began to have success, drawing heavily on the expertise of ironmasters in Wales 
who were using Welsh anthracite to forge iron.
58
   
Once boosters addressed the technical problems, the anthracite iron industry grew 
rapidly.  Within seven years, more than forty forges were producing over 150,000 tons of 
iron.  Despite a temporary decline in production caused by the rescinding of protective 
tariffs in the late 1840s, output increased from practically nothing in 1840 to more than 
half a million tons annually at the outbreak of the Civil War.  By 1855, iron masters in 
the United States were producing more iron with anthracite than any other fuel source.   
The expansion of anthracite iron production was predicated on the ever-increasing 
supply of coal to its forges.  After the domestic heating market, the iron industry became 
the single largest user of anthracite coal.  Given that there were relatively stable ratios 
between the amounts of iron produced and the amounts of coal consumed, we can 
approximate the total consumption of coal each year.  About two tons of anthracite coal 
were needed to produce a ton of pig iron.  An additional quarter ton of coal per ton of pig 
iron was necessary to fuel a steam engine to operate bellows if a forge was not located at 
a site water power was available.  
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Once pig iron was produced, much of it was reprocessed to form products 
such as rails, nails, and plates.  Significant quantities of anthracite coal were used in these 
operations, although it is more difficult to determine the exact amount.  It took an 
additional two tons of coal to roll or puddle iron and a ton of steel required as much as 
eight tons of coal in its preparation.   In the absence of clear data on the consumption of 
anthracite in rolling operations, it is nevertheless possible to obtain estimates through 
interpreting the existing data.  First, in 1847, a year for which good data exists, there was 
a total production of 151,331 tons of pig iron, and the entire industry was said to consume 
483,000 tons of anthracite.
59
  If roughly 300,000 tons were used to produce the pig iron, 
that leaves about 180,000 tons used in secondary processing, or an additional 60 percent.  
Second, from the study of coal consumption along the path of the canals in the Schuylkill 
and Lehigh Valleys, we reach similar numbers.  As shown below in Table 2.9, the Lehigh 
and Schuylkill Valleys produced about half of the total anthracite iron production.  In 
1855, for example, total pig iron production was 381,866 tons.  Assuming that about half 
of this was made in the Lehigh and Schuylkill Valleys (190,000 tons) this would have 
required 380,000 tons of coal.  The regions consumed about 639,825 tons of coal in iron 
production, leaving a balance of 259,825 tons, or 68 percent more.  Finally, in 1860, total 
pig iron production was 519,211 tons, with an estimated 260,000 produced in the 
Schuylkill and Lehigh regions.  About 885,000 tons of coal were consumed in the region, 
which leaves a balance of about 365,000 tons of coal used in secondary iron operations or 
a ratio of 70 percent more than in pig iron production.  Therefore, assuming a ratio of 65 
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percent more coal used in secondary processing gives a reasonable estimate of the 
total consumption.   
These calculations are summarized in Table 2.8.  I have rounded the calculations 
to the nearest 5,000 tons to indicate the limits of precision in calculating the data.  Two 
trends are particularly important to note.  First, the expansion of coal consumption in 
anthracite production was remarkable, increasing from practically nothing before 1840 to 
half a million tons in 1847 and quadrupling again by the middle of the Civil War.  
Second, from the 1850s, anthracite iron steadily represented about 20 percent of all 
anthracite shipments.  The energy landscape of anthracite transport kept pace with the 
iron industry’s ravenous appetite for coal.   
 
Table 2.8: Estimated Anthracite Consumed in Iron Production, in Tons 1847-1864
60
 
Year Anthracite 
iron 
production 
(in tons) 
Coal used for 
pig iron 
production 
(estimate) 
Coal used in 
secondary iron 
processing (65%) 
(estimate) 
Anthracite 
used in iron 
industry 
(estimate) 
All anthracite 
shipments 
% of total 
1847 151,331 305,000 200,000 505,000
61
 2,284,659 22% 
1849 109,166 220,000 145,000 365,000 3,027,708 12% 
1854 339,435 680,000 440,000 1,120,000 5,086,391 22% 
1855 381,866 760,000 495,000 1,255,000 5,876,872 21% 
1856 443,113 885,000 575,000 1,460,000 6,607,517 23% 
1857 390,385 780,000 505,000 1,285,000 6,896,351 19% 
1858 361,430 720,000 470,000 1,190,000 6,644,941 18% 
1859 471,745 940,000 610,000 1,550,000 6,802,967 23% 
1860 519,211 1,040,000 675,000 1,715,000 7,808,255 22% 
1864 684,519 1,370,000 890,000 2,260,000 9,566,006 24% 
 
                                                
60
 Sources for Table 2.8: Anthracite iron production numbers are from Bartholomew, Metz, and 
Bartholomew, The Anthracite Iron Industry of the Lehigh Valley, 52-53; Proceedings of the American Iron 
and Steel Association at Philadelphia, Nov. 20, 1873,  (Philadelphia: Chandler, 1873), 51; Daddow and 
Bannan, Coal, Iron, and Oil, or, the Practical American Miner: A Plain and Popular Work on Our Mines 
and Mineral Resources, and a Text-Book or Guide to Their Economical Development, 698; "Henry Clay in 
Philadelphia," Miners' Journal, August 10, 1850.  Coal used for pig iron production is estimated by 
multiplying anthracite iron production by two.  Given that this does not include any coal for firing steam 
engines, this number is a conservative estimate.  Coal used in secondary iron processing is calculated by 
multiplying coal use in pig iron production by 65% as described in the text.  Anthracite used in iron 
industry is the addition of the previous two columns.  All data for anthracite shipments are from: Miners' 
Journal, Coal Statistical Register for 1870. 
61
 According to contemporary sources, the actual amount of anthracite used in the iron industry that year 
was 483,000 tons.  Childs, The Coal and Iron Trade, Embracing Statistics of Pennsylvania, 24. 
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Table 2.9: Coal Consumed in Iron Production in the Schuylkill and Lehigh Valleys, 
1840-1860
62
 
Year Coal consumed 
on SNC and 
Reading RR 
Coal 
consumed on 
LC&NC 
Coal consumed 
on Lehigh 
Valley RR 
Coal consumed in 
Lehigh and 
Schuylkill Valleys 
Amount likely 
consumed in iron 
production 
1840 28,924 23,955  52,879 10,576 (20%) 
1845 90,000 (81,726)  171,726 103,035 (60%) 
1850 207,863 117,119  324,982 259,986 (80%) 
1855 481,861 229,056  710,917 639,825 (90%) 
1860 608,877 (174,462) (200,000) 983,339 885,005 (90%) 
 
 The anthracite iron industry operated as a mineral economy.  This is most clearly 
seen by comparing its development to the charcoal iron industry.  Americans had been 
forging iron with charcoal (wood burned in the near absence of oxygen) for many 
decades and Pennsylvania’s large forests supplied much of the nation’s needs.  However, 
the dependence on organic energy sources meant that the charcoal iron industry differed 
in two fundamental ways.  First, its output was subject to the limits of available land.  
Second, it had a completely different geography.   
Land was the great constraint for the charcoal iron industry.  A typical early 
nineteenth century forge producing 600 tons of iron a year required the charcoal 
equivalent of one acre a day of timber for its operations.  This meant that for sustainable 
development (assuming 300 days of operation a year and 30 years to reforest land), the 
iron company would need a 9,000 acre plantation for sustainable operations.
63
  While 
there were plenty of available forests left in Pennsylvania in 1860, the dependence on 
land still presented finite limits for the expansion of charcoal iron production.  Moreover, 
                                                
62
 Sources for Table 2.9: Coal consumed on the lines is taken from data tables earlier in the chapter (Tables 
2.1, 2.2, and 2.3).  The Lehigh Valley RR began operations in 1855 and delivered nearly 500,000 tons of 
coal along its line in 1865 according to: Daddow and Bannan, Coal, Iron, and Oil, or, the Practical 
American Miner: A Plain and Popular Work on Our Mines and Mineral Resources, and a Text-Book or 
Guide to Their Economical Development, 7105.  Therefore, I have estimated its deliveries in 1860 as 
200,000.  The consumption estimates are based on calculations from Table 2.4 which showed that 90% of 
the consumption along the paths of the Schuylkill carriers was for iron production in 1855.  The earlier 
estimates assume a steady rate of growth.   
63
 Bartholomew, Metz, and Bartholomew, The Anthracite Iron Industry of the Lehigh Valley, 6. 
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because charcoal is a brittle substance, it cannot be transported far overland without 
breaking into small and unusable pieces.  This meant that there were limits to the total 
energy supply that could be gathered at a single location, resulting in several 
decentralized forges with relatively small outputs.
64
   
The anthracite iron industry, by contrast, did not encounter these limits.  The 
increase in output of anthracite forges was impossible for the charcoal industry to 
replicate.  Table 2.10 documents the total output of iron by the two sources.  Anthracite 
iron output increased dramatically.  While the charcoal industry continued to grow, its 
relative share of the industry dropped significantly.  Moreover, the average charcoal 
furnace produced much less iron than the average anthracite forge—730 versus 3,783 
tons per year in 1847.
65
  Even though more charcoal furnaces (67) were opened than 
anthracite forges (36) between 1842 and 1846, the total output of the charcoal furnaces 
only totaled 75,200 tons versus 103,000 tons for the anthracite furnaces.
66
    
                                                
64
 Sieferle argues that there is a natural limit of 2,000 tons annual production for a charcoal forge based on 
the limits of charcoal transport: Sieferle, The Subterranean Forest: Energy Systems and the Industrial 
Revolution, 64. 
65
 Bartholomew, Metz, and Bartholomew, The Anthracite Iron Industry of the Lehigh Valley, 52-3; Childs, 
The Coal and Iron Trade, Embracing Statistics of Pennsylvania, 23. 
66
 Childs, The Coal and Iron Trade, Embracing Statistics of Pennsylvania, 23. 
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Table 2.10: U.S. Iron Production By Fuel Source, in Tons, 1847-1864
67
 
Year Anthracite % of total  Bituminous and coke % of total Charcoal % of total 
1847 151,331 38.9 17,800 4.6 219,674 56.5 
1849 109,166
68
    175,174  
1854 339,435 46.1 54,485 7.4 342,298 46.5 
1855 381,866 48.7 52,390 or 62,390 8.0 339,922 43.3 
1856 443,113 50.2 69,554 7.9 370,470 41.9 
1857 390,385 48.9 77,451 9.7 330,321 41.4 
1858 361,430 51.3 58,351 8.3 285,313 40.5 
1859 471,745 56.1 84,841 10.1 284,041 33.8 
1860 519,211 56.5 122,228 13.3 278,331 30.3 
1864 684,519 59.5 210,108 18.3 255,486 22.2 
 
By the 1860s, the production of the anthracite iron industry exceeded the organic 
limitations of Pennsylvania’s charcoal iron production.  By 1820, coal-fueled British iron 
production had already exceeded the capacity of its total landmass if charcoal had been 
the fuel.  A similar dynamic began to appear in Pennsylvania during this period.
69
  Given 
the ratio of 9,000 acres of land for the sustainable yield of 300 tons of iron, 
Pennsylvania’s landmass could generate enough energy for a maximum capacity of 
982,500 tons or iron.
70
  By 1860, there were already 519,211 tons of pig iron produced 
with anthracite in addition to 278,331 tons with charcoal (approximately 80 percent of the 
nation’s anthracite iron and 50 percent of the charcoal iron was being produced in 
Pennsylvania).  By 1869 the iron production of Pennsylvania from all sources would have 
exceeded the sustainable limits of organic energy sources.  National iron production that 
year was approximately 1.9 million tons, about 1.25 million tons of which were produced 
in Pennsylvania.  Most of Pennsylvania’s iron, about 800,000 tons, was forged with 
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 Sources for Table 2.10: Bartholomew, Metz, and Bartholomew, The Anthracite Iron Industry of the 
Lehigh Valley, 52-53; Proceedings of the American Iron and Steel Association at Philadelphia, Nov. 20, 
1873, 51; Daddow and Bannan, Coal, Iron, and Oil, or, the Practical American Miner: A Plain and 
Popular Work on Our Mines and Mineral Resources, and a Text-Book or Guide to Their Economical 
Development, 698; "Henry Clay in Philadelphia."; Schurr and Netschert, Energy in the American Economy, 
1850-1975: An Economic Study of Its History and Prospects, 66. 
68
 The decline from 1847 to 1849 was a result of the U.S. dropping its tariff on foreign iron.  Cheap iron 
from Britain flooded the market and cut into domestic production.   
69
 Sieferle, The Subterranean Forest: Energy Systems and the Industrial Revolution, 103. 
70
 Pennsylvania’s area is 46,055 square miles, or 29,475,200 acres.   
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anthracite.
71
  By 1880, anthracite iron production reached 1,807,651 tons—a level of 
production that was impossible in an organic economy.
72
    
 The anthracite industry also operated in a radically different geography.  Because 
charcoal iron forges required acres of land, they were disproportionately located in rural 
areas where there were no competing demands for the forests.  This meant that charcoal 
iron production was decentralized and there were high costs for the transport of its 
products.  By contrast, anthracite iron forges were densely concentrated along the banks 
of the canal network.  As shown in Table 2.11, the industry was concentrated into five 
distinct regions, each connected to one of the anthracite canals.
73
  By 1856, there were 
121 anthracite iron furnaces nationwide, and 93 of them were in eastern Pennsylvania.
74
  
In 1873, there were at total of 202 anthracite iron furnaces, and only two were not in the 
eastern mid-Atlantic—one in Massachusetts and one in Virginia.
75
  
 
                                                
71
 Anthracite iron production for the nation was 971,150 tons, about 80% of which was produced in 
Pennsylvania.  In addition, there were 392,150 tons made with charcoal and 553,341 with coke and 
bituminous.  At least half of this production came from Pennsylvania.  Bartholomew, Metz, and 
Bartholomew, The Anthracite Iron Industry of the Lehigh Valley, 53. 
72
 Ibid. 
73
 The Lehigh Valley was the clear leader, with several of the largest iron forges.  The Schuylkill Valley 
had many iron furnaces, particularly in Reading, Phoenixville, and the towns just outside of Philadelphia.  
The Lower Susquehanna River area included forges in Harrisburg and Lancaster County.  The Upper 
Susquehanna River area included the iron forges of Wilkes-Barre and Scranton.  The Eastern region 
included the iron production of New Jersey and New York, most of which occurred along the Hudson 
River and Morris Canal. 
74
 Miller and Sharpless, The Kingdom of Coal: Work, Enterprise, and Ethnic Communities in the Mine 
Fields, 64. 
75
 Proceedings of the American Iron and Steel Association at Philadelphia, Nov. 20, 1873, 49. 
 125 
Table 2.11: Location and Output of Anthracite Iron Furnaces, 1864
76
 
Region # of 
furnaces 
In blast in 
1865 
1864 
production 
(in tons) 
Coal used 
(in tons) 
Ore used 
(in tons) 
Ore used 
per ton 
Coal used 
per ton 
Lehigh  30 22 214,093 459,051 486,105 2.33 2.15 
Schuylkill 24 20 112,806 227,000 259,000 2.3 2 
Lower 
Susquehanna 
32 22 118,615 228,886 271,762 2.33 2 
Upper 
Susquehanna 
29 16 108,664 213,477 261,015 2.6 2 
Eastern  31 10 130,140 256,147 242,485 1.8 2 
    Totals 146 90 684,519 1,384,561 1,520,367   
 
This geographic concentration did not occur by accident—it was shaped by the 
energy landscape of anthracite canals.  First, enterprises could only obtain the quantities 
of iron necessary for iron production at a competitive price along the paths of a canal.  
Second, the canals facilitated the movement of other goods related to the iron industry, 
including iron ore, limestone, and finished goods.  The cost of shipping iron to 
Philadelphia or New York from inland rural furnaces was typically five to eight dollars 
per ton, whereas canal boats could deliver iron for as little as a dollar per ton.
77
  Finally, 
canals offered water-power that could operate the furnace bellows, thereby lowering 
operating costs.  Therefore, canals did not just shape the flows of coal, they also 
structured the geographies of energy-intensive industries as well.  If the anthracite canals 
were the backbone of the new energy landscape, it is not surprising that iron forges, the 
society’s most energy-intensive industry, attached themselves like ribs. 
Moreover, the dense concentration of anthracite iron forges did not require social 
trade-offs regarding land use.  Coal made it possible to increase iron production without 
sacrifices in other domains.  For example, in 1864, there were 30 furnaces in the Lehigh 
Valley that used nearly 500,000 tons of coal to produce more than 200,000 tons of iron in 
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 Daddow and Bannan, Coal, Iron, and Oil, or, the Practical American Miner: A Plain and Popular Work 
on Our Mines and Mineral Resources, and a Text-Book or Guide to Their Economical Development, 698. 
77
 Miller and Sharpless, The Kingdom of Coal: Work, Enterprise, and Ethnic Communities in the Mine 
Fields, 64. 
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an area of only 730 square miles.
78
  This density of production was impossible in an 
organic economy.  Characteristic of a mineral economy, however, the Lehigh Valley’s 
agricultural output increased at the same time as its iron and coal industries expanded.  
The region’s production of grain, corn, oats, and dairying grew during the 1840s and 
1850s.
79
  The new structural relationships between land, energy, and society are clearly 
indicated by the fact that the region could increase multiple areas of economic activity at 
the same time without needing to decide between alternatives.     
 
Steam Engines 
 The development of the steam engine has been widely recognized as one of the 
crucial drivers of industrialization.  By transforming heat into motion, steam engines 
created the potential for new types of machinery that could transform work, production, 
and transport.  Of course, these revolutionary effects were dependent on cheap and 
abundant sources of heat.  At first, organic sources sufficed.  The first fleet of steam 
vessels in the mid-Atlantic relied on wood.  However, organic sources could not support 
patterns of ever-increasing use of steam engines.  As early as 1830, steam vessels had 
contributed to the deforestation of large parts of New Jersey and the land along the 
Delaware and Hudson rivers.  Over the next several decades, steam engines and 
anthracite coal worked in a synergistic manner to transform the region’s factories, coal 
mines, and transport systems.    
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 Total production in the Lehigh Valley in 1864 was 214,093 tons consuming 486,105 tons of anthracite. 
Daddow and Bannan, Coal, Iron, and Oil, or, the Practical American Miner: A Plain and Popular Work on 
Our Mines and Mineral Resources, and a Text-Book or Guide to Their Economical Development, 698.  
Area information from Lehigh Valley Convention and Visitor’s Bureau Home Page: 
http://www.lehighvalleypa.org/ [accessed September 18, 2008]. 
79
 Brzyski, "The Lehigh Canal and Its Economic Impact on the Region through Which It Passed, 1818-
1873", 711-722. 
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Steam Engines in Manufacturing 
 The first American steam engines were stationary installations that provided 
power for industrial enterprises.  Before the spread of steam engines, most American 
industrial power came from muscles and water mills.
80
  For example, in 1820, there were 
as many as one hundred water wheels for each steam engine.
81
  This made sense in an 
organic economy.  Water power was relatively cheap and offered the densest 
concentration of energy in a single location.  However, reliance on water power had 
geographic consequences.  First, it was an inflexible energy source.  Water power was 
only available at points where rivers fell.  Second, the energy could not be transported 
away from the river banks.
82
  As a result, water power was similar to charcoal iron 
production in that energy supply necessitated a decentralized distribution of largely rural 
manufacturing establishments.   
 The development of New England industries reflects the geographic logic of 
water.  Most mills were established in rural areas where falling water was available.
83
  
The possibilities and limitations of water power are most clearly embodied by the great 
textile mills at Lowell.  While the company was generally profitable, in large part due to 
the cheap water power, the site had disadvantages.  The Lowell entrepreneurs invested 
                                                
80
 For an overview of American energy technologies in the industrialization process, see: Louis C. Hunter, 
A History of Industrial Power in the United States, 1780-1930 (Charlottesville: Published for the 
Eleutherian Mills-Hagley Foundation by the University Press of Virginia, 1979). 
81
 Jeremy Atack, Fred Bateman, and Thomas Weiss, "The Regional Diffusion and Adoption of the Steam 
Engine in American Manufacturing," Journal of Economic History 40, no. 2 (1980): 282.   The authors 
document the presence of 43 American steam engines in 1820. 
82
 The energy of falling waters was usually transferred to machinery by leather belts, gears, and pulleys.  
The friction associated with these devices created a maximum limit to the distance the energy could be 
transported on the order of hundreds or at most a few thousand feet.  Nye, Electrifying America: Social 
Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940, 193-95. 
83
 For example, see Judith McGaw’s study of mechanization in the Berkshire paper-making industry: Judith 
A. McGaw, Most Wonderful Machine: Mechanization and Social Change in Berkshire Paper Making, 
1801-1885 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
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millions of dollars to create a factory system that would capture the large energy 
supply of the Merrimack River.  Because few people lived in the immediate area, the 
company’s directors had to go to elaborate lengths to attract workers, house them, import 
supplies, and export finished products, thereby forcing them to address a range of labor 
and material problems.  In addition, the overall output of the site was limited by the 
energy capacity of the Merrimack River.
84
 
 Steam engines operated according to a different logic.  In those sites where 
abundant and cheap heat was available, steam engines could support industrial growth 
without the limits of the organic economy and in a geographically flexible manner.  The 
energy landscape of anthracite coal meant that the mid-Atlantic was uniquely privileged 
to take advantage of steam engines, particularly in the region’s metropoles.   Between 
1820 and 1860, Philadelphia and New York took pioneering roles in the adoption of 
steam engines, thereby laying the groundwork for an urban manufacturing system 
characteristic of a mineral economy.   
Steam engines were complex technologies and boosters engaged in significant 
experimentation to adapt their boilers to anthracite coal as a fuel source.  For example, 
the low flame of an anthracite fire required engineers to place the boiler closer to the heat 
source.  The first reported successful use of anthracite in a steam engine in the United 
States occurred in 1825 at the Phoenix Nail Works of Jonah and George Thompson on 
French Creek in Chester County, Pennsylvania.
85
   
                                                
84
 On the history of the Lowell mills, see: John F. Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and 
Republican Values in America, 1776-1900 (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1976), chapter 2; Thomas 
Dublin, "Women, Work, and Protest in the Early Lowell Mills: 'the Oppressing Hand of Avarice Would 
Enslave Us'," Labor History 16 (1975). 
85
 Binder, Coal Age Empire: Pennsylvania Coal and Its Utilization to 1860, 50. 
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Philadelphia soon took a leading position in the use of steam engines.  In 
1831, it was reported that there were between sixty and eighty steam engines in 
Philadelphia burning anthracite, with more operating in New York City and on 
steamboats.
86
  According to trade journals, nearly all of the steam engines in Philadelphia 
were fueled with anthracite.
87
   By 1838, Philadelphia County led the nation in the use of 
steam engines and the various applications to which they were applied.  According to a 
report prepared by the Treasury Secretary Levi Woodbury, 178 of the nation’s 1,860 
stationary steam engines were in Philadelphia and another 41 were in use in the 
surrounding counties, representing more than 10 percent of the nation’s capacity.
88
   
These steam engines did not represent a very sizable fraction of the overall 
anthracite consumption.  Most of the stationary steam engines were of relatively small 
capacity (5-20 horsepower) especially when compared to steam vessels, which often had 
engines rated at more than 100 horsepower.
89
  Atack et al estimate that average fuel 
consumption for a steam engine in the 1830s was 7.5 pounds of fuel per horsepower 
hour.
90
  According to Woodbury’s report, Philadelphia’s 178 steam engines were rated at 
a total of 1860 horsepower.  Assuming they were operated 6 days a week for 12 hours a 
day, this gives a total coal demand in 1838 of about 26,000 tons.
91
  Given that there were 
only 87 steam engines reported in New York State and 32 in New Jersey according to the 
report, it is unlikely that the total fuel demand in stationary steam engines was more than 
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 "Anthracite Coal Trade of the United States," Hazard's Register, July 16, 1831. 
87
 "To the Editor of the NY Post," Miners' Journal, February 5, 1831. 
88
 Secretary of the Treasury, Report on Steam Engines, 156-167, 379. 
89
 The relatively small size of steam engines was linked to the pattern of small to medium sized enterprises 
which dominated Philadelphia’s industrial landscape.   
90
 Atack, Bateman, and Weiss, "The Regional Diffusion and Adoption of the Steam Engine in American 
Manufacturing," 295. 
91
 The math is as follows: (7.5 pounds of fuel x 1860 horsepower x 12 hours per day x 309 days per year) / 
(2000 pounds per ton) = 25,863 tons of coal used in steam engines. 
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40,000 tons at this date.
92
  As total anthracite shipments in 1838 were more than 
700,000 tons, less than 6 percent of total anthracite consumption went towards stationary 
steam engines.  By the end of this period, stationary steam engines consumed much larger 
quantities of anthracite.  There is no reliable data on steam engines from 1850 and 1860, 
but by 1870, it was reported that there were 1,877 establishments using steam power in 
Philadelphia with a total capacity of 49,674 hp, thereby requiring approximately 275,000 
tons of coal per year.
93
   
The use of steam engines in manufacturing contributed to two of the shifts of the 
mineral economy.  The first was the exponential increase in energy consumption, shown 
by the large increase in steam engines and coal demand.  The second shift was 
geographic.  By providing a flexible form of power, steam engines gave energy-intensive 
enterprise the option to locate a plant in an urban location where workers, suppliers, and 
markets were nearby.  Several industries, particularly textile and metal manufacturers in 
Philadelphia, took advantage of these opportunities and concentrated in cities.  Similar to 
the ways that canals supported numerous iron forges along their banks, steam engines 
allowed a dense concentration of manufacturing enterprises in urban locations.  Instead of 
moving manufacturing establishments and workers to sites of energy, entrepreneurs built 
factories in cities where workers and supplies were abundant.  In other words, the 
Philadelphia model replaced the Lowell model as the primary pattern of American 
industrial development.  Despite the persistent popular mythology of the small New 
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 Secretary of the Treasury, Report on Steam Engines, 379. 
93
 Philadelphia Committee on United States Census 1870, Manufactures of the City of Philadelphia. Census 
of 1870 (Philadelphia: King & Baird, 1872), 27. By the 1890s, Atack, Bateman, and Weiss argue fuel 
consumption of steam engines had declined to two pounds per horsepower-hour.  In 1870, it was most 
likely around 3 pounds.  If the engines operated 12 hours a day, 6 days a week, the fuel consumption would 
be 278,969 tons (6 x 12 x 52 x (3/2000) x 49,674).  Atack, Bateman, and Weiss, "The Regional Diffusion 
and Adoption of the Steam Engine in American Manufacturing," 295. 
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England mill town tucked into nature, by mid-century “the dominant patterns of 
industrializing … America would come to resemble … Pennsylvania much more than the 
model mill towns of New England.”
94
 
 
Steam Engines in Coal Mining 
 Beginning in the 1830s, steam engines began to play an important role in the 
mining of anthracite coal.  As coal miners began to dig deeper for coal, they found that 
mines began to fill with water.  In addition, deep shafts required powerful fans to provide 
ventilation.  By the 1830s, most mine operators found that steam engines were necessary 
to handle the increasing quantities of water.  In the early 1840s, steam engines were also 
applied to coal-breaking, the process of smashing large chunks of coal into pieces that 
consumers could easily use.   
 The growth of steam engines used in mining is documented most clearly in the 
Schuylkill region.  The North American Coal Company purchased the first steam engine 
used for coal mining in 1833; by 1840, there were twelve engines in the Schuylkill 
region.  A decade later, there were 165 steam engines, and the rate increased steadily.  To 
estimate the total fuel consumption of these engines, it must be kept in mind that they 
were likely far less efficient in operation than those in Philadelphia since the coal supply 
was essentially free (mining operators used leftover coal bits that could not be sold in 
markets) giving the companies little incentive to economize.
95
  I estimate the total coal 
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 D. W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History, 4 vols. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), Volume 2, Continental America, 1800-1867, p. 397. 
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 To illustrate this, a report on the North American Coal Company’s 15 horsepower steam engine in 1834 
noted that it burned 2 tons of coal operating five hours a day.  This implies that the engine was consuming 
fuel at the astounding rate of 53 pounds per horsepower-hour.  Given that this was one of the first engines 
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consumption of these engines in Table 2.12 based on the assumption that they were in 
operation 16 hours a day, 6 days a week, and were less fuel-efficient than engines outside 
of the coal regions.  It should be noted that this coal is not represented in the shipments of 
anthracite to markets calculated above since it was never shipped or sold.    
 
Table 2.12: Steam Engines in Mining Operations, Schuylkill County, 1840-1865
96
 
Year Engines in mining Horsepower Pounds of coal per 
horse-power hour 
Coal consumption 
(in tons) 
1840 12 364 9 8,000 
1845 41 1,278 9 29,000 
1850 165 4,753 8 90,000 
1855 280 9,649 8 193,000 
1860   7  
1865 320 18,500 7 325,000 
 
 This data can be extrapolated to the rest of the coal regions by estimating the 
percentage of output from the Schuylkill regions to the total anthracite output as seen in 
Table 2.13.
97
   
                                                                                                                                            
in mining operations, I assume that the efficiency was significantly higher in 1840, but also that the engines 
operated longer hours.  "Anthracite for Steam Engines," Hazard's Register, Aug 30, 1834. 
96
 Sources for Table 2.12: Eighth Annual Report Made by the Board of Trade to the Coal Mining 
Association of Schuylkill County,  (Pottsville, PA: Benjamin Bannan, 1840); Thirteenth Annual Report, 
Made by the Board of Trade, to the Coal Mining Association of Schuylkill County; "Steam Engines in This 
Region," Miners' Journal, January 5, 1850; "The Coal Trade of 1855."; Daddow and Bannan, Coal, Iron, 
and Oil, or, the Practical American Miner: A Plain and Popular Work on Our Mines and Mineral 
Resources, and a Text-Book or Guide to Their Economical Development, 726.  Pounds per horse-power 
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Atack, Bateman, and Weiss, "The Regional Diffusion and Adoption of the Steam Engine in American 
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the collieries in 1865 rarely achieved an efficiency better than six pounds of coal per horsepower hour.  
Total consumption is determined by assuming these engines were in operation 16 hours a day, 6 days a 
week.   
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 These estimates are similar to calculations made by Schaefer on coal consumption in the industry’s steam 
engines.  He estimates slightly higher overall consumption based on steam engines operating 24 hours a 
day, 6 days a week.  Given that machines broke down and mines occasionally closed during slack seasons, 
I believe the average of 16 hours a day is a more reasonable measure over time.  Donald Fred Schaefer, A 
Quantitative Description and Analysis of the Growth of the Pennsylvania Anthracite Coal Industry, 1820 to 
1865 (New York: Arno Press, 1977), 207. 
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Table 2.13: Steam Engines in Mining Operations, Anthracite Regions, 1840-1865
98
 
Year Schuylkill coal 
shipments (% of 
total) 
Coal consumption 
in Schuylkill steam 
engines  
Shipments from 
other regions (% 
of total) 
Coal consumption 
in other region 
steam engines 
Total 
consumption in 
steam engines  
1840 52 8,000 48 7,500 15,500 
1845 54 29,000 46 25,000 54,000 
1850 52 90,000 48 85,000 175,000 
1855 51 193,000 49 190,000 383,000 
1860 40  60   
1865 43 325,000 57 430,000 755,000 
 
 The use of anthracite to mine anthracite eventually brought the coal regions into 
the mineral economy by substituting coal for organic energy sources.  However, what is 
perhaps most notable about the process of coal mining is the extent to which its activities, 
while fundamental to the mineral economy, were mostly characteristic of the organic 
economy.  For many years, the anthracite industry used picks, wagons, mules, and human 
muscles for its energy then shipped its products along canals.  While steam engines 
assisted these efforts, anthracite mining was not as intensively mechanized as many other 
aspects of industrial manufacturing.  Therefore, coal mining was a curious hybrid 
between organic and mineral economies.   
 
Steam Engines in Transportation 
 Steam engines could also provide motive power when connected to paddles and 
wheels.  Anthracite boosters found great success in encouraging steam vessels to run on 
coal, but had much greater difficulty with railroads.  Even the Reading Railroad, which 
carried large amounts of anthracite, burned wood in its locomotives for many years.   
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 Steam vessels involved in the coastal trade surrounding New York and 
Philadelphia consumed the greatest amount of anthracite for transportation-related 
ventures.
99
  Americans were pioneers in the adoption of steam power for river 
transportation, beginning with Robert Fulton’s Clermont in 1807.  Early steam vessels 
burned wood, which was initially abundant along the paths of the boats (mostly the 
Delaware and Hudson rivers, and the Atlantic coast).  However, the steamboats’ massive 
appetites for fuel soon reduced supplies of timber.  In 1828, it was reported that the New 
York City fleet of steamers consumed 200,000 cords of pine per year and that 
Philadelphia’s fleet used an additional 150,000 cords.  Most of the fuel wood came from 
New Jersey, though some was imported from North Carolina.
100
  As early as 1829, the 
pine lands of New Jersey, previously considered of low value, were being rapidly 
deforested for use in steam vessels and charcoal production.
101
  Steam vessels in the 
1840s continued to consume large quantities of wood when it was available: “[s]mall and 
medium-sized river steamboats burned from twelve to twenty-four cords of wood a day, 
and the large boats consumed as much as fifty to seventy-five cords for every twenty-four 
hours running time.”
102
  While the pressures to find a new fuel source were less 
significant along the sparsely populated Mississippi River, the deforestation along 
commonly traveled routes in the American mid-Atlantic and northeast made the fuel 
shortage more acute.   
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 The coal transport companies saw the potential for a large market and took 
important steps in solving the technical problems associated with adapting anthracite to 
steam vessels.  The Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company made the first efforts 
beginning in 1826.
103
  By 1831, their steam ship, The Pennsylvania, was towing coal 
barges up and down the Delaware River using anthracite for fuel.  It required three tons 
of coal transport coal barges weighing 400 tons 66 miles.
104
  The company would build a 
few other steam vessels running on anthracite to haul its coal.  In addition, the Delaware 
& Hudson Company dedicated great effort to introducing anthracite into steam vessels.  
The company believed that the particular characteristics of Lackawanna coal (which was 
lighter than Schuylkill or Lehigh coal and therefore easier to ignite) gave it an advantage 
for producing steam.  In addition, steam navigation was of great importance to the 
commerce of New York City, which consumed most of the coal from the Delaware & 
Hudson’s mines.  The company absorbed the costs of converting fireboxes and grates in 
New York City ferries, gave free anthracite to steam vessels experimenting with its use, 
and supported efforts by entrepreneurs to develop marine boilers designed for 
anthracite.
105
 
The extensive use of anthracite coal in steam vessels really began at the beginning 
of the 1840s.  In 1831, the Delaware & Hudson Company reported that only six steam 
vessels in operation in the New York City area used anthracite.
106
  However, by 1839, the 
LC&NC could report to its stockholders that many boats on the Delaware, Hudson, and 
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Long Island Sound were using anthracite.
107
  In 1845, the Coal Mining Association of 
Schuylkill County estimated that there were 35 steam boats based in Philadelphia that 
used 45,000 tons of anthracite and that the steam vessels based in New York “consume 
annually more than 100,000 tons of Anthracite coal, making the whole amount at these 
two points not less than from 150 to 160,000 tons consumed annually, for generating 
stream for the propulsion of vessels.”
108
  An article from LeBow’s Review noted that in 
the 1850s, over half the steamships in the American coastal trade burned anthracite, 
consuming around 250,000 tons annually.
109
  The U.S. Navy took note of these 
developments and determined that anthracite coal provided 66 percent more power 
compared with bituminous, leading the Engineer-in-Chief to recommend the use of 
anthracite.
110
  
 Although there was substantial effort put into developing ocean-going steam 
vessels that burned anthracite, this market never developed.  Despite many promotional 
articles and the construction of a few examples, the use of anthracite in steam vessels was 
largely limited to mid-Atlantic rivers and the trade of the eastern seaboard.
111
  The 
regional supply of anthracite coal was one of its limitations for international trade.  
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Bituminous coal was much more broadly available at international ports than 
anthracite coal, making it a safer investment for ship captains.   
 The other great transportation revolution of the antebellum era was the railroad.  
Boosters had high hopes for the use of anthracite in railroad locomotives, but this market 
did not develop as they hoped.  This was a surprising result to many, especially since one 
of the first successful American locomotives, the “Tom Thumb” of the Baltimore & Ohio 
Railroad in 1832, burned anthracite.
112
  However, when used in locomotive engines, the 
intense heat of anthracite melted grates, developed clinkers that impeded combustion, and 
destroyed boilers.  In addition, it was harder to control the flame of an anthracite fire to 
increase or decrease the power output when the train was starting, stopping, or going up 
slopes.  The higher maintenance costs associated with burning anthracite encouraged the 
Baltimore & Ohio and other railroads to use other fuel sources (mostly wood).
113
   
 The Reading Railroad’s difficulties exemplify the challenges and frustrated 
expectations of using anthracite in the iron horse.  It was shocking to many that when the 
Reading Railroad first began carrying coal in 1841, its engines burned wood, which was 
more costly and occupied more space than anthracite.  It was not until the early 1850s 
that the Reading finally adopted anthracite widely for its fleet.  In 1855, G. A. Nicolls, 
the Engineer and Superintendent of the Reading Railroad, wrote an open letter in which 
he described the efforts of the Reading to burn anthracite in its engines.  He noted that as 
of 1847, only 5 percent of their engines used anthracite before an intense effort to convert 
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to coal.  By 1854, 85 percent of their engines used anthracite and the company’s 
locomotives burnt 50,000 tons of anthracite per year.  Each roundtrip between Pottsville 
and Philadelphia consumed 8 or 9 tons of anthracite (with a 740 ton loaded train 
outbound and a 250 ton empty train returning traveling at 10 to 12 miles per hour).  
However, the use of anthracite meant that the boilers had to be replaced every six 
months, three times as often as wood-fired boilers, thereby leading to maintenance costs 
that were about 10-20 percent higher.
114
   
 By 1855, then, many of the problems associated with using anthracite in 
locomotives had been addressed reasonably effectively.  Some of the other railroads in 
the anthracite region, such as the Beaver Meadow Railroad, had used anthracite in their 
engines before this time, but the scale of their operations was much smaller than the 
Reading’s.
115
  After the Civil War, most of the railroads in the anthracite region were 
using anthracite coal, but railroads in other parts of the United States largely relied on 
bituminous coal from other locations.  In the end, the vast majority of the coal 
consumption on the nation’s railroads was not anthracite.    
However, anthracite did play an important secondary role in spurring the growth 
of the railroad system.  Building railroads required huge quantities of iron and steel 
mostly for tracks, but also for locomotives and railroad cars.  Much of this iron and steel 
was forged with anthracite.  As shown previously, the anthracite iron industry made it 
easier and cheaper to construct railroad systems by increasing the supply of iron and 
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lowering its costs.  Therefore, even if locomotives were powered by another fuel 
source, they had likely been crafted out of iron and rode on rails forged with anthracite.   
Coal-powered steam engines on ships and railroads altered traditional 
relationships between land and transport.  Waterways were the main transport conduits of 
the organic economy.  Before the introduction of steam vessels, there were already 
several sailboats plying the coastal waters of the Atlantic seaboard and the interior rivers.  
In this sense, steam vessels simply enhanced existing patterns, making transportation 
faster and more reliable.  However, the ability of steam vessels to travel upriver against 
the current opened new trade patterns that were not possible in an organic economy.  For 
example, traveling up the Hudson River to Albany in a sailboat was difficult, time-
consuming, and expensive, taking as long as nine days.
116
  Most of the trade, such as bulk 
agricultural goods, only floated downriver in barges.  The upriver transportation costs 
could only be recouped on high-value goods, such as mail, manufactured products, and 
passengers.  Steam vessels changed this logic, significantly lowering the cost for upriver 
transportation and thereby enabling new patterns of reciprocal trade that were not 
possible before.   
Anthracite coal also supported the extension of steam vessel operations.  The 
organic economy fueled the beginnings of the steam vessel trade, but by the 1830s it was 
already reported that the main trade routes of the mid-Atlantic were being deforested.  
The conversion to anthracite coal as fuel ensured that lack of wood would not hamper 
trade along the eastern seaboard.   
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Steam engines had their most revolutionary effects on transportation with 
railroads, which enabled a significant shift of trade away from waterways and allowed the 
development of regions lacking navigable rivers.  However, because of its extensive 
waterways, in addition to its well-developed canal network, railroads were not as 
important to the growth and expansion of the mid-Atlantic as they were to other regions 
in the United States.
117
  In the end, anthracite coal’s most important stimulus to the rise of 
railroads came through enabling the production of cheap and abundant iron.  
 
Factories 
 The fourth broad category of anthracite consumption came from its use in heat-
intensive enterprises.  In addition to powering steam engines, anthracite also provided 
direct heat for a wide variety of businesses that had previously relied on wood, charcoal, 
and imported bituminous coal.  Bakers, brewers, distillers, brick-makers, sugar refiners, 
tanners, bleachers, salt-makers, metal-workers, and more all required significant amounts 
of heat to make a finished product.  In fact, very few business enterprises did not require 
a form of heat, if only to warm the working environment during the winter.  Even hat 
makers began adopting anthracite to heat the pots of water necessary for shaping 
materials.
118
   
For enterprises simply needing heat, substituting anthracite for wood or imported 
bituminous coal was a relatively straightforward process.  There were a few kinks to be 
worked out, such as reconfiguring stoves to burn anthracite, modifying boilers to 
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withstand the heat of an anthracite fire, and separating the gas emissions from edible 
goods to ensure they did not taste of sulfur or soot.  However, in comparison with the 
efforts required to apply anthracite to steam engines or iron manufacture, these 
challenges were minor.  As anthracite was the cheapest heating fuel available by the 
1830s, it is likely that most manufactories in Philadelphia and New York converted to 
coal for their heating needs.   
 The decentralized nature of these businesses and the lack of statistics make it 
impossible to estimate the total use of coal in this category.  However, factories used 
enough anthracite to make a notable difference in Philadelphia’s economic development.  
Diane Lindstrom noted that whereas abundant water power in New England encouraged 
the growth of textile mills focused on spinning and weaving, Philadelphia manufactures 
took a leading role in heat-intensive operations, including bleaching, dyeing, paper 
making, glass making, distilling, and metal-working.
119
  As with steam engines, the use 
of coal in urban factories helped create a new geographical pattern of production and 
consumption centered in cities.   
 The use of anthracite coal in factories shaped the mineral economy in a manner 
similar to its use in home heating.  At first, the conversion to anthracite was simply a 
substitution of one fuel source for another.  Over time, however, the fact that anthracite 
coal consumption could be expanded exponentially and concentrated in a single place 
created a new set of relationships between land and energy consumption.  Shipments of 
anthracite coal transformed cities from energy-scarce places in organic economies into 
sites of superabundance capable of supporting dense concentrations of people and 
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factories.  Simply put, without abundant energy from anthracite, it would have been 
impossible for Philadelphia to become “the workshop of the world.” 
 
Conclusions 
Winners and Losers 
The benefits of the mineral economy were not evenly distributed across the mid-
Atlantic.  Instead, the energy landscape of anthracite coal structured who had access to 
cheap energy, thereby influencing where it was used and its regional effects.  Where 
people lived in relationship to the canal network—at the terminus in Philadelphia or New 
York, at the beginning in the anthracite regions, along the route, or not connected at all—
structured their experience of the emerging mineral economy.  The most significant 
changes were felt in cities at the ends of canals followed by the coal regions and towns 
along the canal paths.  The lives of those in the countryside were minimally affected by 
these changes.   
 The shift from an organic to a mineral economy was most pronounced at the 
termini of the transport networks in Philadelphia and New York.  Residents of these cities 
consumed the greatest amounts of coal in the widest array of uses and most quickly 
adopted the characteristics of a mineral economy.
120
  Seaboard cities led the region in the 
use of coal in home heating, steam engines, and factories—all the categories of 
consumption except iron production.  By 1860, the large majority of Philadelphians and 
New Yorkers were burning anthracite in their homes and the cities’ heat-intensive 
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businesses relied on coal.  Most of the steamboats burning anthracite were 
headquartered in these cities as well.  In addition, while Philadelphia was not a center of 
iron production, the Quaker City supported a significant industry processing iron into 
finished products.  Overall, Philadelphia and New York had clearly developed new 
relationships with land, energy, and limits that were no longer characteristic of an organic 
economy. 
 The story in the anthracite regions was somewhat different.  There were sweeping 
social changes for residents of towns such as Pottsville, Mauch Chunk, and Honesdale 
due to the rise of the coal industry, the rapid influx of population, and the booms and 
busts associated with mining districts.  However, these changes were not specific to the 
development of a mineral economy.  In fact, much of the activity in the anthracite regions 
was characteristic of the organic economy.  The main tools of coal mining were pickaxes, 
wheelbarrows, wagons, donkeys, and canals.  Most people not involved in the coal 
industry farmed.  It is interesting to note that although the anthracite regions were 
supplying the raw material that would make the mineral economy possible, the 
production of coal occurred largely in the context of the organic economy. 
 It was only with the extensive use of steam engines for coal mining during the 
1840s and 1850s that the anthracite regions began to operate as a mineral economy.  As 
the industry matured and the coal above the water level had been mined, the expansion of 
the industry was dependent upon solving the problems of draining deep shafts, raising the 
coal hundreds of feet, and providing proper ventilation.  Because of the amount of power 
involved, traditional power sources such as animals could not address this problem on a 
 144 
large scale.
121
  Steam engines, which were originally developed for this capacity in 
Britain, provided an effective solution.  With the large-scale introduction of steam 
engines for mining, and later for railroads, anthracite mining took on the patterns of the 
mineral economy.    
 At the beginning of the period, the regions along the paths of the canals 
experienced less change than either the coal regions or the cities.  Between 1820 and 
1840 only around 5 to 10 percent of the coal shipped on the Schuylkill and Lehigh canals 
was consumed before reaching tidewater.
122
  Even comparatively large towns along the 
paths, such as Reading, only had 8,410 people in 1840.  Wood was still relatively 
abundant for heating and manufacturing purposes, and the limits of the organic economy 
were hardly constraining to people in these towns due to their small populations.  The 
development of the anthracite iron industry in 1840 initiated a significant change.  As 
discussed previously, the production of iron with anthracite coal was characteristic of a 
mineral economy.  For people living in towns such as Reading, Phoenixville, Bethlehem, 
and Allentown, the anthracite iron industry ushered in a significant change to their local 
economies.  The iron industry generated significant amounts of wealth for several 
decades and encouraged the growth of subsidiary industries.  However, because there was 
relatively little consumption of coal separate from the iron industry, the rhythms and 
patterns of the organic economy persisted in most places outside the great iron works.     
In the rest of the mid-Atlantic, there was very little experience of the mineral 
economy.  The predominantly rural population experienced little change in their daily 
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lives from the development of coal canals and anthracite consumption.  Their patterns 
were still governed by the organic economy, although the limits were hardly apparent and 
rarely mattered in a region where forests were still abundant.  The charcoal iron industry 
continued to increase its output in rural Pennsylvania, taking advantage of the uncut 
forests.  Farming communities could find plenty of streams to support mills and 
congregated along waterways that provided water power and transport opportunities to 
distant markets.  On the whole, rural residents of the mid-Atlantic remained in the 
organic economy during the antebellum era.   
Thus, the experience of these changes was significantly influenced by where 
people lived in relation to the paths of the anthracite canals.  Moreover, these geographic 
shifts were not neutral.  Economically, environmentally, and physically, the distribution 
of costs and benefits accompanying the development of the mineral economy favored 
those living in cities versus those living in the anthracite regions. 
Economically, the development of the anthracite industry benefited cities the 
most.  In Diane Lindstrom’s analysis of the relationships between Philadelphia and its 
hinterland, she notes that while all regions may have benefited from the development of 
an integrated economy, the urban core experienced the greatest gains.  She demonstrates 
that Philadelphia had the fastest rates of population growth, the highest rates of return on 
investment, and captured the greatest benefits of the transportation savings, which were 
usually passed on to consumers instead of producers.
123
  In addition, the varied uses of 
coal in cities gave rise to a diversified urban economy that was better able to withstand 
peaks and valleys in business cycles.  The dependence on a single product in the 
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anthracite regions (coal) and canal towns (iron) left them subject to significant 
recessions when the coal and iron markets experienced difficulty, a regular occurrence 
throughout the nineteenth century.
124
 
People in the anthracite regions bore most of the negative environmental impacts 
of the anthracite industry.  Coal mining often produced scarred landscapes.  In addition, it 
produced large quantities of coal dust that settled on houses and fields, tainted drinking 
water supplies, and caused “black lung.”  While most anthracite was burnt in urban 
locations, its high carbon content mitigated the effects of smoke pollution.  Anthracite 
smoke was far cleaner than bituminous smoke due to the lack of impurities in the coal.  
Therefore, the urban air quality of eastern seaboard cities such as Philadelphia and New 
York, while never ideal, was far better than in urban locations dependent on bituminous 
coal like Pittsburgh, Chicago, and St. Louis.   
Finally, coal mining in the antebellum era was an extremely dangerous 
occupation.  Miners faced a range of physical threats including suffocation through poor 
ventilation, the collapse of mine shafts or tunnel supports, dynamite explosions, and fires.  
Anthony Wallace calculated that anthracite miners had less than an even chance of 
surviving fourteen years of employment without a fatal or crippling accident.
125
  Workers 
in cities also experienced physical risks accompanying the rise of industrialization and 
steam engines, but not to the extent that permeated coal mining.  Therefore, those living 
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in the anthracite regions experienced a disproportionate share of the costs of the 
anthracite industry while recouping fewer of the benefits than those living in cities.   
 
Building Dependence 
The mid-Atlantic’s first steps into the mineral economy would not be its last.  By 
the dawn of the Civil War, the mid-Atlantic had already become dependent on fossil fuel 
energy.  At first, people experienced the new availability of anthracite coal as an open 
choice.  A family could decide whether or not to purchase a coal-burning stove.  A 
manufacturer could decide whether to use wood or coal for his heat and where to locate 
his factory.  By 1860, this was no longer the case.  Without ever-increasing supplies of 
anthracite coal, eastern seaboard cities would have struggled to heat their growing 
populations, the iron industry would have collapsed, transport networks would have 
failed, and there would have been an exodus of industries and people from urban centers.  
Residents of the mid-Atlantic had stepped into a brave new world of fossil fuel 
consumption from which they could only turn away with great difficulty.  The free 
choices that people experienced about whether to use coal in the 1820s and 1830s were 
no longer free in 1860.  Anthracite was a necessary part of life for people in the mid-
Atlantic. 
 Two analytical concepts can help us make sense of this transition.  In the history 
of technology, Thomas Hughes introduced the concept of momentum to describe an 
important characteristic of technological systems.
126
  At the beginning of their 
development, technological systems are open to significant modification by social actors.  
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Over time, however, this flexibility is diminished as the system becomes more 
entrenched.  This is partly economic— the capital investments in a system make it 
increasingly expensive to make any changes—and partly social—operators of the system 
establish stable rules and procedures and users become accustomed to a particular way of 
doing things.  Likewise, in environmental history, Donald Worster has described the 
concept of an infrastructure trap.
127
  Once a society commits a certain amount of 
resources to solving a problem in a particular way, those choices become a straitjacket, 
making it difficult to think about or address problems in any other way.  
Fossil fuel consumption gained the momentum characteristic of an infrastructure 
trap in the mid-Atlantic during the antebellum era.  Technologically, mid-Atlantic 
residents altered their built environment in ways that depended on the continued 
availability of anthracite.  They constructed dense concentrations of homes and factories 
in cities that required more heat and power than organic sources could supply.  Capitalists 
who invested in iron forges along the banks of the canals or operated steam vessels along 
the eastern seaboard could only generate a return to investors if ever-increasing quantities 
of coal were available.  Moreover, as people gained familiarity with burning coal, they 
became accustomed to its use and benefits.  The higher heating value of anthracite versus 
firewood and its lower cost meant that homes could be kept warmer in winter, factory 
production costs were lower, and land was freed up for other purposes.  For most people 
with access to cheap and abundant anthracite, life was better with coal than without it.   
The dependence of the mid-Atlantic on anthracite coal was partly generated by 
boosters and partly the product of thousands of individual decisions.  Boosters and 
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transport companies actively encouraged people to adopt anthracite and worked to 
create large and growing markets.  However, boosters were not all powerful.  It took 
thousands of individual choices by people and industrialists about where to live, how to 
heat their homes, and where to locate factories to create a new built environment and set 
of cultural expectations in the mid-Atlantic.  Of course, these individual decisions were 
not made in isolation.  They were structured by an economic system that encouraged the 
pursuit of profit and an energy landscape that made anthracite coal cheap and abundant.  
These collective efforts, choices, expectations, and forces pushed the mid-Atlantic 
steadily down a development path that depended on ever-increasing supplies of fossil fuel 
energy. 
 
A Region Transformed 
By the outbreak of the Civil War, the mid-Atlantic was a very different place than 
it had been forty years before.  The creation of a new energy landscape and the first 
stages of a mineral economy had altered many aspects of social life, including 
urbanization, industrialization, labor practices, regional diversification, immigration, and 
political debates about the future of the nation.  While each of these processes were 
shaped and influenced by a wide variety of social, cultural, economic, and environmental 
factors, coal played an important role in each of them as well.  This section reviews some 
of the broad regional changes impacted by the emerging mineral economy.   
 Urbanization and industrialization were synergistic processes, both of which were 
enabled and amplified by fossil fuel energy.  Anthracite coal provided heat for people’s 
living needs and energy for industrial operations, thereby making it both possible and 
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desirable for residents and businesses to congregate in cities.  The dense 
concentration of energy, labor, markets, and technological skill in cities, in turn, 
sustained and encouraged the rise of an urban industrial economy.     
 Both urbanization and industrialization initiated broad sets of social changes in 
how mid-Atlantic residents lived, worked, and played.  Life in cities was very different 
than in the countryside.  For example, most farmers in the early nineteenth century grew 
many of the crops they needed for food and exchanged surplus goods on a barter system.  
Urbanites, by contrast, relied on a cash economy to purchase nearly all the necessities of 
life.  Farmers lived and worked on the same property while urban workers resided and 
labored in separate spheres, commuting to and from factories and homes.  The location of 
these residences, in turn, were increasingly balkanized along class and ethnic lines as 
cities like Philadelphia and New York grew to house hundreds of thousands of people.
128
  
This balkanization increased the visibility and experience of inequality in the city.  Even 
though inequality was always part of American history—10 percent of Philadelphia’s 
population in 1774 owned nearly 90 percent of the taxable wealth
129
—the small size of 
the town brought people from all classes and backgrounds into regular interaction on the 
streets. By 1860, the spatial expansion and segmentation of cities made it much less 
likely that people of different racial, ethnic, and socio-economic backgrounds would 
cross paths.    
 Industrialization further amplified these changes.  The shifts accompanying 
industrialization touched practically every aspect of social life, including the distribution 
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of wealth, the goods people used in home and at work, and the balance of power 
between regions.  As summarized by Walter Licht, industrialization was linked to: “[t]he 
expansion of market activity, the spread of wage labor, mechanization, the coming of the 
factory system, the massive migration of people into and through the country, 
urbanization, occupational change, social segmentation and divisions within 
communities, labor organization, the emergence of a distinct middle class, the separation 
between men and women, declines in fertility, and ultimately, the rise of the large-scale 
corporation.”
130
  Few aspects of daily life were left untouched by industrialization.     
A closer look at labor practices shows the deep and varied effects of 
industrialization on workers.  First, industrialization undercut the traditional system of 
artisan production and the apprenticeship system that had previously structured careers 
for laborers.  Instead of being apprenticed to a master craftsman in a small shop, laborers 
were more likely to work in a larger factory with little training.  The time-discipline of 
the factory schedule replaced the seasonal rhythms characteristic of craft production.
131
  
Second, new machines altered the skills required to operate them.  Some machines such 
as steam engines were complex technologies demanding a new class of highly skilled 
operators.  The same machines could also create the need for unskilled labor such as 
feeding coal into boilers.  Therefore, industrialization was linked to an increasing gap 
between skilled and unskilled labor.  Finally, these changes in labor practices gave rise to 
new forms of worker protest.  Workers gathered together in new organizations like the 
Working Men’s Party to demand higher wages, shorter working hours, protection from 
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dangerous machinery, and other benefits.  These early collective actions by laborers 
would shape the emergence of unionization in the following decades.
132
 
 The social effects of urbanization and industrialization were structured by the 
energy landscape of anthracite coal.  The primary points of delivery for coal were New 
York and Philadelphia, and it is therefore no surprise that these were the nation’s largest 
cities by 1860 with 813,669 and 565,529 people, respectively.  Baltimore, with access to 
coal via the Susquehanna River, was third with 212,148 residents while Boston, St. 
Louis, and Cincinnati all had more than 150,000 people.
133
  Moreover, Philadelphian 
(99,003) and New York (102,969) had more workers engaged in manufacturing. Than 
any other American city.
134
  In other words, just the industrial workers of New York and 
Philadelphia constituted a larger population than all the residents of almost any other 
American city at the time.  In the words of Thomas Cochran, anthracite coal helped give 
rise to “one great manufacturing complex from Wilmington to New York.  From 1843 to 
1860 this megalopolis was probably the most rapidly growing large industrial area in the 
world.”
135
  Coal, canals, and the industrial cities they served grew together 
synergistically, but only in a limited geographic area.   
 The development of the mid-Atlantic’s industrial economy heightened the 
divergent trajectories of various American regions in the antebellum era.  By 1820, it had 
already been clear that New England, the mid-Atlantic, and the South were evolving 
along different economic trajectories for a variety of historical, cultural, and 
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environmental reasons.  The small farms and mill towns of New England operated 
differently than the large grain farms and artisan shops of the mid-Atlantic or the large 
plantation cash crop agriculture system of the South.
136
      
 The introduction of fossil fuel energy exacerbated these differences, thereby 
playing an important role in the start and end of the Civil War.  As described by John 
Majewski, Abraham Lincoln’s observation of a “house divided” could be better 
understood as a house dividing over several decades.
137
  Parts of Pennsylvania and 
Virginia that had similar climates, soil endowments, and population densities at the 
beginning of the century had grown apart over the next sixty years.  These tensions 
spilled out into the political domain in battles between northern politicians seeking a 
stronger federal government and protective tariffs versus southern politicians advocating 
for lower taxes and greater states’ rights.  While these were not the central issues over 
which the Civil War was fought, the different economic trajectories of the regions 
contributed to the belief among many that secession made sense politically and 
economically.   
 Once the Civil War began, the fact that the industrial heartland of America was 
north of the Mason-Dixon line gave the Union a great strategic advantage in the conflict.  
The mid-Atlantic was able to supply the Union Army with armaments and deliver these 
quickly using its extensive network of railroads, canals, and steamboats.  The particular 
geography of the anthracite coal energy landscape, therefore, both contributed to the 
onset of the Civil War and its resolution in favor of the North.   
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 Anthracite coal also influenced immigration patterns in the antebellum era.  
First and most directly, coal influenced transportation choices.  Many immigrants arrived 
in America on steam-powered vessels.  Once they landed, they could travel along canal 
or railroad networks to reach their final destinations.  Second, coal influenced who 
immigrated.  Building and operating an industrial enterprise required skilled laborers.  
Mid-Atlantic firms recruited highly trained workers from Britain, Wales, and Germany to 
work in the region’s factories.  For these workers, the promise of wages two to three 
times the average in Europe along with a cheaper cost-of-living was ample incentive to 
immigrate.
138
  Third, the mineral economy influenced where immigrants went.  The 
growing industrial opportunities in Philadelphia and New York contributed to the rise of 
immigration into the mid-Atlantic states.  Moreover, with ample coal available to support 
large urban populations and industrial enterprises requiring both skilled and unskilled 
laborers, many immigrants remained in cities as opposed to moving to the countryside.
139
  
In these ways, coal created new patterns of immigration in the mid-Atlantic.   
 Finally, the mining, transport, and consumption of anthracite coal contributed to 
the rise of corporate power in the young nation, an issue of broad political debate at the 
time.
140
  For many Americans, corporations were a threat to republican values.  A 
complex and malleable set of ideas and values, republicanism encouraged government 
actions that struck a balance between centralized authority and personal liberty.  In 
contrast to those seeking a strong central state, republicans feared that giving too much 
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power to the government would lead to abuses of power and corruption.  Republican 
fears extended to corporations as well, particularly when these organizations were 
granted special privileges such as permission to print banknotes or seize property by 
eminent domain.  Political virtue, according to republicanism, was based in the 
disinterested decisions of self-sufficient citizens.  Therefore, republicans sought to protect 
the position of small farmers and artisans in order to create a sound basis for a virtuous 
polity.  The presidencies of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson were particularly 
strongly associated with a rise of republican sentiments.
141
  
 The nexus of coal and corporations challenged republican values.  Canals and 
railroads, anthracite iron forges, many mining enterprises, and several urban factories 
were capital-intensive operations that often sought corporate privileges.  While it was not 
inevitable that the corporate form would be used to exploit fossil fuels—many of 
Philadelphia’s small shops were managed as partnerships, even including the large-scale 
Baldwin locomotive works
142
—the size and scale of coal-based enterprises encouraged 
their directors to pursue incorporation: “[s]team engines … permitted large-scale 
manufacturing, which in turn fostered corporate development.  There is thus a direct 
connection between coal, mass industry, and the rise of the bureaucratic corporation.”
143
  
These developments were not always welcomed.  We can see the attacks on the corporate 
privileges of the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company in the 1830s as part of republican 
fears over monopoly power.   
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The interconnections between corporate power and the exploitation of coal 
resources forced people to grapple with the proper balance between individual enterprise 
and centralized authority.  While these debates were never resolved at the level of ideas, 
the nexus between the anthracite industry and the mineral economy led to a de facto 
defeat for republicans.  Despite negative public attention, the corporate charters of 
industrial operations were rarely rescinded, and if anything, they became more common 
over time.  This contributed to a shift in how people understood republicanism.  Whereas 
in the eighteenth century, many republicans held that the pursuit of economic opportunity 
was inherently corrupting, this view had softened by the nineteenth century.  In reviewing 
attacks on railroad companies in Virginia and Pennsylvania, Majewski notes that there 
was “widespread consensus in favor of commercial expansion” but “conflict about its 
particulars.”
144
  The chartering, utilization, and social responses to anthracite corporations 
therefore both reflected and shaped the evolution of republican ideals in American 
political discourse.   
In sum, transporting and consuming anthracite coal was not simply about 
providing a source of heat or mechanical power.  Fossil fuel energy altered structural 
possibilities that generated a brave new world of human activity.  Anthracite coal did not 
determine the political and personal responses people made to the mineral economy, but 
it did force people to address new problems.  Their choices reshaped the development of 
the mid-Atlantic and the history of the nation.    
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 Anthracite coal gave mid-Atlantic residents their first tastes of fossil fuel 
energy.  But coal was not the only fossil fuel buried beneath the region’s soil.  At the 
dawn of the Civil War, sensational news reports began to emanate from western 
Pennsylvania.  Prospectors drilling into the earth had found large quantities of petroleum.  
Speculators jumped aboard coal-powered locomotives that sped across tracks of iron 
forged with anthracite.  Capitalists sent agents and financial promises to Titusville.  
Thousands of people flocked west to join the rush for black gold.  The region’s appetite 
for fossil fuels had been whet by anthracite, but the hunger had not been sated.  It is to the 
story of petroleum and its transport that we now turn.   
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Chapter 3: The Tide-Water Pipeline and the  
Transport of Pennsylvania Petroleum, 1860-1900 
 
 While Pennsylvania’s vast coal resources provided mid-Atlantic residents with 
their first large doses of fossil fuels, the Keystone State’s energy endowment was not 
limited to bituminous and anthracite.  In 1859, Edwin Drake successfully drilled for 
petroleum in Titusville, a small town in western Pennsylvania, giving rise to America’s 
first oil boom.  Within a few years, a sleepy and sparsely inhabited region became the 
center of oil production, with profound social, economic, and environmental effects on 
western Pennsylvania as well as the rest of the mid-Atlantic.   
 There are striking similarities between the development of Pennsylvania’s 
anthracite and petroleum industries.  Both sets of fossil fuel resources were located in 
rural regions significantly removed from centers of population and consumption.  Booms 
and busts, land speculation, and environmental degradation characterized the 
development of each region.  Moreover, both places became known by their 
representative product: the petroleum-bearing parts of Western Pennsylvania were soon 
called the “Oil Regions.”  Finally, solving transport problems shaped the development of 
each industry.   
 There were differences as well, many of which resulted from the choices people 
made about transport infrastructure.  After experiments with wagons, barges, and 
railroads, pipelines became the dominant technology for moving oil.  Pipelines created a 
distinct geography of oil flow that funneled petroleum to a few urban centers.  Moreover, 
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by dramatically lowering the cost of shipping oil, pipelines created an energy 
landscape that helped deepen and extend the mid-Atlantic’s transition into a mineral 
economy.   
 This chapter studies the development of oil transport infrastructure in the mid-
Atlantic.  I begin by looking at the role of early oil transport technologies in bringing 
petroleum to market.  I then examine the building of the Tide-Water pipeline, the world’s 
first long-distance pipeline for the transport of oil.  My last section explores the shift to 
pipelines as the dominant transport technology for petroleum.  The next chapter will 
study the flow of oil along the pipeline networks and the social consequences of oil 
consumption patterns.   
 I focus on the Tide-Water pipeline in this chapter for two reasons.  First, it was a 
path-breaking technology that shifted the way oil was transported.  Second, its history 
highlights the critical intra-industry struggles that can shape the development of transport 
infrastructure.  Simply put, pipelines did not emerge out of a vacuum or out of a simple 
effort to find the lowest cost way to move oil—they were weapons in a highly 
competitive industry.  Understanding the contingencies of the Tide-Water pipeline 
provides us with insights into how and why energy transport infrastructure is built, whose 
interests it is designed to serve, and the various factors (law, geography, capital, and luck) 
that shape its development.   
 
Oil Transport By Water and Rail 
 Transport has been one of the great challenges facing the petroleum industry since 
its founding days.  This fact is based in the geography of oil.  Almost all of the world’s 
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petroleum reserves are located in areas substantially removed from the places where 
the oil is refined and consumed.  Today, oil often travels thousands of miles from wells in 
the Middle East to South America, from the Niger delta to China, and from Alaska to the 
continental United States.  Although the relevant distances were shorter in absolute terms 
during the first quarter-century of oil’s production, the transport problems were no less 
thorny.    
The modern oil industry began in earnest in 1859 when “Colonel” Edwin Drake 
led an effort to drill for oil in Western Pennsylvania.
1
  For years, small amounts of oil had 
been collected along the length of the aptly named Oil Creek, where petroleum seeped to 
the surface.  Native Americans and European settlers gathered petroleum by laying 
blankets on pools of oily water, wringing the liquid out, and then evaporating or boiling 
off the water.  They sold most of this oil for use in patent medicines used to treat bruises, 
burns, and rheumatism.
2
  The scale of these operations was very small.  By the 1840s, 
several farmers along Oil Creek gathered two to twelve barrels a season, producing an 
amount sufficient to supply the apothecaries in Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and New York.
3
 
  Drake and his financial backers had different plans.  They knew that oil could be 
refined into a valuable illuminating liquid as well as other profitable by-products.
4
  But 
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how to increase the yields of oil?  The men got inspiration from the salt-drilling 
industry.  Several salt wells had reportedly filled with briny oil when drilled to a certain 
depth.  While such oil was considered a nuisance because it ruined the salt, Drake and 
others believed the technique of drilling might produce petroleum in large quantities.  
They were right.  On August 28
th
, 1859, Uncle Billy Smith, Drake’s drill operator, 
discovered that they had struck oil.  The news spread like wildfire, and what followed 
was a speculative boom in oil production that utterly transformed western Pennsylvania.  
Men flooded into the area, leases of land were sold for fantastic sums of money, and 
towns were erected practically overnight.  The nation, it seemed, had “oil on the brain.”
5
 
It quickly became clear that shipping oil would not be an easy matter.  The Oil 
Regions were located in a remote part of western Pennsylvania with few roads and no 
railroad connections.  While merchants had shipped small amounts of oil for use in patent 
medicines before 1859, the volume of oil moved was so minimal that they had little 
incentive to invest in improved transport facilities.  As oil production boomed in the 
wake of Drake’s discovery, however, the storage and transport of oil became the primary 
bottlenecks.  An estimated 8,500 barrels of oil were produced in 1859, while output 
skyrocketed to reach 650,000, 2,118,000, and 3,056,000 barrels in the next three years.
6
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A driller fortunate enough to strike a gushing well, however, would watch 
most of the oil pour away until he could obtain barrels or erect storage tanks.  Often, 
producers dug large holes into the ground in a desperate effort to collect the petroleum.  
Despite the large numbers of wooden barrels imported into the region, they were almost 
always in short supply.  The inadequacy of storage facilities led to thousands of barrels of 
oil seeping into soil, collecting in rivers, and catching fire throughout the region.
7
 
Producers found transport to be as insufficient as storage.  First, oilmen followed 
the patterns of earlier industries in the area.  For several years, lumber had been floated 
down Oil Creek to the Allegheny River, where it continued its journey to Pittsburgh.  
However, Oil Creek was too shallow and irregular to transport bulky goods reliably.  
Lumber merchants used pond freshets to overcome this limitation.  A pond freshet 
involved creating temporary dams to raise the water level behind the barrier.  When the 
floodgates were opened, the lumber floated along the stretch of higher water that 
resulted.
8
  However, pond freshets were not a particularly reliable approach to river 
management.  Whenever a pond freshet was scheduled, crowds would gather to witness 
the frequent wrecks and crashes that ensued.
9
  
With the increase in oil production, pond freshets were operated as often as three 
times a week during the early 1860s.  Oil was loaded onto shallow barges capable of 
carrying between 25 and 1,000 barrels.
10
  A single pond freshet might involve several 
hundred boats.  However, this coordination often created dangerous conditions: a 
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December 1862 disaster triggered by breaking ice destroyed half of a freshet carrying 
350 boats and 60,000 barrels of oil and caused $350,000 of property damage.  In 1865, a 
fire sparked by a lantern spread to nearly a hundred boats and led to the loss of 8,000 
barrels of oil.
11
    
As the oil trade grew, railroad companies saw opportunities for profit and began 
expanding their tracks into the Oil Regions in the early 1860s.  Local oilmen took the 
first steps to create railroad connections.  Producers of oil seeking a better outlet for 
petroleum organized the Oil Creek Railroad in 1860.  By 1862, they had completed a 
twenty mile line from Titusville to Corry, where the Sunbury & Erie Railroad had a 
connection.  From Corry, oil could then be sent to Cleveland or the eastern seaboard via 
railroad, the Great Lakes, and the Erie Canal.  In the following years, the Oil Creek 
Railroad was expanded further into the Oil Regions to capture more output.  In 1864 the 
railroad shipped approximately 430,000 barrels of oil.
12
  The creation of the Oil Creek 
Railroad drew other parties to the region as well.  By 1862, the Atlantic & Great Western 
Railroad, working with the Erie Railroad, had extended its tracks to Corry to enter the oil 
business.  Not wanting to be left out, the Pennsylvania Railroad contracted with the 
Philadelphia & Erie Railroad to extend its tracks to Sunbury, so that it would have access 
to the Oil Regions.
13
  This began an intense competition between the major trunk 
railroads that would play a significant role in the transport of oil.    
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Map 3.1: Railroads in the Oil Regions, 1860s 
 
While rivers and railroads helped get oil to distant urban markets, neither 
approach addressed local transport.  Before it could be shipped long distances, oil had to 
get from the wellhead to a river shipping point or a railroad depot.  When Pennsylvanians 
first struck oil, their only option was to haul the oil in barrels by wagons over rough dirt 
roads.  The teamsters quickly obtained a monopoly on this overland transport.  Teamsters 
had flocked to the Oil Regions in great numbers following Drake’s discovery, 
recognizing the opportunity for good wages.  While the pay was favorable, the work was 
brutal.  Using horse-drawn carts that could carry five or six barrels weighing around 360 
pounds each, teamsters loaded the oil and drove it over the rough roads, then unloaded 
the barrels into oil barges or onto railroad cars.  In good conditions, this was slow and 
arduous work.  During rainy seasons, the roads became practically impassable, and 
wagons often sank up to their axles in mud.  Teamsters and their horses also hauled the 
empty barges back up Oil Creek for the next shipment.    
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While teamsters provided an essential function for the oil industry, they were 
widely despised by oil producers and community members.  Not only were the rates that 
teamsters charged widely considered exorbitant, often as much as $3 or more per barrel, 
they were also a source of social tension.
14
  Teamsters were considered to be a 
particularly hard-drinking lot who spent most of their spare time boozing and fighting.  
They drove their horses so hard that it was rare for an animal to survive more than two 
years of service.  Those getting in the way of teamsters faced the prospect of feeling the 
“black snake” of a whip across their legs.
15
  Producers of oil felt unfairly robbed of 
profits by teamsters, while community members experienced them as a toxic presence.  
However, with no other way for getting oil to transport points and faced with the ability 
of the teamsters to keep outsiders from entering the hauling business, there appeared to 
be no alternative except to tolerate an unwelcome presence.  As Ida Tarbell summarized, 
“[i]ndispensable to the business [teamsters] became the tyrants of the region—working 
and brawling as suited them.”
16
   
A standard trop in newspaper articles of the time and early histories of the Oil 
Regions, the frustrations with the teamsters reflected a pattern that would be repeated 
time and time again in the oil industry.  Control over transport allowed teamsters to hold 
considerable power within the industry and make handsome profits while withstanding 
social critique.  Though teamsters accomplished this first, their success would later be 
matched by the railroads and Standard Oil, and then by the parties controlling pipelines.    
                                                
14
 Ibid., 185. 
15
 Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, I, 14. 
16
 Ibid. 
 166 
During the early years of the oil industry, transport was by far the most 
significant expense.  To get a barrel of oil to a seaboard market in 1860 cost an estimated 
$11.00 per barrel.
17
  By 1862, Scientific American estimated the cost of shipments at 
$8.00 per barrel.
18
  In 1864, things were not much better.  Oil cost $7.00 at the well, but 
over $15.00 in New York, meaning that over 50 percent of the cost was allocated to 
transport ($1.50 for hauling to a railroad depot, $3.60 for railroad charges, and $3.25 for a 
barrel).
19
  In addition, unreliable transport and storage facilities meant that the production 
of oil far exceeded the amounts that arrived in markets.  Williamson and Daum estimate 
that only 15-20 percent of oil production in the early 1860s actually reached consumers.  
For instance, of the more than two million barrels produced in 1861, about 94,000 
reached Pittsburgh by pond freshet, 135,000 reached the Sunbury & Erie railroad, and the 
Atlantic & Great Western railroad shipped 70,000 barrels.
20
  Paul Giddens notes that 
“[t]he pond freshet always involved a heavy loss of oil; a third of it was lost by leakage 
before the boats started, and another third was lost before reaching Pittsburgh.”
21
  The 
remaining oil was lost to leaky barrels, evaporation, and unreliable transport 
infrastructure.    
This system of transport left much to be desired.  Newspaper articles bemoaned 
the presence of teamsters within the community and oil producers railed against the high 
prices of transport.  Moreover, wagons, barrels, and barges could only move so much oil.  
As production increased from thousands to hundreds of thousands to millions of barrels, 
                                                
17
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 107. 
18
 Scientific American, LXVI (Feb. 27, 1862), 134.  As cited in: Ibid. 
19
 Johnson, "The Development of American Petroleum Pipelines: A Study in Private Enterprise and Public 
Policy, 1862-1906". 
20
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 109. 
21
 Paul Henry Giddens, Early Days of Oil, a Pictorial History of the Beginnings of the Industry in 
Pennsylvania (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948). 
 167 
there simply were not enough teamsters, wagons, horses, roads, barges, and pond 
freshets to get the oil to market.  This state of affairs created a powerful incentive for 
entrepreneurs to develop new ways of transporting oil.       
In 1865, Samuel van Syckel introduced the first revolution in the transport of oil 
by building a gathering pipeline that connected a series of oil wells to a centralized 
collection point at a railroad depot.
22
  His efforts were inspired in large part by the 
prolific wells discovered along Pithole Creek.  Despite an estimated three thousand 
teamsters flooding to the area, transport was slow and expensive.  Van Syckel decided 
that a pipeline crossing the foothills and arriving at the Oil Creek Railroad depot on 
Miller Farm could be a profitable investment.  He took out a loan for $30,000—
approximately $370,000 in 2005 currency—from the First National Bank of Titusville.
23
  
He attached three pumps to a five mile pipeline with a two-inch diameter, and was able to 
force the oil through its length in a continuous flow.  The capacity of the pipeline, eighty 
one barrels per hour, was estimated to do the work of three hundred teams working ten 
hours a day.
24
  Van Syckel charged one dollar per barrel and made a small fortune.      
To build his pipeline, van Syckel drew on technology that had already been 
developed, particularly in urban water and gas lighting systems.  In addition, others had 
already attempted to apply pipelines to the transport of oil.  Samuel Karns and Heman 
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Janes made proposals in 1860 and 1861, respectively, to construct pipelines, but 
nothing came of their efforts.  In 1862, James Hutchings built a thousand foot pipeline 
from a well-head to a refinery that operated on the siphon principle.  When he tried to 
attach a rotary motor and force the oil uphill, his pump and pipes proved inadequate for 
the task.  Another effort by Hutchings in 1863-64 faced similar problems with leaking 
pipes and was abandoned when teamsters tore up the pipes.
25
    
Most oil producers greeted van Syckel’s breakthrough enthusiastically.  It offered 
a cheaper way to transport oil and alleviated some of the bottleneck.  The teamsters, on 
the other hand, recognized the pipeline as a profound threat to their livelihood.  On 
multiple occasions they sabotaged van Syckel’s pipeline, forcing him to post armed 
guards along the line day and night.  An early employee later wrote that “[a]ll of the 
officials of the company, including the writer, were threatened by the teamsters with 
transportation to a warmer climate.”
26
  However, the protests of the teamsters did not 
succeed.  As short-distance gathering pipelines spread throughout the Oil Regions, the 
numbers and social power of teamsters faded rapidly. 
 At the same, railroads were also rapidly overtaking rivers as the main method for 
transporting petroleum long distances.  Numerous factors encouraged this development.  
The first was the increase in number of railroads serving the region.  By 1866, several 
railroads were operating in the region, each with a connection to one of the big three 
railroads—the Pennsylvania headed by Tom Scott, the Erie led by Jay Gould, and the 
New York Central directed by Cornelius Vanderbilt.  Second, iron tanks capable of 
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storing thousands of barrels of crude oil came into common use after 1865, when the 
end of the Civil War made iron more widely available.  The introduction of iron tanks 
aided railroads by gathering large amounts of oil at centralized stations.  A third boon 
was the development of tank cars, reducing the need to transport oil in barrels.  Amos 
Desmore is credited with developing the first innovation by creating 40-50 barrel 
cylindrical wooden tanks that could be attached to flat cars.
27
  The more familiar 
horizontal boiler-type railroad cars were developed in 1868 and soon became the industry 
standard.  With adequate connections in the region, gathering pipelines that could collect 
large quantities of oil in centralized depots, adequate storage facilities, and tank cars, the 
railroads became the predominant transporters of oil over long distances.  
Interestingly, the lack of iron for storage tanks appears to be one of the few effects 
the Civil War had on the early oil industry.  Despite the large amounts of resources and 
manpower directed towards the war effort by both North and South, the oil industry never 
lacked for capital or laborers.  The disruptions of the war did have a couple of other 
effects on the trade.  First, it interrupted shipments of turpentine from the South.  
Turpentine was an essential ingredient in camphene, a widely used artificial illuminant 
that competed in markets with kerosene.  By cutting off the supply of camphene, the war 
helped create markets for kerosene.  Second, when the war ended in 1865, many of the 
single men in the armies headed to the Oil Regions, thereby expanding the booming 
production of oil. 
Once loaded onto railroads, most of the oil was shipped to refining centers 
including Cleveland, New York, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Baltimore.  At these 
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locations the oil was refined into several products including kerosene, naphtha, 
paraffin wax, and lubricating oils.  Just as most oil today is turned into gasoline, in the 
nineteenth century kerosene was the most valued product.  Kerosene was used for indoor 
lighting and was widely considered to be superior to candle light.  Demand for improved 
illumination was particularly strong in Europe where the majority of American kerosene 
production was shipped.  By 1866, more kerosene was being sold abroad than 
domestically, a pattern that held throughout the nineteenth century.
28
   
Between 1865 and 1872, there was a relative balance of power within the industry 
between producing, refining, and transport interests.  At least ten different companies 
operated gathering pipelines, ensuring competitive rates.  For the long-distance transport 
of crude by railroad, producers and refiners considered rates generally favorable because 
the major trunk lines were in competition with each other for obtaining the agricultural 
trade from the Midwest, and therefore generally kept rates on oil low.  During these 
several years, both gathering pipelines and railroads entrenched their positions as the 
dominant methods of transporting oil short and long distances.   
This period of balance did not last.  The rise of the Standard Oil Company 
dramatically changed the competitive dynamics of the industry.  Volumes have been 
written on Standard Oil, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the history of 
the “octopus” beyond its broadest outlines.
29
  However, it is important to note that control 
over transport—both gathering pipelines and long-distance transport by railroad—was 
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central to the ability of John D. Rockefeller’s company to form one of the most 
remarkable monopolies in business history during the 1870s.  From its roots as a small 
Cleveland refiner in 1865, Rockefeller’s company managed to acquire control over 
practically all of the refiners of his city by 1872 and 90 percent of the nation’s refining 
capacity by 1879.   
The key factor behind Standard Oil’s success was its ability to gain consistently 
lower rates on the transport of oil.  As Ida Tarbell summarized: “It was the rebate which 
had made the Standard Oil Trust, the rebate, amplified, systematised, glorified into a 
power never equaled before or since by any business of the country.”
30
  How did 
Rockefeller use transport to his advantage?  First, he benefited immensely from 
Cleveland’s advantageous geography.  At first glance, this is a surprising statement.  
Most of the oil refined during the first two decades of the industry was exported overseas.  
Therefore, it would seem that shipping the oil 150 miles west of the Oil Regions would 
add at least 300 miles to the total distance it would need to travel before it could be 
loaded on ocean-going vessels.  Pittsburgh, the Oil Regions, New York, and Philadelphia 
all seemed to have a more favorable location for oil refining based on shipment distances.  
Cleveland’s only geographic advantage seemed to be for the small trade in western oil 
shipments. 
However, absolute distance between points was only one factor in determining 
transport costs, and in the context of nineteenth century railroad practice, it was rarely the 
most important.  Competition mattered far more.  In this context, Cleveland was uniquely 
situated.  Two railroads systems served Cleveland—the Lake Shore Railroad and the 
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Atlantic & Great Western Railroad—thereby ensuring competitive rates.  More 
importantly, for shipments of refined oil to the eastern seaboard, Cleveland refiners had 
several options.  Both the Lake Shore and Atlantic and Great Western Railroads had 
connections with the three major trunk lines (the Pennsylvania, Erie, and Central 
Railroads) for shipments to Philadelphia or New York.  In addition, Cleveland benefited 
from the availability of water transport.  Oil could be shipped over the Great Lakes to the 
Erie Canal or directly to Europe through the St. Lawrence River (see Map 3.1).    
The presence of multiple shippers in Cleveland provided Rockefeller with the 
opportunity to obtain rebates and discounts on his oil shipments by playing competing 
transport system against one another.  He took advantage of this situation masterfully.  
First, he negotiated with all the shippers to obtain the lowest rates possible.  These initial 
lower rates helped him to build up his business.  By 1870, Rockefeller was doing large 
amounts of business and he could negotiate further discounts by offering railroads bulk 
shipments.  These bulk shipments lowered the railroad’s costs by utilizing their 
investments in tank cars more effectively, allowing them to give Standard Oil lower 
rates.
31
  This soon turned into a synergistic cycle whereby lower transport costs allowed 
Standard Oil to increase its business, which resulted in even larger oil shipments.  The 
company could then achieve further rate cuts, which put it in an even stronger 
competitive position. 
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While Rockefeller’s excellent business skills and negotiating acumen played a 
critical role in obtaining these discounts, it is important to note that he had a geographical 
advantage as well.  Refiners in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, by contrast, had far less 
opportunity to negotiate because there was little competition on oil shipments to these 
destinations.  The Pennsylvania Railroad had a near-monopoly on shipments, particularly 
to the eastern seaboard.  Without strong competition, the railroad chose to keep its prices 
relatively high, thereby disadvantaging refiners in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia.
32
   
Using his financial advantages from lower transport costs, Rockefeller eliminated 
his competitors in one of two ways.  His preferred method was collaboration, particularly 
if a rival firm had promising executive talent.  Many prominent oilmen ended up joining 
Standard Oil and profiting handsomely, especially when they brought management skills.  
If a competitor was unwilling to collaborate, or did not feel Rockefeller was offering a 
fair price, then Standard Oil would unleash its second tactic: a rate war.  They would 
offer oil in the competitor’s region at prices far below market levels and absorb the 
losses, knowing that their greater capital would allow them to outlast the competition.  
The strategy of rate wars was particularly effective because Standard Oil did not actually 
lose nearly as much money as its competitors due to cheaper oil shipments.  
In addition to profiting from the long-distance transport of crude oil, Standard Oil 
also began acquiring control of the gathering pipeline network.  There were close to a 
dozen independent pipeline and storage companies in the beginning of the 1870s, but by 
the end of 1877 Standard owned a controlling stake in practically all of them.  
Domination of oil’s transport infrastructure—through owning controlling stakes in the 
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gathering pipelines and storage tank companies and obtaining the lowest rates from 
railroads—enabled Standard to reap massive profits and eliminate competitors.  The fact 
that Standard was paying $.85 per barrel or less for shipments to the seaboard while it 
cost independents $1.25 to $1.40 per barrel explains some of this disparity.
33
  Eventually, 
Rockefeller was even dictating to the railroads the percentages of oil they would carry 
and the rates they would receive.
34
  By 1878, a typical barrel of oil would be pumped by 
an independent producer and sent into a Standard-controlled gathering pipeline to be 
stored in a Standard-controlled iron tank then shipped to a Standard-controlled refinery 
via a Standard-controlled railroad and sold to consumers through a Standard-controlled 
marketing group. 
 This system worked extremely well for Standard as well as the railroad 
companies, who still considered oil one of their most profitable products despite the high 
rebates they paid when shipping for Standard.  One of the primary reasons the trunk lines 
agreed to give Standard preferential rates is that Rockefeller eliminated the competition 
between them for oil.  All these railroads were competing for the lucrative Chicago 
agricultural trade and often engaged in rate wars against each other.  The fact that they 
could hold a steady price for petroleum made it a profitable business.  The advantages 
that accrued to Standard Oil and the railroad companies came at the expense of others, 
most notably independent oil refiners and oil producers.
35
  In addition, it has been argued 
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that consumers of refined oil paid higher prices as a result of Standard Oil’s 
monopoly pricing.
36
   
Independent oil refiners and producers were not blind to the rise of Standard Oil 
and the role of transport advantages in the growth of the company.  Over the 1870s, 
different actors attempted several responses to confront Standard Oil, including group 
organization and integrating transport and refining interests.  For example, in 1872, 
independent oilmen formed the Petroleum Producers Union to protest the South 
Improvement Company scheme, a proposal by Standard Oil and the railroad companies 
to control oil shipments.  By withholding oil shipments from participating railroads, the 
Petroleum Producers Union helped ensure that the South Improvement Company’s plan 
was abandoned.  However, many of the rate structures included in the proposal were soon 
implemented in other forms.
37
 
Joseph Potts of the Empire Transportation Company led a separate effort in 1877 
to challenge Rockefeller’s company.  Empire owned a series of gather pipelines and 
railroad tank cars that were shipped on the Pennsylvania Railroad’s tracks.  With the 
focus of Standard Oil on refineries in the New York area, both Potts and President Tom 
Scott of the Pennsylvania Railroad feared they would see a decline in oil shipments.  
Potts therefore began to purchase refineries in Philadelphia and New York to guarantee 
that Empire would have an outlet for its oil.
38
  Standard Oil responded quickly to the 
challenge by removing its oil shipments from the Pennsylvania Railroad and a general 
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rate war soon broke out.  The Erie dropped its rate from over a dollar to thirty-five 
cents for shipments east and the Pennsylvania Railroad reportedly carried oil for eight 
cents a barrel.
39
  By the end of the summer, Standard Oil had emerged victorious.  The 
Pennsylvania Railroad withdrew its support of Potts and the properties and assets of 
Empire were sold to Standard Oil, thereby increasing Rockefeller’s grip on oil transport.    
Transport was not the only problem facing independent producers.  Chronic 
overproduction contributed greatly to the low profits of oil producers.  In 1878, drillers 
flooded to the newly discovered Bradford field (near the New York border) and 
production skyrocketed.  Prices plummeted correspondingly.  However, producers noted 
that Standard Oil was still able to profit during hard times for the rest of the industry.  
Many of them gathered together under the auspices of the Petroleum Producers Union to 
seek to control production and fight Standard Oil through political and legal means.  For 
example, the Union introduced bills to the Pennsylvania legislature that would give 
eminent domain privileges to pipelines, appealed to Governor Harncraft of Pennsylvania 
to force the Pennsylvania Railroad to establish fair rates on oil transport, and protested 
the competitive practices of Standard Oil.
40
  These efforts led to a series of investigations 
that drew public attention to Standard Oil, but did not fundamentally alter the dynamics 
of the industry.
41
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Ultimately, these efforts to fight Standard Oil failed to defeat the octopus.  
Instead, the results of these battles usually left Standard Oil in stronger position, as 
Rockefeller was able to either demoralize his enemies (as in the case of the Petroleum 
Producers Union) or acquire their assets (as in the case of Empire).  By the end of the 
1870s, Standard Oil’s control over oil transport was nearly complete.   
 
The Tide-Water Pipeline 
 Astute oilmen knew that oil transport influenced profitability and some of them 
believed long-distance pipelines could alter the industry’s existing balance of power.  If 
they could construct a pipeline to the seaboard that was not controlled by Standard Oil, 
they might be able to beat “the octopus” at its own game.  In 1879, these hopes became 
physically embodied in the Tide-Water pipeline.     
While pipelines had been used since 1865 to move oil from wellheads to railroad 
depots, the development of a long-distance pipeline was a very different proposition.  
Gathering pipelines were small-diameter (usually two inches) and short-distance 
(typically under five miles).  Often the oil flowed either by gravity, or was driven by 
small pumps where there was an elevation gain.  Gathering pipeline companies operated 
as intermediaries between producers and shippers.  Long-distance pipelines, by contrast, 
had large-diameters (five inches and above) and operated over long distances (ranging 
from a hundred to several hundred miles).  Large pumps were needed to force the oil 
across long stretches of terrain.  Long-distance pipeline companies operated as 
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intermediaries between gathering pipeline companies and refineries.  In other words, 
the two systems involved different capital requirements, technologies, and customers.   
The first effort to create a long-distance pipeline began in 1874.  David Hostetter, 
a former patent medicine salesman, formed the Columbia Conduit Company to build a 
32-mile pipeline from the Butler oil field to a point 10-12 miles from Pittsburgh.
42
  His 
workers laid a 4-inch pipeline with pumping stations every five miles.  He immediately 
ran into trouble, however, as his pipeline had to cross the tracks of the Western branch of 
the Pennsylvania Railroad.  Taking a cue from actions of the teamsters the previous 
decade, the railroads moved with force against the new competitor.  As soon as the pipes 
were laid under the tracks, railroad employees pulled them out and used their corporate 
strength in the courtroom to defend their actions.  Not content to rely on the law, the 
railroad men built fortifications out of railroad ties and kept armed guards on site to 
prevent the completion of the pipeline.
43
  Frustrated and ready to give up, Hostetter 
leased the pipeline to Byron Benson, Robert Hopkins, and David McKelvy in April, 
1875.   
Benson, Hopkins, and McKelvy had been working together for several years.  
Benson and Hopkins were born on farms in Onondaga County, New York.  At the ages of 
17 and 16, respectively, they left their homes and traveled west together to seek their 
fortunes.  Failing to strike it rich, they returned to New York in 1854 and began a lumber 
business.  During the Civil War, Benson served as Sheriff of Onondaga County and 
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Hopkins joined the Union Army.  After the war, the two moved to Enterprise, 
Pennsylvania (five miles east of Titusville) and established an oil and lumber company.  
The men used the lumber mill to obtain regular profits until they found oil in paying 
quantities.  They soon met a young lawyer named David McKelvy and in 1870 the parties 
created an oil-producing partnership that generated significant income over the next 
several years.
44
    
J. G. Benton, an oil producer and friend of Benson and Hopkins, alerted the men 
to the pipeline opportunity.  Benton had an idea but needed capital to implement his plan.  
His solution was cost-effective, if not elegant.  He realized that if the line was split in the 
middle at a public crossing of the railroad, the men could make regular oil shipments by 
carting the oil over the tracks in horse-drawn tank cars.  Benson, Hopkins, and McKelvy 
agreed and leased the pipeline from Hostetter.  Benton located a public highway that 
crossed the railroad near the path of the line and built a storage tank at either side of the 
line.  When the oil arrived at the north side of the tracks, it was pumped from the pipe 
into a horse-drawn tank car, driven across the railroad tracks, deposited in the pipes on 
the south side, and sent to Pittsburgh.  The railroad company tried to thwart this plan by 
leaving railroad cars parked on the tracks, but because it was a public highway, a court 
forced them to stop this practice.  With this work-around, the pipeline was able to ship 
5,000 barrels a day and earn a good rate of return.
45
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The success of the Columbia Conduit drew the attention of Standard Oil.  
After Rockefeller defeated the Empire Transportation Company, Standard Oil purchased 
the Columbia Conduit in 1877 as part of their effort to control oil transport.  Hostetter 
reportedly received a million dollars, and paid a quarter of that sum to Benson, Hopkins, 
and McKelvy to terminate the lease.
46
 
A more aggressive pipeline effort came in 1876 from Henry Harley of the 
Pennsylvania Transportation Company, who proposed a 230-mile pipeline to Baltimore.  
He employed the noted Civil War general and civil engineer Herman Haupt, who had led 
early efforts to construct the Hoosac Tunnel, a railroad tunnel in Massachusetts.  Despite 
having completed the survey, drawn up the technical plans, and raised some capital, this 
effort was abandoned when Harley was arrested for fraudulent dealings in oil.  His 
company had oversold its oil holdings and went into bankruptcy.  Standard Oil purchased 
the gathering pipelines of Harley’s company the next year.
47
   
In 1878, Benson, Hopkins, and McKelvy purchased the rights to Harley’s 
proposed pipeline to Baltimore using half of the money they were given when Standard 
Oil bought the Columbia Conduit.  They formed the Seaboard Pipe Company and 
obtained subscriptions for many of the shares, drawing particular support from 
independent oilmen aligned with the Petroleum Producers Union.
48
  However, questions 
over the feasibility of the project led to its collapse.  The biggest issues were the lack of 
independent refiners in Baltimore, declining production in the Butler oil fields where the 
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line was to originate, and questions over whether the entire 230-mile right-of-way 
was secure.
49
    
 Turning their attention to an alternate route, Benson, Hopkins, and McKelvy 
created the Tide-Water Pipe Company in November of 1878.  They would find that the 
third time was the charm, at least as far as their pipeline efforts were concerned.  They 
came to an agreement with Franklin Gowen, the flamboyant President of the Reading 
Railroad, to construct a 110-mile pipeline from the newly discovered Bradford oil field 
east to Williamsport, where the Reading would take the oil to independent refiners in 
Philadelphia and New York.  The Reading agreed to provide half the needed capital—
$250,000, equivalent to about $3.5 million in 2005—in return for the opportunity to enter 
the oil trade.  Because the Reading’s tracks did not extend west of Williamsport, it had 
previously been reliant on transfers from other railroads in order to obtain any oil 
business.   
The exact lineage of this proposal is unclear.  Newspapers reported that Benson 
was in Philadelphia over the summer of 1878 raising capital for a pipeline project with 
the Reading Railroad.
50
  However, the official contracts indicate that the agreement was 
originally reached with H.L. Dilks of the Equitable Petroleum Company, practically the 
last gathering pipeline company independent of Standard Oil.  The original agreements 
are signed September 26, 1878 between the Reading Railroad and the Equitable 
Petroleum Company, with an amendment on November 18, 1878 transferring the rights 
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to the Tide-Water Pipe Company.
51
  It is uncertain whether Dilks intended to build 
the pipeline with Equitable or was acting in the interests of the Tide-Water parties before 
they could arrange a corporate charter.  By April of the following year, Equitable, along 
with its gathering pipelines and storage tanks, had been absorbed by Tide-Water.
52
  
Workers began constructing the pipeline in February of 1879.  The company’s 
directors, engineers, and workers had to face a number of technical and competitive 
challenges.  Pipelines had been proven to work with small diameters and over short 
distances, but no one had yet attempted anything on this scale.  Could a pipe sustain the 
pressure required to pump the oil over the Allegheny Mountains?  Would oil be tarnished 
by extended contact with iron?  Would oil spills ruin the farmlands through which the 
pipe ran?  What interference would Standard Oil present?  The combination of these 
challenges led many in the region to dub the effort “Benson’s folly.”
53
 
Some of the challenges were technical.  First, the company had to design its 
supplies before it could even place orders.  The company purchased sixteen to twenty 
foot wrought-iron pipes with a six-inch diameter from the National Tube Company and 
the Reading Iron Works, which were larger than any pipes previously used for oil.  Each 
pipe length weighed 340 pounds, and collectively the pipes were estimated to weigh over 
five million pounds.
54
  Because these pipes were larger and heavier than anything used 
before, the company had to design new tools—large pipe tongs—that would allow 
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workers to connect them.
55
  However, simply designing and ordering the parts was 
not enough.  The company had to identify manufacturing companies that were not 
dependent on the business of Standard Oil in order to be assured that their products 
would not be manufactured poorly or delivered late.
56
    
Second, the company needed to design pumping stations that could force the oil 
over large elevation gains without exceeding the pressure capacity of the wrought-iron 
pipes.  Most pumps at the time were direct-acting, which created high levels of pressure.  
Working with the Holly Manufacturing Company, the Tide-Water’s engineers developed 
a tri-plex pump that could deliver seventy horsepower at a steady level of pressure.
57
  
This meant that much more force could be delivered to the oil without tearing the pipes 
apart at the joints.  In reviewing the new design, Mr. Holly, president of the pump 
company, reportedly announced that he fully understood pressure for the first time.
58
   
The labor of constructing the pipeline was a grueling process.  The path of the 
pipeline cut through the forests of the Allegheny Mountains where there were few roads.  
Therefore, large numbers of teamsters were needed just to deliver the pipe lengths fifteen 
to twenty miles from the railroad depots to their final destination.  Teams of eleven men 
positioned the heavy pipes in the correct position and used the newly designed pipe tongs 
to screw the lengths together.  The muscle power of men and animals provided the energy 
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needed to construct the line.
59
  Similar to the building of coal canals, while the Tide-
Water pipeline would play an important role in creating a mineral economy, the energy 
that constructed it was drawn from the organic economy.   
Finally, the natural landscape provided another set of challenges to the line’s 
construction.  It was easier to obtain the rights-of-way for the pipeline if the line went 
through the Allegheny Mountains, but this made building the line that much harder.  In 
addition to the difficulty of getting the pipes and men to the sites of construction, the 
pipeline had to ascend over fifteen hundred feet to a maximum elevation of twenty-six 
hundred feet.  A severe winter did not help matters, and crews were forced to work 
around the clock to complete critical sections while navigating through five-foot snow 
banks.
60
   
The technical challenges proved minor in comparison with the competitive threats 
the new company faced.  Standard Oil understood the value its control over transport 
technologies held, and quickly mobilized several resources to attack the Tide-Water 
company.  Rights-of-way were one of the company’s greatest vulnerabilities.  At this 
time, pipeline companies did not have the right of eminent domain, primarily because 
Standard Oil and the railroads had gone to great lengths to defeat legislative efforts by 
independent oilmen to achieve this goal in 1873 and 1878.
61
  The company had to 
purchase rights-of-way from landowners for the entire 110 miles.  Standard Oil agents 
immediately began efforts to buy a north-south blocking line that would prevent 
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completion of the east-west line.  They challenged the leases obtained by the new 
company along its proposed path and sought to purchase other lands.  Two Standard Oil 
employees were even arrested when they were found to be impersonating Tide-Water 
officials.
62
  As late as May of 1879, Standard Oil was willing to spend $20,000, 
equivalent to more than a quarter million dollars in 2005, to buy two small farms that 
would break the path of the pipeline.
63
    
Standard Oil pursued the fight on several other fronts as well.  When the pipeline 
was being built, there were seven independent refineries in New York that had signed 
agreements to get their oil from the new company.  Standard Oil purchased control of six 
of them before the line was completed.
64
  Through its influence in several newspapers, 
Standard Oil published negative articles about the pipeline and its founders.
65
  In addition 
to the pressure from Standard Oil, the railroads were also threatened by the new pipeline 
and offered any resistance they could.  The pipeline crossed under the tracks of both the 
Northern Central and Buffalo, New York & Philadelphia railroads.  As soon as the pipes 
were laid, the railroads sent teams to rip the pipes out.  Court injunctions upheld the Tide-
Water company’s land claims and the pipes were replaced.
66
  In addition, the railroads 
delayed and misplaced shipments of pipe and supplies along their lines.
67
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 Despite the technical challenges and competitive pressures, the Tide-Water 
pipeline was completed in late May of 1879.  Oil entered the pipeline on May 28
th
 
moving at about the pace of a man walking.  After a short delay to remove pieces of 
wood left in the line—the result of careless workers or sabotage—the oil arrived in 
Williamsport in the early evening of June 4
th
.
68
  For the Tide-water officials, the success 
of the pipeline was a vindication of their efforts and an impressive technological 
accomplishment.  It would later serve as the model for a 1937 Kern & Hammerstein 
musical “High, Wide, and Handsome” produced by Paramount Pictures and starring Irene 
Dunne, Randolph Scott, and Dorothy Lamour.    
 
Map 3.2: Tide-Water Pipeline, 1879 
 
 However, simply building a pipeline was not enough for the company to profit 
from its investments, let alone transform the oil industry.  First, the company needed to 
maintain the pipeline in working order.  This required employing at least ten men to 
patrol the length of the line continually to be sure there were no line breaks.
69
  In 
addition, the company found that temperature changes could wreak havoc on the pipes.  
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The heat of summer caused the pipes to expand and the length of the line buckled.  A 
Tide-Water engineer described it thusly: “The line seemed to be everywhere except in its 
proper position; telegraph poles and small trees that were fifteen to twenty feet distant 
when the line was laid were pushed over by it.”
70
  The company therefore buried the 
pipeline at a depth of eighteen inches at an estimated cost of $30,000.
71
  Third, large 
deposits of paraffin wax clung to the walls of the pipeline, limiting the flow of oil.  In 
response, the company developed the “Go-Devil”—a wooden ball connected to leather 
straps and metal scrapers that could be inserted into the pipeline and clear the paraffin 
wax off the walls.
72
  
Completing the pipeline and maintaining its operations did not end the 
competitive challenges.  In fact, it brought on new issues to deal with.  The first salvo 
came from the railroad companies.  The day after the pipeline’s first successful shipment, 
top executives of the railroads involved in the oil trade gathered in Sarasota, NY and 
agreed to wage a rate war to put the new competitor out of business.  They lowered the 
prices for shipping crude dramatically: as low as fifteen to twenty cents a barrel to New 
York.  Standard Oil agreed to support the railroads and withheld any shipments from the 
new line.  For the next six months, oil was shipped by all parties at extremely low rates.  
Tide-Water officials could only find buyers for a quarter of the line’s capacity, about 
1,500 barrels per day, and lost an estimated $100,000 according to the testimony of 
Gowen before the House Committee of Commerce.
73
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 The Tide-Water’s losses were nothing compared with the losses of the 
railroads, however.  The railroads were hemorrhaging cash, with their losses estimated as 
high as ten million dollars.
74
  The pipeline’s dramatically lower costs of operation 
provided a competitive advantage the railroads could not overcome.  Defeated, the 
railroads ended the rate war in early 1880, and came to an agreement allocating a certain 
percentage of the oil traffic to the Tide-Water pipeline.
75
  Rates were restored to their 
previous levels, but the business of oil transport would never be the same.  As Cornelius 
Vanderbilt presciently observed: “The oil business is sealed; that is settled; there is no 
question about that; we [the railroads] won’t any of us have the oil business long.”
76
  The 
Tide-Water pipeline had opened a new era in the transport oil.   
 With the railroads defeated, Standard Oil continued the fight against the Tide-
Water on a variety of fronts.  Following his preferred strategy, Rockefeller attempted to 
cooperate with the new competitor and bring them into the Standard Oil conglomerate.  
Benson’s son later reported that Rockefeller offered to purchase the Tide-Water Pipe 
Company in May of 1879 before the line began operations.  This offer was rejected—not 
necessarily for ideological reasons, but because Benson felt the reported offer of 
$300,000 was not compelling.
77
  In 1882, many of the officials at Tide-Water reportedly 
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were willing to sell to Rockefeller for a price of $5,000,000, but it appears Standard 
Oil was not willing to pay this much.
78
   
 Standard Oil offered a more formidable attack by purchasing the independent 
refineries that were expected to be the Tide-Water’s customers.  This partly explains the 
low shipments over the line during its first six months.  In response, the Tide-Water 
officials realized that offering low cost transport would not allow them to make money if 
they had no markets for the oil.  They would need to move into the refining and 
marketing of oil to be assured a stable business.  In early 1880 the Tide-Water officials 
began building their own refineries at locations in Chester, PA and Bayonne, NJ.  In the 
winter of 1881-1882, the pipeline was extended to Tamanend, PA so that oil could be 
shipped directly to Bayonne on the New Jersey Central Railroad.
79
  Although these 
projects consumed large amounts of capital and effort, they were necessary for the 
company to benefit from its ability to transport oil cheaply.   
 
Map 3.3: Tide-Water Pipeline, 1882 
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In addition to attacking the Tide-Water interests, Standard Oil also showed the 
company the highest form of flattery—imitation.  As early as March of 1879, senior 
Standard Oil officials were urging Rockefeller to begin building his own network of 
pipelines.  They recognized pipelines as both a threat and an opportunity.  Pipelines were 
a threat because they could undermine the existing transport order that Standard Oil 
controlled.  If Standard Oil were to lose its dominance in transport, its ability to 
monopolize the refining sector of the industry might suffer as well.  They were also an 
opportunity, because if Standard could gain control over pipelines, the organization could 
retain and even strengthen its control by cutting the railroads out of the loop.  Rockefeller 
was quick to act.  By the end of 1879, Standard Oil had already begun construction on a 
five and a half inch pipeline to Cleveland.  In the following years, pipes were laid to New 
York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore.  By 1883, Standard Oil had completed 
four major pipelines to serve its refineries across the country.
80
  The construction of these 
pipelines was a shrewd move by Standard Oil to ensure its continued dominance of the 
industry.   
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Map 3.4: Oil Pipeline Network, 1884 
 
Standard Oil’s next attacks on the company were more subversive and involved 
dissension within the ranks of the boards of directors.  In September of 1882, a 
dissatisfied stock-holder—Elisha Patterson—sued the managers of the company for gross 
fraud and negligence.  Patterson had been one of the original stock subscribers when the 
company was organized in 1878, but had never actually paid for his shares.  In 1882, 
Patterson received a payment of $20,000 from Standard Oil and used $5,000 of it to 
purchase his Tide-Water stock.  He immediately filed a lawsuit against the company, 
citing the fact that the pipeline was operating at levels significantly below capacity.  The 
cause for this low output was soon discovered—a piece of wood had been shoved into the 
line blocking much of the flow of oil.
81
  With this piece of sabotage removed, the line 
resumed its normal capacity.  The court case brought by Patterson was dismissed by the 
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Court of Common Pleas on January 16, 1883.
82
  Several observers argued that the 
main point of the lawsuit was to discredit the company at a time when it was raising two 
million dollars in capital to expand its operations.  They argued the move was an effort 
by Standard Oil to prevent its competitor from mounting a more formidable challenge.
83
  
While the company succeeded in raising the money, it had to accept unfavorable terms on 
the loans.
84
 
 The next winter an even bolder attempt to overtake the company occurred.  The 
annual board of directors meeting was scheduled for January 17, 1883.  Because the 
necessary financial documents had not been prepared in time, the directors sent notices to 
stockholders rescheduling the meeting for the following month.  With Benson and other 
directors out of town, a group of minority share-holders with known ties to Standard Oil 
opened the meeting and elected themselves as directors of the company.  With McKelvy 
as the only director loyal to the original managers present to object, the minority group 
voted their shares and the shares of other absentees.  They installed themselves in 
leadership positions, and took over the operations of the company.  Given the ties of the 
new directors to Standard Oil, their clear intention was to negotiate some form of 
agreement.
85
   
 The original directors immediately filed an injunction arguing the election had 
been fraudulent.  In a case decided on the legal procedures for corporate elections, the 
presiding judge ruled in favor of the original directors and determined that those present 
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had illegally overridden the objections of McKelvy and did not have the authority to 
vote absentee shares.
86
  The results of the election were dismissed and the original 
directors were restored to their management positions.  Much of the trial centered on the 
question of Standard Oil’s actions against the pipeline, with Tide-Water officials 
claiming Standard Oil was continually interfering while Standard Oil officials argued that 
Tide-Water officials had sought them out to collaborate.    
 By the fall of 1883, the sentiment of the directors had shifted in relationship to 
their battle with Standard Oil.  Several factors, including being exhausted by the 
continual attacks on their enterprise, difficulties with their refined oil sales, the 
withdrawal of support by the Reading Railroad when Gowen was ousted as the president, 
and finally being offered compromise terms that were acceptable, induced the Tide-Water 
company to enter a pooling agreement with Standard Oil in October of 1883.  Under the 
terms of the agreement, Tide-Water would be allocated 11.5 percent of the traffic of the 
Oil Regions and Standard Oil would control the remaining 88.5 percent.
87
  For Tide-
Water officials, the agreement guaranteed them oil shipments equal to the capacity of 
their pipeline, adequate markets for their products, and that they would remain an 
independent corporate entity.
88
    
The agreement was a partial victory for the pipeline.  The terms were better than 
most other competitors of Standard Oil had achieved, which indicated that the pipeline 
had enabled the company to mount a formidable challenge against a monopoly power.  In 
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1913, the company president boasted that those who invested in 1882 had received 
dividends totaling 2000 percent of the initial investment and that the value of the shares 
had increased fifteen-fold.
89
  In fact, the terms were similar to the arrangements Standard 
Oil had made with the powerful railroads a few years earlier.   
However, the agreement also demonstrated that technological innovation alone 
could not transform the dynamics of the industry.  By agreeing to limit its traffic, the 
Tide-Water company effectively ended its bid as an independent actor.  It would not 
build a broader network of pipes to compete with the Standard Oil system nor would it 
offer relief to other independent oil producers.  The Tide-Water company would live long 
and prosper, but never again be a revolutionary force in the transport of oil.
90
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Oil Transport after Tide-Water 
 After the completion of the Tide-Water pipeline, the industry moved towards the 
rapid adoption of pipelines as the principal means of oil transport.  Standard Oil quickly 
followed the lead of the Tide-Water Pipe Company and built its own network of pipelines 
connecting Cleveland, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore to the Oil 
Regions by 1883.  The railroads continued to carry some oil, but their percentage of 
crude oil shipments declined dramatically in the following years.  According to Allan 
Nevins, within a few years of the Tide-Water pipeline, the large majority of oil moved 
through pipes: “It was the beginning of an industrial change which in a few years would 
turn three-quarters or more of all the crude oil produced away from the rail heads into 
silent channels underground.”
91
  
 Some Standard Oil officials had been pushing for the development of a pipeline 
network before the creation of the Tide-Water pipeline, but Rockefeller had opposed this 
move, largely because his company benefited greatly from its control over railroads.  
Once the Tide-Water proved the success of long-distance pipelines, however, Standard 
Oil wasted little time entering the pipeline business.  And when they did, they did so with 
the thoroughness and expertise that characterized their refining operations.
92
    
 The first pipeline built by Standard Oil was a five and a half-inch line that 
spanned a little over a hundred miles from the Oil Regions to Cleveland.  Rockefeller 
contracted with the Chicago and Great Western Railroad to use their rights-of-way in 
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return for a guarantee that the railroad would receive one-third of the oil shipments to 
the west and southwest.
93
  Work began in the fall of 1879 and the laborers completed it in 
March of 1880.  The line had five pumping stations and cost $500,000.
94
  The pipeline 
lowered to cost of shipping oil to Cleveland from between thirty-five and fifty cents per 
barrel by railroad to twelve to twenty cents by pipe.  While Standard Oil allowed 
competitors to purchase oil from the pipeline, they set quotas on the total purchases.  
Therefore, one refiner was allowed to purchase 85,000 barrels of oil a year for twenty 
cents a barrel, but Standard Oil cut off shipments when this amount was exceeded.
95
  It 
did not take long for Standard Oil to use pipelines as a competitive weapon. 
 Standard Oil also used a pipeline to Buffalo as a strategic weapon.  In 1881, a 
group of independents led by the Kalbfleisch Brothers built a pipeline from the Bradford 
oil field to Buffalo to serve their refineries.  The four-inch Buffalo & Rock City pipeline 
began operations in August of 1881, charged ten cents per barrel, and had a daily 
capacity of 5,000 barrels.  Having heard of the independents’ plan, Standard Oil built its 
own three-inch pipeline to Buffalo at about the same time.  Using its typical tactic of 
buying up competitors, Standard Oil bought out the independent refiners and by the 
beginning of 1882, purchased the Buffalo & Rock City pipeline for nearly $500,000, 
approximately the cost of construction.
96
  Standard Oil then tore up its own pipeline and 
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used the Buffalo & Rock City line.  However, rates were immediately increased to 
twenty-five cents per barrel.
97
   
 Standard Oil was also interested in building trunk pipelines to its refineries on the 
eastern seaboard.  It first made a deal with the Erie Railroad, paying the railroad $50,000 
to use its rights-of-way and promising to maintain a certain level of oil shipments along 
the line.
98
  Workers began constructing the six-inch pipeline from Olean, NY to the New 
York Harbor in July of 1880 and worked from both ends.  The line was completed as far 
as Saddle River, NJ by December of 1881, about sixty miles from Bayonne.  Shortly 
afterwards, Standard Oil began to lay a second six-inch pipeline next to it, doubling the 
capacity of the line to approximately 24,000 barrels a day.
99
  In 1884, the line was 
extended to Bayonne with a branch supplying oil to refiners on Long Island.
100
  Standard 
Oil also built a 260-mile six-inch pipeline to Philadelphia in 1882.  The line began in 
Colegrove, PA and traveled to the Atlantic Refining Company’s refinery at Gibson’s 
Point in Philadelphia.  The following year a 70-mile branch was added to Baltimore.
101
  
Finally, Standard Oil was still operating the Columbia Conduit pipeline to Pittsburgh.   
 By 1883 Standard Oil had developed a comprehensive network serving its 
refineries in Bayonne, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Cleveland, Buffalo, and Pittsburgh.  
There are several things that are notable about this network.  First, Standard Oil’s close 
relationships with the railroad companies facilitated the development of its pipeline 
network.  By paying nominal fees for rights-of-way and guaranteeing railroad companies 
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a percentage of the business, Standard Oil was able to build its pipelines to Cleveland, 
Buffalo, and New York along the paths of railroads.  Second, Standard Oil used its 
pipelines to regulate competitors, especially in Cleveland and Buffalo.  Third, once the 
network was established in 1883, there were no major competitors for nearly a decade.  
By investing in pipelines, Standard Oil had not only re-established its control over oil 
transport; it had strengthened its domination by cutting out the railroads. 
 Over the next ten years, Standard Oil expanded its system to serve its refineries.  
It extended its lines into the newly developing oil fields in West Virginia and Ohio during 
the 1880, including an eight-inch pipeline from the Ohio oil fields to Whiting, Indiana, 
about 15 miles south of Chicago.  Standard Oil established a refinery at this location that 
eventually led to the decline of Cleveland as a refining center, as Whiting was more 
geographically convenient for the western trade.  In addition, the Tide-Water company 
extended their pipeline in 1887 from Tamanend to its main refinery at Bayonne, NJ.
102
  
With its oil flowing exclusively to the New York harbor, Tide-Water sold its refinery in 
Chester, PA, and concentrated its refining at Bayonne. 
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Map 3.5: Tide-Water Pipeline, 1887 
 
 In the early 1890s, independent oilmen pioneered two major pipeline projects.  
First, William Mellon of Pittsburgh spearheaded the Crescent Pipeline.  Mellon had 
entered the oil business in 1889 and was in the process of expanding his business when 
the Pennsylvania Railroad raised the cost of his shipments to the seaboard in 1892.  In a 
deal similar to the proposal of the Tide-Water pipeline, Mellon decided to build a five-
inch pipeline from the Oil Regions to Carlyle, PA, where the Reading Railroad would 
take the oil to the coast.  When the Reading switched presidents and refused to honor the 
deal, Mellon extended the line to Marcus Hook, PA, just south of Philadelphia.  The line 
was 270 miles, could ship 8,000 barrels of oil a day, and was completed in November of 
1892.
103
  In his construction efforts, Mellon benefited greatly from the passage of a 
Pennsylvania law granting pipeline companies eminent domain privileges in 1883.   
 With his line complete, Mellon began to develop foreign marketing channels in 
Europe for his oil.  In particular, he had connections with several French refiners who 
were looking for new sources of oil.  However, the Panic of 1893 caused Mellon to 
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abandon the oil trade and focus on his other businesses.  He agreed to sell the pipeline 
to Standard Oil in 1893 for a reported $2,500,000.
104
  Like the Columbia Conduit, 
Pennsylvania Transportation Company, and Empire Transportation Company, a would-be 
competitor’s efforts ended up improving Standard Oil’s position.    
 The second independent effort was longer-lived and offered the most sustained 
challenge to Standard Oil’s dominance in the Pennsylvania Oil Fields.  Led by Lewis 
Emery, an oil producer, representative in the Pennsylvania Legislature, and Standard Oil 
foe, a group of oilmen came together and formed what eventually became the Pure Oil 
Company.
105
  In the fall of 1892, this group began construction on two four-inch 
pipelines from the Oil Regions to the eastern seaboard.  The first pipeline was designed to 
ship crude oil to independent refiners while the second pipeline shipped refined oil from 
the Oil Regions to the eastern seaboard where it would be exported.  The notion of a 
refined product pipeline was radical at the time because conventional wisdom held that 
exposure to the wrought-iron pipes would tarnish the oil.
106
 
 Emery and his men ran into several of the challenges faced by earlier companies 
while building their line.  At first, the workers hoped to reach the tracks of the New York, 
Ontario, and Western Railroad at Hancock, NY, so that the railroad could take the oil to 
the Hudson River to be shipped to the New York harbor on barges.  The Erie Railroad, 
however, refused to let the company lay its pipe under its tracks.  Reportedly, the Erie 
sent several locomotives, armed men, and a brass cannon to the site to be sure that the 
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pipes would not be laid.
107
  Emery decided to abandon this route and build the 
pipeline to Wilkes-Barre, PA, where the New Jersey Central Railroad would take it to 
New York.   
In 1895, the Pure Oil Company continued its efforts to reach the seaboard via 
pipe.  It hoped to secure a line from Easton, PA through New Jersey, but ran into 
opposition from the Belvidere Railroad (part of the Pennsylvania Railroad system) and 
later from the Delaware, Lackawanna, and Western Railroad.  After four years of 
litigation in the courts, the railroad won the case and the pipeline route was abandoned.
108
  
Ultimately, the line was extended to Marcus Hook, PA in 1900 and the Pure Oil 
Company gave up its attempt to build a line crossing New Jersey.  The inability of Emery 
to obtain rights-of-way through New Jersey demonstrates the influence of state policy on 
pipeline developments.  The eminent domain privileges in Pennsylvania made it easier 
for independent companies to build pipelines while the lack of such rights in New Jersey 
supported the position of established powers.    
By successfully building two pipelines to the seaboard, the Pure Oil Company 
became Standard Oil’s biggest domestic competitor.  The Pure Oil Company produced, 
transported, refined, and marketed oil.  Moreover, by innovating with the first refined 
product pipeline, the company reversed the geographic disadvantage that had previously 
hampered refiners in the Oil Regions.  By making it possible to ship refined oil at rates 
similar to the shipments of crude oil, it erased one of the major barriers to refineries in the 
Oil Regions.   
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By 1900, pipelines were the dominant technology for the transport of oil. The 
location of these lines influenced the regional distribution of oil.  In addition, there were 
important technological differences between pipelines and the transport infrastructure 
networks that preceded them.   
For example, pipelines carried a single product in a single direction to a single 
point.  While there were no technical obstacles to drawing off oil at points in-between the 
ends of the lines, this rarely happened in practice.  In addition, oil only flowed in one 
direction—it was not a reciprocal trade.
109
  By contrast, railroads, like canals, could move 
a variety of goods to many places along the paths of their tracks.  Railroads, therefore, 
offered the possibility of reciprocal benefits in regional development, similar to the way 
anthracite canals helped create a thriving iron industry along their routes.  The only 
possible reverse flow along pipelines was capital, although almost all of the money was 
funneled to capitalists in eastern seaboard cities.  Even though the profits of railroads 
usually remained in eastern seaboard cities, trains could bring people, supplies, and goods 
to the Oil Regions that could bolster regional development.  Pipelines funneled a valuable 
resource away from the Oil Regions while returning very little. 
A second feature of pipelines was that they operated continuously, invisibly, and 
with little human interaction.  Unlike railroads where tank cars needed to be coordinated, 
trains scheduled, and pick-ups and drop-offs implemented, pipelines operated around the 
clock with steady flows of oil.
110
  Trains with their loads could be seen crossing the 
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landscape while most pipes were buried one to two feet under the ground.  While 
pipelines did require several humans to keep them operating—usually a foreman, two 
engineers, two assistant engineers, four firemen, a telegrapher, and line walkers for every 
pumping station in addition to a management team coordinating the buying and selling of 
oil—this was far less than the elaborate labor system required to keep railroads 
running.
111
  Moreover, the labor of operating pipelines was focused on keeping the 
pumping stations in working order, not actually touching the oil.  Oil could be drilled at 
the well-head, shipped in a gathering pipeline to a storage tank, then pumped to the 
seaboard in a pipeline and delivered to refinery stills without a human hand ever touching 
it.    
The invisibility of pipeline transport helps make oil into an abstract commodity.  
When we fill our tanks with gas or heat our homes with oil, we do not know where the 
petroleum comes from, and the only contact we are likely to have is if the gas pump 
overfills the tank and splashes us.  Invisibility and abstraction dissociate consumers from 
the social effects of oil use.  We know that oil production leads to environmental damage, 
unstable geo-political relationships, and other negative consequences, and yet we 
continue to exacerbate these problems through consumption.  While there are many 
explanations for this dependence, the abstraction of oil as a commodity makes it easier 
for consumers to divorce themselves from the consequences of their actions.  Ever since 
the construction of the Tide-Water, pipelines have been part of making oil an invisible 
and abstract commodity. 
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Third, pipelines significantly lowered the cost of transporting oil.  Although 
actual pipeline operating costs were rarely stated explicitly, most estimates place the cost 
at less than twenty cents per barrel from the Oil Regions to the seaboard while prevailing 
railroad rates had been approximately a dollar per barrel.
112
  To put this into context, after 
1878 the price of crude oil rarely exceeded one dollar, meaning that with railroads, 
transport comprised half the cost at seaboard locations.
113
  With pipelines, the cost of 
transporting oil represented a smaller fraction of the total costs, thereby encouraging its 
consumption at more distant locations.  In addition, pipelines helped give rise to new uses 
of oil.  For example, the use of petroleum for fuel oil was not practical unless it could be 
shipped very cheaply.  It takes about five barrels of oil to get the energy equivalent of one 
ton of coal.
114
  If shipments cost five dollars in addition to the price of crude, then fuel oil 
could not compete with coal (anthracite was being sold at the mines for between $1.41 
and $2.01 between 1880 and 1900 with transport costs that rarely exceeded $2.00 per 
ton).
115
  On the other hand, if five barrels of crude oil could be shipped for less than a 
dollar, petroleum could compete with coal as a source of heat and power in many 
markets.  Therefore, pipelines helped lay the groundwork for the intensive consumption 
of fuel oil and gasoline in the twentieth century by lowering its cost to consumers.   
                                                
112
 As examples, Standard Oil charged twelve to twenty cents per barrel to pipe oil over 100 miles from the 
Oil Regions to Cleveland, the Tide-Water pipeline estimated its cost as 16.67 cents per barrel to ship oil to 
the seaboard, and Standard Oil offered to ship oil from the Oil Regions to the seaboard for the Philadelphia 
Railroad at rates of between six and ten cents per barrel.  See respectively: Williamson and Daum, The 
American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 448., Francis Buente, Autobiography of 
an Oil Company (New York: Tide Water Oil Company, 1923), 23., and Johnson, "The Development of 
American Petroleum Pipelines: A Study in Private Enterprise and Public Policy, 1862-1906", 127. 
113
 Price information from The Derrick's Hand-Book of Petroleum; a Complete Chronological and 
Statistical Review of Petroleum Developments from 1859 to 1899, I, 713-715. 
114
 One barrel of Pennsylvania crude has a BTU value of 5,550,000 while a ton of anthracite coal has a 
BTU value of 25,400,000.  Schurr and Netschert, Energy in the American Economy, 1850-1975: An 
Economic Study of Its History and Prospects, 499. 
115
 See Chapters 1 and 2 for details on transportation of anthracite.  Price information from: United States 
Geological Survey, Mineral Resources of the United States, 1901, 301. 
 205 
Conclusion  
The story of the building of the Tide-Water pipeline and the company’s struggles 
with Standard Oil is a fascinating tale full of conflict, intrigue, and subterfuge.  In 
addition, it had important short-term and long-term impacts on the development of the oil 
industry and the energy patterns of the mid-Atlantic region.    
First, this case study demonstrates the crucial role played by transport 
infrastructure in determining power relationships within the early oil industry.  The 
teamsters, the railroads, and later Standard Oil had all used control over transport to 
dominate the industry at one point in time.  The introduction of long-distance pipelines in 
1879 provided new organizations with the opportunity to reshape the power relationships 
of the industry.
116
  The Tide-Water company used pipelines to carve a space for itself 
within the industry.  Standard Oil recognized the threat pipelines represented to its 
interests and moved quickly to appropriate the new technology by attacking Tide-Water 
and developing its own network.  The railroads could not adapt to the pipelines and as 
Vanderbilt predicted, lost their role in the oil trade.   
However, although pipelines provided a competitive opening, technology alone 
was not sufficient to alter the balance of power within the industry.  Because Standard Oil 
was quick to build its own network of pipelines, it used the new technology to entrench 
its position.  Moreover, the Tide-Water company was not able to succeed simply by 
lowering the cost of oil shipments.  The company had to fend off attacks from Standard 
Oil and develop its own refining and marketing operations to stay in business.  In the end, 
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the Tide-Water Company agreed to a compromise settlement with Standard Oil that 
guaranteed profitability but ended its bid as an independent company.  Pipelines created 
new possibilities: how the various parties reacted to these opportunities determined the 
outcomes.   
The case also reveals the important role played by governments in structuring 
market conditions along with the influence of corporations on government decisions.  
Pipelines were at a distinct legal disadvantage vis-à-vis railroads because they lacked 
eminent domain privileges.  As a result, a company wishing to construct a pipeline had to 
purchase unbroken rights-of-way for many miles, leaving them subject to being blocked 
by competitors, harassed by railroads, and extorted by local landowners charging high 
fees for the use of small pieces of land.  Legal efforts to achieve such rights were 
consistently defeated by the combined strength of Standard Oil and the railroads, which 
saw such legislation as a threat to their interests.  Standard Oil and the railroads were able 
to parlay their financial strength and monopoly positions into legislative influence that 
would help ensure the status quo.  As a result, the actions of the Pennsylvania Legislature 
structured market conditions in favor of entrenched interests, which in turn, increased the 
ability of corporations like Standard Oil and the Pennsylvania Railroad to further 
influence the legislative process.   
Finally, the development of pipelines created a new energy landscape for the flow 
of petroleum.  Once constructed, pipelines could ship oil hundreds of miles for a fraction 
of the cost of other technologies.  Crude oil cost as much as $8.00 per barrel to ship from 
the Oil Regions to New York in 1863, or more than twice the cost of oil at the well.  
Typical railroad prices for comparable oil shipments were between eighty cents and a 
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dollar and a half per barrel, approximately the same cost as the oil itself.  Pipelines, 
on the other hand, could ship oil hundreds of miles at a significantly lower rate—as little 
as five to ten cents per barrel.  By rendering the cost of transport almost irrelevant, 
pipelines created a landscape in which cheap and abundant oil was available in the mid-
Atlantic’s industrial centers.  As we will see in the next chapter, this new energy 
landscape enabled the ever-increasing consumption of petroleum, thereby deepening the 
mid-Atlantic’s transition into a mineral economy.       
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Chapter 4: Piping Petroleum, Consuming Crude:  
Oil Flow and Usage Patterns in the Mid-Atlantic, 1860-1900 
 
 
 The history of the Tide-Water pipeline demonstrates the importance of transport 
infrastructure within the competitive dynamics of the oil industry.  How oil was 
transported shaped who made money and which parties would gain broader control over 
production, refining, and marketing.  However, the transport of petroleum was not only 
important from an intra-industry perspective.  Waterways, railroads, and then networks of 
pipelines structured the flows of oil throughout the mid-Atlantic and America during the 
last four decades of the nineteenth century, thereby influencing where oil went, how it 
was used, and the development of a mineral economy.   
 Once crude oil was refined into kerosene, lubricants, and fuel oils, consumers 
used these products for light, reduced friction, and power.  In the process, they deepened 
the region’s transition into a mineral economy.  At the same time, the expansion of the 
petroleum industry was linked to the extension of the region’s industrialization, new 
political responses to corporations and monopoly capital, and the creation of a fossil fuel-
dependent society.  This chapter explores these developments by analyzing the flow of oil 
along transport infrastructure networks, the effects of new consumption patterns on the 
creation of a mineral economy, and the broader significance of these changes.  
 
Oil Flows 
 The oil boom following Colonel Drake’s discovery in 1859 drew thousands of 
speculators from all over the United States into western Pennsylvania’s Oil Regions.  
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However, the products of their labor and the concentrated energy bounty of millions 
of years of captured sunlight flowed in the opposite direction.  The great majority of the 
oil drilled and collected by these speculators was funneled away from western 
Pennsylvania to refineries throughout the United States where it was processed into 
products including kerosene and lubricating oils.  From the refineries, these products 
were distributed to consumers around the nation and the world.   
 How and where oil flowed was neither natural nor inevitable.  Instead, transport 
infrastructure played a crucial role in determining where oil went.  Waterways, railroads, 
and pipelines each had their own geographic logic that privileged certain places and 
regions over others.  The impacts of transport infrastructure on the changing geography 
of American refining clearly demonstrate the interconnections between energy 
landscapes and regional development.    
 
Waterways (1859-1865) 
 Titusville had very little transport infrastructure in 1859.  There were no railroad 
stops nearby and the roads were mostly dirt paths.  Therefore, the oil industry turned to 
the transport system that humans had been using for thousands of years to move bulk 
goods: waterways.  By dramatically reducing friction and sometimes providing a current, 
waterways enabled humans to move heavy items with relatively minimal effort.  Rivers, 
lakes, and seas were the favored transport systems of organic economies for this reason.  
Waterways had limitations, though.  Most obviously, they were sited by nature, not 
humans.  People had to direct their goods to the places rivers flowed, which were not 
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always the most desired destinations.
1
  Second, rivers reflected seasonal variations.  
They might freeze in the winter, be dangerously full during the spring thaw, and too 
shallow during the hot months of summer.      
 In the first years of the oil industry, there was only one usable waterway to a 
larger market: Oil Creek.  This small stream ran for about 16 miles from Titusville to Oil 
City, where it connected with the Allegheny River.
2
  At this point, the oil could be loaded 
onto larger boats and shipped the remaining 130 miles to Pittsburgh.
3
  However, the 
shallow depth of Oil Creek frustrated the efforts of oilmen, particularly during the 
summer.  To improve the river for their needs, oilmen used the system of pond freshets 
developed by the local lumber industry.
4
  For several years, lumbermen had erected 
temporary dams to capture large pools of water.  When the dams were dismantled, they 
released waves of high water that could float the lumber downstream.  By the early 
1860s, oilmen were coordinating two to three freshets per week, often involving hundreds 
of barges carrying tens of thousands of barrels.  
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Map 4.1: Oil Creek 
 
 
 The energy landscape of water transport privileged Pittsburgh, which was the 
nearest large manufacturing city that could be reached by boat.  Once the oil reached 
Pittsburgh, it was refined and then shipped west and south along the Ohio River or east 
on the Pennsylvania Railroad.  To a lesser extent, transport along waterways also 
encouraged refining centers at Buffalo due to its access to the Erie Canal and Great 
Lakes.  From Buffalo, oil could be shipped west to Cleveland and east to New York City.  
In addition, the general expense and difficulty of shipping crude oil encouraged refining 
in the Oil Regions themselves.  In the early 1860s, only 60 to 65 percent of a barrel of 
crude oil could be successfully turned into saleable refined oil.
5
  Therefore, oil refined at 
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the site of production lowered the cost of transport because it reduced the absolute 
amount of oil that needed to be shipped.   
 Although data on the early oil industry is fragmentary, Table 4.1 indicates that the 
geography of refining reflected the logic of waterways.  Pittsburgh was the clear leader 
with nearly 40 percent of the nation’s refining capacity.  Refiners in the New York City 
area possessed about a quarter of the nation’s capacity while the Oil Regions handled an 
additional fifth of the volume.  By contrast, cities without water connections to the 
Titusville area acquired only small amounts of the trade.  For example, Philadelphia, 
Baltimore, and Boston collectively represented no more than 10 percent of the total 
industry.    
 
Table 4.1: Geography of Oil Refining, 1864-1865
6
 
City Capacity of refineries 
(barrels per day) 
% of total 
Pittsburgh 4,500 39 
Philadelphia 600 5 
Boston 500 4 
New York – New Jersey 3,100 26 
Cleveland 800 6 
Oil Regions 2,160 19 
Erie … <1 
Baltimore 20 <1 
Elsewhere … <1 
  Total 11,680 100 
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Railroads (1865-1883) 
 The energy landscape of railroads restructured the geography of the nation’s 
refining industry.  Railways were a revolutionary technology because they broke the links 
between nature and transport that had long shaped human trade patterns.  In contrast to 
waterways, rails could be built in whatever direction served human needs and operated 
year-round.
7
  While nature still mattered—features such as mountains and river crossings 
increased the cost of construction—the iron horse represented an important break from 
the past.
8
   
 Railroads began to dominate the transport of crude oil by 1865.  Three railroad 
systems were involved: a local connector, the eastern trunk railroads, and railroads to the 
west.  The first great challenge was simply to create connections between the Oil Regions 
and existing railroad systems since the nearest depot was twenty miles away from 
Drake’s well.  A group of oil producers addressed this problem by building the Oil Creek 
Railroad in 1862 between Titusville and Corry, PA.  From Corry the oil could be sent 
west along the Atlantic & Great Western to Cleveland or east to Salamanca, NY and 
transferred to the Erie Railroad for delivery to New York City.  As new oil fields were 
discovered, the Oil Creek Railroad was periodically extended to transport oil from those 
areas to central depots.  In this capacity, the Oil Creek Railroad operated as a local 
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connector, bringing the output of various oil fields to the depots of other railroad 
systems.
9
     
 Eastern trunk lines and railroads to the west carried the crude oil from centralized 
depots like Corry to refineries in large manufacturing cities.  The Pennsylvania, Erie, and 
New York Central railroads were the three great eastern trunk lines connecting the 
eastern seaboard with the west.  By 1865, all of these systems had created connections 
with the Oil Regions and transported most of the nation’s crude oil production to their 
main hubs: Pittsburgh and Philadelphia for the Pennsylvania and New York City for the 
Erie and Central railroads.  The Baltimore & Ohio extended its tracks near Pittsburgh in 
the early 1870s, thereby encouraging the growth of refining in Baltimore.  In addition, 
two railroads shipped oil west, primarily towards Cleveland and Chicago: the Atlantic & 
Great Western and Lake Shore railroads (see Map 3.1). 
 Connections made railroad transport of crude oil possible; competition structured 
where it went.  Because oil was not a perishable commodity, the cost of its transport was 
far more important to most parties than the speed at which it was delivered.
10
  And 
nothing structured the cost of railroad transport more than competition.  Where a railroad 
was the only carrier in the region, rates tended to be high.  On routes where there were 
competitors, rates were much lower.  For example, William Cronon demonstrated that 
railroad rates on transporting wheat from Chicago to the eastern seaboard were 
significantly lower during the summer months when the waterways of the Great Lakes 
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offered competition.  In the winter when water routes were closed, railroad rates 
increased.
11
  In other words, rates were determined more by the price that people would 
pay than the railroad’s costs of operation.   
 The practice of creating railroad rates based on competition led to a plethora of 
complaints.  Newspapers throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century were littered 
with angry letters denouncing the abuses of railroad companies.  These missives usually 
focused on the seeming arbitrary nature of rates and their pernicious impacts on farmers 
and small producers.  Not only did rates vary dramatically from season to season, it was 
widely reported that large shippers could obtain substantial rebates on their goods, 
thereby giving them an unfair advantage.
12
  For many people it seemed that railroad rates 
should be derived from how far goods traveled, not the degree of competition.   
 The situation was no different in the oil industry.  Competition structured rates on 
oil traffic and therefore the flows of oil.
13
  Moreover, competition was especially fierce 
for the oil trade because it was part of the broader efforts of the trunk lines to secure 
dominance in the lucrative trade between the eastern seaboard and Chicago.  The most 
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competitive points along these lines were between the Oil Regions and New York, 
where all three trunk lines operated, and the stretch between the Oil Regions and 
Cleveland.  In both these situations, there was additional competition during the summer 
months from water shipments on the Great Lakes and Erie Canal.  By contrast, there was 
little competition between the Oil Regions and Pittsburgh or Philadelphia, where the 
Pennsylvania Railroad was the only major shipper.  Because the Pennsylvania wanted to 
ship oil long distances, it discouraged the trade to Pittsburgh.  As Allan Nevins noted: 
“One of the chief reasons for Pittsburgh’s loss of ground lay in the outright unfairness of 
the Pennsylvania Railroad to the city.”
14
 
Oil shipments soon showed a shift that reflected the energy landscape of railroads 
(Table 4.2).  Refiners in Cleveland and the New York harbor expanded their capacity 
significantly while those in Pittsburgh and the Oil Regions experienced the greatest 
losses.  Cities such as Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Boston did not dramatically improve 
their position (most of the gains represented by Philadelphia in 1881 were a result of the 
Tide-Water pipeline).
15
 
Of course, human actors shaped these outcomes as well.  The fact that John D. 
Rockefeller began his business in Cleveland and was a particularly astute negotiator for 
railroad rebates played an important role in the rise of that city’s refining prominence.  
However, it is equally important to note that without operating in a city served by two 
railroads and a major waterway, Rockefeller would have had a much more difficult time 
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turning the energy landscape of railroads to his advantage.  Given the realities of 
railroad space in the early 1870s, it is difficult to imagine the possibility of an 
entrepreneur in Pittsburgh or Philadelphia dominating the transport of oil the way John D. 
Rockefeller did.   
 
Table 4.2: Geography of Oil Refining, 1873, 1881
16
  
Region 1873 (refining capacity in 
barrels per day) 
1881 (refining capacity in 
barrels per day) 
Cleveland 12,732 21,425 
Pittsburgh 8,990 16,765 
NY-NJ 9,790 36,871 
Philadelphia 2,061 15,457 
Baltimore 1,098  
Erie 1,168  
Boston 600  
Buffalo 450  
Oil Regions 9,231 7,260 
Others 450  
Total 46,570 97,760 
 
 
Pipelines (1883-1900) 
 After the construction of the Tide-Water pipeline, the movement of crude oil from 
well-head to refinery quickly switched from railroads to pipe lines.  The energy landscape 
of pipelines was similar to railroad space, but it was not identical.  It was similar because 
Standard Oil built most of the region’s pipelines.  Although the Tide-Water pipeline 
pioneered the shift, Standard Oil’s system handled over 85 percent of the traffic by 1883.  
Since Standard Oil had already established its main refineries in Cleveland and New 
York, it chose to build pipelines to serve these existing locations rather than to create new 
ones.  In addition, Standard Oil used its close relationships with railroads to build its 
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pipelines along the rights-of-way of the railroad companies.  In this sense, the energy 
landscape of pipelines reflected and reinforced the patterns of railroads.   
 However, pipelines could and did introduce shifts into the geography of refining.  
For example, a pipeline could lower the cost of shipping oil along a route where railroad 
competition did not exist.  Building a new railroad simply for the movement of oil would 
cost far too much, but pipelines (while not cheap) were much less capital-intensive.  
Therefore, while Philadelphia and Baltimore did not benefit from railroad competition 
driving down the cost of oil shipments, the construction of pipelines to these cities put 
their refiners on a more competitive basis.  In other words, pipelines reduced the 
importance of competition between railroads and waterways for the geography of 
refining.   
 
Map 4.2: Pipeline Network, 1900 
 
 
 The system of pipelines also led to a relative decline in Cleveland’s importance as 
a refining center.  During the 1870s, Cleveland benefited from cheap oil shipments, the 
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presence of John D. Rockefeller’s operations, and its site as the westernmost refining 
center.  However, as the geography of the nation’s population expanded westward, 
Standard Oil chose to shift much of its western refining to its Whiting refinery outside 
Chicago.  Thus, while New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Whiting expanded their 
output considerably, Cleveland saw a relative decline.  In fact, the loss was more 
significant than Table 4.3 indicates.  Even though Cleveland’s refineries maintained a 
large capacity, their actual output was much lower.  In 1904 Standard Oil only processed 
1,039,385 barrels of oil in that city, whereas 9,720,950 barrels were refined at 
Philadelphia, 10,590,381 barrels at the main refinery in Bayonne, NJ, and 8,192,945 
barrels at Whiting.
17
  
 A final shift occurred with the innovation of refined oil pipelines.  In 1895, a 
group of oilmen from the Titusville area decided to construct a refined oil pipeline to 
lower the transport costs of their kerosene.  Despite beliefs that iron pipelines would 
corrode refined oil and decrease its quality during shipments over long distances, the 
United States Pipe Line Company—later part of the Pure Oil Company—succeeded in 
their efforts.
18
  As a result, this pipeline made it economically feasible for refiners in the 
Oil Regions to compete with seaboard refiners since shipping refined oil via railroad was 
much more expensive than transporting crude oil in pipelines.    
The impacts of pipelines on the geography of oil refining can be seen in Table 
4.3.  New York remained the leader in refining capacity while Philadelphia grew 
                                                
17
 United States of America, Petitioner, V. The Standard Oil of New Jersey Et Al, Defendants,, Petitioner’s 
Exhibits, vol. 8, p. 940, Petitioner’s Exhibit 393. 
18
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 571-72; 
Industrial Commission, "Preliminary Report on Trusts and Industrial Combinations," 651. The historical 
record does not make it clear what techniques the company used to maintain the quality of the oil.   
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significantly.  Whiting grew dramatically at the expense of Cleveland as much of the 
latter city’s large refining capacity went idle.  Refiners in the Oil Regions increased their 
operations while Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and Buffalo retained small amounts of the trade.   
 
Table 4.3: Geography of Oil Refining, 1884, 1888, 1895-1897
19
 
 1884 1888 1895-1897 
 Standard Independent Standard Independent Standard Independent 
Cleveland 22,000  22,000 3,310 20,000 3,310 
Pittsburgh …..  ….. 4,103 … 5,000 
NY – NJ 43,000  49,266 3,500* 55,000 7,000 
Philadelphia 13,000  17,200 3,500* 45,000 3,500 
Baltimore …..  2,000 610 3,000 … 
Whiting, IN …...  … … 36,000 … 
Toledo-Lima …..  … … 7,000 7,000 
Buffalo 1,600  3,000 1,500 4,500 … 
Oil Region …..  12,000 9,000 7,000 12,000 
Other ……  … 4,000 2,500 … 
Standard 
acquisitions 
(post Jan 1, 
1888) 
……  2,000  3,000 … 
Total 96,000 28,868 110,771 29,523 183,000 37,810 
Total U.S. 124,868 140,294 220,810 
% Standard 78% 79% 82% 
* includes Tide-Water refining capacity 
 
 
 
From the Refineries: Exports and Domestic Consumption 
 At New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Cleveland, and Whiting, crude oil was 
refined into finished products including kerosene (used for home lighting), naphtha 
products (used as cleaning solvents and for making manufactured gas) and lubricants 
(used in machinery).  From the refineries, these products were then distributed to 
consumers in America and internationally on railroads and ships.   
                                                
19
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 627.  
Original data from: Hidy and Hidy, History of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey): Pioneering in Big 
Business, 1882-1911, 100-01, 120; Industrial Commission, "Preliminary Report on Trusts and Industrial 
Combinations," I, 541-42; House of Representatives, "Report on Investigation of Trusts," 424, 438-40.  
Data also collected from the trade journals Petroleum Age and Oil Paint & Drug Reporter. 
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The data describing the distribution of refined oil products from the refinery to 
the end consumer are spotty and the patterns can only be described with broad 
brushstrokes.  Most of the kerosene was exported overseas, with the bulk being 
consumed in Europe.  Domestic consumers used most of the naphtha products and 
lubricants.  Kerosene was sold throughout America, although its use was most common 
in cities.    
 
Oil Exports 
 American refiners began to develop international markets for refined oil almost 
immediately.  Fortunately for the historian, exports were documented much more 
carefully than domestic consumption because port officials had to tabulate tariffs and 
therefore tracked shipments.  This allows us to recreate a pretty complete picture of oil 
flows internationally, at least from the United States to the major distribution points in 
various countries around the world.   
Bulk shipments of refined oil began in 1861.  The firm of Peter Wright & Sons 
chartered the sail ship Elizabeth Watts to deliver kerosene to London in wooden barrels.  
Apparently, sailors’ concerns about the danger of transporting such a flammable 
substance made it difficult to attract a crew: “Failing to engage sailors in the regular way, 
men were got aboard while under the influence of liquor, and she sailed down the 
Delaware River with a drunken crew.”
20
  By the end of the Civil War, trans-Atlantic 
shipments of refined oil were commonplace.  In 1863, a British shipyard built the 
Atlantic, reportedly the first ship with large partitioned containers inside the hull to hold 
                                                
20
 For information on early oil shipments see: James Dodds Henry, Thirty-Five Years of Oil Transport; the 
Evolution of the Tank Steamer (London: Bradbury, Agnew, & Co., 1907), 5. 
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oil in bulk.  Over the next fifteen years, wooden sailing vessels with wood or iron 
tanks in their hulls transported the bulk of oil abroad.  By replacing wooden barrels with 
large tanks, these vessels decreased the amount of oil lost to leakage and increased the 
efficiency with which their cargo could be loaded and unloaded.  In 1880, Dutch 
shipyards pioneered the development of tank steamers which eventually handled most of 
the trade.
21
   
  By 1866, over two-thirds of the oil refined in America was being exported 
(Table 4.4).  There were also some exports of crude oil, naphtha, lubricants, and 
residuum, but illuminating oils (mostly kerosene) represented the large majority of 
overseas shipments  (Table 4.5).  The large majority of oil exports went to Europe, 
typically at a rate of between 80 to 90 percent between 1860 and 1900 (Table 4.6).
22
  
Germany and Britain absorbed the greatest amounts of refined oil while France imported 
the largest quantities of crude oil.
23
  However, petroleum exports were not limited to 
Europe.  As early as 1874, refined oil was shipped to China, Japan, Turkey, Australia and 
numerous other countries throughout the world.  If a port had any significant international 
trade, it was likely that it was receiving American oil by the 1870s. 
 
                                                
21
 Ibid., 6-9. 
22
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 
Appendix D:1, 742. 
23
 France erected high tariffs on imports of refined oil and low tariffs on crude oil in order to support its 
domestic refining industry.  Ibid., 327. 
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Table 4.4: Oil Exports, in 1000s of Barrels, 1862-1870
24
 
Year Total refined 
output 
Domestic 
consumption 
Exported % Exported % of Exports of 
refined vs. 
crude oil 
1862 335 240 95 28 34 
1863 855 350 505 59 71 
1864 1,266 722 544 43 70 
1865 1,336 727 609 46 82 
1866 2,049 633 1,416 69 84 
1867 2,418 773 1,545 64 92 
1868 3,410 1,131 2,279 67 92 
1869 3,267 1,089 2,177 67 86 
1870 3,875 1,292 2,583 67 90 
 
Table 4.5: Oil Exports, in 1000s of Gallons, 1871-1900
25
 
Year U.S. crude 
production 
Crude 
exports 
Illuminating 
exports 
Naphtha 
exports 
Lubricant 
exports 
Residuum 
exports 
Total 
exports 
1871 218,620 
(5,205 bbls) 
11,279 
($2,172) 
132,179 
($33,493) 
8,399  
($896) 
240  
($92) 
101  
($10) 
152,197 
($36,664) 
1875 510,826  
(12,163 bbls) 
16,537 
($1,739) 
201,679 
($28,169) 
14,049 
($1,392) 
938  
($266) 
2,324 
($170) 
237,526 
($31,735) 
1880 1,104,017 
(26,286 bbls) 
36,748 
($2,772) 
286,132 
($29,048) 
15,115 
($1,345) 
5,607  
($1,142) 
3,178 
($199) 
346,779 
($34,506) 
1885 918,069  
(21,859 bbls) 
81,436 
($6,041) 
445,881 
($39,476) 
14,739 
($1,161) 
12,979 
 ($2,659) 
5,714 
($335) 
560,784 
($49,672) 
1890 1,924,552 
(45,823 bbls) 
96,573 
($6,535) 
550,878 
($39,826) 
12,463 
($1,051) 
32,091 
($4,767) 
1,831  
($92) 
693,830 
($52,271) 
1895 2,221,476 
(52,892 bbls) 
111,285 
($5,162) 
714,859 
($34,707) 
14,801  
($911) 
43,419 
($5,867) 
138  
($13) 
884,502 
($46,660) 
1900 2,672,062 
(63,621 bbls) 
137,501 
($7,310) 
730,585 
($53,934) 
18,263 
($1,648) 
68,998 
($9,543) 
19,776 
($842) 
975,123 
($73,276) 
  
                                                
24
 Ibid., 332, 325, 332, 338, Appendix A. 
25
 United States Geological Survey, Mineral Resources of the United States, 1901, 540-42.  The value of 
the exports, in $1,000 increments, is noted in parentheses.   
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Table 4.6: Oil Exports by Destination, in 1000s of Gallons, 1874
26
 
Region Crude Oil Naphthas Illuminants Lubricants Residuum 
Europe 16,875.5 
($1,996.2) 
9,655.2 
($1,018.6) 
194,434.0 
($32,564.7) 
1,166.1 
($366.9) 
36.2 (barrels) 
($124.9) 
North 
America 
899.0 
($141.3) 
59.8  
($25.6) 
4,680.0 
($1,074.2) 
38.3  
($20.2) 
5.9 (barrels) 
($12.5) 
South 
America 
1.8  
($.2) 
14.1  
($3.8) 
4,601.6  
($1,021.2) 
27.6  
($13.0) 
1.5 (barrels) 
($4.9) 
Asia … 7.2  
($2.0) 
6,406.2 
($.7) 
.7 
($.3) 
… 
Oceana … … 3,754.1 
($828.6) 
… … 
Africa … 1.0 
($.2) 
2,674.5 
($578.9) 
11.6 
($3.8) 
… 
All other 
ports, 
countries, 
seas 
… … 670.2  
($135.7) 
  
  Total 17,776.4 
($2,107.8) 
9,737.5 
($1,050.2) 
217,220.5 
($37,620.8) 
1,244.3 
($404.2) 
43.5 (barrels) 
($142.3) 
 
 The demand for illuminating oil in foreign markets was driven by several factors, 
most significantly price.  The alternatives to kerosene were either much more expensive 
(whale oil), offered inferior light (candles), or were not available to most of the 
population (gas light).  These problems were particularly acute in continental Europe 
because those nations had been experiencing shortages of fats and oils for several 
decades that increased the price of candles.
27
  As many parts of Europe experienced the 
connected processes of industrialization and urbanization, this also increased the need for 
better lighting in factories and homes.   
 Petroleum exports became one of the United States’ most valuable products by 
the 1870s (Table 4.7).  While cotton remained the nation’s most lucrative export product, 
petroleum ranked fourth overall, and first in terms of manufactured goods.  Oil exports, 
                                                
26
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 
Appendix D, 742-43. The value of the exports, in $1,000 increments, is in parentheses. 
27
 Ibid., 322. 
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therefore, played an important role in the rise of the United States’ position in the 
global economy during the latter half of the nineteenth century.   
 
Table 4.7: Average Annual Value of U.S. Exports, in Millions of Dollars, 1871-1900
28
 
Years Cotton Wheat Meat Petroleum 
1871-75 $205.6 $82.2 $33.9 $36.9 
1876-80 183.5 134.0 66.7 43.8 
1881-85 218.8 157.6 69.3 47.8 
1886-90 224.6 106.3 59.7 51.2 
1891-95 230.7 147.2 82.2 49.3 
1896-00 220.9 148.2 100.9 68.8 
 
 
Domestic Consumption 
 The patterns of oil flows from the refineries to consumers within the United States 
are extremely difficult to trace.  From about 1860 to 1880, jobbers purchased oil products 
from the refineries and then distributed them to local stores using railroads and wagons.  
Local stores sold oil from barrels to consumers in gallon increments.  In this sense, the 
flows of oil from refineries to consumers were similar to the distribution of a wide range 
of consumer goods in the nineteenth century.  Unfortunately, comprehensive data tracing 
the sales of oil from these county stores is lacking.  Even Stephen Peckham, who spent 
several years studying all aspects of the oil industry on behalf of the Census, bemoaned 
the lack of concrete data on domestic consumption, stating: “[t]he amount of petroleum 
and petroleum products consumed in the United States in any given time is a residual 
quantity consisting of elements very difficult to estimate with absolute accuracy.”
29
   
 Williamson and Daum argue that between 1865 and 1873, domestic consumption 
was predominantly an urban phenomenon and that it was centered in the mid-Atlantic 
                                                
28
 Department of Commerce, "Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1946,"  (Washington: 1946), 904, 
905.  
29
 Peckham, Report on the Production, Technology, and Uses of Petroleum and Its Products, 270. 
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states.  Some oil went to the south, but the devastating effects of the Civil War on 
southern railroads limited the penetration because it increased the transport price and 
made certain areas difficult to reach.  Oil marketers found better success in the mid-West, 
where the region’s transport infrastructure remained in better condition.
30
   Over the next 
decade, they note that urban markets still dominated domestic consumption.  It was in 
cities that people had greater needs for improved lighting and large quantities of naphtha 
were sold to urban gas works.  While country stores generally stocked kerosene for 
consumers by the 1870s, it was often considered a luxury purchase rather than a 
requirement for people living in rural areas.
31
 
 By the beginning of the 1880s, Standard Oil had begun to take control over the 
marketing of oil as well its transport and refining.    Their key innovation was to establish 
a system of marketing stations and tank wagons to supply general stores with oil to sell to 
consumers.  Each marketing area had one or more main stations surrounded by several 
substations.  The main station had large storage tanks with a capacity of 5,000 to 10,000 
barrels, roughly equal to a 30 to 60 day supply.  The tanks were supplied by shipments of 
refined oil by railroad tank cars from the refineries.  Depending on the population density 
and size of the marketing area, several substations with storage capacity of 250 to 500 
barrels would receive their supplies of oil from the main station and distribute it to the 
smaller towns in the countryside.  From either the main station or the substation, an 
employee would drive a tank-wagon with a capacity of a few hundred gallons to the 
                                                
30
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 338. 
31
 Ibid., 524-26. 
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stores on his route and sell oil to the storekeepers.  A tank-wagon driver typically had 
a range of about twenty miles.
32
   
 By eliminating the jobbers and controlling the output of refined oil, Standard Oil 
was able to control nearly 90 percent of the marketing of oil in the United States by 1900.  
Because of John D. Rockefeller’s obsessive attention to detail, Standard Oil’s Statistical 
Department kept detailed records on how much oil was sold, where it was sold, and how 
much market share competitors had in any given area.  However, because Standard Oil 
also prized its secrecy, most of these documents were either destroyed or never made 
available.  The only public records of this information that I have discovered are the 
documents that were obtained under subpoena in the famous antitrust case that began in 
1906.  Two pieces of information are particularly illustrative.  The first is a set of maps 
showing the growth of the Standard Oil marketing stations between 1888 and 1906.   
 
                                                
32
 Details on the operations of the Standard marketing system are given in the testimony of Standard 
officials in the United States v. Standard Oil of New Jersey antitrust case.  See, in particular, the testimony 
of William King, John Archbold, and Henry Tilford in: United States of America, Petitioner, V. The 
Standard Oil of New Jersey Et Al, Defendants,, vol. 12, vol. 17, vol. 17. 
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Map 4.4: Standard Oil Marketing Stations, 1888
33
 
 
 
Map 4.5: Standard Oil Marketing Stations, 1906
34
 
 
                                                
33
 Ibid., vol. 19, Defendant’s Exhibits, Exhibit 263, p. 622. 
34
 Ibid., vol. 19, Defendant’s Exhibits, Exhibit 264, p. 623. 
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These maps demonstrate that by the turn of the twentieth century, Standard 
Oil had established marketing stations near every settled population, even including a few 
stations in Alaska.  Practically every community of any size in America had access to 
kerosene through a Standard Oil affiliate.  For example, Standard Oil’s marketing stations 
in 1904 served towns in Colorado with as few as 200 residents.
35
  But neither population 
nor marketing stations were distributed evenly.  The densest concentration of marketing 
stations in 1906 started along the middle of the eastern seaboard and extended through 
the industrial core of Pennsylvania and Ohio.  This was not by accident.  If we were to 
superimpose the map of pipelines circa 1900, we would see that its outlines mirrored this 
geography closely.
36
  While oil was available everywhere, the marketing stations were 
disproportionately located in the mid-Atlantic.    
 In addition, by comparing the sales of oil in various geographic regions by 
Standard Oil and its competitors, we can see the disproportionate sales of oil in mid-
Atlantic cities (Table 4.8).  Philadelphia, New York City, and Baltimore each consumed 
more oil than either the state of Ohio or California.  Residents of the New York City and 
Newark purchased a greater amount of illuminating oils and naphtha products than the 
rest of New York state as well as the entire St. Louis region comprising the part of 
Illinois near St. Louis, the southern half of Missouri, Arkansas, Indian Territory, 
Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana west of the Mississippi, and Mexico.   
                                                
35
 Standard Oil had marketing stations in towns such as Fort Lupton, CO (population 214), Eaton, CO 
(population 384), and Breckenridge, CO (population 976). United States of America, Petitioner, V. The 
Standard Oil of New Jersey Et Al, Defendants: Brief for Defendants on Facts, 3 vols. (N.P.: [1909]), vol. 3, 
p. 576.  Note: this volume was filed in conjunction with the United States v. Standard Oil of New Jersey 
case but its title pages do not identify an exact date or place of publication.   
36
 See Map 4.2 earlier in the chapter.  Both maps show a rough rectangle bordered by Chicago on the 
northwest, Albany on the Northeast, extending south through New York City and Philadelphia to Baltimore 
on the Southeast corner, and continuing west from Baltimore through Pittsburgh and the middle of Ohio. 
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Table 4.8: Domestic U.S. Consumption of Refined Oil, in Barrels, 1904
37
 
Illuminating Oil Naphtha Products (measures are in 
barrels) Standard Independent % Indep. Standard Independent % Indep. 
Kentucky 1,269,074 179,845 12.4 516,766 92,689 15.2 
Indiana 2,125,164 321,618 13.1 1,348,329 193,316 12.5 
St. Louis 771,046 89,453 10.4 278,640 29,850 9.6 
San Francisco 388,418 35,467 8.4 245,803 61,636 20.0 
Denver 144,521 1,332 .9 44,304 302 .7 
Ohio 418,836 68,989 14.1 277,464 18,663 6.3 
Winnipeg & 
Vanc. 
66,450 17,697 21.0 10,913 5,123 31.9 
General Trade 24,053 893 3.6 11,605 271 2.3 
  Total West 5,207,562 715,294 12.1 2,733,824 401,850 12.8 
 
Pittsburgh 329,856 71,406 17.8 64,509 16,049 19.9 
NY stations 689,669 60,856 8.1 128,275 15,642 10.9 
Toronto 173,248 35,061 16.8 28,493 6,311 18.1 
  Total Middle 1,192,773 167,323 12.3 221,277 38,002 14.7 
 
Baltimore 727,747 70,537 8.8 185,160 23,676 11.3 
West India O. 
Co. 
14,619 6,873 32.0 274 … … 
Philadelphia 661,654 91,333 12.1 252,382 38,365 13.2 
Providence 538,254 34,726 6.1 136,599 10,830 7.3 
Boston 676,970 55,843 7.6 189,339 9,546 4.8 
Newark 199,575 21,269 9.6 93,304 12,368 11.7 
N.Y.C. 527,816 44,350 7.7 192,911 22,697 10.5 
Montreal 105,249 28,323 21.2 13,576 2,679 16.6 
Maritime Prov 84,564 14,308 14.5 2,925 154 5.0 
Govt. Oil 
(Canada) 
… 2,561 … … 60 … 
  Total East 3,536,448 370,145 9.5 1,066,470 120,375 10.1 
 
Unknown  188,177   74,610  
Total 9,936,783 1,440,939 12.7 4,021,571 634,837 13.6 
Standard Oil 
Purchases from 
independents 
113,861 113,861  84,882 84,882  
  Grand Total 9,822,922 1,554,800 13.7 3,936,689 719,719 15.5 
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 United States of America, Petitioner, V. The Standard Oil of New Jersey Et Al, Defendants,, vol. 8, 
Petitioner’s Exhibits, Exhibit 387a, p. 916.  Kentucky refers to the Standard Oil Company of Kentucky, 
which served Louisiana east of the Mississippi River, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Georgia, Florida, 
and Alabama.  The Standard Oil Company of Indiana served North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, northern Missouri, Illinois, Michigan, and Indiana.  St. Louis refers to the region 
of the Waters-Pierce Company, which served the part of Illinois near St. Louis, the southern half of 
Missouri, Arkansas, Indian Territory, Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana west of the Mississippi, and Mexico.  
San Francisco indicates the region of Standard Oil of California: California, Washington, Oregon, Arizona, 
and Nevada.  Denver was served by the Continental Oil Company operating in Colorado, Utah, Montana, 
Idaho, Wyoming, and New Mexico.  Ohio was served by the Standard Oil Company of Ohio, Pennsylvania 
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Winnipeg, Vancouver, Montreal, Toronto, and Maritime Provinces represent the sales in Canada. 
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While the mid-Atlantic led the nation in oil consumption, it is important to 
note that the distribution of petroleum products was national in scope, especially when 
compared to the limited distribution of anthracite coal in the antebellum period.  Two 
factors shaped the broad geography of oil consumption.  First, between 1860 and 1900 
the development of a railroad network across the continental United States made it 
possible for goods to be shipped overland much more cheaply than was possible before 
the Civil War.  Second, consumers could benefit from purchasing much smaller 
quantities of kerosene than anthracite coal.  A single gallon of kerosene could provide up 
to 140 hours of light—enough to give a family an extra hour and a half of light per night 
for an entire season.
38
  By contrast, a family purchasing anthracite coal would need to 
purchase several tons every winter to stay warm.  Therefore, kerosene purchases 
represented a much smaller fraction of a family’s overall budget, bringing it within the 
financial reach of a much wider range of the public.
39
   
 
 In reviewing the flow of petroleum from the Oil Regions to refineries and then to 
consumers, three patterns are particularly important.  First, transport infrastructure 
networks shaped the distribution of crude oil.  The energy landscapes of waterways, 
railroads, and pipelines structured where oil went, thereby favoring certain places over 
others.  Second, refined oil was sold across the nation, even as far away as Alaska.  This 
development was also dependent on transport infrastructure—the creation of a vast web 
                                                
38
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 496. 
39
 The price of kerosene will be discussed further in the next section.  By the last decade of the nineteenth 
century, a gallon of kerosene was selling for eight to ten cents wholesale in cities such as New York, and its 
actual cost to consumers was somewhat higher.  Even at thirty cents a gallon, it was much cheaper for a 
family to purchase a gallon of kerosene than a one or two month supply of anthracite coal.   
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of railroad lines over the latter half of the nineteenth century made it possible for 
refined oil to be distributed practically anywhere people were living.  However, the 
extent to which different areas were served by competitive transport system influenced 
the cost at which refined oil was available.  In other words, oil flowed almost 
everywhere, but not in the same quantities or at the same price.  Third, the mid-Atlantic 
was the center of America’s production, refining, and consumption of crude oil during 
the nineteenth century.  New York and Philadelphia led the nation in refining while the 
consumption of petroleum products in eastern seaboard cities outpaced its use in other 
areas.    
 
Consuming Oil, Deepening the Mineral Economy 
 The first forty years of the petroleum industry had profound consequences for the 
environment, economy, and development of the mid-Atlantic.  It created massive wealth, 
particularly for Standard Oil executives.  Standard Oil’s monopoly powers ultimately 
provoked one of the most significant antitrust cases in the nation’s history.  The 
production and refining of oil remade the landscape of western Pennsylvania and the 
mid-Atlantic.      
 Oil also accelerated the transition from the organic to the mineral economy in the 
mid-Atlantic region.  It provided a new form of fossil fuel energy that could be used to 
generate light, lubricate machinery, create heat, and be processed into a variety of 
products like solvents, waxes, and tar.  This section documents the various uses of 
petroleum between 1860 and 1900 and analyzes the ways these patterns deepened the 
transition to a mineral economy.  I also note two additional developments of particular 
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importance in understanding the shift away from organic energy sources.  First, oil’s 
most significant effects on the creation of a mineral economy began in the nineteenth 
century but only achieved full expression after the turn of the twentieth century with the 
expanded use of fuel oil and gasoline.  Second, coal provided the bulk of fossil fuel 
energy consumed in the mid-Atlantic during the latter half of the nineteenth century.  
Therefore, to understand the expansion of the mineral economy, it is necessary to review 
the expansion of coal consumption from 1860 to 1900. 
 
Table 4.9: U.S. Refinery Output, 1000s of Barrels, 1873-1899
40
 
 1873-1875 
(average) 
1878-1880 
(average) 
1884 1889 1894 1899 
Illuminating Oil 
  Production 6,529.5 10,779.8 15,450.4 20,191.2 29,457.5 29,953.8 
  % of Refined Output 85.4 85.3 80.0 74.4 70.0 61.2 
  Domestic Consumption 1,626.0 3,197.1 5,120.6 7,053.8 12,067.8 12,702.3 
  Exports 4,903.5  7,602.7 10,329.8 13,137.4 17,389.7 17,251.5 
  % Exported 75.1 70.4 66.9 65.1 59.0 57.9 
Naphtha-Benzine-Gasoline 
  Production 894.7 1,482.2 2,485.1 3,915.6 6,113.9 6,682.5 
  % of Refined Output 11.7 11.7 12.9 14.4 14.4 13.7 
  Domestic Consumption 617.6 1,100.7 2,159.5 3,582.6 5,743.5 6,256.2 
  Exports 277.1 381.5 325.6 333.0 370.4 426.3 
  % Exported 31.0 25.7 13.1 8.5 6.1 6.4 
Lubricating Oils 
  Production 225.8 376.1 898.7 1,834.5 3,288.4 4,056.6 
  % of Refined Output 3.0 3.0 4.7 6.8 7.8 8.3 
  Domestic Consumption 198.6 286.4 613.3 1,170.1 2,331.5 2,405.9 
  Exports 27.2 89.7 285.4 664.4 956.9 1,650.7 
  % Exported 12.0 23.8 31.8 36.2 29.1 41.7 
Fuel and Residuum 
  Production   482.9* 1,195.0 3,522.0* 8,239.1 
  % of Refined Output   2.5 4.4 8.3 16.8 
  Domestic Consumption   482.9 1,195.0 3,552.0 8,239.1 
  Exports   0 0 0 0 
  % Exported   0 0 0 0 
Total Refined Output 7,650.0 12,638.1 19,317.1 27,136.3 42,381.8 48,932.0 
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Illuminating Oils 
 The illumination market was the primary driver for the beginning of the oil 
industry.  The first major report on the chemical characteristics of petroleum by Benjamin 
Silliman focused on lighting and it was illumination that attracted investors.
41
  The 
prospectus for the Cherry Run Petroleum Company in 1863 enthusiastically claimed: 
“Petroleum is bound to become the illumination of the world.”
42
  The market for 
illuminants showed great promise both because of limited supplies from other sources 
and the increasing demand for light from an urbanizing and industrializing population.  
Throughout the nineteenth century, illuminating oils were the main output of American 
refineries, representing as much as 85 percent of the total in 1873-75 and 70 percent in 
1894 (Table 4.9).   
 Before the introduction of kerosene, Americans had used a wide range of 
illuminants including candles, whale oil, camphene, coal oil, and manufactured gas. 
Candles were the most common form of artificial lighting before 1830.  They were 
relatively cheap and easy to make, particularly for a rural population with farm animals (a 
wick dipped into fat or tallow would produce a flame).  Whale oil, particularly from 
sperm whales, provided a much brighter glow, but was more expensive.  By the 1840s, 
camphene, a mixture of turpentine and alcohol, became the most commonly used 
synthetic illuminating liquid in America.  Coal was also used to create artificial light.  In 
response to developments in Europe, the United States developed a coal-oil industry in 
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the 1850s.  Building on the success of Europeans, by 1860 American firms were 
producing as much as 30,000 gallons of coal-oil a day and selling it at wholesale for 75 
cents a gallon.
43
  In addition, wealthy residents of cities could obtain light from 
manufactured gas companies.  By the 1850s, urban gas works piping manufactured coal 
gas into people’s homes were operating in more than 50 American cities.
44
  Finally, 
electric lighting, pioneered by Thomas Edison in 1882, provided another source of fossil-
fuel based lighting.   
However, none of these alternatives possessed the combination of widespread 
availability, cheapness, and quality of light of kerosene.  Candles offered a comparatively 
weak glow.  The superior light of whale oil came at a price—between 34 and 79 cents a 
gallon at wholesale between 1846 and 1856 while the more highly desired sperm oil cost 
between 88 cents and $1.62 per gallon in the same period.
45
  Camphene offered 
comparable light quality to whale oil but it gave off a foul smell and was prone to 
dangerous explosions.  Moreover, its cost often ran as high as $2.00 a gallon depending 
on where it was delivered.
46
  The coal-oil industry was entirely subsumed by the 
petroleum industry within a few years as coal-oil refiners discovered it was much cheaper 
to make illuminating oils with petroleum than coal.
47
  And the benefits of manufactured 
gas and electricity were restricted to the homes of wealthy urban residents because of the 
high costs for installing pipes and wires as well as expensive monthly service charges.   
                                                
43
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 56-58. 
44
 Ibid., 39. 
45
 Walter Sheldon Tower, A History of the American Whale Fishery (Phildelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1907), 52. 
46
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 33-34. 
47
 For example, the three coal-oil refining firms in Pittsburgh—the North American, Lunesco, and Alladin 
companies—had converted to petroleum as their raw material by 1861: Thurston, Pittsburgh and Allegheny 
in the Centennial Year, 203. 
 236 
By contrast, kerosene offered a high-quality illuminating fuel that was cheaper 
than its competitors and required minimal investment by consumers.  In 1865, a gallon of 
kerosene cost 72 cents (wholesale in New York).  By 1870, the price had dropped to 26 
cents and to 8 cents in 1885.
48
  Typically, consumers paid 10 to 15 cents per gallon at the 
store for kerosene over the last two decades of the nineteenth century, depending on how 
far they were located from a major refinery or marketing station.
49
  In addition, there 
were few barriers preventing consumers from switching to kerosene.  In the 1850s, the 
coal-oil industry had introduced low-cost lamps into markets (often less than a dollar) 
and taught consumers how to tend wicks and maintain their lights.
50
  It was simple and 
cheap, therefore, for consumers to begin using kerosene.    
 The introduction of kerosene into lighting markets did face other barriers, 
particularly the danger of fire.  Many cities passed zoning restrictions and inspection laws 
that limited the areas where large amounts of oil could be stored and specified fire safety 
standards.
51
  These requirements also led to the creation of various grades of kerosene 
according to two main variables.  The first was the color and appearance of the oil 
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(standard, water white, and premium).  The second category was the fire test, which 
determined the temperature at which the oil would ignite.
52
  Most often, explosions were 
caused when lighter, more inflammable, naphtha fractions were mixed in with kerosene 
or when the refining of the oil was not complete.  While the classifications of kerosene 
and fire tests helped improve safety, it did not solve the problem.  A trade journal 
reported that between 5,000 and 6,000 people died annually during the 1870s as a result 
of fires started by exploding lamps.
53
   
 Despite the risk of fire, kerosene was by far the most widely used oil product of 
the nineteenth century both domestically and internationally (Table 4.9).  Its use 
contributed to two shifts in the development of a mineral economy: first, it was an 
artificial lighting source that could be produced and consumed on an exponentially 
increasing basis.  Second, it led to cultural shifts away from the natural patterns of the 
seasons.   
 Kerosene’s output could be continually expanded as long as more oil fields were 
discovered.  Candles, whale oils, and camphene, by contrast, all faced finite limits to the 
expansion of their production characteristic of the organic economy.  The decline in 
candle production due to a shortage of fats and tallow in continental Europe during the 
nineteenth century indicated the connections between candles and the land.   The same 
was true for camphene, whose main ingredient, turpentine, came from resin-bearing trees.  
And despite the common rhetoric of the inexhaustibility of the oceans, whaling vessels 
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were already being forced to travel longer distances in search of prey by the 1860s.  
The output of the American industry actually peaked in 1846, years before the 
introduction of petroleum illuminants.
54
  It is doubtful that the oceans could have 
continued to provide American consumers with average yields of 117,950 barrels of 
sperm oil and 215,913 barrels of whale oil, as the industry had produced between 1835 
and 1860.
55
  While petroleum has rightly been linked with numerous environmental 
harms, kerosene most likely saved certain species of the world’s whale populations from 
extinction.    
 Coal oils, manufactured gas, and electricity were not subject to these same limits 
because they were based on fossil fuels.  However, they had other limitations.  Coal oils 
were much more expensive than kerosene, while both manufactured gas and electricity 
were expensive and only available in limited geographic areas.
56
  During the nineteenth 
century, most of their light was limited to factories, streetlights, and the homes of the 
urban wealthy.    
 Kerosene, therefore, offered a form of fossil fuel based lighting that was broadly 
available and not subject to limits.  As with other forms of fossil fuel energy, once people 
got access to it, their appetite increased quickly.  The average American per capita 
consumption of kerosene was 1.5 gallons in 1874, 3.6 gallons in 1884, and 7.4 gallons in 
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1894.
57
  As a gallon of kerosene could provide about 140 hours of light, this 
represented an increase from 210 to 1,036 hours of light a year, or about 40 minutes a day 
of lighting to nearly 3 hours.
58
  Given that more petroleum was consumed in the mid-
Atlantic than any other part of America, the per capita consumption in the region was 
even more extensive than these numbers indicate.    
The widespread consumption of kerosene also contributed to cultural shifts 
associated with new lighting patterns.  People living in an organic economy tend to 
experience the changes in nature more directly than those in a mineral economy.  Two of 
the most important environmental changes are the shifts between day and night and the 
seasonal pattern of longer days in the summer and longer nights in the winter (in the 
northern hemisphere).  With lighting a limited and somewhat expensive resource, this 
encouraged certain patterns of social behavior.  Gatherings in the evenings, for example, 
were often held during times of the month where the moon was full thereby making night 
travel easier and safer.
59
  If manufacturing operations did not have artificial lighting in 
winter months they needed to close their doors early.
60
  Those living on farms often slept 
much longer hours during winter as a result of having less work and less light.
61
 
Kerosene helped change these patterns, reflecting a move away from the organic.  
Quite literally, kerosene helped many to lengthen the day.
62
  With cheap and abundant 
light, it was easy for people to have social gatherings in the evenings, do detailed work at 
                                                
57
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 521, 681. 
58
 Ibid., 496. 
59
 Brian Bowers, Lengthening the Day: A History of Lighting Technology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), chapter 2. 
60
 Schurr and Netschert, Energy in the American Economy, 1850-1975: An Economic Study of Its History 
and Prospects, 97. 
61
 Williamson and Daum, The American Petroleum Industry: The Age of Illumination 1859-1899, 30. 
62
 Bowers, Lengthening the Day: A History of Lighting Technology. 
 240 
home, or spend more time reading.  Factories could employ either kerosene lamps or 
manufactured gas to extend hours during the winter.  As a kerosene booster reported to 
Chemical News: “[t]he effect that this illuminating agent has produced throughout the 
country is very striking.  It has entirely displaced all other means of lighting except gas, 
and is used even in cities by many who desire an absolutely steady light…  Kerosene has, 
in one sense, increased the length of life among the agricultural population.  Those who, 
on account of the dearness or inefficiency of whale oil, were accustomed to go to bed 
soon after sunset and spend almost half their time in sleep, now occupy a portion of the 
night in reading and other amusements; and this is more particularly true of the winter 
season.”
63
  While a more cautious observer might not have ventured such a bold 
declaration as early as 1864, Dr. Draper’s statement captures a gradual change in 
people’s living patterns that occurred over the course of the next several decades.    
 
Naphtha Oils 
Naphtha oils were the lightest fractions of refined crude oil, including naphtha, 
benzine, and gasoline.
64
  Because kerosene was the most desired output, refiners tried to 
minimize the output of naphtha oils to a little over 10 percent of the total crude oil 
processed.
65
  At first, these lighter fractions were difficult to sell because there were few 
known applications and their volatility made them dangerous for general use.  Often they 
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were simply burnt off as a valueless by-product similar to the way early drillers in 
Texas flared natural gas.  Occasionally, unscrupulous refiners mixed naphtha oils into 
kerosene, contributing to the fires resulting from exploding lamps.  However, by the end 
of the period, several new uses for naphtha had been found, and it began to be sold at a 
price similar to kerosene.  The result was a small increase in the percentage of oil refined 
into naphtha fractions from just over 11 percent in 1873 to nearly 15 percent by 1899 
(Table 4.9).   
 The first widespread use for naphtha and benzine was in cleaning solvents, 
particularly for working with India rubber or gutta perchas used in waterproofing.  
Benzine could also be used to extract oils from vegetable materials such as flax, cotton, 
and castor beans.
66
  Other applications of naphtha included replacing turpentine in the 
manufacture of varnishes and lacquers as well as cleaning guns and oil wells.
67
    
 The biggest boost to the naphtha industry during the nineteenth century was its 
application to the manufacture of gas for lighting systems.  For years, urban gas works 
had used bituminous coal to generate their gas.  In 1869, A. C. Rand and Dr. Leonard 
Gale revolutionized the industry by developing a process to make manufactured gas with 
naphtha.  They demonstrated that naphtha could provide a comparable quality gas while 
lowering the cost of labor and materials by as much as two-thirds.  Within four years, at 
least fourteen gas companies were using naphtha exclusively to produce manufactured 
gas.
68
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 Gasoline, the quintessential petroleum product of the twentieth century, was 
mostly considered a low-value byproduct in the nineteenth century.  Air-gas machines 
used gasoline to produce light but this did not constitute a large market.
69
  A few 
automobiles with internal combustion engines were introduced in the 1890s, but there 
were only 8,000 automobiles registered in the United States in 1900.  Therefore, neither 
gasoline nor other naphtha oils contributed greatly to the emergence of a mineral 
economy in the mid-Atlantic during the nineteenth century.  However, as will be 
discussed later in this section, gasoline had revolutionary effects as automobile use 
expanded in the early decades of the twentieth century.  By 1912, the number of car 
registrations had grown to more than 900,000, creating new demands for petroleum.
70
   
 
Lubricants 
 Although lubricating oils represented only a small percentage of the overall 
consumption of petroleum during the nineteenth century, they were arguably the most 
important product of rock oil.  Lubricants derived from animals and plants had greased 
axles, waterwheels, and other moving parts in machinery for thousands of years.  
However, with the application of steam power to machinery and vehicles, the levels of 
friction and resistance grew exponentially over the course of the nineteenth century.  As 
energy analysts have noted: “[b]y the middle of the nineteenth century, the rapid growth 
of the factory system, the invention of new machines, and the expansion of steamship and 
railroad transportation had reached the point where the scarcity of efficient lubricants had 
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become a serious bottleneck.”
71
  After about a decade of experimenting with new 
techniques like slow distillation, refiners learned to make high quality lubricants out of 
petroleum.  The chemical properties of these new products ensured that friction would 
not slow the accelerating pace of industrial growth.
72
   
 Whereas kerosene was sold in just a few grades, refiners created dozens of 
varieties of lubricants.  This diversification was a response to the very different needs of 
machinery: some required heavy lubricants that could withstand high heat while others 
benefited from a higher-viscosity oil.  A particular type of lubricating oil manufactured 
by the Galena-Signal Oil Company (a company eventually purchased by Standard Oil) 
was so effective under heat and pressure that it was eventually used by over 95 percent of 
the nation’s steam railroads.
73
  An 1878 analysis of lubricating oils found over 118 
varieties, of which the most common classes were spindle oils, machine oils, and cylinder 
oils.
74
  Because several lubricants were specialized products instead of commodity goods 
like kerosene, this market offered opportunities for small refiners to maintain profitable 
businesses and avoid direct competition with Standard Oil.   
 The geography of oil influenced the production of lubricants.  In general, 
Pennsylvania’s crude oil production was characterized by high levels of paraffin wax, 
which were helpful in the manufacture of certain lubricants.  However, certain oil fields 
contained crude with even higher levels of heavy oils.  The “Venango first sand” of the 
Franklin field, about fifteen miles southwest of Titusville, produced the best oil for 
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making lubricants and sold at a much higher price.
75
  Although it is common to think 
of crude oil as a generic commodity, the particular characteristics of oil fields often 
influenced refining, particularly in the production of lubricants.
76
   
 Lubricants enhanced the transition to the mineral economy by literally greasing 
the joints of the mid-Atlantic’s industrial machinery.  Their importance, in this respect, 
far outweighed their meager percentage of total output (never more than 10 percent of 
refinery production).  Seince the mid-Atlantic led America’s industrialization process, 
petroleum lubricants played a key role in ensuring that the wheels of industry would keep 
turning.  Whether it was steam engines, railroads, or factory equipment, the increasing 
levels of power and speed embodied in industrial machinery generated new levels of heat 
and friction.  Although plant and animal based lubricants had been in use for hundreds of 
years, petroleum-based products offered an increased ability to withstand heat, varying 
levels of viscosity, and the flexibility to be manufactured into several different products.  
The continued industrialization of the mid-Atlantic during this period owed a significant 
debt to new lubricants.   
 
Fuel Oil 
 Fuel oils represented a small, but growing, percentage of petroleum consumption 
in the nineteenth century.  With minimal processing, crude oil could be burnt to provide 
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heat and power instead of firewood or coal.  Boosters were quick to realize this and 
sought to develop new markets for crude oil as a replacement for wood or coal.  In the 
early 1860s, individuals in the Oil Regions began experimenting with fuel oils and the 
Federal government in 1862 passed an act allocating funds to explore the use of 
petroleum to power naval ships.
77
  However, the use of petroleum as a fuel oil was rare in 
the early decades of the industry, and only expanded in the last twenty years of the 
nineteenth century.   
For some applications, oil was superior to other fuel sources.  Because petroleum 
could be applied steadily, oil-fired furnaces were relatively easy to maintain at a fixed 
temperature.  In addition, liquid oil could be fed into boilers via gravity instead of by 
human effort.  This was seen as a major advantage for naval ships since more of the crew 
could be at battle stations during combat rather than shoveling coal.
78
  By 1880, it was 
reported that petroleum had been shown to be usable in steam vessels and railroads.
79
  
However, these advantages of oil were generally offset by its significantly higher price.  
Even at the price of one dollar a barrel, which was considered extremely low by 
producers, oil still cost much more than coal per unit of heat output.
80
  Therefore, fuel oil 
was rarely cost-effective for consumers during the nineteenth century: it was typically 
much more valuable as an illuminant than a source of heat or power.   
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 There were two major exceptions to this rule.  First, when the price of oil at 
the well-head dropped below a dollar a barrel, some of it was likely used as fuel oil in 
refineries and factories in the Oil Regions where the negligible transport costs made it 
competitive with coal.
81
  Similar to the lack of data on the use of anthracite consumed in 
steam engines in coal mines, we have very little data on how much fuel oil was actually 
burnt in the Oil Regions.  Some analysts suggest that the reported levels are therefore too 
low.
82
  The oil produced in Ohio’s Lima fields was a second exception.  Lima crude had a 
high percentage of sulfur making it extremely difficult to refine into kerosene.  As a 
result, its price was much lower than Pennsylvania crude and comparable to coal.  Before 
1890, it sold for as little as fifteen to thirty cents a barrel and around fifty cents a barrel in 
the 1890s.
83
  Therefore, large amounts of Lima crude were used as fuel oil, particularly in 
Ohio, Indiana, and Chicago.      
 The efforts of nineteenth-century fuel oil investigations would yield fruit in the 
twentieth century.  A series of factors, including the dramatic expansion of crude oil 
production, the development of oil fields in California at sites where coal was not 
abundant and cheap, and a naval arms race between Germany, Britain, and the United 
States caused the use of fuel oil to grow dramatically in the first decades of the twentieth 
century.  In addition, as noted in the previous chapter, pipelines reduced the cost of oil 
transport, further lowering the cost to consumers.  As will be explored briefly in the next 
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section, these uses would have revolutionary impacts on American energy 
consumption patterns in the early twentieth century.    
 However, as was the case with naphtha oils, the use of crude oil for fuel made 
only a small contribution to the mid-Atlantic’s transition into the mineral economy until 
after the turn of the twentieth century.  The total amount of oil used for fuel in the 
nineteenth century was quite small, not exceeding 10 percent of refinery output until after 
1894.  Other energy sources were more important for the mid-Atlantic’s energy 
economy: the approximately eight million barrels of petroleum used for fuel oil in 1899 
only contained the energy equivalent of about 1.4 million tons of coal, less than 1 percent 
of Pennsylvania’s anthracite and bituminous production for 1900.
84
  
 
Oil in the Early Twentieth Century 
 The finding that the use of oil did not cause a dramatic shift in the transition to the 
mineral economy results from looking at how and where people consumed petroleum 
during the nineteenth century.  If we expand our perspective to the twentieth century, the 
story changes dramatically.  A quick look at oil consumption between 1899 and 1930 
shows exponential increases in petroleum use, particularly when transportation replaced 
illumination as the main consumption sector (Table 4.10).    
The most important shift in oil consumption in the early twentieth century was its 
application to transportation.  Railroads, ships, and automobiles consumed oil in 
exponentially increasing quantities that dwarfed the use of kerosene.  For example, in 
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1889, 20 million barrels of kerosene could supply the entire American market and 
satisfy the lighting needs of much of Europe (Table 4.9).  By 1909, the railroads in the 
western United States were reportedly consuming this same amount annually.
85
  The 
great buildup of naval ships by Germany, Britain, and the United States in the pre-WWI 
era involved a transition to diesel fuel, thereby increasing the demand for fuel oil.
86
  And 
the expanded use of automobiles, particularly after the introduction of Henry Ford’s 
Model T in 1908 lowered the price of cars dramatically, would lay the stage for the great 
expansion of gasoline use.  After 1909, gasoline consumption increased from less than 13 
million barrels to more than 425 million barrels in 1930, a gain of over 3500 percent in 
two decades.  The use of fuel oils and gasoline increased more than fifty- and sixty-fold 
between 1900 and 1930 while kerosene output did not even double.   
Petroleum and internal combustion engines integrated personal mobility with the 
mineral economy.  Like steam vessels in the antebellum era and railroads throughout the 
nineteenth century, automobiles created new transportation patterns impossible in an 
organic economy.  Individuals could now harness hundreds of horsepower of energy to 
travel anywhere adequate roads existed.  Moreover, petroleum provided a level of energy 
availability impossible in an organic economy.  The 965 million barrels of refined oil in 
1930 provided the energy equivalent of a forest five times the state of Pennsylvania.
87
  By 
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1930, therefore, the use of oil had played a critical role in shifting Americans—in the 
mid-Atlantic and elsewhere—into the mineral economy.   
 
Table 4.10: U.S. Refinery Output, 1,000,000s of Barrels, 1899-1930
88
 
Year Gasoline and 
naphtha 
Kerosene Fuel oils Lubricants Other products Total 
1899 6.7 (14.0%) 30.0 (62.5%) 7.3 (15.2%) 4.0 (8.3%) n/a 48.0 
1904 6.9 (12.5) 32.4 (58.5) 8.6 (15.5) 7.5 (13.5) n/a 55.4 
1909 12.9 (12.2) 39.8 (37.5) 40.5 (38.2) 12.8 (12.1) n/a 106.0 
1914 34.8 (19.1) 46.2 (25.4) 88.8 (48.8) 12.3 (6.8) n/a 182.1 
1920 116.3 (26.3) 55.2 (12.5) 211.0 (47.6) 24.9 (5.6) 35.5 (8.0) 442.9 
1925 259.6 (34.3) 59.7 (7.9) 365.0 (48.2) 31.1 (4.1) 42.2 (5.6) 757.6 
1930 432.2 (44.8) 49.2 (5.1) 372.5 (38.6) 34.2 (3.5) 76.9 (8.0) 965.0 
 
 
Expanded Coal Consumption 
 The most important factor in the mid-Atlantic’s transition into a mineral economy 
between 1860 and 1900 came from coal, not petroleum.  As shown in chapters 1 and 2, 
the development of an extensive trade in anthracite coal initiated a move away from the 
organic economy.  By 1860, with total anthracite production at just over ten million tons 
(and a little more than eight million transported to eastern markets), the mid-Atlantic had 
already begun to develop a mineral economy.  Over the next forty years, coal 
consumption continued to grow at a rapid pace.  By 1900, anthracite production had 
increased more than five-fold to over 57 million tons (Table 4.11).  Moreover, this period 
witnessed a dramatic expansion of the utilization of Pennsylvania’s bituminous 
coalfields.  While less than five million tons were mined in 1860, production practically 
doubled every decade until there were nearly 80 million tons produced in 1900.    
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 To put this growth of into perspective, Pennsylvania’s coal production in 1900 
provided a thermal energy equivalent roughly 10 times greater than American petroleum 
production in the same year.
89
  Another measure of the significance of this growth was 
that Pennsylvania coal mining in 1900 generated the heat equivalent of a forest nearly 
four times the size of the state.
90
  Therefore, while petroleum garnered large amounts of 
attention as a new energy source, the expanded use of coal during this period represented 
the most significant increase in the mid-Atlantic’s dependence on fossil fuel energy.   
 
Table 4.11: Pennsylvania Coal Production, in Tons, 1860-1900
91
  
Year Anthracite Rate of increase Bituminous Rate of increase 
1860 10,983,972  4,710,400  
1870 19,958,064 82% 9,223,856 96% 
1880 28,649,812 44% 21,280,000 131% 
1890 46,481,641 62% 42,302,173 99% 
1900 57,367,915 23% 79,842,326 89% 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
Regional Differentiation 
 Oil altered life in the mid-Atlantic, but in different ways in different places.  In 
many ways, the regional patterns of oil were similar to the dynamics of the coal industry.   
Petroleum was produced in rural locations but refined and consumed mainly in urban 
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locations.  The worst environmental harm occurred in the Oil Regions and the 
producers of oil reaped only a small share of the profits.  One pattern was noticeably 
different between coal and oil: the transport of oil via pipeline eliminated the possibility 
for reciprocal trade to develop along the energy pathways.  
As with coal, urban residents benefited the most from the development of the oil 
trade.  City dwellers used the most oil in the greatest number of ways.  Kerosene and 
naphtha oils offered cheap and bright illumination.  Lubricants and fuel oils increased the 
efficiency of urban industries.  Moreover, the location of refineries in urban locations 
created jobs and wealth in cities such as Cleveland, New York, and Philadelphia.     
Oil producers and residents living in the Oil Regions experienced many fewer 
benefits and more of the costs.  Kerosene and lubricants may have made life easier, but 
the total amounts consumed were minor in comparison with cities.  Moreover, the 
financial benefits were much less significant.  Although many landowners and oil 
producers earned small fortunes, the bulk of the industry’s profits went to refiners, 
marketers, and Standard Oil executives in Philadelphia, Cleveland, and New York.  
Adjusted to present-day values, while some oil producers became millionaires, the 
billionaires lived in distant cities.     
Those living in the Oil Regions also experienced the worst environmental harms.  
Oil drilling was a highly destructive process.  Forests were clear-cut to provide timber for 
derricks.  Poor storage facilities meant that large amounts of oil spilled onto the ground 
and ended up in streams and rivers.  In the race to maximize production, large amounts of 
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oil were wasted.
92
  These observations were clear to contemporaries as well as 
historians.  Stephen Peckham described the scene this way:  
“The development of the oil territory proceeds, after its existence has been 
demonstrated, without regard to any other interest.  The derrick comes like an 
army of occupation.  In the towns a door-yard or a garden alike surrender its 
claims.  The farms, fields, orchards, or gardens alike are lost to agriculture and 
given to oil, and on the forest-covered hills the most beautiful and valuable 
timber is ruthlessly cut and left to rot in huge heaps wherever a road or a derrick 
demands room.  Pipe-lines are run over the hills and through the valleys, through 
door-yards, along streets, across streets and railroads, and here and there the vast 
storage-tanks stand, a perpetual menace to everything near them that will burn.  
Nothing that I ever beheld reminded me so forcibly of the dire destruction of war 
as the scenes I beheld in and around Bradford at the close of the census year; and 
nothing else but the necessities of an army commands such a complete sacrifice 
of every other interest or leaves such a scene of ruin and desolation.”
93
 
 
Just as the Anthracite Regions in northeast Pennsylvania were left to deal with the bulk of 
the environmental harms of mining, the Oil Regions bore the brunt of the damages from 
oil production.   
 Cities had a more mixed experience of the environmental effects of oil 
consumption.  Kerosene was an improvement over burning candles in terms of indoor air 
quality.  Naphtha and fuel oils gave off some emissions, but far less than the amounts of 
coal already being burnt in cities.  However, refining produced extensive pollution.  In 
addition to smoke from coal fires, large amounts of chemicals were dumped into rivers 
and oil leaked out of pipes and tanks.  As Jonathan Wlasiuk has shown, Standard Oil’s 
Cleveland refineries caused significant environmental damage to the Cuyahoga River, 
forcing the city to seek new sources of drinking water.
94
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 For those living along the paths of oil pipelines, oil was a mixed blessing.  
Most farmers were given generous stipends in exchange for granting rights-of-way for a 
pipeline across their property.  On the other hand, oil pipelines leaked regularly and 
occasionally burst.  Although we have little data on how much oil leaked out of pipes, we 
know that it happened regularly.
95
  Farmers traded cash for the risk of their land being 
ruined by oil leaks.   
In addition, those living along the paths of pipelines did not benefit from the 
reciprocal trade relations initiated by the anthracite canals.  By providing two-way 
transport of a wide range of goods, anthracite canals supported the development of an 
anthracite iron industry between the Anthracite Regions and the large cities at the termini 
of the pathways.  Pipelines, which shipped only one good in one direction, did not lead to 
the development of subsidiary industries along their path.  Therefore, the areas along the 
paths of the pipelines did not benefit nearly as much as the regions along the banks of the 
anthracite canals.   
 The distribution of kerosene throughout the rural regions of the mid-Atlantic 
likely had a slightly beneficial, although not substantial, effect on those living on farms.  
With access to a cheap and effective illuminant, people had access to better lighting 
options.  If they desired, they could use this light to alleviate the darkness of the winter 
evenings, read more, or perform detailed handiwork at night.  Petroleum lubricants may 
have made work on the farm easier by reducing friction.  However, because the levels of 
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consumption were relatively minor, oil did not lead to a restructuring of rural life in 
the mid-Atlantic before the introduction of automobiles in the twentieth century.
96
    
 
Creating Dependence 
 By 1900, many mid-Atlantic residents had come to use petroleum extensively in 
their lives.  Boosters were quick to note its general usefulness and to declare that it had 
become a practical necessity.  As Stephen Peckham claimed in his 1885 report on the 
industry, “petroleum has become one of the indispensable needs of civilized man, and 
ministers to his wants in such a multitude of forms and under such a multitude of 
circumstances that it may be safely said that it ameliorates the conditions of his struggle 
with external nature, adds comfort to health, and soothes in sickness, prolonging his 
active life by extending the day into the domain of night over all that portion of the 
earth’s surface accessible to commerce.”
97
  Yet once people began using petroleum, it 
initiated behaviors that could only be reversed with great difficulty.  Kerosene helped 
accustom individuals to the benefits of artificial lighting, thereby encouraging its 
expanded use.  Even though electricity overtook kerosene as the main illuminant for mid-
Atlantic residents in the twentieth century, oil played a role in changing people’s 
expectations for how homes and factories should be lit.  Once new lubricants were 
introduced, they made it possible for machinery and vehicles to operate at higher levels 
of heat and friction.  As the capacities of industrial technologies were expanded, it 
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created an ongoing need for more and better petroleum lubricants.  Fuel oil enabled 
the expansion of transport networks in areas without other fossil fuel endowments, such 
as California.  Once these railroads were built, they required a constant source of 
petroleum to keep them moving.  Without the continued supply of oil, several aspects of 
home and work life would no longer have been possible.   
 Moreover, as automobiles became a common form of personal transport in the 
first decades of the twentieth century, Americans quickly became dependent on cheap 
and abundant petroleum in order to drive cars to and from home, work, and vacation 
sites.  The transport of goods also began a switch from railroads to long-distance trucks 
and short-distance delivery vans.  The oil infrastructure created during the nineteenth 
century—pipelines, drilling technologies, refining techniques, marketing stations—
played a critical role in expanding the consumption of oil in the twentieth century and 
creating a world in which that supply was necessary to society’s smooth functioning.   
 
A Region Transformed 
 The transport and consumption of petroleum in the mid-Atlantic contributed to 
several broad social changes in the region and nation between 1860 and 1900.  The 
deepening of the mineral economy expanded the depth and breadth of industrial activity 
in the mid-Atlantic.  In addition, the boundaries of the nation’s industrial district 
expanded westwards across southern New York and Pennsylvania to include parts of the 
mid-West including Ohio and Chicago.  The creation of large corporations like the 
Standard Oil Trust, U.S. Steel, and the railroads generated new social and political 
questions about how to protect citizens and workers against these powerful organizations.  
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Finally, many workers pursued unionization efforts in response to shifting work 
conditions and the growing power of corporations.    
 The early stages of industrialization in the mid-Atlantic during the antebellum era 
set the stage for the dramatic expansion of industrial enterprises in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.  In 1860, the United States trailed Great Britain, France, and 
Germany in industrial output.  By 1900, American workers produced more goods than all 
three European nations combined.  A quarter of the nation’s labor force—5.9 million 
people—worked in factories. Fossil fuel energy—coal to provide heat and power, 
petroleum for lighting, fuel, and lubrication—helped industrial operations increase their 
output five-fold during the period.
98
 
 The phenomenal growth of industrial output did not occur steadily, nor did it 
benefit all people and places equally.  Devastating depressions from 1873-78 and 1893-
97 forced many business owners to shut their doors and lay off thousands of workers.  
Some cities grew disproportionately—New York and Philadelphia remained the nation’s 
main manufacturing centers while Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Buffalo, and Chicago grew 
dramatically—and others were overshadowed—Lowell was surpassed by other textile 
centers while Troy, New York and Patterson, New Jersey experienced relative declines.  
Urban locations attracted the lion’s share of new manufacturing centers.  The largest ten 
cities increased their total share of manufacturing from 24 percent of the nation’s output 
to 38 percent between 1860 and 1900.  Moreover, the rich got richer: the top 1 percent 
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owned 52 percent of the nation’s wealth while the bottom 44 percent only owned 1.2 
percent in 1890.
99
 
 The geography of industrialization changed as well.  While the eastern mid-
Atlantic and mill towns of New England were the nation’s primary manufacturing centers 
in the antebellum era, industrial growth spread westward over the latter half of the 
nineteenth century.  The result was a broad industrial heartland bordered by Baltimore, 
Philadelphia, and New York on the east, Pittsburgh and Cincinnati on the south, Albany, 
Rochester, Buffalo, and Cleveland on the north, and Chicago on the west.
100
   This 
industrial heartland contained the great bulk of the nation’s industrial capacity.   
 The transport and consumption of oil shaped and reflected these patterns.  The Oil 
Regions were similar to Troy and Lowell as promising refining sites that got passed over 
in favor of Cleveland, New York, and Philadelphia.  John D. Rockefeller’s ability to 
control the oil industry contributed to the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few.  
Finally, transport infrastructure played a crucial role in creating the boundaries of the 
industrial heartland.  Most notably, the outlines of the industrial heartland appear clearly 
in three of the maps already shown in this chapter.  The location of American 
manufacturing shows a remarkable overlap with the railroad system circa 1875, the 
pipeline system in 1900, and the distribution of Standard Oil marketing stations in 1906.  
Railroads and pipelines brought cheap and abundant coal and oil to the cities along their 
paths, thereby giving them an advantage over other locations.  Transport infrastructure 
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both reflected and shaped this geography.  As geographers have noted about this 
heartland: “The really striking feature is the absence of any major industrial center … 
south of the B&O Railroad.”
101
   
 The spread of an industrial heartland to the west did not mean the eclipse or 
decline of the mid-Atlantic.  Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey remained leading 
industrial states while New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Baltimore were among 
the nation’s preeminent industrial cities.  Instead, the spread of industry to Ohio and 
Illinois reflected the extension of the mid-Atlantic’s style of fossil-fuel powered 
industrialization to other parts of the nation.  Cities like Cleveland and Chicago were 
similar to Philadelphia and New York in that they had limited supplies of water-power.  
Their industrial expansion depended on coal and oil.    
 Corporations grew in tandem with the nation’s industrial growth.  While 
corporations had already been seen as a threat to republican values in the antebellum era, 
their growth in number and scale created a range of new social challenges in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century.
102
  Some of these problems were internal.  How could a 
company operate successfully when it had to handle multiple divisions, a diverse product 
line, and hundreds or thousands of laborers?  One response was the rise of bureaucratic 
management.  Hundreds of unnamed middle managers innovated with new management 
forms and created procedures and practices to handle the complexities of corporations.
103
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In addition, they pioneered new forms of information flows to keep the company’s 
operations in order.
104
 
 Corporations posed a series of problems for those outside the boardroom walls as 
well.  Small manufacturing firms had to adjust their strategies to avoid being swallowed 
by large conglomerates.  Many managed to do so, largely by specializing in high-quality 
batch production.
105
  The disproportionate power of corporations over workers led many 
laborers to join unions.  Farmers, who often felt victimized by the seemingly arbitrary 
practices of railroad companies, organized themselves under the auspices of the Grange 
to fight back.
106
  Muckraking journalists like Upton Sinclair and Ida Tarbell protested the 
unchecked power of corporations.  Finally, some politicians sought to expand the role of 
the state to provide a check against corporate abuses.  These efforts led to the creation of 
the Interstate Commerce and Sherman Antitrust Acts and the rise of government 
regulation.   
 The oil industry offered one of the most visible examples of the dangers of 
corporations.  The monopoly powers of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Trust were 
widely denounced in hearings before state commissions, articles by Ida Tarbell and 
Henry Demarest Lloyd, and the protests of oilmen.  The various hearings, legal actions, 
and ultimate dissolving of the Standard Oil Trust figured prominently in the development 
of a political response to corporate power in America.    
 Finally, workers experienced numerous changes during this period.  First, the 
demographics of labor shifted.  Those employed in industrial occupations grew from 1.5 
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million in 1860 to 5.9 million in 1900.  Their backgrounds changed as well: more 
than 80 percent were born in foreign countries or were the children of immigrants.
107
  
Second, laborers found themselves dealing with corporations instead of shop owners.  
This meant that laborers were removed from the owners of the enterprises, managed by 
foremen (many of whom were notorious for showing favoritism and demanding bribes 
for good jobs), and had considerably less power over the workplace environment.  In 
response, many laborers decided to form unions and protest their diminished status.  They 
created the National Labor Union in 1866, the Knights of Labor in 1869, the American 
Federation of Labor in 1886, and many other unions.  Fossil fuel energy contributed to 
these changes by helping give rise to large corporations and the expansion of industrial 
enterprise.  Therefore, coal and oil were linked to the organization of labor unions, which, 
in turn, would have significant consequences for the nation’s political economy in the 
twentieth century.   
  
 Coal and oil remade the society and economy of the mid-Atlantic during the 
nineteenth century by providing new ways to heat and light homes, power machinery, 
and transport goods and people around the nation.  In the last quarter of the century, 
inventors and entrepreneurs began to generate and harness a new medium that would 
further revolutionize the mid-Atlantic’s energy base: electricity.  The channeling of 
electricity through wires offered a flexible form of energy delivery that would extend the 
development of the mineral economy in the region.  It is to this story that we now turn.   
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Chapter 5: River of Power: The Holtwood Dam and the  
Development of a Mid-Atlantic Power Grid, 1900-1930 
 
 
 Electricity captivated Americans in the late nineteenth century.  Its unique 
combination of invisibility, danger, and wide range of uses drew reactions ranging from 
awe and wonder to terror.  For many, it was magical: “Electricity was the sign of 
Edison’s genius, the wonder of the age, the hallmark of progress.  It was a mysterious 
power Americans had long connected to magnetism, the nervous system, heat, power, 
lightning, sex, health, and light.”
1
  As electrification spread across the mid-Atlantic 
during the early part of the twentieth century, it would change more than people’s mental 
states: it would build on and expand the social, economic, and environmental 
transformations initiated by coal and oil.  
 As a source of light and power, electricity had profound impacts for mid-Atlantic 
residents.  It led to new patterns of suburban living, changes in labor arrangements, and 
the widespread use of fossil fuel-based mechanical energy in the home.  For those with 
access to cheap and reliable electricity, it made many aspects of life easier.  Better 
lighting helped maintain eyesight and encouraged reading.  Streetcars allowed working 
families to purchase houses in the newly developing suburbs.  Electric machines were 
often more reliable, quiet, and safe than those driven by steam.  Moreover, electricity 
gave rise to a host of leisure activities including the widespread dissemination of radios 
and movies.  There were downsides as well.  Well-lit factories made graveyard shifts 
practical.  Suburbs often exacerbated class and ethnic segregation.  Moreover, not 
everyone had the same access to electricity or paid the same rates.  Electrification was 
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largely an urban phenomenon.  Residential consumers, when they had access to 
electricity, usually paid rates three to four times higher than industrial consumers.  
 By transforming the lives of mid-Atlantic residents, electricity had much in 
common with coal and oil.  Most importantly, turning the potential of fossil fuels or 
falling water into energy that consumers would use (and pay for) required major 
alterations of the built environment.
2
  While dams, generating stations, and dynamos 
were necessary for producing electricity, it was the creation of vast networks of 
transmission wires that allowed this power to travel to the places where consumers were 
located.  In doing so, transmission wires created new energy landscapes that made 
electricity cheap, abundant, and reliable in certain places.     
 This chapter studies the development of transmission wires in the mid-Atlantic 
between 1900 and 1930.  The first half of the chapter analyzes the transmission wires 
extending from the Holtwood hydroelectric dam on the Susquehanna River.  The 
Holtwood dam was one of the pioneering electrical projects in the mid-Atlantic during 
this period and its construction highlights the challenges, choices, and contingencies 
shaping the development of transmission wires.  The second half of the chapter examines 
the emergence of a broader electrical grid throughout the region.  I conclude with an 
exploration of the political debates over how integration should be managed and who 
should own the network.  These debates make it clear that there were several possible 
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forms the electric grid could take and that choices about how to build and operate 
transmission wires shaped the social consequences of electricity in the mid-Atlantic.   
  
Taming the Susquehanna River: The Holtwood Dam 
 The Susquehanna River has figured prominently in the history of the mid-
Atlantic.  For hundreds of years, Native American groups lived along its banks and fished 
its waters.  Captain John Smith led the first survey of the river by European settlers in 
1608 and William Penn envisioned a sister city for Philadelphia that would be located 
where the Susquehanna and Conestoga rivers met.
3
  As discussed in Chapter 1, questions 
over whether the lucrative agricultural trade of central Pennsylvania would flow south 
along the Susquehanna to Baltimore or east along roads to Philadelphia focused the 
attention of each city’s merchants on the navigability of the Susquehanna.  The perceived 
threat of the Susquehanna to Philadelphia’s trade prospects encouraged boosters to 
develop the Pennsylvania canal network in the nineteenth century.  At the dawn of the 
twentieth century, the Susquehanna River would once again take a prominent role in mid-
Atlantic affairs as the site of major hydroelectric developments.   
 While the Susquehanna River was one of the largest waterways in the region, its 
natural features had frustrated many in the mid-Atlantic.  Whereas most of the other 
major rivers along the eastern seaboard had been supporting significant amounts of 
transport and/or power for several decades, the lower Susquehanna was relatively 
                                                
3
 “A Short Story of the History of the Susquehanna River in Lancaster County” August 3, 1943. 
Pennsylvania Power & Light Collection, Pennsylvania Water & Power Company Files, Accession 1552, 
Box 149, Folder 3.  Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, DE.  Hereafter, this collection will be 
referred to as “Hagley PWP Collection.” 
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undeveloped by the end of the nineteenth century.  Two distinct features of the river 
limited its effectiveness for either purpose.  First, over the course of a year there could be 
great fluctuations in water level between the raging torrents common during the spring 
thaws and the slow trickle typical of late summer, thereby hampering navigation.  These 
variable water levels also frustrated power developments because it was difficult to site a 
mill along the river’s banks.  The full strength of a spring flood would provide too much 
power to control effectively, while lower water levels might not even reach a water 
wheel.   
 Second, the river’s greatest drops in elevation occurred over the last forty miles.  
Most major rivers have large drops near their sources and flatten out as they travel to the 
sea, thereby making it easy to transport goods from inland to the coast and vice versa.  
Boats traveling down the Susquehanna, on the other hand, found that the most difficult 
part of their journey was reaching these broader markets because of the steep and 
dangerous final descent.  This also meant that goods could not be shipped efficiently up 
the Susquehanna from the Chesapeake Bay.  In addition, the concentration of falls near 
the end of the river inhibited power developments because most nineteenth century mills 
were not capable of harnessing such large sources of power.
4
  It was not until the 1870s 
that a development of paper mills at York Haven sought to use the lower Susquehanna 
                                                
4
 The developments at Lowell along the Merrimack are an exception that proves the rule.  The only way 
that such a major water power site could be developed was with the investment of significant sums of 
capital.   
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for industrial power.
5
  As a result of these features, the Susquehanna River was not 
nearly as developed as most other major rivers along the eastern seaboard around 1900.
6
  
The development of the electric industry and the push towards hydroelectricity 
changed the course of the Susquehanna River and its role in the mid-Atlantic.  The first 
hydroelectric plant was established in Wisconsin in 1882 and in the 1890s, the 
development of extensive power plants at Niagara Falls proved the viability of obtaining 
large amounts of electricity from falling water.  As hydroelectric technologies such as 
dams, turbines, and transmission wires improved, people began to turn their attention to 
other opportunities, including the Susquehanna River.   
The first hydroelectric facilities on the Susquehanna were built along its 
tributaries, including the Rock Hill and Wabank plants on Conestoga Creek (1896-7) the 
Colemanville plant on Pequea Creek (1896) and the Delta Electric Power Co. plant on 
Muddy Creek (1896).
7
  At York Haven, a group created a hydroelectric facility on the 
Susquehanna River by erecting a wing-dam part of the way across the river.
8
  In many 
ways, the development of these small plants fit the pattern of the organic economy, where 
falling water was used to generate power for a local mill.    
Several parties had more ambitious aims.  They knew that a dam erected across 
the entire breadth of the river would create a power potential of more than 75,000 kw, 
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 R. L. Thomas, “The Development of a Regional Power System” June 6, 1935, Hagley PWP Collection, 
Acc 1552, Box 149, Folder 14. 
6
 Nature did provide one important advantage to those looking to develop the river: the banks of the lower 
Susquehanna featured steep cliffs that were relatively unpopulated.  This meant that if the river were 
dammed, the cliffs would reduce the amount of flooded land, thereby making it much cheaper for a 
company to obtain the necessary property rights. 
7
 These plants generally had a capacity of 500 – 1,000 kw.  R. L. Thomas, “The Development of a Regional 
Power System” June 6, 1935, Hagley PWP Collection, Acc 1552, Box 149, Folder 14, p. 3. 
8
 The York Haven plant was built by a group of men including George Burbank who had been active in the 
creation of the Niagara Falls project.  This facility had an initial capacity of 5,000 kw that was later 
expanded to 15,000 kw.  Ibid., p. 4. 
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dwarfing the output of other facilities on the Susquehanna.  Such a facility would no 
longer be characteristic of the organic economy.  Given the rural nature of the 
surrounding areas, there were no local markets for such a large supply of electricity.  
Instead, prospective dam builders could only obtain financing if the power were to be 
sent to distant urban markets.  Instead of people moving to a site of energy abundance, 
the dam and its wires would ship the energy elsewhere.  Such a dam would be a hybrid 
between the organic (capturing renewable flows of solar energy) and mineral economies 
(producing concentrated power and transporting it to distant markets).    
 
The McCall Ferry Power Company  
The McCall Ferry Power Company led the first effort to transform the 
Susquehanna River into a source of energy for distant markets.  The scale of the project 
was immense.  The dam would need to stretch over half a mile making it the longest in 
the United States and comparable to the recently built Aswan Dam in Egypt.
9
  The 
hydroelectric output of the powerhouse would only be exceeded by Niagara Falls on all 
rivers east of the Mississippi.  To tackle such an immense project, the McCall Ferry 
Power Company was created in 1905 with the financial support of New York capitalists 
and an elite group of engineers with extensive experience working on the Panama 
Canal.
10
   
                                                
9
 See several of the articles in Hagley PWP Collection, Accession 1962, McCall Ferry Power Co Scrap 
Book, p. 13. 
10
 The financing for the project came mostly from New York bankers including the Bertron, Storrs and 
Griscom banking firm and Harvey Fiske and Sons of New York.  In addition to a number of prominent 
capitalists on the board of directors, the firm also hired several well-known engineers to supervise the 
work, including George S. Morrison (who died during construction), Cary T. Hutchinson, Boyd Ehle (who 
worked with Morrison on the Panama Canal), F. Q. Blackwell, and Charles Main. 
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Work to survey the river and secure land rights had actually begun several 
years before the company was officially incorporated.  Engineers including Boyd Ehle 
and Robert Anderson led surveys of the river in 1901.
11
  By 1902, Cary T. Hutchinson, 
one of the company’s directors, had purchased many land rights in the area of McCall’s 
Ferry, an inn along the edge of the river along with a ferry service for those wishing to 
cross the river.
12
  Much of this work was done in secret, largely because other parties 
were seeking to procure land rights to develop the river themselves.
13
    
The McCall’s Ferry site had several advantages for a hydroelectric dam: there was 
a large island in the middle of the river that would make dam construction easier, a 
natural tailrace for the power house’s water discharge between the island and east side of 
the river, and a bend in the river above the site that meant the large blocks of ice that 
swept down the river would flow to the west side of the river and away from the power 
house, thereby preventing damage.  However, there were disadvantages.  Most notably, it 
was a very rural and remote site.  The only local structure of note was a small inn forcing 
the company to import laborers, erect housing, build construction plants, and supply any 
other facilities it needed.    
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 Affidavit of Robert Anderson, September 30, 1926, p. 1. Hagley PWP Collection, Accession 1962, Box 
215, Folder 13.   
12
 When the McCall Ferry Power Company went into receivership, it had to list all its assets in court 
papers.  This included over 100 properties which detail who purchased the property and when.  Recurrent 
names in these deeds are Frederick Shoff, Cary T. Hutchinson, and James Harlow.  George Willson and 
William Beyer, who were likely agents of Cary T. Hutchinson, also purchased many of the properties.  The 
full list of properties are listed in: “Amended Bill of Complaint, Answer, Decree Appointing Receiver and 
Certificate of Clerk of Court as to Entry of Bond of Receiver” Circuit Court of the United States (Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania), April Sessions, 1909.  No. 329, p. 26.  In McCall Ferry Power Company 
Reorganization, 1908-1910, Hagley PWP Collection, Accession 1962.   
13
 For example, James Harlow and the Susquehanna Electric Power Company purchased properties in the 
same area as did the agents of the Susquehanna Power Company, an organization with connections to New 
York financiers. 
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 By 1905, Hutchinson and his fellow directors felt sufficiently confident in 
their surveys and property rights to create the McCall Ferry Power Company and begin 
raising the several millions of dollars needed to dam the river.  Enough capital was raised 
by October of 1906 to begin construction.  The company brought in several hundred 
immigrant laborers to perform the necessary work, housing them in simple shacks near 
the construction site.
14
  The skilled “American” workers were put up in houses offering 
room and board services.
15
  The work was managed by Hugh L. Cooper, who went on to 
a significant career directing infrastructure developments across the globe.
16
  
The incredible labor and financial resources necessary to construct a dam were 
not the only challenges the company faced.  As word was spread to local communities 
about the building of the dam, it caused a great stir, particularly among shad fishermen.  
Because the dam was being built in such a rural location and the company had kept quiet 
during its surveying, corporate organizing, and property purchases, few people had a 
clear idea of what a large undertaking the project would be or could imagine a dam 
stretching over half a mile restraining the turbid waters of the Susquehanna.  When 
newspaper reports began circulating in the spring of 1906, however, many local residents 
began to protest the proposed dam.  In particular, shad fishermen feared the dam would 
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 Similar to the construction of canals in the early nineteenth century, most of the hard work was 
performed by those in a low social position.  Moreover, the opinions of the directors reflected ethnic 
stereotypes. According to Christie Hutchinson, brother of Cary and a lawyer for the company, “most of the 
force now is Italian, our superintendents finding that, on the whole, Italians are better workers than Slavs.” 
“York to Have Power from McCall’s Ferry” July 6, 1906.  An article in a York newspaper in Hagley PWP 
Collection, Accession 1962, McCall Ferry Power Co Scrap Book, p. 13. “Developing Electricity from the 
Susquehanna River” Manufacturers’ Record, October 4, 1906. 
15
 Immigrant laborers were typically paid $1.50 per day and paid $1.00 per month for the shacks they lived 
in.  Skilled workmen were paid $2.50-$3.25 per day and $4.50-$6.00 per week for room and board. “York 
to Have Power from McCall’s Ferry” July 6, 1906.  An article in a York newspaper in Hagley PWP 
Collection, Accession 1962, McCall Ferry Power Co Scrap Book, p. 13. 
16
 Harold Dorn, "Hugh Lincoln Cooper and the First Detente," Technology and Culture 20, no. 2 (1979). 
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end their livelihoods because the fish was a migratory species that would be cut off 
from its breeding grounds.
17
  Others objected to the raising of the river behind the dam, 
which would submerge favorite local islands, such as the Indian Steps.  These rock 
islands in the river were attractive fishing spots and local lore held that William Penn had 
bequeathed them to local residents.
18
   
These protests were powerful enough to draw the attention of Pennsylvania’s Fish 
Warden, W. E. Meehan, who brought the issues to Pennsylvania’s Attorney-General 
Hampton L. Carson.  Carson questioned whether the company had a right to build a dam 
across the entire breadth of the river since it would interfere with the migration of fish 
and the movement of vessels.  In particular, Carson was not convinced that the Mill Act 
of 1806, by which the company claimed the right to build its dam, was applicable.  In 
August 1906, Carson appealed to the District Court of Pennsylvania in Dauphin County 
for a preliminary injunction halting work on the dam.
19
  On January 14, 1907, a 
compromise agreement was reached where the company was allowed to proceed with 
work on the dam on the conditions that it provide a fishway for the shad and facilitate 
navigation if any party built a canal above the dam.
20
  This decision ended Carson’s 
efforts to halt the dam and effectively ceased any protest by the shad fishermen that 
would threaten the project. 
The McCall Ferry Power Company also had to secure additional land rights.  The 
geography of the Susquehanna River made this task much easier.  Along its lower 
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 “Alderman Aughenbaugh Insists that Power Company Dam Will Destroy Fish” York Gazette, April 2, 
1906; “Don’t Give Up the River” York Dispatch March 27, 1906.  
18
 “The Great River Work” Lancaster New Era March 13, 1906. 
19
 “M’Call’s Ferry Is In Danger” Wilmington Evening Journal, August 15, 1906.  
20
 A copy of the relevant part of the court’s decision is at: Hagley PWP Collection, Accession 1962, Box 
35, Folder: “McCall Ferry Power Company – Decree of Court of Common Pleas – Dauphin County Dated 
January 14, 1907”.   
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lengths, steep cliffs border most of the river’s banks.  These cliffs were largely 
uninhabited, making the land rights cheaper to purchase.  Moreover, they contained the 
lake that would be created behind the dam to a relatively small area, lowering the overall 
amount of property that the company needed to obtain.   
Despite this favorable geography, there were significant challenges to obtaining 
the necessary property rights.  First, the company had to negotiate agreements with the 
other parties who had purchased rights in the hope of constructing their own dam.
21
  
Second, they had to acquire additional properties from landowners.  Despite a reputation 
for fair dealing—an editorial on the development of the dam acknowledged that the 
company had been upfront with landholders, often paying double the cost “had it resorted 
to chicanery and deception”—the company was not able to obtain all the land it desired.
22
  
For example, a local resident owned land that would be flooded if the dam was raised at 
its originally designed height of 85 feet.  Because the company could not obtain his 
property and a few other sites as well, they begrudgingly lowered the height of the dam to 
65 feet.  This involved a significant loss of power, but made the project more feasible in 
the short term.
23
        
                                                
21
 The McCall Ferry Power Company was able to purchase the property rights of the Susqeuhanna Electric 
Power Company.  However, it had more difficulty acquiring the rights of the Susquehanna Power 
Company.  Eventually, the two parties divided their land holdings, giving the McCall Ferry Power 
Company the rights to lands at McCall’s Ferry and the Susquehanna Power Company the rights to lands 
near Conowingo, MD.  The agreement also forced the McCall Ferry Power Company to invest in the stock 
of the Susquehanna Power Company.  “Making a Great River Work for Men,” Baltimore Sun, February 20, 
1910.  The agreement between the McCall Ferry Power Company and Susquehanna Power Company is 
dated August 11, 1908.  Reprinted in “Amended Bill of Complaint, Answer, Decree Appointing Receiver 
and Certificate of Clerk of Court as to Entry of Bond of Receiver” Circuit Court of the United States 
(Eastern District of Pennsylvania), April Sessions, 1909.  No. 329, Appendix D. In McCall Ferry Power 
Company Reorganization, 1908-1910, Hagley PWP Collection, Accession 1962.   
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 “Don’t Give Up the River” York Dispatch March 27, 1906. 
23
 “The Land Damage Cases” October 19, 1906. Hagley PWP Collection, Accession 1962, McCall Ferry 
Power Co Scrap Book, p. 19.  In 1935, R. L. Thomas of PWP noted that in the long term, the decision to 
lower the dam left a sufficient fall above McCall’s Ferry to warrant the building of the Safe Harbor plant: 
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 Finally, the company had to make arrangements with the Pennsylvania 
Railroad Company, as the dam would flood the tracks of the Columbia & Port Deposit 
Railroad running along the Susquehanna River.  The company needed to relay tracks for 
the railroad for six miles above and below the dam, a significant expense.
24
  When a few 
landholders refused to sell their properties at prices considered fair by the McCall Ferry 
executives, the directors turned to the strength of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 
still one of the state’s most powerful corporations, to resolve the issue.  Because the 
Pennsylvania Railroad had eminent domain privileges, the two companies worked out an 
arrangement whereby the railroad company used these rights to purchase the land at a 
cheaper price.  While several landowners sued the two companies on grounds that the 
railroad did not have the right to use its eminent domain privileges for the benefit of the 
dam company, the courts rejected the landowners’ claims.
25
      
 While the McCall Ferry Power Company successfully navigated the acquisition of 
land rights, thwarted legal obstacles to the dam, and made significant headway on 
constructing the dam, it met its demise with the collapse of the financial markets in the 
fall of 1907.  Even though the company had completed 80 percent of the work on the 
dam, it found itself unable to raise additional funds to complete the project.  By March of 
1908, work had ceased entirely.  According to one of the company’s engineers, the dam 
was complete with the exception of fifteen 40-foot sections letting the water through and 
                                                                                                                                            
R. L. Thomas, “The Development of a Regional Power System” June 6, 1935, Hagley PWP Collection, 
Acc 1552, Box 149, Folder 14, p. 7. 
24
 They needed to raise the tracks below the dam as well to provide a gentle incline to the higher tracks 
above the dam.    
25
 “The Land Damage Cases” October 19, 1906. Hagley PWP Collection, Accession 1962, McCall Ferry 
Power Co Scrap Book, p. 19; “Railroad Work Stopped” Lancaster Intelligencer, Oct. 12, 1906.  
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the company hoped to acquire new funds.
26
  By December 15, 1908, the company 
could no longer meet the interest payments on its bonds and was forced into 
receivership.
27
  As a result, the first attempt to install a major hydroelectric development 
on the Susquehanna River came to a close.
28
   
 
Aldred Takes Over – the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company 
 The failure of the McCall Ferry Power Company revealed that a combination of 
prominent New York financiers and engineers was not sufficient to transform the 
potential water power of the Susquehanna River into a usable and profitable commodity.  
However, by constructing 80 percent of the dam before running out of money, the 
company’s efforts made it likely that a new party would complete the project.  Once the 
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 “‘White Coal’ From the Susquehanna” Lancaster New Era?, March 4, 1908 in Hagley PWP Collection, 
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 Letter from Bondholders Committee to Holders of First Mortgage Bonds and Preferred Stock of McCall 
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 Several factors contributed to the financial failure of the McCall Ferry Power Company.  The most 
immediate explanation was the Panic of 1907.  When the Knickerbocker Trust Company failed in its effort 
to corner the copper market, it led to a cascading series of bank failures.  Investors who had been burned 
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had been signed with the Consolidated Gas, Electric, and Light Company and United Railways (both of 
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expected output (“Susquehanna Power Here in September” Baltimore News, February 15, 1910).   It is 
possible that had the McCall Ferry Power Company been able to present investors with a more complete set 
of customers for the dam’s output, it may have made the company a more desirable target for investment.  
The primary importance of being able to transmit and sell the energy is a central theme that will be returned 
to several times in the rest of this chapter.   
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company could no longer meet its interest payment, the bondholders of the McCall 
Ferry Power Company gathered together to find new investors that could finish the 
dam.
29
   
 The Bondholders’ Committee—a group of the prominent capitalists William 
Barnum, A. C. Bedford, Charles Coffin, S. Reading Bertron, and Gardiner Lane—began 
negotiations with several interested parties, ultimately agreeing to terms with a syndicate 
headed by John E. Aldred.  Aldred had long been associated with the Shawinigan Water 
& Power Company, an organization that operated a large dam on the St. Lawrence River 
and transmitted the electricity to Montreal.  According to his own recollections years 
later, he was aware of the developments on the Susquehanna River, watching them with 
interest from 1905.  He had approved of the general plan but thought the company’s 
building methods were overly costly.
30
  He visited the site early in 1909 and agreed to 
raise the additional money to complete the project.   
The terms of the deal were extremely favorable for Aldred and his investors.  The 
old stock of the company was eliminated and the bonds were converted into 40 percent 
new bonds and 60 percent stock.  In exchange for raising up to $4,250,000 in bonds, 
Aldred and his new investors would receive the value of those bonds plus a bonus of 
$3,500,000 in stock.
31
  Some of the original investors protested these terms, arguing that 
they were too generous.
32
  As Aldred himself noted years later, “[t]he general proposition 
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was not looked upon favorably [by the bondholders] as the plan was considered too 
drastic a scaling down of the securities.”
33
  In exchange, the Bondholders Committee 
insisted that Aldred assume general management of the company and provide security for 
the enterprise by maintaining his interest for several years.  All the new stock shares were 
put into a Voting Trust until 1912, preventing anyone from selling their shares before this 
time.
34
  Ultimately, the bondholders agreed to Aldred’s plan, and he was appointed the 
Receiver of the assets and liabilities of the McCall Ferry Power Company by the Circuit 
Court of the United States for Eastern Pennsylvania on July 7, 1909.
35
   
 Aldred had already been at work preparing to raise additional funds for the 
enterprise.  He raised part of the money through his co-investors in the Shawinigan Water 
& Power Company.  Two of his partners in that enterprise, Herbert S. Holt and E. R. 
Wood, invested enough money to warrant changing the name of the dam from McCall’s 
Ferry to Holtwood, a combination of their names.  Aldred raised the additional money in 
England, working with R. M. Aitken of the Kitcat and Aitken banking house.  As he 
recalled, capital was still tight in America and utility stocks in particular were held in low 
regard making it necessary to go abroad.
36
  Most of the money was raised over the fall of 
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1909, and by January 13, 1910, the name of the enterprise was officially changed to 
the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company.
37
 
 Through his experience with hydroelectricity in Canada, Aldred knew that it was 
not enough simply to generate electricity, one had to be able to transport and sell it.  He 
and his associates surveyed the power situation within a wide radius of the dam to 
identify potential markets.  They saw the best opportunity in Baltimore, both because of 
the potential for growth and the fact that it was possible to obtain a controlling stake in 
the Consolidated Gas Electric & Light Company (Consolidated), which had a monopoly 
on the distribution of electricity in that city.  Obtaining control over Consolidated would 
prove to be one of the most important steps in the history of the enterprise and will be 
discussed further in the next section.   
 Once the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company was incorporated and additional 
funds were raised, engineers and laborers renewed work on the dam and made plans to 
complete the powerhouse and transmission lines.  Aldred brought engineer J. A. Walls 
with him from Shawinigan to oversee the construction.  Most of the engineers associated 
with the McCall Ferry Power Company were let go.  Over the winter and summer of 
1910, the workers completed the dam by filling in the remaining open sections.
38
  The 
company then built the powerhouse and installed turbines developed by the I. P. Morris 
Company of Philadelphia.  The General Electric Company supplied the generators and 
the transformers were purchased from Westinghouse.
39
  By the fall of 1910, the work on 
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the dam and the initial installation of powerhouse equipment was complete.  Now the 
question became: who would buy the power and how would it be distributed? 
 
Image 5.1: Aerial View of the Holtwood Dam, 1933
40
 
 
 
 
Finding Consumers  
 For most observers, the creation of a dam more than half a mile long and capable 
of holding back the raging waters of the Susquehanna River was the most impressive 
                                                
40
 This image shows the power house on the right, the high cliffs along the lower Susquehanna, the bend in 
the river that pushed the ice blocks away from the power house, the raised tracks of the Columbia and Port 
Deposit Railroad, and the rural agricultural land surrounding the dam.  The smoke is from the steam plant 
the company built in 1924 to supplement the hydroelectric power.  Image courtesy of Hagley Museum & 
Library, Wilmington, DE.  Image from Pennsylvania Water & Power Company, 1933 Annual Report 
(Holtwood: Pennsylvania Water & Power Company, 1934).  Annual reports obtained as part of 
Pennsylvania Water & Power Company records at the Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, DE.  
Annual reports will hereafter be cited by their year. 
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accomplishment of the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company.  While the 
construction of the dam was a remarkable engineering feat, approximately 400,000 cubic 
yards of concrete funneling a major river through hydroelectric turbines did not guarantee 
financial success.  In fact, as the McCall Ferry Power Company discovered, finding 
customers was a major challenge.  It was in this capacity that Aldred’s experience with 
hydro-electricity and financial resources proved pivotal. 
 At first glance, it seems surprising that it would be difficult to sell electricity.  If 
power could be produced at a competitive cost, it would seem to follow that it would find 
an immediate market.  However, several factors, including the monopoly power of utility 
companies, sunk costs, questions over supply of peak versus base power, and the variable 
flows of the river made it significantly more difficult for a hydroelectric company to 
profit from its investments.  Simply put, in 1910, as today, there was no free market for 
electricity.    
 First, the company had to navigate the monopoly privileges of utility companies.  
By 1910, almost all consumers in the mid-Atlantic region who had access to electricity 
were supplied by a utility that had exclusive rights to distribute current within a specified 
geographic area.
41
  This meant that any other company, including the Pennsylvania Water 
& Power Company, was legally barred from selling electricity directly to consumers in 
these areas.  The company’s only practical option was to act as a wholesaler of power 
selling its current to utilities who would then distribute the electricity to consumers.  
                                                
41
 In the area surrounding the dam, the major cities were all served by a utility company with exclusive 
franchise rights for distributing electricity, including the Philadelphia Electric Company in Philadelphia, 
the Consolidated Gas Electric Light & Power Company in Baltimore, the Harrisburg Light & Power 
Company in Harrisburg, the Edison Electric Company in Lancaster, the Edison Company in York, and the 
Metropolitan Edison Company in Reading.   
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Therefore, the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company’s possible customer base was 
not the tens of thousands of electricity users in the mid-Atlantic, but the handful of utility 
companies in the surrounding region.    
 While these utilities were interested in obtaining cheap electricity, they had their 
own sets of considerations that made procuring large blocks of hydroelectric power less 
desirable.  Most importantly, these companies had sunk large amounts of capital into 
coal-fired steam plants to supply the needs of their customers.  Due to the interest 
payments the utilities had to make on the borrowed capital, their profitability depended 
on using these investments at full capacity.  This meant that a utility in 1910 that already 
had enough generating capacity to meet the needs of its customers would have little 
incentive to purchase additional hydroelectric power.  At most, a utility would only have 
the financial incentive to take a few thousand kilowatts of power to support the growth of 
new industries.  From the perspective of the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company, 
such contracts would not tap the full capacity of the dam or provide a sufficient return on 
its investment.   
 Second, utilities distinguished between the supply of base power and peak power.  
Base power was the general draw on the system that was used almost all of the time.  
Peak power represented the shorter periods of high use when electricity demand 
increased.  For example, around five in the afternoon was the peak time for many utilities 
because factory machinery was still operating, lights were being turned on, and 
commuters were riding electrified streetcars.  Utilities had to have sufficient capacity to 
provide for peak power, which meant that for most of the day, a large portion of their 
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generating capacity went unused.
42
  As a result, most utility companies had the 
financial incentive to supply their base loads with their own generating equipment and 
purchase supplementary peak power from a hydroelectric facility.  However, such an 
arrangement was not desirable for the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company because it 
would only be selling a few hours of power a day.   
 To use its dam to its full capacity, the company had to sell base power to utilities.  
However, this was further complicated by the inconsistent flows of the Susquehanna 
River.  The water levels varied significantly from season to season (spring usually saw 
the heaviest flows and summer the lightest), meaning that the actual output of the 
Holtwood powerhouse would vary depending on the season.  Because the electricity 
could not be stored and base load power always had to be provided, the company could 
only contract for the minimum levels of output the dam would generate, not the average.  
This meant that most of the power generated by the dam, particularly the surplus energy 
in the spring, could not be included as part of base-power contracts.   
 Taken together, these considerations show that there were significant gaps 
between what utilities and the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company wanted in a 
contract.  A utility desired supplementary peak power that would allow it to use its 
existing equipment at full capacity.  If base power was to be supplied, the utility needed a 
guarantee that there would be sufficient power, even at times of low river flow.  By 
contrast, the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company wanted to supply base load power, 
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but was limited in the possible contracts it could make by the minimum level of river 
flow, not the maximum or even the average.      
 The point of this lengthy discussion of utility operations is to highlight the 
significance of Aldred’s purchase of a controlling stake in Consolidated of Baltimore 
around the same time he took control of the McCall Ferry project.  By purchasing control 
of Consolidated, Aldred could operate both Consolidated and the hydroelectric dam as a 
single entity.  This was critical to the eventual success of the Pennsylvania Water & 
Power Company.  On August 29, 1910, the two companies signed their first ten-year 
power contract.
43
  Under the terms of the contract, Consolidated would absorb the bulk of 
the output of the Holtwood dam and supply the company with steam generated electricity 
to sell to other utilities at times of low river flow.  This plan benefited both parties, but it 
was far more essential to the success of the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company.  It 
gave the company the opportunity to supply large amounts of base power to the biggest 
local market.
44
  The contract also meant that Consolidated suddenly had significant 
amounts of surplus steam power.  This capacity could be put on hold during times of high 
river flow when Holtwood would supply large amounts of power and then be put into 
operation when the river flow was low.  Being connected to Consolidated’s steam power 
meant that the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company could then make contracts with 
other utilities for a greater supply of base load than would have been possible if it was 
solely dependent on the river to supply power.  In the short term, this arrangement was 
not to the great advantage of Consolidated, since it did not maximize the use of their 
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invested capital, but in the long term, it provided an outlet for Baltimore steam-
generated electricity in other locations.  Consolidated also gained by getting a low rate on 
the electricity delivered from the dam.   
 While there were reciprocal benefits to this contract, they would take several 
years of cooperative action to be realized.  Without an interlocking directorate and shared 
management, it is difficult to imagine the companies agreeing to such a complex 
interaction.  For example, the chief engineer of Consolidated, H. A. Wagner, opposed the 
contract because he thought the variable flows of the Susquehanna were less reliable than 
steam plants.
45
  This is why Aldred spoke of the necessity of purchasing a controlling 
stake in Consolidated at the same time he took control of Pennsylvania Water & Power:   
“One of the important elements necessary to make a success of this 
undertaking was the disposal of the power.  After extended negotiations, 
contracts were made with the Consolidated Gas Electric Light and Power 
Company and The United Railways and Electric Company of Baltimore.  
In order to make possible the first and most important of these contracts, it 
was necessary for me to purchase control of the Consolidated Gas Electric 
Light and Power Company of Baltimore, which involved raising several 
million dollars.”
46
 
 
By the spring of 1910, Aldred was elected President of both Consolidated and the 
Pennsylvania Water & Power Company, greatly facilitating the signing of a complex 
power-sharing agreement.  Moreover, several of his syndicate, including Wood, Holt, and 
Charles Clarke, were elected to both boards.
47
  As he stated to the dam company’s Board 
of Directors, the purchase of control assured “close and harmonious relations.”
48
  This 
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comprehensive power selling and sharing agreement was the most important step in 
the eventual financial success of the hydroelectric dam.   
The Pennsylvania Water & Power Company also made a contract with The 
United Railways and Electric Company (United Railways) of Baltimore, the city’s 
electric streetcar company.  Negotiations began as early as July of 1910, but were not 
completed until 1911.
49
  By 1912, United Railways had over 400 miles of track and 800 
cars in its system, operating all the streetcars within 17 miles of Baltimore.  The contract 
was signed on February 11, 1911 and reportedly called for an initial supply of 16,000 hp 
(electricity sales used both horsepower and kilowatts as units of measurement.  1 kw is 
approximately 1.33 hp).
50
  This contract also included a power-sharing clause whereby 
the new steam generating stations of United Railways would be available to the 
Pennsylvania Water & Power Company at times of low river flow.
51
  
 The difference between owning a controlling stake in the companies and 
operating as independent entities can be seen from a comparison of the contracts the 
Pennsylvania Water & Power Company and McCall’s Ferry Power Company made with 
the Baltimore companies.  The McCall’s Ferry Power Company had signed contracts 
with Consolidated and United Railways as early as 1907, but these contracts were for 
small amounts of power.  While exact details are not known, newspaper articles reported 
that the total was around 10,000 kw for Consolidated and 4,000 kw for United Railways.  
The contracts Pennsylvania Water & Power made allowed a much greater percentage of 
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the dam’s output to be sent to Baltimore, starting with 25,000 kw and allowing for 
increases of up to 100,000 kw.
52
  This difference between supplying small amounts of 
power versus a large percentage of the base load was a significant factor in the financial 
success of the latter organization.   
 The integration of the Holtwood Dam into a network with the coal-fired 
electricity plants of Consolidated and United Railways marked a further departure from 
the organic economy.  The variable flows of the river could not supply the consistent and 
ever-increasing power needed by the region’s electrical consumers.  By supplementing 
the river’s flows with fossil fuel energy, the Holtwood dam became part of an electrical 
network characteristic of the mineral economy.  
Lancaster was the third major customer for Holtwood’s power.  Lancaster was 
interested in receiving hydroelectricity early on because the local utility, the Edison 
Electric Company, had generating plants that were not in good operating condition.  As 
early as 1910, the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company reported in its annual report 
that a contract had been agreed to supply Lancaster with power and only needed formal 
confirmation.
53
  Apparently this formal confirmation never happened.  By June 16, 1911, 
the Board of Directors authorized Aldred to suspend negotiations with Edison Electric 
due to a failure to reach an agreement.
54
  By June of the following year, the Board of 
Directors approved resuming negotiations and a contract was signed on October 9, 
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1912.
55
  In its 1912 Annual Report, the company announced that a ten-year contract 
had been signed and would go into effect on May 1, 1913.  Pennsylvania Water & Power 
would supply practically all the power needs of Edison Electric using both 
hydroelectricity and steam power from Consolidated during times of low river flow.
56
  
Once again, it is important to note that signing a contract for all of Lancaster’s power 
needs was dependent upon the initial contract with Consolidated that gave the dam 
company access to steam power at times of low river flow.  The Edison Electric 
Company took responsibility for building the twenty-mile transmission line from 
Lancaster to Holtwood.  This contract was the first step towards the development of a 
regional power network that went beyond supplying Baltimore.    
 Even with these three contracts signed, the nature of the Susquehanna River and 
the variable demands of electric utilities for power meant that Pennsylvania Water & 
Power still had excess capacity, particularly during times of high river flow and at non-
peak load times.  To utilize this power, the company decided to create an electro-
chemical plant that could be supplied with this cheap power when demand from other 
consumers was low.  Aldred had already tried this strategy successfully with his 
Canadian hydro-development project.  In 1915, Pennsylvania Water & Power formed the 
Shawinigan Electro-Products Company to manufacture ferro-silicon, a raw material 
important in steel manufacture.  With an initial installation of a 10,000 hp furnace, the 
company noted that the plant would generated $150,000 in earnings from electric usage 
alone.  The dividends from sales of ferro-silicon would go to company stockholders as 
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well.
57
  At first, this was a very successful venture, especially as ferro-silicon was 
important for the war effort.  The plant’s capacity was expanded to 30,000 hp in 1917, 
when the company reported that it would use 100,000,000 kwh that would have 
otherwise gone unused.
58
  With the end of the war, there was a glut of ferro-silicon on the 
market and the total output decreased significantly.  By 1919, the plant was barely in 
operation.
59
  Although the company continued to exist for several years, its relative 
importance seems to have diminished as it ceased to be mentioned in Annual Reports or 
Corporate Minutes.   
 It is also important to note where power did not go.  There were several other sites 
of significant electricity consumption within a hundred miles of the dam for which 
contracts could not be negotiated, including Philadelphia, Wilmington, Harrisburg, and 
Reading.  The fact that arrangements could not be made to sell excess power to these 
sites demonstrates that simply having the capacity to produce electricity did not mean it 
would get used or paid for.  The network of customers created by Aldred was not simply 
the set of largest and nearest utilities.  The energy landscape of the Susquehanna River 
was determined by financial interrelationships and prior technological investments, not 
geographical proximity.   
 
Transmitting Energy 
 Customer contracts were necessary to the financial success of a hydroelectric 
enterprise, but only if the power could be transported many miles from the dam cheaply 
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and reliably.  Without wires connecting Holtwood with its customers, the output of 
the dam would have been trapped at the site of production.  The transmission wire 
network of the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company made it possible for the power of 
the river to support the extension of an urban and industrial society many miles away.  By 
studying these wires, we get a better sense of how the system as a whole worked.    
 When Pennsylvania Water & Power turned its attention to transmitting power to 
Baltimore at the beginning of 1910, it planned to create the longest high-voltage line on 
the eastern seaboard.  Fortunately, it could draw on earlier precedents and engineering 
knowledge that made the project more feasible.  At this time, California led the nation in 
the development of high-voltage transmission wires.  Hydroelectric resources in the 
Sierra Nevada Mountains were aggressively pursued as a way to provide power to 
growing cities such as San Francisco and Los Angeles.  For example, as early as 1901 the 
Bay Counties Power Company had constructed a 140-mile transmission line from the 
Sierra Nevada mountains to Oakland.
60
  In addition to knowledge from other parts of the 
nation, several of the engineers Aldred brought to Holtwood including J. A. Walls had 
prior experience operating transmission wires from Shawinigan Falls to Montreal.   
 As soon as Aldred acquired control of both the Holtwood Dam and Consolidated 
in 1909, it was a foregone conclusion that power would be sent to Baltimore.  Company 
engineers soon began to acquire many of the necessary rights-of-way for the transmission 
line.
61
  The company desired to have a one hundred-foot wide right of way for the forty-
mile route to Baltimore.  The relatively wide strip of land would allow the company to 
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build several transmission lines along the right of way and to keep trees away, 
thereby mitigating the risk that they would fall on the line and interrupt service. 
 Obtaining rights-of-way was not a simple process.  Utility companies, despite the 
efforts of the McCall Ferry Power Company and Aldred, did not have general eminent 
domain privileges.
62
  Moreover, the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company’s charter did 
not grant it privileges to operate over a large geographic area.  Therefore, the 
management team created three subsidiary companies to build the transmission lines: the 
Pennsylvania Transmission Company in York County, PA; the Susquehanna 
Transmission Company in Baltimore County, MD; and the Susquehanna Pole Line 
Company in Harford County, MD.    
 For most practical purposes, the fact that these were separate companies was just 
a legal matter that did not influence actual operations.  However, there was one notable 
exception.  The Susquehanna Pole Line Company in Harford County, MD had a special 
corporate charter that gave it eminent domain privileges.
63
  This right allowed the 
Susquehanna Pole Line Company to force owners to sell them rights-of-way across 
private lands at court-ordered prices.  This quickly drew the ire of landowners who either 
opposed the presence of high-voltage transmission wires across their property or wanted 
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to receive higher levels of compensation.  However, the courts upheld the 
transmission company’s rights.
64
  By contrast, in York and Baltimore counties, the 
subsidiary companies had to pay higher rates to landowners for the right-of-way.  In all 
the counties, the companies needed to apply to the County Commissioners for permission 
to cross public highways.
65
   
 Despite these subtle differences between the subsidiary companies, they were all 
under the direction of the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company.  By the summer of 
1910, the company had acquired the rights-of-way in York and Harford counties, but was 
having difficulty getting the remaining rights in Baltimore County.
66
  Finally, by the end 
of August, it was reported that the final property rights had been attained.
67
 
 At the same time the company was working to acquire the line, it also made its 
decisions on materials.  As was common on long-distance transmission wires, the 
company opted for steel towers instead of wooden poles.  Steel towers were more reliable 
and could support heavier cables, thereby justifying the additional construction expenses.  
This was especially important as it was common for alternating current to be separated 
into three phases, each of which was shipped over its own wire.  A circuit consisted of 
the three wires put together, and a transmission wire usually referred to one or two 
circuits.  The company contracted with the Milliken Company to design steel towers 
capable of supporting two circuits or a total of six wires.  Second, the company chose to 
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use aluminum wires wrapped around a steel core.  Copper was the most common 
material for transmission wires at the time due to its high levels of conductivity.
68
  
However, aluminum was lighter than copper, had a higher melting point which was 
beneficial at high voltages, and only cost slightly more per pound.
69
  Because aluminum 
was lighter, each wire could hold 19 strands, thereby giving the circuits a normal capacity 
of 16,000 kw and a maximum capacity of 40,000 kw.   
 Finally, the company had to decide on the line’s operating voltage.  Higher 
voltages were more desirable because they resulted in lower energy losses during 
transmission.  For example, the energy loss over forty miles on a 66,000-volt line was 
estimated to be 1/40
th
 the loss on an 11,000-volt line.
70
  On the other hand, increasing the 
voltage of the electricity required transforming the electricity (“stepping it up” at the 
generating station and “stepping it down” at the receiving station).  Some electricity was 
lost as the voltage was increased or decreased, and a company also had to invest in 
machinery to perform these tasks.  Higher voltage electricity was also more difficult to 
manage and needed more insulators along the transmission route.  Therefore, company 
engineers had to find the right balance between energy losses in transmission and the 
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financial costs of stepping the energy up and down.  They ultimately decided to 
operate the line at 70,000 volts.   
 With these decisions complete, workers began actual construction of the line.  The 
first step was to build the steel towers, each of which was fifty to a hundred feet high and 
about five hundred feet apart.  By the summer, several hundred men were at work.  
Construction teams were generally composed of a foreman, linemen, and grunts.  
Linemen were skilled workers who climbed the towers as they were being built and 
connected the steel beams.  Grunts were responsible for hauling the materials and 
hoisting the beams to the linemen.  The men lived in tents along the path of the wire and 
moved camp as they made progress.
71
 
The labor of building a transmission line was not easy.  The erection of steel 
towers was physically demanding under the best conditions.  The steel bars for the towers 
needed to be hoisted into place using ropes and pulleys.  To provide foundations for the 
towers, the men drilled holes in rocks and poured concrete foundations.  Under good 
conditions, a team could erect a tower in a day or two.  However, if the land was uneven 
or the ground was marshy, it could take up to a week for a single tower.  The supplies had 
to be hauled to the area by men and animals since most of the path ran through rural 
fields.  There was also danger: a worker could fall off a tower, be struck by a tool 
dropped by a lineman, or be injured dynamiting ground rock to create a base for the 
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tower.  One of the workmen, a man named Evans Vickers from Delta, PA, died when 
a dynamite stick exploded as he approached a tower base.
72
   
As the company was overseeing construction of the steel towers, it also built 
transformer stations at the beginning and end of the line.  The wires began at a substation 
on the island between the York and Lancaster side of the river.  Here the electricity was 
stepped up from 11,000 volts to 70,000 volts.  The company bought a piece of property 
from Consolidated on the outskirts of Baltimore and built a second transformer station 
(Highlandtown) that reduced the voltage of the line to 11,000 volts.
73
  From this 
substation, Consolidated shipped the electricity to its other substations and further 
reduced the voltage as it was distributed to end customers.   
By the end of July, the steel towers had been erected in York County and the 
northern section of Harford County.
74
  The remaining towers were built over the next two 
months.  The final step was to string the wires.  First the men installed a grounding wire 
along the top of the steel towers for lightning protection.  For the installation of two 
circuits, a small group of men traveled the length of the line, uncoiling the six aluminum 
wires and connecting them to the steel towers.  Each wire was separated from the steel 
tower by three feet of porcelain insulators.  
By October, the line was complete and the company was ready to begin service.  
On October 14
th
, Mayor Mahool of Baltimore touched a knob in the powerhouse at the 
dam and electricity began coursing through the line.  It was reported that lights were 
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burning in the Baltimore substation before the spectators were able to begin 
applauding.
75
  The flowing water of the Susquehanna could now power lights, run 
streetcars, and operate machinery several miles away.   
 Although the construction of the Holtwood Dam drew the most comment from 
contemporary observers, the creation of a transmission line network was as critical to the 
ultimate success of the venture.  The fact that the transmission wires allowed the energy 
to travel instantaneously to Baltimore’s homes and factories with only small losses meant 
that the energy of the Susquehanna River was no longer restricted to the riverbed.  As had 
happened with coal canals and oil pipelines, transport infrastructure enabled a geographic 
separation between the sites of energy production and consumption.  A new energy 
landscape had been created.   
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Image 5.2: Transmission Wire to Baltimore, Showing 2 Circuits
76
 
 
 
Putting the System to Work  
 With the creation of the dam, powerhouse, transmission lines, and customer 
contracts, the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company was ready to turn the estimated 
thirteen million dollar investment into a productive enterprise.
77
  The company soon 
began to ship large amounts of electricity to its customers.  By 1916, the company 
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produced 420,000,000 kwh, which was over 14 percent of the electricity generated by 
utilities in Pennsylvania and 3 percent of the hydroelectric power produced nationally.
78
  
The company was able to supply the entire needs of the city of Lancaster, a majority of 
the power in Baltimore, and had enough left over to operate a ferro-silicon factory.    
 Baltimore was the first and primary market for the company’s hydroelectricity.  
Consolidated absorbed the lion’s share of the Holtwood dam’s output, which provided 
more than half of Baltimore’s electric supply for the period.  During the 1910s, 
hydroelectricity made up nearly two-thirds of Consolidated’s energy, and just under half 
in the following decade (see Table 5.1).  In addition, the company sent a considerable 
amount of electricity to Baltimore that United Railways used for its streetcar service.   
 
Table 5.1: Consolidated Steam versus Hydro Electricity, 1910-1929
79
 
 Electric output  Steam generation Hydro power 
purchased  
% of total output 
from hydro 
1910-1914 524,698,746 137,477,583 387,491,163 73.81 
1915-1919 1,588,413,815 611,918,635 976,495,180 61.48 
1920-1924 2,739,137,068 1,441,974,768 1,297,162,300 47.36 
1925-1929 4,044,206,887 2,240,636,305 1,803,570,582 44.60 
 
 The delivery of electricity from the Susquehanna River to Baltimore coincided 
with, and no doubt contributed to, a period of major industrial growth for the city.  Ever 
since a fire had destroyed much of Baltimore’s downtown in 1904, its citizens and 
boosters had felt the city’s industrial growth was not keeping pace with other urban 
centers.  Because he believed that a healthy Baltimore economy would be profitable to 
both Consolidated and Pennsylvania Water & Power, Aldred spearheaded an industrial 
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survey of the city in 1914 that sought to identify opportunities for growth.  The 
opening of the report noted that not all was well: “The one clear and emphatic impression 
left upon our minds by the data hereinafter presented is that the industrial growth of 
Baltimore has been less pronounced than it should have been, having in mind the general 
economic progress of the country and the forward strides of other cities no more 
favorably circumstanced.”
80
  Given Baltimore’s advantages in location and access to 
natural resources, the report noted that much better progress could be achieved if 
businessmen actively supported new enterprises.  The survey inspired Baltimore 
businessmen to create The Industrial Corporation, an agency designed to provide capital 
and support to new business enterprises.
81
   
 The efforts of the new organization, along with cheap power from the 
Susquehanna, contributed to an industrial resurgence over the next couple decades.  
When Consolidated sponsored a new industrial survey twenty-five years later, the report 
noted: “The progress of the City during this period has been northing short of remarkable, 
its industrial growth far surpassing that of competing cities on the Atlantic Seaboard and 
its rank among the industrial centers of the United States, based on value of 
manufactures, advancing from eleventh to seventh.”
82
  Baltimore’s industrial output grew 
from just under 300 million dollars to more than 925 million dollars from 1914 to 1937.  
Moreover, its industrial output had actually grown despite the Depression conditions 
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whereas other seaboard cities such as New York, Philadelphia, and Boston had 
experienced declines.
83
   
Consolidated played an important role in stimulating this growth, serving more 
than 3,300 industrial customers with over 425,000 hp of installed motors by 1924.  153 
companies in the metal industry had installed 130,773 hp of electrical capacity, 29 
railroad and railway companies used 45,771 hp, 17 fertilizer companies used 21,652 hp, 
and 18 shipbuilding companies used 18,348 hp.  Other industries using significant 
quantities of electricity included textiles, ice and refrigeration, stone and concrete, 
woodworking, paper, office buildings, butchers, bakers, glass, and electrical equipment.
84
  
By 1931, Baltimore’s residential customers used nearly 20 percent more electricity and 
paid 3 percent less than the average residential customer for the nation as a whole.
85
  
Baltimore homeowners used more electricity than Philadelphians as well, consuming on 
average 585 kwh versus 499 kwh in 1929.
86
  
Lancaster also benefited from access to power from the Susquehanna.  Beginning 
in 1913, the Holtwood dam provided nearly all the power distributed by the Edison 
Electric Company.  The demand in that year was just under 25,000,000 kwh.  By 1936, 
the demand for electricity exceeded 166,000,000 million kwh, an increase of 650 percent 
in just over twenty years.  Once known for its rich agricultural heartland, Lancaster also 
developed into an important industrial center using electricity in industries including 
machine shops, fertilizer, bakeries, textiles, ice, glass, cork, dairies, linoleum, and 
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hardware.
87
  As was characteristic of the mineral economy, this industrial growth 
occurred without requiring the region to decrease its agricultural output—more and more 
was possible.  
 The final outlet for power was the Shawinigan Electro Products Company.  The 
factory was built in 1915 with one 10,000 hp electric furnace capable of producing 30 
tons of ferro-silicon a day, or about 10,000 tons per year.  The next year, the company 
tripled the plant’s capacity to 30,000 hp, due to the high demand for steel during the First 
World War.  The electrical consumption of the plant was remarkable—about 55,000,000 
kwh in 1916, nearly 100,000,000 in 1917, and 60,000,000 in 1918.
88
  To put this 
consumption into context, a single factory used more electricity than the entire load of 
Lancaster and nearly a third of Baltimore, one of the nation’s largest cities.  Given the 
huge electricity inputs to the creation of materials such as ferro-silicon or aluminum, it is 
clear that the production of these materials was only possible within the context of energy 
superabundance.    
 As Pennsylvania Water & Power increased its supply of electricity to its various 
markets, it had to expand both its production facilities and its transmission wire network.  
For example, the company added new generators to the hydroelectric plant.  When the 
powerhouse was completed in 1910, it was designed for a total capacity of ten generators, 
but the company had only installed the hardware for the first five units by 1911.  This 
was a pragmatic financial move, since each generator cost a significant amount of money 
to install and it was not worth incurring the interest charges until it was clear that the 
power could be sold.  As it turned out, the company also benefited when improvements in 
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generator capacity allowed them to install more efficient turbines.  The initial 
capacity of each generator installed in 1910 was 7,500 kw.  By 1911, the capacity of each 
generator had been increased to 10,000 kw, and the sixth unit in 1912 was rated at 12,000 
kw.
89
  The seventh unit was installed in 1913, the eighth in 1914, and units nine and ten 
in 1924.   
 In 1924, the company decided to supplement its hydroelectricity with a steam 
power plant that could be used during times of low river flow.  For fuel, the company 
decided to take advantage of an unintended consequence of its dam construction.  Since 
being built, the lake that formed behind the dam had operated as a settling basin for 
anthracite coal dust from the collieries upstream.  By dredging the mixture of sand and 
coal from the lake bottom and separating it into low-grade coal, the company found a 
cheap and available fuel for its steam plant.  By summer of 1925, the company had an 
additional 30,000 hp of steam capacity supplementing the flow of the river.
90
  A river 
survey conducted by the company in 1931 estimated that there were more than ten 
million tons of recoverable anthracite coal in the lake bed, enough to power the plant for 
several decades.
91
 
 As with other examples of transport infrastructure, the company’s transmission 
network required maintenance and expansion over time.  From the beginning the 
company employed a number of men to patrol the transmission line to ensure it remained 
in working order.  In addition, as Baltimore increased its electricity demand, the 
transmission losses on the initial two circuits began to increase.  Therefore, the company 
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added another steel tower capable of handling two more circuits along its right of way 
in 1914.  One circuit of wires was added in 1914 and the other in 1917.  The company 
also expanded the Highlandtown substation to be able to handle the additional flow of 
electrons, increasing the station’s capacity to 94,000 hp of electricity.  The company 
noted that the efforts would cost around $400,000 but pay for itself very quickly in 
decreased line losses.
92
   Within a year, the new wires had already reduced transmission 
losses by 2.5 percent.
93
    
 The company also worked to make the lines more reliable.  Lightning was the 
biggest source of disruptions.  In the line to Baltimore’s first full year of operation, there 
were 23 interruptions due to lightning strikes.  Between 1911 and 1917, lightning caused 
an average of 5.8 outages per year.
94
  One way of mitigating the effect of lightning was to 
run two wires at the top of the steel tower that were designed to catch the lightning and 
run it to the ground.  In addition, the company installed Nicholson’s fuse lightning 
protection apparatus.  The device automatically removed the voltage from the 
transmission line when a lightning flash was detected and immediately restored service 
afterwards.
95
   
Aldred also sought new markets for the company.  In the early 1920s, there were 
several discussions about the possible development of an integrated power system 
connecting the utilities of the eastern seaboard.  The first was the Superpower system 
proposed by William S. Murray, who envisioned a series of long transmission wires 
linking large generating stations between Washington D.C. and Boston thereby creating 
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an integrated network on the eastern seaboard.
96
  Pennsylvania Water & Power was a 
strong early proponent of this system, largely because it offered the company more 
outlets for peak hydroelectric power that currently went unsold.  The more the company 
was integrated into regional transmission grids, the more power it could sell.  By 1921, 
the company was providing information to the Superpower survey and by the following 
year was proclaiming Holtwood to be ideally located for such a system in its promotional 
literature.
97
  Although a government initiated Superpower system never came to fruition, 
Pennsylvania Water & Power was supportive of the move towards regional integration of 
power distribution.    
 While supporting the Superpower proposal, the company took matters into its 
own hands and expanded its network by signing new contracts in 1923 with the Edison 
Light & Power Company in York, PA and the Chester Valley Electric Company in 
Coatesville, PA.  To supply these customers with electriicty, the company built 70,000-
volt transmission lines to each of the cities that could later be expanded to 110,000 volts 
if integrated into a wider network.  While neither of these contracts called for power 
deliveries comparable to the arrangements with Baltimore or Lancaster, they provided the 
company with a wider power market and an expanded network.  The company saw this as 
an advantageous strategy since it positioned them to be a more central player in any 
Superpower network.  The transmission line to Coatesville was also strategic.  It ran on a 
path directly from the dam towards Philadelphia, making a future interconnection with 
the Philadelphia Electric Company easier to implement.   
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 Finally, in 1930, the company began construction of a new hydroelectric dam 
eight miles north of Holtwood at Safe Harbor.  Company engineers had been considering 
a second dam since at least the 1910s, and by the end of the 1920s believed there was 
sufficient demand to justify the construction of a 255,000 kw dam, more than twice the 
capacity of Holtwood.  Pennsylvania Water & Power and Consolidated jointly financed 
the project and ground was broken in April of 1930.  Due to a fortuitous combination of 
cheap labor due to the start of the Great Depression and a year of low river flow, the dam 
was completed ahead of schedule by December of 1931.  Most of the power was 
absorbed by Consolidated while the Pennsylvania Railroad, which was in the process of 
electrifying its railroad lines between Washington, DC and New York, consumed much 
of the rest of the output.
98
   
 The companies constructed a series of new transmission wires to distribute the 
output.  These included a 70-mile set of 220,000-volt wires to the Westport substation on 
Baltimore’s west side built in 1931, a 32-mile 132,000-volt transmission wire from Safe 
Harbor to Perryville, MD (near Havre de Grace) to supply the Pennsylvania Railroad, and 
a 70,000-volt line connecting the Safe Harbor and Holtwood dams.  In addition, 
Consolidated built a 60-mile 220,000-volt line from Baltimore to Washington D.C. to 
provide an interchange with the Potomac Electric Power Company.
99
   
 The expansion of its system led to financial rewards.  The company began paying 
dividends in 1914 at a rate of 1 percent quarterly and increased this rate to 1.75 percent 
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by 1921.
100
  In May of 1927, the company decided to eliminate the par value of its 
stock (which had previously been $100) and issue four shares for every previous share.
101
  
The dividends had been paying at 2 percent quarterly prior to the split, and in 1930, the 
new dividend rate was $3 per share (comparable to 3 percent quarterly under the old 
share).  By 1931, the price of a share was selling on the New York Exchange at around 
$63 in 1931, giving original stockholders a tidy profit.
102
  By 1936, in the midst of the 
Great Depression, the dividend rate was increased to $4 per share and it would reach $5 
per share in 1939.
103
  
 Two things are notable about the supply of electricity shipped from the 
Susquehanna to these locations.  The first is that the transmission wires enabled the 
building up of energy-intensive enterprises at locations far away from the site of energy 
generation.  Instead of moving people and industries to the Susquehanna River, the 
transmission wires made it easy to move the power of the Susquehanna River to cities.  
Second, once each location got access to cheap and abundant electricity, it triggered a 
pattern of steady growth.  Lancaster, a mid-sized city, was using more power in 1923 
than Consolidated supplied to Baltimore just eleven years before.
104
  Consolidated’s 
output grew at a similar rate, from just over 125 million kwh in 1914 to 1,300 million 
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kwh in 1938.
105
  Once businesses, shopkeepers, and homeowners were able to acquire 
cheap electricity, they increased their consumption exponentially.    
 
Map 5.2: The Pennsylvania Water & Power Company Transmission Wire Network, 
1933
106
 
 
 
                                                
105
 Industrial survey of Baltimore and Consolidated Gas Electric Light and Power Company of Baltimore, 
Second Industrial Survey of Baltimore. A Quarter Century of Progress in the City of Industrial Advantages, 
1914-1939, 17. 
106
 Image courtesy of Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, DE. Pennsylvania Water & Power 
Company, 1933 Annual Report.   
 304 
Power Grids in the Mid-Atlantic, 1900-1930 
 
When the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company constructed its transmission 
wires from the Holtwood Dam to Baltimore in 1910, they fit the pattern of electricity 
transport in the mid-Atlantic and nation as a whole.  At this date, long-distance 
transmission wires were used almost exclusively to link hydroelectric dams with urban 
markets.  For example, transmission wires connected hydroelectric dams at Niagara Falls, 
the Adirondack Mountains, and the Delaware River with the region’s cities.  Unlike the 
organic economy, where people and industries moved to sites of water power, 
transmission wires enabled hydroelectricity to be diverted to urban industries.   
A survey of the electricity transmission wires built in the mid-Atlantic before 
1910 demonstrates the direct connections between hydroelectric power and long-distance 
transmission.  According to a comprehensive survey undertaken by the trade journal 
Electrical World, there were 24 transmission wires operating in New York and 
Pennsylvania at 44,000 volts or above.  Over two-thirds of these were located in western 
New York around the Niagara Falls power developments.  Three took hydroelectric 
power from the Adirondack Mountains to Utica and its suburbs.  Four more wires were 
built in central Pennsylvania from a small hydroelectric station at Warrior Ridge.
107
  
Thus, all the long-distance wires built during this decade in the mid-Atlantic were 
affiliated with hydroelectric developments.  The mid-Atlantic was not unique in this 
regard.  A survey in 1914 documented 55 transmission wires operating at or above 
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70,000 volts across the world (including the lines between the Holtwood Dam and 
Baltimore).  All but six were connected to hydroelectric plants.
108
 
Most of the nation’s electricity did not come from water power, however.  Steam-
fired turbines burning coal produced most of the electricity.  For example, in 1912, 73 
percent of the nation’s capacity at central power stations was powered by steam and 27 
percent was powered by water.  The mid-Atlantic relied even more heavily on steam—at 
a ratio of approximately 79 percent steam to 21 percent hydroelectric.
109
  The use of coal-
fired steam power in the mid-Atlantic was largely a product of earlier energy landscapes.  
Coal canals, which were later eclipsed by railroads, made anthracite and bituminous coal 
cheap, abundant, and reliable in the mid-Atlantic thereby giving steam-generated 
electricity a cost-advantage in the region.  The transport of steam-generated electricity, 
therefore, had a different logic.  Coal was shipped hundreds of miles by railroads to urban 
generating stations, burned to produce electricity, and then transported short distances to 
consumers.       
Between 1910 and 1930, the use of long-distance transmission wires in the mid-
Atlantic became much more common and was no longer exclusively linked to 
hydroelectric dams.  Three trends were particularly important for stimulating these 
developments.  The first factor was the increasing separation between site of production 
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and site of consumption.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, many industrial 
enterprises generated their own power, meaning that electricity did not even need to 
travel beyond the walls of the factory.
110
  Throughout the nineteenth century, industries 
had been accustomed to supplying their energy needs, whether by installing a water 
wheel or operating a steam engine.  When a company chose to replace their existing 
power source with electricity, they typically purchased their own dynamos and operated 
them internally.   By the 1910s and 1920s, most factory operators decided it was cheaper 
and more efficient to purchase electricity from centralized utility stations.
111
  This 
transition increased the amount of electricity that needed to be transmitted, at the very 
least from the central station to the factory.   
The gradual expansion of the area served by utility companies also drove the 
expansion of the transmission wire network.  In 1910, Consolidated of Baltimore served 
an area of 88 square miles with 16,605 customers.  By 1925 they had expanded to serve 
158,608 customers over a 600 square mile area.
112
  Public Service Electric & Gas, which 
controlled the large majority of electric supply in New Jersey, had only 47 miles of 
transmission wires in 1903.  By 1913, the company created a more integrated network by 
building 576 miles of transmission wires, mostly operating at 6,600 and 13,200 volts.
113
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The expansion of utility networks both geographically and in terms of increased 
numbers of consumers required steady additions to the transmission systems.  
However, the creation of regional utility conglomerates was the most important 
reason for the expansion of long-distance transmission wires.  Between 1900 and 1930, 
and most acutely between 1915 and 1925, the majority of electric utility companies in the 
mid-Atlantic were consolidated into regional monopolies owned by large holding 
companies.  For example, in 1924, over 70 percent of privately-owned electric generating 
capacity was under the control of holding companies.
114
  The mid-Atlantic was no 
exception—in 1922, it was estimated that 98 percent of Pennsylvania’s power came from 
prime movers owned by holding companies.
115
    
There is a subtle distinction between holding companies and regional 
conglomerates.  Holding companies were financial schemes that brought several utilities 
under the overall management of a single organization.  The holding company provided 
several benefits to the individual companies including access to financing, technical 
expertise, and management experience.  Regional conglomerates were collections of 
utilities operating collectively in the same region.  Sometimes holding companies also 
created conglomerates of regional utilities.  For example, the United Gas Improvement 
Company was a holding company that purchased control of the Philadelphia Electric 
Company in 1928.  Because United Gas Improvement Company also controlled the 
Counties Gas & Electric Company, the Philadelphia Suburban Gas & Electric Company 
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as well as sixteen other smaller units operating in the Philadelphia area, it was able to 
bring the entire region under the management of a single organization.  However, holding 
companies did not only acquire utilities in the same region.  For example, United Gas 
Improvement also owned utilities in Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Virginia, and 
Florida.
116
  The desirability of the proliferation of holding companies was a hotly debated 
topic at the time, as will be discussed later in this section, and led to the development of 
alternative political visions for the organization of the electric industry.
117
 
Regional conglomerates were often formed by holding companies, but sometimes 
they emerged independently.  For example, the Aldred companies (Consolidated, 
Pennsylvania Water & Power, and Safe Harbor Water & Power) operated as a regional 
conglomerate, but were not part of a holding company scheme.  The Philadelphia Electric 
Company, while owned by a holding company, was the center of a regional conglomerate 
in the mid-Atlantic.  Regional conglomerates offered an additional benefit beyond 
financial, technical and management assistance: improved performance through system 
interconnection over high-voltage wires.  As regards the creation of transmission wires, 
the important development was the formation of regional conglomerates, a process that 
was connected with, but not identical to, the holding company movement.
118
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Integrating the different systems of a regional conglomerate using 
transmission wires offered at least three technical benefits: improving the reliability of 
service, achieving a better load balance, and consolidating generation at new and more 
efficient stations.  First, interconnection improved reliability because it allowed a utility 
to draw power from other locations if a generator malfunctioned.  This was especially 
important due to the high cost and difficulty of storing electricity.
119
  Therefore, if one 
generator failed or needed repairs, supplementary power could be sent over transmission 
wires.    
Second, transmission wires helped regional conglomerates improve their load 
factor—the ratio of the utility’s overall generating capacity to its average use.
120
  A utility 
had to invest enough capital to handle the peak load (the biggest draw on the system at 
any given time) but was rarely able to utilize its entire capacity for more than a brief 
period of time.  Utility companies sought to improve their load factor by encouraging 
diverse uses of electricity that would consume power at different times of day.  
Combining the loads of several different utilities offered another strategy.  If hypothetical 
utility companies A, B, and C each had a peak load of 25,000 kilowatts, then they would 
need to invest in at least this much generating capacity.  However, if the peak loads of the 
systems occurred at different times, the maximum demand of all three utilities might only 
be 60,000 kw.  By building interconnecting wires and sharing power, the three utilities 
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could save money by avoiding an additional 20 percent investment in generating 
equipment. 
The third opportunity for saving money came from installing large and modern 
generating equipment.  Between 1900 and 1930 the size and efficiency of electricity 
generators increased dramatically.  A 5,000 kw generator in 1905 was considered large, 
as was a 12,000 kw generator in 1912.  By 1929, there were generators with capacities 
exceeding 200,000 kw.
121
  Larger and more modern generators produced more electricity 
using less fuel and at a cheaper cost.  Returning to our hypothetical utilities in the 
previous paragraph, suppose that each anticipated a load growth of 10,000 kw over the 
next five years.  It would be far more cost-efficient to build a single 30,000 kw generating 
station rather than three separate 10,000 kw installations.   
The benefits of interconnection can be seen in the actions of the Metropolitan 
Edison Company in 1923.  The company already controlled utilities in several cities in 
eastern Pennsylvania (Easton, Reading, York) and New Jersey (Dover).  In 1923, the 
company extended its territory into central and southern Pennsylvania by purchasing 
utilities in York Haven, York, and Hanover.  Second, it expanded its network of 
transmission lines by building a 110,00-volt line connecting Reading and Easton.  Third, 
it constructed a 30,000 kw steam plant at Middletown along the Susquehanna River near 
Harrisburg and began work on a 200,000 kw plant along the Delaware River by 
Easton.
122
  Each of these moves (buying up companies, building transmission wires, 
constructing large generating stations) was related, as it only made sense to concentrate 
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production in large plants if one had the transmission wires to move it and the broad 
customer base to balance the load and absorb the full output of a large new generating 
station.  
Of course, regional utility conglomerates had non-technical benefits for utility 
companies as well.  Most importantly, they led to a significant reduction in regional 
competition.  Even though most utility companies operated with monopoly privileges in a 
given geographic area, they were still required to justify their rates to various regulatory 
commissions.  By lowering competition, regional conglomerates could charge higher 
prices and experience less pressure from regulatory agencies.   
By 1930 the various utilities in eastern Pennsylvania had been gathered into a 
small number of regional conglomerates.  These oligopolistic enterprises included 
Metropolitan Edison, Philadelphia Electric Company, Pennsylvania Power & Light 
(which controlled utilities throughout the anthracite region including service in Mauch 
Chunk, the Panther Valley, Mahoney, and Wilkes-Barre), New Jersey Public Service 
Electric & Gas (which controlled most of New Jersey), and the Aldred companies 
(Consolidated, Pennsylvania Water & Power, Safe Harbor Water & Power).   
The economic benefits of integrating networks through load sharing and building 
efficient generating stations could only be achieved with a mechanism for transmitting 
the power between the utilities.  High-voltage long-distance wires filled this need.  
Between 1910 and 1919, 28 new lines were built.  Several of the hydroelectric 
companies, including Pennsylvania Water & Power, Niagara, Lockport, and Ontario 
Power, Utica Gas & Electric, and Adirondack Power & Light extended their transmission 
networks, together building ten additional wires operating at 66,000 volts spanning about 
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280 miles.  This decade also witnessed the first development of transmission wires 
designed for networks of steam plants.  In Pittsburgh, the Duquesne Light & Power 
Company constructed a one hundred mile network of ten 66,000-volt wires between its 
coal-fired plants and the West Penn Electric Company built two additional wires of the 
same voltage with a length of over 60 miles.  The Penn Central Light & Power Company 
extended its network with an additional 100 miles of 45,000-volt wires through five 
separate lines, although it appears that no new hydroelectric stations were involved.
123
   
Between 1920 and 1924, there was a dramatic increase in the pace of transmission 
wire construction that helped create a broader grid of lines in the region.  There had been 
about 1,200 miles of high-voltage transmission lines built between 1900 and 1919 in the 
mid-Atlantic.  In the five years between 1920 and 1924, utilities built an additional 2,200 
miles of transmission wires, including the region’s first 110,000-volt wires.  These wires 
were largely the result of the interconnections between regional utility conglomerates.  
Many of the companies that had built wires in the preceding decades expanded their 
networks by acquiring new utilities and markets.  For example, companies like Niagara, 
Lockport, and Ontario Light & Power, Duquesne Light & Power, and Penn Central Light 
& Power expanded their networks.  In addition, new conglomerates such as Metropolitan 
Edison (seven wires of at least 66,000 volts spanning 200 miles) and Penn Public Service 
Corporation (four wires traveling 225 miles at 110,000 volts) entered the field.  By the 
end of 1924, there were a total of 130 high-voltage transmission wires stretching nearly 
3,500 miles across Pennsylvania and New York.
124
  The region now had a transmission 
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grid network connecting its hydroelectric and steam plants with urban consumption 
centers.   
 
Map 5.2: Map of Transmission Lines 60,000 Volts and Higher, 1925 
 
 
 
The Politics of Integration 
By 1920, it was widely recognized that utility companies could produce electricity 
more cheaply when they combined diverse loads and shared generating capacity via 
transmission networks.  However, there was significant debate about what form this 
“sharing” or “collaboration” would take.  Despite the benefits of lower costs, many 
worried that the emergence of holding companies and consolidation within the industry 
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would lead to monopoly conditions.  Without competition the savings in generation 
costs might go to financiers, not customers.  In addition, anti-monopoly advocates had 
recently had their greatest victory, with the court-ordered breakup of the Standard Oil 
Trust in 1911, thereby encouraging those opposing the rise of holding companies.  
Throughout the 1920s, and continuing into the 1930s with Roosevelt’s New Deal 
programs, politicians, businessmen, and citizens debated how regional networks should 
be formed, who should own them, how they should be operated, and most importantly, 
who would benefit the most from them.   
Many of the differing perspectives can be understood through the history of 
Superpower, Giant Power, and the PNJ Interconnection.  Superpower and Giant Power 
were government-initiated proposals that sought to create regional networks across the 
eastern seaboard and Pennsylvania, respectively.  Neither proposal was implemented, but 
they provide a useful perspective on debates at the time.  Drawing on some of the ideas of 
Superpower, the PNJ Interconnection was a set of electricity transmission wires and 
operating arrangements between three large regional conglomerates in the mid-Atlantic.  
Understanding why Superpower and Giant Power failed while the PNJ Interconnection 
succeeded gives us insight into the power dynamics of regional transmission networks.   
The ideas for the Superpower proposal emerged during the energy shortages of 
World War I.
125
  Due to a combination of increasing coal prices, material shortages, and 
high demand from war-related industries, most utilities in the mid-Atlantic and across the 
nation had difficulty supplying enough electricity.  These energy shortages disrupted 
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manufacturing for the war effort and led to unreliable electric service in all sectors.  
Utilities found it difficult to increase their output due to long lead-times for installing new 
capacity, shortages of materials, and high labor costs.  Several observers from the 
industry noted that electricity shortages often occurred in one location while surrounding 
utilities had extra power.  The total supply of energy was not the critical problem—it was 
a transport issue.  If there was a mechanism to share power between utilities, they 
reasoned, many of the shortages could be avoided.   
This observation did not lead to the creation of regional connections during the 
war, but it did inspire the development of a Superpower proposal shortly afterwards.  
William S. Murray, a consulting engineer to railroad companies, began conceptualizing a 
plan to interconnect the electrical grids in the American northeast.  He envisioned 
creating a Superpower zone between Washington D.C. and Boston that extended from the 
coast about 150 miles inland.  He began talking with other engineers and politicians 
about building high-voltage transmission lines between utilities, concentrating production 
at large plants, and electrifying the trunk-line railroads.  He hoped that the electrification 
of the railroads would reduce the burden of carrying coal, thereby opening freight space 
for higher-value industrial goods and conserving the supply of coal. 
In 1920, Murray obtained financial support from the Secretary of the Interior to 
investigate his ideas further under the auspices of a Superpower survey.  He gathered a 
team of utility executives, electrical engineers, and financial analysts together and formed 
an Advisory Board that sought to determine how such a system could be implemented.
126
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The board quickly agreed on the engineering aspects of the proposal.  The economic 
benefits of regional integration were clear and the technology of transmission wires was 
well understood.  However, the members could not reach an agreement on issues of 
financing, ownership, and regulation.  The utilities refused to accept a plan that allowed 
the Federal government to purchase Superpower properties after 50 years, while the 
government was unlikely to grant eminent domain privileges and other incentives for the 
project without additional regulation.   
In the end, the Superpower Advisory Committee agreed to present the technical 
aspects of the proposal without addressing the legal, political, and financial aspects.  The 
report was printed on June 30, 1921 and received favorable newspaper coverage.
127
  
However, little direct action came of the proposal since it did not provide a mechanism 
for its implementation.  While various groups continued to discuss ideas of Superpower 
over the next several years, it was not implemented according to Murray’s vision.   
Superpower was not the only government proposal for transmission networks on 
the eastern seaboard.  Under the leadership of the engineer and former utility regulator 
Morris Cooke and Governor Gifford Pinchot, Pennsylvania developed an alternative 
vision of electrification.  Pinchot had become famous for his conservation work as head 
of the Forestry Service and had been elected on a reform platform.  Once in office, he 
worked with Cooke to develop a new proposal for electrification in Pennsylvania.  
According to Cooke and Pinchot, the existing networks in Pennsylvania were being run 
for the benefit of the corporations, not the people.  They believed that consumers paid too 
much for electricity that was being generated in old and inefficient plants, that rural areas 
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had too little access to electricity, and that the Superpower scheme was designed to 
maximize profit, not benefits for common people.   
Cooke had been an early advocate of the Superpower system and a friend of 
Murray’s, but had distanced himself when Murray publicly critiqued the Ontario Hydro-
Electric Commission in 1922.
128
  The Ontario system was a very well regarded public 
power project and Cooke thought Murray’s critique painted an unfair picture of 
government’s role in the electric industry.  In 1923, he convinced Pinchot to develop an 
alternative plan for Pennsylvania that would use the power of government to create an 
electric distribution system that would benefit individual consumers, not large utility 
companies.  They successfully petitioned the state for authorization of a “Giant Power” 
survey in 1923 and began work.   
In 1925, Cooke and Pinchot presented an ambitious proposal to the Pennsylvania 
legislature.  Although the proposal shared many of the technical features of the 
Superpower plan—high-voltage transmission wires, large and efficient generating 
stations, railroad electrification—it also included major initiatives for rural electrification, 
rate reductions for residential consumers, and expanded government oversight.  The 
center of the system was a series of large “mine-mouth” generating plants located in the 
heart of western Pennsylvania’s bituminous coalfields.  Smaller and less efficient stations 
in the east would be phased out and the electricity would be shipped across the state over 
a series of 220,000-volt transmission lines 300 miles in length.  The coal would be pre-
treated to recover its bi-products, thereby further lowering the cost of electric production.  
While some questioned particular aspects of the technical elements of the plan, such as 
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whether there was sufficient cooling water at mine-mouths and how power plants on 
the east coast would be phased out, it was the other provisions of Giant Power that 
elicited the strongest responses.
129
 
The report’s calls for shifts in distribution, ownership, and oversight were 
controversial: Pinchot and Cooke were recommending a significant shift in the 
relationships between the government and industry.  Pinchot and Cooke argued this was 
necessary to obtain desirable social outcomes.  They claimed the difference between 
Superpower and Giant Power was like that between a tame and wild elephant: “One is the 
friend and fellow worker of man—the other, at large and uncontrolled, may be a 
dangerous enemy.  The place for the public is on the neck of the elephant, guiding its 
movements, not on the ground helpless under its knees.”
130
  The men painted the 
consolidation of the electric industry as a serious threat: “under the control of a single 
monster corporation...If uncontrolled, it will be a plague without previous example.”
131
  
Only with a more active government role, Pinchot and Cooke argued, could society 
increase rural electrification, lower the electric rates paid by domestic consumers, and 
protect itself from the dangers of corporations.   
As these sentiments make clear, Giant Power was not simply a proposal to 
increase the reliability of electricity.  For Cooke and Pinchot, along with many other 
contemporaries, electricity was more than an energy source: it was essential to improving 
the human condition.  Ronald Tobey’s aptly titled book, Technology as Freedom, 
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captures the widespread belief in the 1920s and 1930s that electrification would lead 
to numerous social benefits.
132
  For instance, Pinchot argued that electrification provided 
the opportunity to return to a pastoral ideal of living in the countryside: “Steam brought 
about the centralization of industry, a decline in country life, the decay of many small 
communities, and the weakening of family ties.  Giant Power may bring about the 
decentralization of industry, the restoration of country life, and the upbuilding of the 
small communities and of the family.”
133
  Giant Power was a social movement as well as 
a technical proposal.   
While there was widespread sentiment that many of the aims of Giant Power were 
socially desirable, the proposed restructuring of the utility industry galvanized its 
opponents.  A mostly factual recounting of the proposal in Electrical World was titled 
“Pinchot Takes a Radical Stand.”
134
  William Murray called the ideas “communistic” and 
“rotten at the core.”
135
  In addition, the Giant Power report was vague about how its goals 
would be achieved.  It called for the creation of a Giant Power Board that would be 
responsible for implementing the broad goals.  In January and February of 1926, a Joint 
Committee between the House and Senate of the Pennsylvania Legislature met to discuss 
the proposal.  Opponents of the bill brought in industry experts to argue that the plan was 
not realistic and would damage Pennsylvania’s power system.  Ultimately, the Joint 
                                                
132
 Ronald C. Tobey, Technology as Freedom: The New Deal and the Electrical Modernization of the 
American Home (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 
133
 Pennsylvania. Giant Power Survey Board., Pinchot, and Ettinger, Report of the Giant Power Survey 
Board to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, xii. 
134
 "Pinchot Takes a Radical Stand," Electrical World 85, no. 8 (1925). 
135
 William S. Murray, "To the Editor of Electrical World," Electrical World 85, no. 10 (1925). 
 320 
Committee agreed with the opponents and voted against the proposal on February 8, 
1926.
136
  It does not appear that the bill was ever re-introduced. 
While neither Superpower nor Giant Power was implemented in a way that their 
founders intended, the general discussion of interconnection did lead to new energy 
transmission patterns.  However, it would be developed by utilities, not government.  In 
1927, Pennsylvania Power & Light, the Philadelphia Electric Company, and Public 
Service Electric & Gas came together to create the PNJ Interconnection.  The three 
parties agreed to construct a 210-mile 220,000-volt set of transmission wires that would 
connect each company’s systems at four locations: Bushkill, PA, Siegried, PA, Plymouth 
Meeting, PA, and Roseland, NJ.  The transmission network would allow each company 
to share electricity efficiently so as to minimize overall production costs.
137
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Map 5.3: PNJ Interconnection, 1928 
 
 
The logic of the PNJ Interconnection was essentially the same as sharing 
electricity within the several branches of a regional conglomerate.  By having access to 
power from other suppliers, each company lowered its overall capital requirements for 
electricity generation, obtained additional reliability, and balanced its load versus that of 
other suppliers.  As Bayla Singer noted in her study of the PNJ Interconnection, it was a 
conservative strategy that fit the utilities’ current working model.
138
  The PNJ 
Interconnection provided a technical and administrative structure that encouraged the 
utilities to share power whenever it was profitable to do so without disrupting the existing 
patterns of the industry.   
Even though there were technical similarities between Superpower, Giant Power, 
and the PNJ Interconnection—all involved creating high-voltage long-distance 
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transmission lines to connect the region’s generating stations—their histories reveal 
much broader debates about the politics of such a system.  In the end, the fact that the 
PNJ Interconnection was designed by and paid for by utility companies meant that certain 
political visions were excluded.  The final agreement did not call for centralization of 
production, electrification of railroads, conservation of coal, rural electrification, or 
reduced rates to consumers.  It simply provided a mechanism for the utility companies to 
reduce costs.  The strength of the holding companies would not be challenged, and their 
utility companies would continue to increase their profits.   
However, the ambitions in Superpower and Giant Power did not die entirely.  
Some of them were integrated into New Deal reforms in the 1930s that achieved greater 
government regulation and rural electrification.  In 1935, the Public Utility Holding Act 
forced several holding companies to dissolve, including eventually forcing Aldred to 
resign his role as director of Pennsylvania Water & Power and Consolidated.  The Rural 
Electrification Act did more to bring electricity to farms than any efforts undertaken by 
the utilities.
139
  Taken collectively, these various visions of electrification demonstrate 
that differences in how transport networks are constructed can lead to very different 
social outcomes.    
 
Conclusion 
 The Holtwood Dam and its transmission wires created new relationships between 
mid-Atlantic residents and their environment.  Before the erection of the dam, the raging 
powers of the Susquehanna River were considered too remote and variable to be of much 
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use as an energy source.  Transforming the river’s power into hydroelectricity that 
could be shipped cheaply and abundantly to urban locations changed this logic—it 
created a new energy landscape.  Similar to the development of canals and pipelines, this 
energy landscape took concentrated energy from rural regions and transported it to the 
region’s urban centers.  Moreover, by providing mid-Atlantic residents with ever-
increasing quantities of energy, the dam and its wires contributed to the deepening of the 
mineral economy.   
  In 1910, the dam and its transmission wires were pioneering electrical 
developments in the region.  The dam was the most extensive in America and the wires 
were among the longest in the region.  Over the next twenty years, other utilities in the 
region began to follow the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company’s example.  Utility 
companies formed regional conglomerates and used transmission wires to link their 
various generating stations, similar to the way the Holtwood Dam’s wires exchanged 
power between the Susquehanna River and Baltimore’s steam-fired plants.     
 Collectively, the mid-Atlantic’s transmission wire network directed large amounts 
of energy to the region’s industrial cities.  There was nothing natural or inevitable about 
this.  As revealed by the histories of Superpower, Giant Power, and the PNJ 
Interconnection, citizens, businessmen, and politicians debated where transmission wires 
should be built, how they should be operated, and who they should benefit.  Of course, 
the region’s history influenced the outcome of these debates.  Earlier energy landscapes 
of coal and oil had encouraged the rise of industrial cities by making fossil fuel energy 
cheap and abundant in urban cores.  Once electricity was added to the region’s energy 
mix, it followed many of the patterns established by coal and oil.   
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Electricity transmission wires pushed the region further into the mineral 
economy.  Wires enabled electricity to be generated at one location and then shipped to 
another.  They made electricity cheaper in the regions they served by lowering the capital 
construction costs of utility companies.  Wires increased the reliability of electrical 
service by providing linkages between various generating plants in case one of them 
failed.  Cheap and reliable electricity, in turn, provided people with new opportunities to 
use energy in homes, factories, and for transport.  How, when, and where mid-Atlantic 
residents used this energy and how it accelerated the transition to a mineral economy is 
the subject of the next chapter.    
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Chapter 6: Electricity Consumption and the  
Mineral Economy, 1900-1930 
 
 The widespread introduction of electricity has been one of the most important 
transformations of the twentieth century.  By providing a flexible energy source that can 
be used in homes, shops, and factories, electricity has altered many of the ways 
Americans live, work, and play.  A typical American today uses electric power dozens of 
times daily, in alarm clocks, coffee makers, computers, elevators, televisions, vending 
machines, and more.  The extent of our current dependence on electricity is clearly 
revealed on those rare occasions when the power goes out.  For example, the widespread 
electrical blackouts hitting the Northeast in August of 2003 disrupted life-support 
systems at hospitals, shut down many transportation systems, and crippled 
communication networks.  It even forced wealthy tourists visiting New York City to 
sleep in hotel lobbies when the electric locks on their doors could not be opened. 
 These patterns have their roots in electrical practices developed between 1900 and 
1930.  During these years, mid-Atlantic residents created new uses for electricity that 
changed their world.  Electric lighting created new visual landscapes for cities and 
homes; electric streetcars made suburban living practical; electric motors in factories 
facilitated the rise of new forms of work organization such as assembly lines; and the use 
of domestic appliances initiated the use of fossil fuels for mechanical energy in the home.  
Overall, these new consumption patterns helped solidify the development of a mineral 
economy in the mid-Atlantic.  By 1930, the mid-Atlantic was an urban and industrialized 
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society using coal, oil, and electricity to surpass the limits to growth characteristic of 
an organic economy.   
Electricity had many features in common with coal and oil but also introduced 
new twists to the energy practices of the mid-Atlantic.  Coal, oil, and electricity were 
similar in that all could be used to provide heat, light, and power.  However, electricity 
was unique because of the flexible ways it could provide these services.  In particular, 
deriving power from coal and oil usually required large and cumbersome steam or 
internal combustion engines.  These worked well to provide power in mines, forges, 
railroads, and automobiles, but did not have much potential to be used on a small scale 
(consider the difficulty of operating an alarm clock with a coal-fired steam engine!).  
Electricity could be used in devices of any size, allowing the development of small (and 
cheap) electrical appliances like radios and irons as well as massive dynamos capable of 
powering entire factories.  As a result, electricity created new possibilities for the 
consumption of mineral energy sources in the mid-Atlantic’s homes, factories, and cities.   
 This chapter connects the development of the transmission wire networks studied 
in the previous chapter to their broader social impacts.  Webs of wires made new 
electricity consumption patterns possible for many, although not all, residents of the mid-
Atlantic.  However, they did not, by themselves, determine what shape these changes 
would take.  This chapter studies how electric energy was used in the mid-Atlantic and 
how these patterns varied both within the region and in comparison with other parts of 
the United States.  In particular, I emphasize the four major uses of electricity during this 
time period—lighting, street railways, industrial power, and domestic appliances—and 
their effects on the mineral economy.  In the conclusions, I examine who gained and lost 
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the most and how electrification perpetuated an ongoing dependence on mineral 
energy sources.   
 
Putting the Energy Landscape to Work 
Wires linked consumers with the generating stations that transformed falling 
water or fossil fuel into flows of electricity.  Although it rarely mattered to consumers 
whether their power came from water or fossil fuels, the source of the electricity 
influenced its transport patterns.  Hydroelectric power usually traveled long distances 
between rivers and cities.  Coal-fired power plants, on the other hand, relied on the long-
distance transport of fossil fuel energy to urban generating stations and then short 
transmission wires to deliver the power to consumers.  Regardless of how it was 
produced, most electricity in the mid-Atlantic between 1900 and 1930 was consumed in 
the same type of place: the region’s urban centers.   
The creation of the Holtwood Dam on the Susquehanna River reflected the logic 
of large-scale hydroelectric developments in the mid-Atlantic.  Transmission wires 
shipped most of the power from these dams away from rivers to distant cities.  The 
Holtwood and Safe Harbor dams on the Susquehanna River supplied electricity to 
Baltimore as well as Lancaster, York, and Coatesville.  The power of the Conowingo 
Dam, completed in 1926 on the Susquehanna River, was mainly transmitted to 
Philadelphia.  The Wallenpaupack Dam, on a tributary of the Delaware River, transported 
its power to Allentown, Williamsport, and Scranton.  Dams in the Adirondack Mountains 
shipped their current to Albany, Utica, Schenectady, and Syracuse.    
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 The hydroelectric facilities at Niagara Falls were a slight exception to this 
pattern.  When the first turbines were installed in 1895, transmission wire technology was 
still in its infancy.  Therefore, several metallurgical and electrochemical factories 
established themselves near Niagara Falls, creating a small industrial center.  Over time, 
engineers constructed a series of transmission wires that carried much of the electricity to 
Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse, but the Niagara area remained an important site of 
production.
1
  The example of Niagara Falls, therefore, is more reminiscent of the organic 
economy and the mills at Lowell, Massachusetts than the Holtwood Dam. 
 Electricity created by burning fossil fuels followed a different transport logic.  
Most of the region’s electricity was generated using coal.
2
  In general, coal-fired 
generating stations were located in the urban areas where their power was consumed.  
These stations, in turn, relied on previously built energy landscapes.  Most importantly, 
they depended on the cheap and abundant transport of coal to cities.  By 1900, the 
transition from canals to railroads for the shipment of coal was practically complete.  In 
fact, coal constituted the greatest volume of freight for the nation’s railroads.  In 1922, 
coal represented a third of Pennsylvania’s railroad traffic—3 billion ton miles.
3
  
Therefore, electricity generated from coal utilized two energy landscapes: railroads to 
ship coal hundreds of miles to urban generating stations, and wires to ship the electricity 
the remaining few miles to customers.   
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 Whether it was produced at rivers in rural areas or in urban generating 
stations, electricity was mainly consumed in the mid-Atlantic’s cities between 1900 and 
1930.  This pattern also reflected the operations of previous energy landscapes—canals, 
railroads, and pipelines had enabled people and industries to concentrate in urban 
locations over the previous decades.  Urbanites had greater needs for mineral-based 
energy sources and greater wealth with which to purchase them.  Moreover, the density 
of population and industries made it cheaper and easier for utilities to serve urban 
customers because it meant less wire, poles, and transformers had to be installed.   
 The energy landscape of electricity transmission and consumption was similar to 
coal canals and oil pipelines, but it was not identical.  First, electricity served a much 
broader range of cities.  Coal canals and oil pipelines funneled the largest amounts of 
energy to a few urban locations, primarily New York City and Philadelphia.  While the 
region’s major cities continued to absorb the lion’s share of electrical production, most of 
the mid-Atlantic’s cities had established electric service by the early years of the 
twentieth century.  For example, there were more than thirty cities in Pennsylvania with 
electric streetcar service by 1912, including smaller locations such as Bloomsburg (7,413 
residents in 1910), Chambersburg (11,800), Dubois (12,623), Lock Haven (7,772), 
McKeesport (42,694), and New Castle (36,280).
4
  By 1922, 785 of 1,212 incorporated 
towns in Philadelphia had access to some level of electricity, serving about three-quarters 
of the population.
5
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Second, the energy landscapes of electricity transformed the geography of 
cities by spurring the growth of suburbs.  As will be discussed further in the next section, 
electric streetcars played a critical role in encouraging suburban living.  By making it 
practical and cheap for workers to live more than a few miles away from their sites of 
employment, streetcars facilitated the geographic expansion of the city into its 
hinterlands.  With improved urban and suburban transport, many cities expanded from a 
dense cluster of buildings whose borders were only a few miles apart into sprawling 
collections of homes and factories spread out in a rough circle with a diameter of more 
than twenty miles.   
 By contrast, there was very little electrification outside of cities and their suburbs 
by 1930.  For those living in the countryside, rural electrification was a rarity before 
1930.  Only 2 percent of farms in the nation had electric service in 1910 and 10 percent 
by 1930 even though home electrification rates were 16 percent in 1912 and 68 percent in 
1930.
6
  The mid-Atlantic had slightly higher rural electrification rates than other 
American regions, but the percentage of farms served was still quite low.  In 1925, 
178,666 of Pennsylvania’s 202,250 farms lacked electric service (12,452 were supplied 
by utilities, and 11,132 operated their own generators either independently or in 
collectives).
7
   
The pathways of transmission wires often determined which rural areas had 
access to electricity.  Due to the lack of population or industrial concentration outside of 
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cities, it was rarely cost-efficient for utilities to build wires to rural areas.  However, 
some sites got access to electricity simply by being located along the pathway of a 
transmission wire between two cities or a hydroelectric dam and a city.  In such cases, it 
was possible to build a transformer station that would make power available.  However, 
there was no guarantee that this would actually happen.  For example, the transmission 
wires between the Holtwood dam and Baltimore did not provide service to any in-
between points. 
 The low rates of rural electrification in the mid-Atlantic and America in general 
were partly a result of geography and dispersed settlements, but they were also a product 
of social choices.  Several other nations including Holland (nearly universal), Germany 
(90 percent), and New Zealand (67 percent) had managed to achieve much more 
impressive rates of electrification by 1930.
8
  Furthermore, once the United States passed 
the Rural Electrification Act in 1935 subsidizing the financing of rural transmission lines, 
the rates increased sharply, showing that policy decisions had tangible impacts on 
development patterns.
9
  Rural electrification owed more to government efforts than the 
invisible hand of the market.    
 
Consuming Electricity, Shaping the Mineral Economy 
Electricity is distinctive as an energy source because of its variety of uses and the 
scales at which it can be applied.  Similar to coal and oil, electricity could be used to 
generate heat, light, and power.  What made electricity different was the fact that it could 
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provide variable levels of power.  Coal and oil used in steam and internal combustion 
engines produced large quantities of power that were only suitable for industrial or 
transport purposes.  Electricity, on the other hand, could safely and cheaply supply 
energy to motors small enough to be used in people’s daily lives and large enough for 
industrial operations.  It was particularly through the spread of small-scale energy 
applications that electricity helped mid-Atlantic residents extend the practices of the 
mineral economy to new domains.  Four applications of electricity were particularly 
significant between 1900 and 1930: lighting, street railways, industrial power, and 
domestic appliances.  Each of these practices contributed to the mineral economy in 
distinct ways.  
 
Overview of Electrical Consumption 
 Table 6.1 provides an overview of all electrical production and consumption in 
the United States between 1902 and 1927 to contextualize the importance of various 
applications.  Although the data are taken only from Census publications, they have been 
compared with other sources of statistics including publications of industry trade groups 
(National Electric Light Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electrical World) and 
other government organizations (United States Geological Survey) and found to be 
similar (most values were within a couple percentage points).
10
  Table 6.1 reveals a 
number of broad trends over time, such as the relative decrease of street railways as 
                                                
10
 National Electric Light Association, The Electric Light and Power Industry in the United States (New 
York: National Electric Light Association, 1928); Edison Electric Institute, The Electric Light and Power 
Industry in 1932 (New York: Edison Electric Institute, 1933); United States Geological Survey, Monthly 
and Annual Production of Electricity for Public Use in the United States in 1930 (Washington: Department 
of the Interior, 1931); "Statistical Summary of Progress in the Electrical Industry," Electrical World 91, no. 
1 (1928).  
 333 
consumers of electricity, the significant increase of industrial enterprises, and the 
slow rise of residential consumption.  I have yet to find any source of comparable data for 
the mid-Atlantic as a whole, but where possible I use particular bits of data to indicate 
when the region followed and deviated from national patterns. 
 
Table 6.1: U.S. Electricity Consumption By Sector, 1902-1927, in Millions of KWH
11
 
Year Total KWH 
(millions) 
Residential Industrial  Street railways Commercial Other (losses, 
imports, 
miscellaneous) 
1927 102,404 7,676 (7%) 54,407 (53%) 9,390 (9%) 10,766 (11%) 20,156 (20%) 
1922 61,816 3,916 (6%) 25,727 (42%) 12,405 (20%) 7,180 (12%) 12,588 (20%) 
1917 43,863 1,731 (4%) 16,510 (38%) 12,188 (28%) 5,213(12%) 8,221 (19%) 
1912 25,000 910 (4%) 5,198 (21%) 9,020 (36%) 4,076 (16%) 5,796 (23%) 
1907 14,262 ~428 (3%) 3,680 (26%) 6,009 (42%) ~1,293 (9%) ~2,852 (20%) 
1902 6,029 ~121 (2%) 1,201 (20%) 2,651 (44%) ~851 (14%) ~1,206 (20%) 
 
 
Lighting 
 Improved lighting was the first commercially successful implementation of 
electricity.  Beginning with Thomas Edison’s 1882 Pearl Street Station providing 
illumination for Wall Street, lighting has been the most long-standing and widespread use 
of electricity.  Whether in cities, homes, stores, or factories, electric light was a highly 
desired service.   
                                                
11
 The statistics in this table are derived from several Census publications, most notably United States 
Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1975), 820, 828. and United States Bureau of the Census, Census of Electrical 
Industries: Street Railways 1902-1927 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905-1930).  Total 
KWH, Residential (1912-1927), and Commercial (1912-1927) is from Census, Historical Statistics to 
1970, p. 820, 828.  Street Railways is from Census, Census of Electrical Industries: Street Railways, 1902-
1927.  Industrial is derived from taking the production as given in Census, Historical Statistics to 1970, p. 
820 and subtracting the production of street railways companies as given in Census, Census of Electrical 
Industries: Street Railways, 1902-1927.  Other (1912-1927) is determined by subtracting the other 
categories from the total.  The values for 1902 and 1907 for Residential, Commercial, and Other are 
estimated.  I assume that Residential was 3% in 1907 and 2% in 1902 and that Other was 20% in these 
years.  Dividing this percentage by total production gives these values, while the remaining production is 
allocated to the Commercial sector for these years.   
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Municipalities were the largest early adopters of electricity.  Many mid-
Atlantic cities had been trying to upgrade their street illumination for several decades and 
were often pioneers in establishing gas light and electric arc lamp systems in the 
nineteenth century.  During the 1880s when many cities adopted electric lighting, there 
were few private utilities in operation.  As a result, many cities established their own 
municipal generating stations that lit city streets and buildings and sold their excess 
capacity to homes and stores.  These installations were usually justified on the grounds 
that better street lighting would lead to safer streets and a more beautiful town.  However, 
the decision to invest in street lighting was not solely rational.  Street lighting was a 
symbol of modernity and towns competed with one another to have the best displays.  
Civic pride was at least as important of a motivating factor as safer streets in the early 
adoption of street lighting.
12
    
 If electric lighting was important to the status of municipalities, this was an even 
greater incentive for commercial establishments.  Shops in downtown regions, 
particularly department stores, used electric lighting in extravagant ways as part of their 
marketing efforts.  The historian David Nye has described this as the Great White Way, 
noting that the ways commercial enterprises used lighting far exceeded functional 
requirements: “electrification was a form of conspicuous consumption that said, ‘We are 
progressive and growing.’”
13
  Electric lighting encouraged the practice of shopping at 
night and provided a catalyst to the growing advertising industry.  Because of the cultural 
associations between electric lighting displays and modernity between 1900 and 1930, 
commercial enterprises invested heavily in lighting technology.   
                                                
12
 Nye, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940, 18. 
13
 Ibid., 54. 
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 In the home, electricity quickly replaced kerosene and gas as the main source 
of lighting whenever it was available and people could afford it.  The carbon-filament 
light bulb was as bright as gaslight without the downside of noxious fumes, dirty fixtures, 
fire risk, and over-heated rooms.  When the tungsten-filament bulb became common 
around the turn of the century, it offered an unparalleled level of brightness.  As 
Wolfgang Schivelbusch noted, “[t]he enthusiasm with which electric light was hailed in 
the late nineteenth century is in many respects reminiscent of the reaction evoked by gas 
lighting seventy years earlier.  In their time, both innovations were regarded as the most 
modern, the brightest, cleanest and most economical form of lighting.”
14
  During the first 
few decades of the twentieth century, the majority of home electric consumption came 
from lights.  The pace and adoption of electric lighting in the home was highly influenced 
by wealth and location.  Wealthy homes in cities began to install electric lighting in the 
1880s, while it took until after World War I for the majority of American homes to have 
access to electricity.  For those living in the country, electric lighting was still rare by 
1930 regardless of income level.
15
   
 Electric lighting was a boon to several industries, as well.  As opposed to 
manufactured gas, electricity produced superior light without several of the downsides of 
gas.  For example, electric lights did not leak gas which could lead to head aches, were 
less prone to starting fires (insurers often reduced rates when gas lights were replaced), 
gave off much less heat keeping factories more comfortable in the summer, and were 
more flexible as they could be moved around a room.  For jobs requiring precision work 
                                                
14
 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Disenchanted Night: The Industrialization of Light in the Nineteenth Century 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 69. 
15
 Nye, Electrifying America: Social Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940, 28. 
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(such as many aspects of textile or craft work), flexible light that could be adjusted to 
the job made a significant difference in the quality of work.
16
    
 Determining exactly how much electricity was used for lighting in cities, homes, 
stores, and industries is difficult.  To get a sense of the total amount of electricity in 
lighting, we can return to Table 6.1 and look at the various user groups.  For residential 
consumers, lighting was the main use of electricity besides domestic appliances, which 
only began to occupy a larger percentage of overall consumption by the end of the period 
(as will be discussed later).  The same was true of commercial enterprises, which adopted 
light eagerly at the beginning and then began to use electricity for other purposes in the 
stores such as fans and elevators towards 1930.  Lighting also made up a surprisingly 
large amount of industry’s electric consumption, particularly in the early years when non-
power uses prevailed (see Table 6.3).  In addition, as street railway companies also sold 
extra electricity to consumers, it is likely that a small percentage of their consumption 
went towards lighting.  Putting all this together, with rough estimates for the percentage 
of use in the various sectors, results in Table 6.2.   
Table 6.2 involves several estimates, so its data should be read carefully.
17
  In 
general, it reveals that the overall amount of electricity consumed for lighting represented 
a significant percentage of early consumption but that its relative importance faded over 
                                                
16
 Ibid., 193. 
17
 The data is corroborated by other sources, giving some assurance that it is reasonably accurate.  For 
example, the 1917 and 1922 Census of Electrical Industries indicates that central stations sold 
5,112,412,219 and 9,777,114,508 kwh of electricity for lighting purposes, respectively.  They made this 
calculation assuming that all commercial and all residential consumption was for lighting while excluding 
the sales of street railway companies and the lighting used in industry.  If some residential and commercial 
consumption is excluded while industrial and street railway consumption is added, then one gets quite 
similar results.  United States Bureau of the Census, Census of Electrical Industries: Central Electric Light 
and Power Stations, 1917 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), 87; United States Bureau of 
the Census, Census of Electrical Industries: Central Electric Light and Power Stations, 1922, 83. 
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time.  Even though the consumption of electricity for lighting increased roughly ten-
fold between 1902 and 1927, it failed to keep pace with growth in other sectors.  The 
percentage of electricity used for lighting showed a steady decrease over the period, from 
roughly over a quarter of all consumption to less than a sixth.  It does not appear that 
lighting patterns were significantly different in the mid-Atlantic region.   
 
Table 6.2: Electricity Used in Lighting, United States, 1902-1927
18
 
Year Total KWH 
(millions) 
Residential Industrial  Street railways Commercial KWH used for 
lighting 
1927 102,404 3,838 (50%) 4,897 (9%) 188 (2%) 7,536 (70%) 16,459 (16%) 
1922 61,816 2,350 (60%) 2,315 (9%) 744 (6%) 5,385 (75%) 10,794 (17%) 
1917 43,863 1,212 (70%) 2,311 (14%) 122 (10%) 4,170(80%) 7,815 (18%) 
1912 25,000 683 (75%) 1,092 (21%) 902 (10%) 3,465 (85%) 6,142 (25%) 
1907 14,262 342 (80%) 957 (26%) 601 (10%) 1,164 (90%) 3,064 (21%) 
1902 6,029 109 (90%) 504 (42%) 265 (10%) 766 (90%) 1,644 (27%) 
 
Table 6.3: Percentage of Electricity Used By Industry For Lighting, 1902-1927
19
 
Year Power Materials 
conversion 
Support 
services 
% of support services 
used for light 
(estimate) 
% of industrial 
consumption used for light 
(Column 4 X Column 5) 
1929 70% 17% 13 65% 8.45 
1920 70.9% 15.2% 13.9% 70% 9.7 
1913 59.2% 13.7% 27.1% 75% 20.3 
1899 30% 10% 60% 80% 48 
 
The use of electricity for lighting contributed to the development of the mineral 
economy in several ways.  First, it provided an essential financial basis for the expansion 
of the electrical industry.  Utilities typically charged much higher rates to residential and 
                                                
18
 The percentage in each category refers to the percentage of total consumption in that sector estimated to 
be for illumination.  The number of KWH is derived from multiplying the percentage by total consumption 
in that sector as presented in Table 6.1.  The estimate of residential consumption is based on a declining 
percentage as domestic appliances were introduced (see the section on domestic appliances).  The estimate 
for commercial consumption also assumes a decreasing percentage as other electric devices for stores 
became available.  The industrial value is derived from Table 6.3, and then extrapolated on a linear basis to 
fit the dates.  The street railway total is based on an estimate of the total light and power business of street 
railways, which decreased over this period.   
19
 Sam H. Schurr et al., eds., Electricity in the American Economy: Agent of Technological Progress, 
Contributions in Economics and Economic History (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 295.  Note: 
support services includes lighting and information processing.  As there was not widespread electronic use 
of information processing equipment, it is likely that the large majority of this consumption was used for 
lighting.  As more alternative devices were developed during this period, I have lowered the percentage 
accordingly.   
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commercial customers who used electricity for lighting than they did to industrial 
consumers using the current for power.
20
  For example, in 1902, it was reported that 
lighting represented over 80 percent of the revenues of central generating stations across 
the nation.
21
  Utilities in the mid-Atlantic were responsible for more than a third of this 
output and sales.
22
  Lighting, therefore, subsidized the growth of the electrical industry in 
its earlier years while new applications were developed.  
 As a financial stimulant to the industry, electric lighting was very similar to 
kerosene for the oil industry.  Kerosene was the primary use of the mid-Atlantic’s oil 
production during the nineteenth century, generating rich financial rewards for refiners.  
However, kerosene consumption could not keep pace with the use of oil for power and 
transportation in the first decades of the twentieth century.  While kerosene growth nearly 
doubled from 1900 to 1930, the use of gasoline and fuel oil grew sixty and fifty fold, 
respectively.  To a lesser extent, lighting played a similar role in the electrical industry.  It 
was a large part of early sales, but faded in importance over time as other applications 
increased their relative importance much more quickly.   
Electric lighting was also similar to kerosene in that it pushed people further away 
from cultural practices characteristic of the organic economy.  Artificial lighting allowed 
                                                
20
 Industries were able to negotiate much lower rates (often twenty cents on the dollar in relation to 
residential and commercial customers) for two reasons.  First, they typically used much larger amounts of 
electricity.  Second, industrial enterprises had leverage over utilities because they had the financial and 
technical resources to operate their own electrical generators if they were unhappy with utility rates.   
21
 Total revenues for electricity by central stations in 1902 were $84,186,605.  $25,481,045 came from arc 
lighting, $44,657,102 from incandescent lighting, and $14,048,458 from other sources. United States 
Bureau of the Census, Census of Electrical Industries: Central Electric Light and Power Stations, 1902 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1905), 38. 
22
 Plants in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania generated 40% of the total electrical output, 35% of 
total electrical sales, and about 35% of the revenues from lighting.  Mid-Atlantic revenues for all electricity 
sales in 1902 were $29,410,354, consisting of $9,525,124 from arc lighting, $14,517,410 from incandescent 
lighting, and $5,367,720 from other sources.  Total output was 1,021,603,500 kwh.  Ibid. 
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people to read and work at any time of night and during the long winter evenings.  
Just as kerosene helped to separate people from the experience of living according to the 
seasons, electric lighting continued these trends.  Moreover, electricity made it even 
easier for mid-Atlantic residents to use artificial light.  While kerosene lights required a 
household to purchase kerosene at the store, fill lamps, and tend wicks, electric lights 
could be operated with the flick of a switch.   
 
 
Street Railways 
 Street railways were one of the most important uses of electricity in the decades 
surrounding the turn of the twentieth century.  Electric streetcars provided a new form of 
urban transport that could effectively move people around cities in ways that transcended 
the capabilities of previous systems.  In particular, street railways made the development 
of suburban living patterns both practical and desirable.  Taking advantage of cheap and 
rapid transport to and from work sites in the urban core, millions of mid-Atlantic 
residents chose to buy homes in the suburbs.  The establishment of suburbs, in turn, had 
critical consequences for the development of a society dependent on mineral energy 
sources.  Once people established homes several miles away from work locations, they 
required regular transport options that exceeded the capacity of organic energy sources.  
Streetcars provided these transport services for the first decades of the twentieth century.  
In the 1920s and 1930s, personal automobiles began to replace streetcars, a development 
that further entrenched the dependence of mid-Atlantic residents on mineral energy 
sources.      
 340 
In the late 1880s, when electric streetcars began to be introduced, cities 
already had access to organic (horses pulling omnibuses) and mineral (steam railroads) 
transport systems.  However, each of these systems had limitations.  Horse-drawn 
omnibuses were slow, expensive, and polluting.  Moreover, they traveled little faster than 
a person walking.  If we take an hour’s commute as a maximum distance people could 
live from their work locations, horse-drawn omnibuses and walking required people to 
live within three or four miles of stores and employment opportunities.
23
  Steam railroads 
were not much more useful.  People resisted their introduction onto city streets because 
they were noisy, polluting, and dangerous.  Moreover, steam railroads were most 
effective for long-distance transport, not the continual starting and stopping every couple 
blocks needed for urban transport.  Commuter railroad systems typically had stops only 
every quarter mile and served less than ten percent of local traffic in the late nineteenth 
century.
24
   
  Electric streetcars, by contrast, could travel more quickly along city streets and 
carry a greater number of passengers than horse-drawn omnibuses.
25
  Their electric 
motors were quiet and could be started and stopped quickly.  Street railways averaging 
eight or nine miles per hour made it practical for people to live as far away as six miles 
from work locations and be able to commute within an hour’s time.  Express routes with 
fewer stops expanded the range of service, thereby allowing people to live even further 
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 Five miles per hour was the maximum average speed for horse-drawn omnibuses.  Riders also had to 
allocate a few minutes to walk to an omnibus stop, wait for a ride, and then walk to their final destination.  
Charles W. Cheape, Moving the Masses: Urban Public Transit in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, 
1880-1912 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 4; Sam Bass Warner, Streetcar Suburbs: 
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 Cheape, Moving the Masses: Urban Public Transit in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, 1880-1912, 
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 Warner estimates that streetcars could consistently travel twice as fast and carry three times as many 
passengers. Warner, Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900, 28. 
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away.  The result of streetcars was to make it practical for urban cores to increase 
from a diameter of roughly five miles to twenty to twenty-five miles.
26
   
 The ability to move passengers efficiently through cities was particularly 
important for Philadelphia and New York, whose populations in 1890 were 1,046,964 
and 1,515,301, respectively.
27
    By 1912, New York City led the nation in total 
passengers with more than a billion paid riders per year using electrified transport 
covering more than 700 miles of track.  Philadelphia streetcars provided nearly half a 
billion rides annually using 650 miles of track.
28
  However, streetcars were not exclusive 
to New York City or Philadelphia.  By 1912, there were more than 70 street railway 
systems operating throughout Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey.
29
   
 Electric railways did not only operate within city boundaries.  While most 
streetcars ran within a five to ten mile radius of city centers, their services were 
supplemented by the development of interurbans, electrified trains connecting nearby 
cities.  While the network of steam railroads developed over the nineteenth century made 
travel between cities possible, their rates, routes, and schedules tended to favor freight 
over passengers.  Interurbans focused on passenger traffic along with light and high-value 
freight such as mail.  The development of a reliable interurban network made it much 
easier for people to travel between cities and for those in the country to visit a city for the 
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 Cheape, Moving the Masses: Urban Public Transit in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, 1880-1912, 
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 New York City had 1,108,237,017 riders in 1912 and Philadelphia had 456,926,814.  United States 
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29
 Ibid., 218. 
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day.  Interurbans also extended suburbanization: for example, interurbans extended 
suburbanization from New York City all the way to Nassau County.  
As a corollary to creating residential living patterns in the suburbs, streetcars 
encouraged the creation of centralized commercial and industrial districts.  Especially in 
conjunction with interurbans that could bring rural residents into the cities, streetcars 
gave a great boost to the development of a commercial downtown where several shops 
could be concentrated.  Large downtown stores, and department stores in particular, 
benefited from this concentration at the expense of country stores.  Similarly, several 
industries took advantage of the fact that streetcars allowed their workers to travel to sites 
further from downtown.  For some industries, this allowed them to obtain cheaper land.  
For others, it allowed them to move nearer to transport facilities or raw materials.  In this 
way, street railways and interurbans brought people closer together and pushed them 
further apart.  The development of electrified transport allowed rural and suburban 
residents to enter cities to shop and work at sites in urban cores, but they also led to a 
geographic dispersion of both industrial sites and population.
30
    
 Finally, streetcar companies were also important because they supplied electricity 
to consumers in their service areas.  Because their demand for electricity around the turn 
of the century was too great for most utilities to handle, most streetcar companies 
operated their own generating stations.  When they had excess electricity, particularly in 
the evening hours when fewer trolleys were in operation, they sold this power to 
consumers along the routes of the streetcars where their wires were already established.  
As a result, living along the path of a streetcar did not only mean that a family had access 
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to transportation, it also meant that they were much more likely to have electrical 
service.  This was especially the case along the paths of the interurbans.  For rural 
residents, one of the only opportunities to purchase electrical current was to tap the wires 
of a nearby interurban.    
By the turn of the century, street railway companies used nearly half of all the 
electricity consumed across the nation.  As seen in Table 6.4, the total electrical 
consumption of street railway companies continued to increase up through 1922, 
although not nearly as quickly as other sectors.  As a result, by 1927, street railway 
companies had more than tripled their electrical demand but had seen the percentage of 
overall consumption decrease from 44 percent to 9 percent of the total.  By the end of the 
1920s, the era of the street railway companies was coming to an end.  A combination of 
general economic decline that commenced with the Great Depression and competition 
from motor buses and automobiles led to a dramatic decrease in street railway operations.    
With only about 20 percent of the nation’s population, the mid-Atlantic was the 
nation’s leading region in streetcar development, transporting over 35 percent of the 
passengers and using more than 30 percent of the total electricity (see Table 6.5).  New 
York City operated the nation’s largest streetcar network while Philadelphia’s was the 
third most extensive behind Chicago by 1902.
31
  The fact that the mid-Atlantic was more 
urban than other regions contributed to this heavier use.  In 1925, there were 122 electric 
street railway companies in 55 of Pennsylvania’s 67 counties.
32
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Table 6.4: Street Railway Electrical Consumption, U.S., 1902-1927
33
    
Year Total electrical 
production (kwh) 
Total street railway 
(kwh) 
% electricity used by 
street railways 
Total passengers 
carried 
1927 102,404,000,000 9,389,597,006 9% 14,901,435,276 
1922 61,816,000,000 12,405,052,635 20% 15,331,399,851 
1917 43,863,000,000 12,187,850,831 28% 14,506,914,573 
1912 25,000,000,000 9,020,017,789 36% 12,135,341,716 
1907 14,262,000,000 6,009,130,100 42% 9,533,080,766 
1902 6,029,000,000 2,651,484,397 44% 5,836,615,296 
 
Table 6.5: Street Railway Electrical Consumption, Mid-Atlantic, 1902-1927
34
 
Year Total kwh street 
railways (US) 
Total kwh street 
railways (mid-Atlantic) 
% kwh mid-
Atlantic 
Passengers 
(mid-Atlantic) 
% passengers  
(mid-Atlantic) 
1927 9,389,597,006 3,596,286,186 38% 5,707,319,536 38% 
1922 12,405,052,635 3,582,760,388 29% 5,466,020,707 36% 
1917 12,187,850,831 3,305,150,097 27% 5,027,469,984 35% 
1912 9,020,017,789 2,717,965,936 30% 4,125,221,246 34% 
1907 6,009,130,100 2,015,156,289 34% 3,512,933,679 37% 
1902 2,651,484,397 992,237,709 37% 2,331,783,405 40% 
 
 The decrease in street railways at the end of this period should not distract us 
from the significant social consequences of these technologies.  The development of 
street railway companies had major effects on the shape of mid-Atlantic cities and the 
daily lives of their residents.  Streetcars significantly expanded the physical parameters of 
the city, altering where people lived, worked, and shopped.  In addition, streetcar 
companies often brought electricity to new parts of cities and competed with utilities to 
provide electrical service, particularly in the early years of the twentieth century.   
 Streetcars also contributed to the development of the mineral economy in the mid-
Atlantic.  First, streetcars required large amounts of mineral energy for power.  In 1925, 
Pennsylvania’s street railway companies used 921,062,435 kwh of power—the energy 
equivalent of 519,698 tons of coal.
35
  Given that New York used nearly twice as much 
energy transporting passengers and New Jersey consumed an additional several hundred 
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thousand kilowatt-hours, the mid-Atlantic likely burned more than a million and a 
half tons of coal per year simply to move its urban populations between home, work, and 
stores.
36
    
 Using mineral energy for everyday travel was not simply significant for its total 
levels of fossil fuel consumption.  This new behavior was a mineral-based response to an 
unintended consequence of the mineral economy.  The transport of coal, oil, and 
electricity enabled the concentration of people and industries in urban cores.  As 
populations expanded to hundreds of thousands and then millions of residents, this urban 
growth created new problems; namely, how to get people to and from the places they 
would live and work.  The solution to the problem was characteristic of the mineral 
economy: use fossil fuel energy to power streetcars.  In other words, fossil fuels were 
used to solve a problem created by fossil fuels in the first place.    
 
Industrial Power 
 Industries consumed the greatest amounts of electricity between 1900 and 1930, 
increasing their use at a dramatic rate.  At the turn of the century, only about 20 percent 
of all electrical production was used for industrial purposes, and much of this was used 
for lighting (Tables 6.1 and 6.3).   By 1927, however, industrial consumers absorbed over 
half of the nation’s electricity, and had increased their use of kilowatt-hours nearly fifty-
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fold in just twenty-five years.
37
  Whereas electric motors accounted for less than 5 
percent of the total horsepower used in industry in 1899, more than 82 percent of 
industrial motors were driven by electricity by 1929.
38
   
 As an industrial power source, electricity replaced existing technologies and 
created new possibilities.  In this capacity, electricity in industry had parallels to its use in 
street railways.  Mineral-based transport systems already existed but streetcars enabled 
safe and efficient travel along city streets.  Similarly, electric lighting and power in 
factories both supplemented existing practices and opened the door for new ones. 
The first industrial uses of electricity simply replaced existing systems.  Electric 
lights provided artificial illumination that was brighter, safer, and more flexible than gas 
lights.  A company could replace its steam engines or water wheels with an electric 
dynamo as well.  With water wheels and steam engines, factories typically used a line-
drive system, a series of shafts and leather belts that ran along the ceiling, to transfer the 
power to each worker’s station.  By replacing a water wheel or steam engine with an 
electric dynamo, organizations could obtain greater control over the output of power, start 
and stop the line drives more easily, and increase the efficiency of their power 
production.  Because factories were accustomed to supplying their own power with water 
and coal, many of them operated their own electrical equipment during the first years of 
the twentieth century.  It was only as central utilities became larger and more reliable that 
factories began to purchase electricity.
39
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Over time, factory operators began to discover that electricity had unique 
features that could be used to change industrial practices.  A key insight was that wires 
could replace the line-drive systems of leather belts and shafts with a unit-drive system 
that placed a motor at each work station.  With the line-drive system, all of a company’s 
work operations had to be laid out in linear paths connected to the overhead belts.  
Moreover, the central steam engine or water wheel had to be in use at all times.  With 
electric power and a unit–drive system, each work station could be powered by its own 
motor, which could be turned on and off as needed.  Moreover, wires could transfer 
power to any site in the factory, freeing operators to organize production according to the 
flow of parts, not just the delivery of power.  In other words, the distinctive features of 
electric power were a crucial precondition for the widespread adoption of the assembly 
line and the implementation of Tayloristic schemes.
40
   
Electric power was not adopted by all industries at the same rate.  New 
enterprises, like automobile manufacturers and companies producing electrical 
equipment, were typically rapid adopters of electrical power.  Industries including 
baking, ready-made clothing, printing, and machine tooling quickly converted to 
electrical power as their main source of supply as well.  Mature industries that had large 
investments in previous power systems—particularly flour milling, sugar processing and 
refining, and the lumber industry—were often slower to transition because of their sunk 
costs.  However, even organizations like manufactured gas companies and coke 
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manufacturers with significant investments in coal technology were using large 
amounts of electrical power by 1930.
41
   
Electricity could be used for more than simply providing power to machinery.  
For example, precision machinery such as electrolytic ovens with thermostats made it 
much easier to maintain a furnace at the right temperature for forging metal.  Electricity 
could also be used to create new materials.  For example, aluminum was considered a 
more valuable metal than gold or silver in the mid-nineteenth century before it was 
discovered that it could be generated in significant quantities through electrolysis.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the Pennsylvania Water & Power Company created a 
subsidiary to produce ferro-silicon, an important material for steel-making, as a way to 
profit from unused electrical current.  The amount of industrial electricity devoted to 
materials conversion increased from 10 percent in 1900 to 17 percent by 1929 (Table 
6.3). 
The relative safety and flexibility of electrical power encouraged its use in mining 
operations.  Underground coal mines, despite being the basis of the mid-Atlantic’s 
mineral economy, were dangerous places to use coal and oil because they could lead to 
explosions of accumulated gas.  Electricity, by contrast, offered a safer way to deliver 
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power to miners.  Operators of mining enterprises used electricity to replace steam for 
the pumps that drew water out of the mines, supplement human muscles and dynamite 
with electric drills, and substitute electric motors for the mule teams that had traditionally 
hauled coal to the surface.
42
  Mining enterprises used approximately 15 percent of the 
electricity consumed by industries during this period.
43
  Given the mid-Atlantic’s 
prominent coal and oil industries, this energy was disproportionately consumed in the 
region.   
 The use of electricity in industry was particularly important in the mid-Atlantic.  
This is not surprising, given the fact that the mid-Atlantic’s advantages in obtaining coal 
and oil over the preceding century had established the region as the nation’s primary 
manufacturing area.  With 20 percent of the nation’s population, mid-Atlantic industries 
consumed at least 30 percent of the total electricity used by industries nationwide in 
1927.
44
  In fact, the ratio may be significantly higher.  For the nation as a whole, 
approximately 60 percent of industries purchased their energy from utility companies and 
40 percent of them operated their own dynamos in 1925.
45
  According to the Giant Power 
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Survey, in 1922 only one-third of the electric power used in industry and mines in 
Pennsylvania was purchased from utilities.
46
  Therefore, Pennsylvania industries may 
have produced and consumed significantly more electricity than is recorded by the data 
above.   
 Established industries consumed the largest amounts of electricity in the mid-
Atlantic.  For example, in Pennsylvania, iron and steel industries used huge quantities of 
electricity as did the coke, cement, paper, and glass industries.
47
  Philadelphia also saw 
the rise of new industrial enterprises focusing on electrical products such as the Electric 
Storage Battery Company and Atwater Kent Manufacturing Company.  Industries in 
other cities in the region drew on electricity as well.  Baltimore manufacturers using 
electricity intensively included the metal industry, railroads, shipbuilders, and electrolytic 
works.
48
 
 Industrial uses of electricity contributed significantly to the entrenchment of the 
mineral economy in the mid-Atlantic.  While the region already had a mature industrial 
base by the turn of the twentieth century, electricity reinforced the central place of 
manufacturing by providing a safe and flexible form of energy that could be used to 
rearrange production processes and increase output.  It also gave rise to new industries 
such as aluminum refining.  Abundant aluminum, in turn, was a critical input for other 
emerging industries such as airplane manufacture.  New companies were established to 
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manufacture electrical equipment including streetcars, motors, and domestic 
appliances.  Finally, the fact that electricity could power smaller motors supported the 
growth of small-shop industries like the ready-made clothing industry.
49
  Whereas coal 
and steam engines had encouraged large industrial enterprises, electricity made it much 
easier for smaller enterprises to consumer mineral power sources.   
 The use of electricity by the region’s industries was characteristic of the mineral 
economy.  Once factories started using electricity, their operators almost always 
increased their consumption.  In just thirty years, industries increased their use of 
electricity more than fifty-fold (Table 6.1).  In addition, electricity could be added 
without making other sacrifices—many factories still used coal and fuel oil for power as 
well.   Industrial electrification further committed the mid-Atlantic to a development path 
requiring ever-increasing supplies of fossil fuel energy to maintain.   
 
Domestic Appliances 
 Electrical appliances in the home consumed a small but growing percentage of 
overall electrical use between 1900 and 1930.  The importance of domestic appliances, 
similar to the use of petroleum for making lubricants, went beyond the absolute amount 
of electricity they consumed.  The electricity used in homes during this period was 
relatively minor to begin with, reaching a peak of 7 percent in 1927, and lighting 
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absorbed a significant amount of this total consumption.  However, the expanding use 
of domestic appliances, particularly during the 1920s, created new patterns of energy 
consumption that accelerated the transition to the mineral economy.   
The adoption of domestic appliances occurred at a far slower rate than the use of 
electricity for lighting, street railways, and industrial power.  In part, this reflected the 
gradual electrification of American homes during this period.  Only 8 percent of 
American homes were electrified in 1907.  This increased to 35 percent of homes by 
1920 and 68 percent by 1930.
50
  The mid-Atlantic was not necessarily better off than the 
rest of the country in this regard: there were over 2,000,000 people living in the area 
served by the Philadelphia Electric Company in 1919 but only 102,464 were customers, 
an adoption rate of roughly 35 percent.
51
  In addition, even when homes had electricity, 
the wires were often poorly insulated and incapable of handling a significant load.  
Power-intensive devices like washing machines and refrigerators required home owners 
to improve their wiring infrastructure.
52
  Only small devices such as lamps or irons could 
be plugged into the average residence.  Finally, the low levels of home electrification and 
limited wiring discouraged manufacturers from investing heavily in the mass production 
of domestic appliances for much of this period.  As a result, these technologies were 
often expensive.   
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 A 1921 survey of 1,300 Philadelphia homes reveals the slow adoption rate for 
domestic appliances.  The National Electric Light Association, an industry trade group, 
found that the average home only had an iron and a vacuum cleaner.  Even in the richest 
homes, other appliances were rare.  Only a third had an electric washing machine or fan 
and almost none had electric ranges, refrigerators, or radios.
53
  In the same year, it was 
estimated that there were a grand total of 565 refrigerators installed in New York, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston, combined.
54
    
 During the next couple decades, however, the use of domestic appliances 
increased dramatically.  In 1922, 34.3 percent of electrified households had electric 
washing machines and in 1929 the number reached 38.4 percent.
55
  Between 1922 and 
1927, the Philadelphia Electric Company sold about $9,000,000 of appliances, about 40 
percent of total sales in the Philadelphia area.  Consumers purchased 95,761 irons, 54,047 
vacuum cleaners, 21,289 washing machines, 2,377 sewing machines, and 566 
refrigerators.
56
  By 1935, the adoption of irons was nearly universal, while about half of 
American households had vacuum cleaners, washing machines, toasters, and clocks.  
Roughly a third of Americans had refrigerators and percolators, and many owned waffle 
irons, ranges, hot plates, and heaters.
57
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 Domestic appliances consumed about 3 to 4 percent of the nation’s total 
electrical consumption, and about half of the electricity consumed in homes, by 1930.  
Despite this relatively modest number, the beginnings of the widespread adoption of 
domestic appliances during this period would have significant consequences for the 
future.  As people adopted more and more appliances, it significantly increased their 
demand for electricity.  When homes only had lights and an iron, their monthly demand 
was around 30 kwh per month.  Adding a radio usually added another 10 kwh per month, 
a refrigerator more than 22 kwh, while a cooking range could consume 123 kwh and a 
water heater as much as 334 kwh per month.
58
  As domestic appliances became more 
widespread, homes soon became significant sites of electrical consumption.  In 1919, the 
average Baltimore residential consumer used 391 kwh of electricity per year, but this 
increased to 635 kwh in 1930 and 902 kwh by 1937.
59
  In Philadelphia, the average home 
in 1930 consumed 500 kwh per year.  By 1960, domestic electrical consumption had 
skyrocketed to 3,300 kwh per year.
60
   
 The real explosion in use of domestic appliances came during the 1930s, and as 
Ronald Tobey has argued, was the result of New Deal policies rather than the invisible 
hand of the market.  One of Roosevelt’s major platforms was a belief that electrification 
was linked to social progress and that it was the role of government to increase its 
availability to those who did not have service from private utilities.  He implemented 
several programs that helped increase the percentage of Americans with electric service 
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and appliances from 20 percent to 80 percent.  Most of these programs, such as Title I 
of the National Housing Act provided cheap financing that allowed homeowners to 
obtain credit for installing wires and purchasing appliances.
61
  After seeing the success of 
these government programs, Tobey argues that utilities began to see the value of offering 
consumers credit and began implementing similar programs themselves.
62
   
Domestic appliances had significant consequences for home life.  Billed as labor-
saving devices, home economists and other experts hoped these technologies would free 
women from the drudgery of the home.  As the historian Ruth Schwartz Cowan has 
shown, these utopian dreams were never achieved.  Refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, and 
washing machines changed the type of work that middle-class housewives performed, 
and even increased their productivity, but they did not reduce the amount of time spent 
tending the home.  Instead, these new appliances replaced domestic servants for middle-
class women, leaving housewives in charge of tasks that previously occupied several 
workers.  The nature of housework had changed, but it had not disappeared.
63
    
 The intensive use of electricity in the home represented an important shift into the 
mineral economy.  Energy had always been part of home life, whether for cooking, 
chores, or even the manufacture of goods under the putting-out system.  Over the course 
of the nineteenth century, fossil fuels had come to replace organic energy sources for 
much of the mid-Atlantic’s heating, cooking, and lighting needs.  However, almost all the 
labor in the home required the power of human muscles before the introduction of 
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electric appliances.  The adoption of irons, vacuums, washers, stoves, sewing 
machines, and other appliances marked the first time that mineral sources of energy were 
used to provide mechanical power in the home.  And characteristic of the mineral 
economy, consumption of electricity in the home increased dramatically over the course 
of the twentieth century.  By 1950, residential consumption had increased to 25 percent 
of the nation’s electrical use and by 1986, as much electricity was being used in the home 
as in industries.
64
    
 This shift was amplified by the use of electricity in leisure activities.  In an 
organic economy, where labor was typically the product of one’s own muscles, leisure 
was often characterized by the absence of energy expenditure.
65
  The application of 
electricity to radios, movie projectors, phonographs, and even amusement parks changed 
this logic.  The use of mechanical energy did not require personal exertion and therefore 
encouraged the development of leisure technologies.  Like domestic appliances, 
technologies such as radios significantly expanded how and where mid-Atlantic residents 
used fossil fuel energy.  Electricity helped extend the mineral economy into home and 
leisure life as well as industrial practices.   
 
 
 Collectively, the consumption of electricity in all domains by mid-Atlantic 
residents broke the organic economy’s relationships between land and energy.  For 
example, in 1927, Pennsylvania produced 11,870 million kwh of electricity—more than 
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10 percent of the nation’s total.
66
  Over 85 percent of this energy (about 10,250 
million kwh) was generated by burning fossil fuels.
67
  To replace this energy with 
firewood would have required a dedicated land area of 7,917,000 acres or 12,317 square 
miles, over a quarter of Pennsylvania’s land mass.
68
  Moreover, Pennsylvanians had 
already tapped many of the state’s most promising hydroelectric sites and there was little 
technology in place to transform other forms of solar energy into electricity.  There were 
no other organic sources of energy capable of meeting Pennsylvania’s recently acquired 
energy needs.   
 While it would have been possible to set aside land for trees that would be burnt 
to produce electricity, it would have required Pennsylvanians to face trade-offs 
characteristic of the organic economy.  Electricity was only 11.5 percent, or less than 
one-eighth, of the nation’s total energy supply in 1929.
69
  Electricity replaced some uses 
of energy, such as when electric lights eclipsed kerosene or electric motors were 
substituted for steam engines in manufacturing, but it only made a small dent in other 
categories such as heating, cooking, and railroad transportation.
70
  In other words, 
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Pennsylvania’s electrical consumption would have required more than a quarter of its 
land area—along with its best water-power sites—but provided less than an eighth of the 
total energy supply.
71
  This was impossible in an organic economy.  By 1930, the use of 
electricity in Pennsylvania had pushed the state further into the mineral economy.     
 
Conclusions 
Winners and Losers 
 Electricity produced a number of costs and benefits for mid-Atlantic residents but 
these were not distributed equally.  Similar to the energy landscapes of coal and oil, city 
residents enjoyed the majority of benefits while those in rural areas experienced the bulk 
of the costs, mostly in the form of environmental degradation.   
City residents benefited the most from electrification.  All the major classes of 
electric consumption—lighting, street railways, industrial power, and domestic 
appliances—were commonly used by urbanites.  It was typical for a city resident in the 
late 1920s to wake up, turn on a light, ride a streetcar to work, use an electrically driven 
machine at work, and listen to a radio at night.  Given the wide variety of uses of 
electricity in cities, it is no surprise that consumption was highest in urban locations.  For 
example, in 1917, people living in cities with more than 200,000 residents consumed 59.1 
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percent of the energy used in lighting and 52.0 percent of the energy used for power 
that was sold by utilities while representing only 30 percent of the population.
72
 
The electrification of urban transport, in turn, promoted the development of 
suburban living.  On the whole, those living in suburbs experienced most of the effects of 
electrification in a manner that was similar to those in the city core.  Because suburbs 
were generally created along the paths of electric railway companies, most suburbanites 
had easy access to electrical service for home lighting and personal transport.  Because 
services like commercial laundries were less often available in suburbs than in the city 
core, suburban residents were more likely to use domestic appliances such as electric 
washing machines.
73
  By contrast, because there were fewer industries in the suburbs, 
much less electricity was used for manufacturing in these locations.   
Within cities and suburbs, socio-economic divisions structured the allocation of 
benefits.  Middle-class residents may have derived the greatest benefits from 
electrification.  This group was most likely to use streetcars to move to the suburbs and 
escape the congestion and pollution of the urban core.  In addition, middle-class residents 
relied more heavily on domestic appliances than the wealthy who had greater access to 
servants or the poor who could not afford them.  The electrification of the factory may 
have benefited all by providing better light and a quieter and safer place to work, but 
most of the financial benefits were returned to the wealthy managers and stockholders.  
Lower-class residents saw few benefits from electrification.  In fact, by being stranded in 
the urban core without middle-class residents to share the tax burden and help advocate 
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for improved city services, electrification may have left many lower-class urbanites 
worse off.    
Electricity outside of cities and suburbs, by contrast, was a rarity before the New 
Deal programs of the 1930s.  In 1925, for example, less than 12 percent of Pennsylvania 
farms had access to electricity.
74
  Even when electricity was available on the farm, it did 
not make a big impact on agricultural practices.  Except for the widespread use of 
electricity for irrigation in the western United States, farmers rarely chose to electrify 
their operations.  Although investors developed electric machines for hoisting hay, 
grinding feed, sharpening tools, or incubating eggs, these were not commonly used.  
Even in the rare cases when transmission wires reached farms, most rural residents chose 
to use electricity for lighting and domestic appliances rather than agricultural production.  
The first purchases usually mirrored what city dwellers bought: lights, irons, and radios.
75
  
When farmers chose to invest in energy technology, gasoline-powered vehicles were a 
much more common choice.  Given that it was estimated that 50 percent of farm work 
was in the fields (mostly plowing) and 22 percent was for hauling, vehicles were a more 
compelling choice for most farmers.
76
  Thus, electrification may have made life on the 
farm a little more comfortable but it did little to revolutionize agricultural practices 
during this time period.   
Rural residents benefited the least from electrification and also paid many of the 
environmental costs.  For example, the development of the Holtwood Dam ruined the 
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local fishing industry.  The extraction of coal, which provided most of the region’s 
electricity, contributed to the environmental degradation of the anthracite and bituminous 
coal regions.  For cities, the environmental record was more mixed.  Although urban 
generating stations emitted a fair amount of smoke, they replaced the need for many 
organizations to operate their own steam engines.  Therefore, urban generating stations 
may have lowered the overall amount of smoke pollution in cities.   
   In the end, the distribution of costs and benefits of coal, oil, and electricity 
showed remarkable similarities.  The transport of cheap and abundant energy to cities 
provided urban residents with access to cheap and abundant heat, power, and light 
thereby creating opportunities for wealth, industrial growth, and labor saving devices.  
Rural residents rarely had comparable access to mineral energy sources.  Moreover, those 
living in the rural sites of energy production typically faced most of the environmental 
costs while receiving relatively few of the benefits.  Electrification reflected and 
reinforced these unequal distributions of costs and benefits of the mid-Atlantic’s mineral 
energy practices.  
 
Creating Dependence 
 The transport and consumption of electricity contributed to the mid-Atlantic’s 
dependence on fossil fuel energy.  When it was first introduced, homeowners, store 
managers, and factory operators could choose whether or not they wanted to adopt 
electricity for heat, light, and power.  By 1930, however, powerful structural forces made 
it difficult for people to live without electricity.  Factories, stores, urban transport 
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systems, and homes all needed continually increasing supplies of electricity to 
maintain their operations.   
 In the factory, electricity provided a myriad of benefits that ensured its ongoing 
consumption for manufacturing purposes.  First, electricity was an efficient form of 
power that lowered costs because motors could be started and stopped quickly, versus 
steam engines that needed to be operated continually.  Second, the fact that electricity 
could be delivered to small motors throughout the factory floor gave rise to new 
manufacturing processes such as assembly lines that further cut costs and increased 
output.  Finally, a whole host of industries were predicated on the use of electricity.  
Manufacturers of metals such as aluminum and ferro-silicon required huge inputs of 
electricity.  In addition, many smaller enterprises found that electric motors in devices 
such as sewing machines and power tools provided a form of energy that was much more 
practical than large steam engines.   
 In the context of a profit-seeking economy, the idea of abandoning the benefits of 
electric power for industrial purposes is difficult to imagine.  Such a decision would have 
put most enterprises at a significant economic disadvantage vis-à-vis their competitors.  
For industries that could not effectively use alternative energy sources—like aluminum 
refining—it would have meant going out of business.  Using electricity did not guarantee 
a firm’s success, but its absence in most industries would have been an economic 
liability.
77
  Not only would it have been illogical for factory operators to abandon 
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 There is not a direct connection between electrification and profitability, but the two were related 
processes.  The fact that only 5% of motors were powered by electricity in 1899 and more than 80% were 
in 1930 indicates that electrification offered clear economic benefits.  Moreover, this period saw a steady 
increase in the application of mechanical power.  In 1899, there was 2.14 horsepower installed per worker 
in manufacturing establishments, and only .1 hp of this was electric.  By 1925, there was 4.26 hp per 
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electricity, it would have been illegal.  Corporate boards were required to maximize 
shareholder value, preventing them from making such a decision if it would hurt the 
company’s economic prospects.  Overwhelming economic and legal pressures, therefore, 
provided powerful incentives for manufacturers to continue using electrical power.   
 The same logic shaped the choices of store owners.  Electric lighting was an 
important part of advertising and technologies such as elevators and fans made stores 
more desirable places to shop.  Electricity, therefore, could provide an enterprise with a 
competitive advantage.  Once one store began to use electricity, competitive dynamics 
provided steady pressure for other store owners to use electricity lest they get left behind.   
 Streetcars provide another clear example of the ways that mid-Atlantic residents 
became dependent on electricity to maintain their way of life.  Electric streetcars made 
suburban living practical for large numbers of people.  Once people moved to the 
suburbs, they no longer necessarily lived within a couple miles of work locations and 
stores.  For many suburban residents, it was impractical to use their muscles for everyday 
transport needs.  Instead, they became dependent on mineral sources of energy for daily 
travel to and from home, work, and stores.  At first, electric streetcars provided this 
service, although automobiles became the preferred mode of personal transport beginning 
in earnest in the 1920s and 1930s.   
Many hoped that suburban living would lead to a revitalization of republicanism, 
typified by the independent farmer.  However, suburban living was anything but 
independent.  Once in suburbs, people required mineral energy sources for daily 
                                                                                                                                            
worker and 3.12 hp was electrified. Schurr and Netschert, Energy in the American Economy, 1850-1975: 
An Economic Study of Its History and Prospects, 187; National Electric Light Association, The Electric 
Light and Power Industry in the United States, 87. 
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transport.  Moreover, they also came to depend on electrical appliances in the home to 
supplement services that were no longer available.  For example, those living in the urban 
core could send clothes to commercial laundries, but in the suburbs it was much more 
common to use electric washing machines in the home.  In addition, because suburban 
houses tended to be larger and were less often attached to other buildings, they required 
more energy to heat (and later cool, when air conditioning became common).  As a result, 
suburban homes perpetuated a lifestyle requiring significant amounts of fossil fuel energy 
to maintain.   
In the home, electricity helped give rise to new social and cultural practices that 
encouraged continually increasing energy consumption.  The small motors in domestic 
appliances made it practical for people to use fossil fuels for tasks requiring mechanical 
energy such as cleaning.  A similar shift occurred in leisure practices.  Beginning with the 
amusement parks at the end of streetcar lines and continuing with the development of 
movie projectors and radios, entertainment increasingly involved the use of fossil fuel 
energy.  In other words, using more electricity in the home was linked to saving one’s 
own labor, if not time, enjoying a greater range of leisure opportunities and a higher 
standard of living.  Relinquishing these benefits would have made little sense to most 
homeowners.  Actual events reflect the logic of ever-increasing consumption—home 
residents in Philadelphia increased their consumption of electricity more than six-fold 
between 1930 and 1960.
78
 
By 1930, a typical mid-Atlantic resident living in an urban or suburban area was 
likely to consume fossil fuel energy working, traveling, maintaining a household, and 
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relaxing.  For those living in mid-Atlantic cities, there were almost no remaining 
vestiges of the organic economy constraining their actions.  Cheap and abundant 
electricity, transmitted to homes, stores, and factories, had become a necessary part of 
life.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
By 1930, the mid-Atlantic had developed a full-fledged mineral economy.  Fossil 
fuels provided the large majority of the region’s energy needs, not organic sources like 
muscles and wood.  Canals, pipelines, and wires had transformed urban locations, which 
had been energy-scarce in an organic economy, into sites of energy super-abundance.  A 
rural and commercial society a century before, the mid-Atlantic was now an urban and 
industrial superpower.  The negative feedback loops of the organic economy had given 
way to synergistic relationships between fossil fuels and continual economic growth.   
 The creation of new energy landscapes structured how, when, and where these 
changes happened.  Without canals, pipelines, or wires, the development of an energy-
intensive society would have required people to move to the anthracite regions, the oil 
regions, or the banks of rivers like the Susquehanna.  Such a development path was 
theoretically possible.  Pittsburgh, for example, developed as an important industrial 
setting based largely on the cheap and easy availability of bituminous coal and river 
transport.  However, while Pittsburgh was connected to mid-Western and southern 
markets via the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, most of the areas where anthracite coal, 
petroleum, and hydroelectric power could be found lacked comparable transport 
facilities.
1
  These locations offered abundant energy, but little else.  It is not clear that 
these rural regions could support have supported the patterns of synergistic growth 
between among residents, workers, and markets that characterized the growth of New 
York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore between 1820 and 1930.        
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 As discussed in Chapter 5, transportation along the Susquehanna River was severely limited by the heavy 
falls along the river’s last 35 miles.   
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As we know, canals, pipelines, and wires were built, resulting in the particular 
development patterns described throughout this work.  By transporting coal, oil, and 
electricity long distances, these energy landscapes created one of the most salient features 
of the contemporary world: the geographic separation of energy production from its 
consumption.  Americans are so accustomed to cheap and abundant fossil fuel energy 
available at almost any time and place that we forget this is neither a natural nor 
inevitable feature of the world.  The need for energy, however, is not just an ideology or 
assumption; it is literally a concrete fact of our living patterns.  The nation’s built 
environment—large homes in the suburbs, an extensive road and highway system, 
sprawling cities—can only function with energy inputs from far away.  The energy 
landscapes of the mineral economy are as important today as they were in the mid-
Atlantic between 1820 and 1930.    
 
Reflections on Coal Canals, Oil Pipelines, and Electricity Transmission Wires 
 Looking back on the history of canals, pipelines, and wires in the mid-Atlantic, 
we can discern several patterns.  First, there were differences within each class of 
technologies, based on who owned them, how they were operated, and where they were 
built.  While they all contributed to the development of a mineral economy in the mid-
Atlantic, their effects were not linear, nor were the benefits and costs distributed equally.  
For example, the transmission wires from the Holtwood dam transported cheap energy to 
Baltimore but not to Philadelphia, thereby supporting the former city’s industrial growth.  
Standard Oil used its control over transport infrastructure to achieve a near-monopoly 
position in the petroleum industry thereby funneling large amounts of profit into the 
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hands of a very small group of investors.  The Schuylkill Navigation Company lacked 
corporate privileges to mine coal as well as to ship it, thereby leading to a different 
pattern of development in the Schuylkill Valley than the Lehigh or Wyoming coal 
regions.   
Moreover, the social impacts of canals, pipelines, and wires could change after 
they were built.  When the Tide-Water Company reached an agreement to operate 
cooperatively with Standard Oil, the ramifications of the pipeline shifted.  It still shipped 
oil from western Pennsylvania towards the east coast, but the pipeline was no longer part 
of an attack on Standard Oil’s monopoly.  The pipeline ceased to be a radical technology 
capable of altering the industry structure.  Instead, it became a conservative investment 
preserving the power of a limited group.  Thus, the ownership and operation of these 
technologies mattered as much as their physical capabilities. 
 There were also differences between these classes of technologies.  Infrastructure 
systems can be distributive (where there is a one-way flow outwards from a central point 
towards many endpoints), accumulative (where the flow is one-way from many points 
towards a central location), and communicative (where flow can happen in many 
directions and along many points).  Electricity, water, and radio are examples of 
distributive systems, sewage and garbage collection are accumulative systems, and 
telephone wires and highways are communicative systems.
2
  Canals best fit the model of 
communicative technologies, as they permit the flow of many goods in two directions.  
Pipelines and wires are both distributive systems, although there were important 
technological differences between the two.  Electricity transmission wires offered a much 
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greater potential for a two-way flow of power and to provide service to places along 
the path of the wire.
3
  Pipelines, by contrast, have a unidirectional flow and rarely deliver 
oil to places along their path.
4
   
These technical features of energy landscapes structured regional development.  
For example, canals supported a thriving iron trade along their paths because they 
facilitated the cheap transport of raw materials to forges and finished products to markets.  
Electricity transmission wires allowed for a similar possibility, as potential users along 
the paths of wires could access the wire through a small substation that transformed the 
electricity to a safe voltage.  However, even though some transmission wires operated 
this way, particularly in California, this does not seem to have been a common practice in 
the mid-Atlantic.
5
  Therefore, electricity transmission wires in the mid-Atlantic do not 
seem to have greatly benefited those living along their paths.  The same is true for oil 
pipelines; I have seen no evidence that significant quantities of oil were delivered 
anywhere along the line, and it is likely that these technologies did not stimulate the 
growth of the regions between their endpoints. 
State and federal governments played important, although not primary, roles in 
the development of energy transport infrastructure.  Most of the capital came from private 
investors—the Pennsylvania State canal system is the one exception—but government 
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 Many transmission wires were built with the explicit intention of sharing electricity between utilities 
when their peak loads occurred at different times.  This was also true for the wires between the Holtwood 
Dam and Baltimore.  While most of the electricity went from Holtwood to Baltimore, the steam stations in 
Baltimore sent power to Holtwood at times of low river flow.   
4
 Reversing the flow of oil along a pipeline required building new pumping stations, a significant capital 
investment.  In practice, I have found no evidence that this ever occurred during the time period of this 
study.   
5
 This was much more common in California, where farmers in the central regions of the state were able to 
get electricity to use in irrigation from the transmission wires connecting the hydroelectric dams in the 
Sierra Nevada Mountains with San Francisco and Los Angeles.  Nye, Electrifying America: Social 
Meanings of a New Technology, 1880-1940, 292-93. 
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decisions structured the development of these technologies and their operations.  
Land rights were particularly important for developers of infrastructure.  By granting the 
rights to develop the Lehigh River to Josiah White and Erskine Hazard, the Pennsylvania 
Legislature facilitated the development of the Lehigh Canal.  By refusing to grant 
eminent domain privileges to oil pipelines until after the completion of the Standard Oil 
network, the same body made it more difficult for entrepreneurs to develop pipelines.  
Electricity companies also sought, but failed, to receive eminent domain privileges for 
transmission lines during the 1910s.   
The role of government was by no means limited to land rights, however.  
Government agencies encouraged energy consumption by sponsoring experiments with 
new energy sources (such as the Navy’s testing of petroleum as a fuel oil in 1862) or 
facilitating the development of more efficient networks (by funding the Superpower 
Survey in 1919).  They gave energy organizations special privileges that made it easier to 
acquire capital or enter the trade (such as corporate privileges for iron forges using 
anthracite coal in Pennsylvania).  At various times the federal government protected 
domestic energy industries by raising tariffs on imported energy sources.  And while 
regulation was heavily resisted by many energy companies, it was associated with a 
number of privileges such as monopoly rights for electric utilities.  Collectively, the 
myriad decisions of government agencies facilitated the development and dispersion of 
new energy practices.   
Another pattern that emerges from this study is that the first efforts to implement 
transport infrastructure usually ended up being financial failures.  By Josiah White’s 
count, there were at least seven different acts passed to improve the Lehigh River before 
 371 
his company succeeded.  The Tide-Water pipeline was completed only after other 
efforts such as the Pennsylvania Transportation Company’s proposed line to Baltimore 
and Benson’s efforts with the Seaboard Pipe Company came to naught.  The men who 
financed 80 percent of the construction of the Holtwood Dam lost their equity stakes 
when the company collapsed in the Panic of 1907.  The first actors, therefore, usually 
failed.  This pattern suggests a lesson relevant to the present day: we should not see it as a 
sign of failure if early attempts to create renewable energy systems do not succeed.  Early 
failures with fossil fuel energy ended up laying crucial groundwork for the success of 
organizations that rose up from the ashes.  
Finally, in the mid-Atlantic, energy supply led demand, not vice versa.  While the 
adoption of coal in Britain was largely driven by a scarcity of other energy sources, this 
was not the case in America.  The boosters associated with each energy source needed to 
convince customers to adopt new energy practices, learn new techniques of harnessing 
power, and change traditional ways of doing things.  In many cases, this was an easy 
argument to make.  Anthracite coal could keep a house warmer for less money.  Kerosene 
offered better light at a cheaper cost.  Electricity gave factory owners more flexible over 
work-space design.  However, most of the time there was not a pent-up demand that 
fossil fuel energy satisfied.  Instead, people had to be shown and convinced that the new 
practices made sense.  Supply was the main driver, not demand.   
 
The Logic of Intensification—Energy as Labor versus Energy as Commodity  
 It would be a mistake, however, to focus entirely on the differences between 
canals, pipelines, and wires.  When seen in historical hindsight, their similarities are 
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ultimately more significant.  Collectively, the most important consequence of 
building energy transport infrastructure in the mid-Atlantic between 1820 and 1930 was 
to set in motion a pattern of intensified fossil fuel consumption.  Canals, pipelines, and 
wires made it possible and easy for residents of the mid-Atlantic to use massive amounts 
of fossil fuel energy.  By doing so, they contributed to a crucial shift from a system where 
it was logical to conserve energy to one where it made sense to consume ever-increasing 
supplies of fossil fuels.  Simply put, energy landscapes gave rise to a logic of 
intensification.   
In an organic economy, the default behavior is to be conservative in one’s use of 
energy.  This behavior is driven by the fact that the muscles of humans and animals 
supply most energy in this system.  As a result, using energy requires personal exertion.  
In most organic societies, the vast majority of the society’s heat energy comes from 
firewood, which requires considerable labor to chop, split, stack, and haul—as much as a 
third of a man’s working hours.
6
  Even the use of animals requires human effort to direct 
the labor and to feed, clean, and house them.  In other words, energy is largely 
synonymous with personal labor.  When one’s own sweat is involved, there is a 
significant incentive to limit one’s needs for energy or to discover shortcuts.  This is why 
people living in organic economies tend to congregate in places where easy energy is 
available or there are ways to avoid energy expenditure, such as the banks of rivers that 
dramatically lower the labor of transporting goods to market and provide a power source.  
Moreover, there are finite limits to the expansion of available energy in an organic 
economy.  There are only so many acres of forest, streams with falling water, and land 
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for grazing.  Once the available resources are being utilized, their output cannot be 
expanded, thereby encouraging people to do more with less.   
 By transforming the built environment of the mid-Atlantic so that it was simple 
and cheap to transport fossil fuel energy from remote regions to urban centers of 
consumption, canals, pipelines, and wires reversed the logic of the organic economy.  
The widespread use of coal, oil, and electricity broke the links between energy and the 
exertion of one’s own muscles.  Instead of energy being synonymous with labor, it was 
transformed into a commodity product.  This led to a new calculus of decision-making—
one that would appear absurd from the perspective of an organic economy.
7
  Cost and 
availability became the primary factors influencing how much energy was consumed.  
Instead of finite limits to energy growth, canals, pipelines, and wires ensured that fossil 
fuels got simultaneously cheaper and more abundant as their use increased.  From this 
new perspective, using ever-increasing amounts of energy became a socially logical 
behavior.   
This shift can be seen in the difference between the parable of the pin-makers in 
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and the industrial logic of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.  Smith’s pin-makers—in an organic economy—increased their profits 
through division of labor and the adoption of more efficient processes, thereby saving the 
application of energy.  In other words, shortcuts that were more efficient led to economic 
success.  By contrast, the economic growth that was most characteristic of 
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industrialization was based on the substitution of fossil fuels for other production 
inputs like labor or capital.  The great enterprises of industrialization, such as railroads 
and iron foundries, required massive amounts of energy for heat and power.  When ever-
increasing supplies of energy at continually decreasing costs were available, greater 
profitability arose from increasing the consumption of energy, not the reverse.   
The evidence that mid-Atlantic residents responded to this new logic by 
intensifying their consumption of fossil fuel energy is overwhelming and has been 
presented throughout this work.  Once people got a taste of the benefits of using coal, oil, 
and electricity, their appetites grew dramatically.  The energy landscapes of canals, 
pipelines, and wires were at the center of these changes.  By transporting energy cheaply 
and abundantly to markets, they initiated a synergistic cycle: canals, pipelines, and wires 
made new energy supplies available, thereby giving people the incentive to discover new 
applications.  Once boosters established new practices, demand for energy increased, 
necessitating the expansion of supply.  Steady expansions of transport infrastructure 
networks ensured that energy could be continually supplied in increasing amounts and at 
a decreasing cost.   
 It was not historically inevitable that new energy landscapes would lead to the 
intensification of fossil fuel consumption.  Nor were these changes purely the result of 
conscious human choices.  However, many factors made this outcome overwhelmingly 
likely.  Simply put, using fossil fuels offered so many benefits and came with so few 
noticeable costs that intensification was practically a foregone conclusion.  The presence 
of a profit-seeking economic system, inter- and intra-regional competition, boosters, and 
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thousands of individual decisions dramatically overwhelmed any possible objections.  
Let’s look at each of these in turn.   
 A profit-seeking economic system in the mid-Atlantic played a significant role in 
making increased fossil fuel consumption a socially logical behavior.
8
  First, it provided 
incentives for the owners of canals, pipelines, and wires to maximize their investments.  
All of these technologies were expensive and represented significant sunk costs.  In order 
to pay off bonds and attract additional investments, the companies managing transport 
infrastructure had powerful financial incentives to operate these technologies at their 
maximum capacity and expand their throughput.  Second, businesses with access to 
cheap fossil fuels found that substituting energy for labor or using large amounts of heat 
in manufacturing operations increased their profitability, thereby encouraging these 
organizations to use more.  Finally, the profit-seeking system fueled the rapid expansion 
of energy production by driving the speculative booms that were common practice in 
Pennsylvania’s coal and oil fields.   
Second, the mid-Atlantic did not operate in isolation.  There was intense 
economic competition intra- and inter-regionally.  Philadelphia, New York, and 
Baltimore fought with each other to control trade.  States competed to attract industries 
and the United States sought to outpace its European rivals.  Because energy was linked 
to economic growth, government agencies adopted policies encouraging the consumption 
of fossil fuels.  Pennsylvania adopted a law giving special corporate privileges to 
                                                
8
 Whether the economy of the mid-Atlantic was truly “capitalist” throughout this time period has been 
debated extensively.  Walter Licht argues that in the course of the nineteenth century, America passed 
“from a mercantile to an unregulated and then to a corporately and state-administered market society.”  For 
the purposes of my argument, it is less important whether the economic system was mercantile, market-
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companies manufacturing iron with anthracite in the 1840s, New York and Maryland 
passed free pipeline bills before Pennsylvania (because it would encourage the flow of oil 
to their states), and the United States government gave financial support for the 
Superpower survey in the 1920s because of concerns over the electrical supply during 
World War I.  Competitive dynamics propelled the coal, oil, and electricity industries 
forward.   
 Boosters were a third force driving the adoption of new energy supplies.  Before 
coal, oil, and electricity could be used in homes and factories, consumers had to be taught 
how to use new energy sources and be convinced of their value.  Boosters developed new 
applications and introduced people to their use.  The officers of the transport companies 
were important boosters in the mid-Atlantic and were joined by scientists, inventors, 
politicians, capitalists, and trade organizations.  Boosters had complex motives.  Some 
were driven by pursuit of profit, others by intellectual curiosity, and many by regional 
pride.  Collectively, their efforts were crucial to creating markets for new energy 
supplies.  
 The development of a mineral economy could not have happened without the 
aggregation of thousands of individual decisions.  Business owners had to make choices 
about where to site their factories and what types of power to use.  Homeowners had to 
decide how to heat and light their homes and whether they would move to the suburbs.  
While individuals with free choice and autonomy made these decisions, their options 
were heavily structured by the region’s energy landscapes.  It made sense to establish an 
energy-intensive factory in a city only if there was sufficient power available.  One could 
not heat a home with coal if canals were not bringing thousands of tons to urban cores.  It 
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was not practical to move to the suburbs if an electric streetcar network would not 
make it convenient to get to work.  Individuals made these choices, but did so in the 
context of a society designed for them to use fossil fuels.   
 There was little to counter these powerful forces encouraging the growth of fossil 
fuel consumption.  The benefits of mineral energy sources—increased economic output, 
warmer homes, better light, increased ability to travel, more abundant and cheaper 
goods—overwhelmed the costs as long as energy was cheap and abundant.  The 
environmental costs of energy production were the most obvious negative result of new 
energy practices during this era.  However, canals, pipelines, and wires physically 
separated consumers from these effects.  Most of the environmental degradation occurred 
at distant sites of production.  The anthracite coalfields and oil regions sustained 
extensive environmental damage through strip mining, loss of forest cover, spilled 
petroleum, and the release of toxins brought to the surface during mining operations.  
Damming the Susquehanna River ruined the local fishing industry.  Urban consumers of 
energy, by contrast, experienced fewer harms.  Anthracite coal burned relatively cleanly, 
a kerosene lamp produced less soot than a candle, and electricity released no pollution at 
the site of consumption.   In other words, transport infrastructure rendered the worst 
social costs invisible to the main consumers.    
 The only other constraint of significance during this period was the persistent 
appeal of republicanism as a social ideal.
9
  Particularly during the antebellum era, the 
drive for an urban and industrialized nation promoted by certain boosters was partially 
countered by believers in the Jeffersonian ideal of the self-sufficient farmer.  By 
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advocating moderated growth and a rural ideal, republicans were linked much more 
closely with an organic economy than a mineral one.  Even as late as the 1920s and 
1930s, Gifford Pinchot and Franklin Roosevelt sought to use rural electrification to 
revive the appeal of life in the countryside.  However, while it is possible that 
republicanism tempered the speed at which a mineral economy developed in the mid-
Atlantic, it ultimately failed to halt its development.  The many immediate advantages of 
using fossil fuel energy proved too great for any serious challenges to the spread of these 
practices.   
 In the end, the establishment of a social and economic logic favoring continual 
intensification was one of the most significant historical patterns to emerge from the 
construction of new energy landscapes.  While this was a multifaceted process involving 
a wide variety of actors, forces, and decisions, coal canals, oil pipelines, and electricity 
transmission wires were the material drivers of these new practices.  Without these 
technologies, the development path of the American mid-Atlantic would have looked 
profoundly different.    
 
Whither the Mineral Economy? 
Over the past several decades we have only deepened our dependence on mineral 
energy sources.  However, two consequences of the mineral economy are becoming 
remarkably clear.  First, it cannot last forever.
 
 While we do not know exactly how much 
carbon we have left to burn, we know that fossil fuel stocks are not infinite.
10
  At some 
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point in the future—be it in a few decades or a century or more—we will run out of 
cheap and abundant fossil fuel energy.  The era of the mineral economy will end sooner 
or later.  Second, overwhelming scientific evidence suggests that if we actually use our 
remaining fossil fuels, we will create climate changes that are not conducive to sustaining 
human life.  We are now in a position where we simultaneously have too much and too 
little fossil fuel energy.   
So, what comes next?  A review of the history of energy landscapes in the mid-
Atlantic suggests at least three lessons.  First, we need to prepare for the end of the 
mineral economy.  We cannot continue forever to derive our energy supplies from stocks 
stored over millions of years.  Instead, we need to return to a system where we obtain our 
energy from capturing solar flows.  In other words, we need to think once again about 
some of the features of the organic economy.  In particular, we need to adjust our energy 
consumption patterns to our technological abilities to extract useful energy from solar 
flows and come to terms with the limits of organic energy sources.   
In the last two hundred years, we have developed more sophisticated ways of 
capturing solar energy, such as hydroelectric facilities like the Holtwood Dam, arrays of 
wind turbines, or solar farms of photovoltaic cells.  Biotechnology research into biomass 
growth and even growing fuel from ocean algae offer the potential to increase our supply 
of useful energy.  However, all of these energy systems still face certain limits 
characteristic of the organic economy.  There are only so many streams to provide 
hydroelectric power and both sunlight and wind vary in space and time.
11
  Gains in 
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biotechnology still require the allocation of land area, creating potential conflicts 
about whether land should be used for energy versus food production.   
What are the implications of shifting to organic energy sources?  First, it means 
we need to think more carefully about the relationships between population and energy.  
If we need to use landmass to provide energy this will decrease the number of humans 
that the land can support.  We will need to make decisions about whether to support small 
populations with relatively large supplies of energy or large populations with smaller 
supplies.  In other words, there may need to be trade-offs between total energy supply 
and population.  Malthus could rear his head once again.    
Second, we need to shift the social logic of energy consumption.  Despite the 
clear dangers of global warming and inevitability of fossil fuel depletion, the social logic 
of intensive fossil fuel consumption has not changed.  Energy consumption is still linked 
with economic growth, labor-saving production, and a more comfortable existence.  
Fossil fuels remain cheap and abundant, and the environmental consequences of their 
production and consumption are treated as externalities.  Moreover, while intensive fossil 
fuel consumption was once largely restricted to America and Europe, the recent increases 
in nations like China and India greatly exacerbate the problems facing our planet.  Unless 
we address the structural conditions that make the benefits of fossil fuel consumption 
outweigh its costs for so many people, it makes little sense to expect billions of 
individuals to alter their fossil fuel consumption practices.   
There are several carrots and sticks we have available as a society to influence 
how people think about energy consumption.  On the carrot side, we can implement 
policies that favor the development of hybrid forms of renewable energy sources like the 
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Holtwood dam.   This will give people practical alternatives to consuming fossil fuel 
energy, making conversion much more feasible.  We can also use policy to build the true 
costs of fossil fuels into the market through mechanisms such as carbon caps.  This will 
increase the price of fossil fuels to consumers, having the twin effect of discouraging 
further consumption and making renewable energy sources more cost-competitive.  
Third, we can establish requirements for utilities to derive certain percentages of their 
energy from renewable sources.  Of course, people have been advocating such proposals 
for years with relatively little success.  Hopefully, increasing social awareness of the 
problems of our energy practices will give these proposals additional momentum in the 
coming years.    
Third, we should use infrastructure developments to initiate a transition to a 
system of sustainable and renewable energy supplies.  As I have shown throughout this 
work, the transition to a fossil-fuel intensive society was actively created by capitalists, 
boosters, and, of course, energy landscapes.  Canals, pipelines, and wires transformed the 
natural world to make coal, oil, and electricity cheap and abundant at sites far removed 
from their production.  In short, they made using fossil fuel energy easy.  Not 
surprisingly, people chose to use this energy and created a world that depended on its 
continued availability.  Homeowners purchased houses in the suburbs where they would 
need mechanical energy to get to work, businesses invested in capital equipment 
designed to consume power, and cities grew to support factories and residential 
populations that could not be fueled solely by the products of their hinterlands.  These 
developments required the continued availability of fossil fuel energy and resulted in the 
emergence of a fossil-fuel dependent society. 
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Now is the time to use infrastructure to privilege new energy supplies.  Just as 
most of the nation’s coal, oil, and hydroelectricity sites are located far away from 
consumption centers, so are many of the most promising wind and solar power sites.  We 
have the technical potential to derive large energy supplies from wind sites in the Great 
Plains or solar farms in the Southwest but lack mechanisms to transport the power to 
consumers.  Investing in new transmission wires could make the development of these 
sustainable resources practical. 
   
 Ultimately, the mineral economy will end, whether we plan carefully for this 
inevitability or bury our heads in the sand.  Planning requires hard work, some sacrifice, 
and changes in how we live.  On the other hand, it offers clear benefits in the potential for 
a sustainable energy system and the preservation of planetary resources that support 
human life, as well as the millions of other species that also occupy the earth.  Taking the 
path of least resistance is easier, but the crash will be much harder.  As I have shown 
throughout this work, the mineral economy was not inevitable; it was shaped by human 
efforts.  Those same efforts are now needed to create a more sustainable and planet-
friendly energy system capable of supporting human life for generations to come.   
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